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ABSTRACT 
This study, using the theoretical basis of the writings of Lenin and Gramsci 
on revolutionary theory and praxis, traces the formation , policy and aims, 
membership and structure, and practices of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) and selected affiliate organisations during the period 1983-1987. The 
central problem investigated is the relation between revolutionary theory and 
praxis and the aims, policies and practices of the UDF and its affiliates. 
More particularly, in what respects does the formation of the UDF and 
revolutionary developments thereafter meet the strategic and tactical 
requirements of Lenin and Gramsci's theories of revolutionary strategy? 
It is argued that the formation of the UDF, and revolutionary 
developments during the period of review, conformed to the strategic and 
tactical requirements of a Leninist-Gramscian model of revolutionary praxis in 
the following way: the general drive to establish mass-based community 
organisations (increasing the complexity of civil society by establishing mass 
organisations); the formation of the UDF in August 1983 (creating a historical 
bloc in opposition to the ruling bloc during the phase of democratic struggle); 
and the development and spread of a common national political culture based 
on resistance to apartheid (expanding the revolutionary consciousness of the 
masses). 
During the period under review, the UDF-Ied opposition to apartheid 
resulted in the organisational and ideological penetration of the Front into 
almost every major sector of black civil society. The major forces behind the 
increasing political and ideological leadership of the UDF were the affiliated 
civic associations, trade unions, student/youth and women 's organisations. 
These organisations played a central role in mass mobilisation and 
organisation and the spread of revolutionary consciousness throughout black 
civil society. 
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The banning of the South African black opposition - the African National 
Congress (AN C) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) - in 1960 and the 
repression of African trade unions thereafter discouraged most forms of 
African organisation during the 1960s. After they were banned, the ANC and 
the PAC adopted revolutionary strategies aiming at the radical transformation 
of South African society through, among other things, armed struggle. The 
subsequent clampdown on political organisations led to the arrest and 
imprisonment of some of their leaders, such as Nelson Mandela and Robert 
Sobukwe. The ANC and the PAC then established missions-in-exile, leaving 
an organisational vacuum in the country which was partly filled by the Black 
Consciousness Movement (BCM) during the 1970s. 
However, the 1976 Soweto revolt and state repression - arrests, detention, 
torture, trials, and deaths in detention - ultimately led to the destruction of 
the organisational base of the BCM. At the same time, from the late 1960s, 
there was a slow revival of African trade unions and the emergence of new 
unions. However, most of these unions confined themselves to economic 
struggles at the place of production and avoided political issues. The late 
1970s introduced a revival of black opposition as the popular class struggles 
evolved from the co-ordinated national mass struggles of the 1950s and early 
1960s to one of combined trade union struggles, student struggles and 
community struggles against apartheid.1 
Popular class struggles are define<;l as all those struggles which challenge the structure of racial 
and capitalist exploitation and domination. National mass struggles are defined as all those 
struggles which involve the masses on a national scale and which challenge the structure of 
apartheid and economic exploitation and political domination. 
2 
Popular struggles in the form of strikes and community-based protest 
developed into a combined assault on the system of domination and 
exploitation in South Africa. The formation of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) in August 1983 introduced a new challenge to white minority rule. This 
organisation provided a national "political form" to popular struggles and filled 
the institutional vacuum created by the banning of the ANC and the PAC. 
1.1. The Research Problem 
Mervyn Frost draws attention to the relationship between the practices of 
black opposition organisations, the UDF in particular, and the type of society 
which will emerge from these practices. 2 According to Frost, there were two 
major approaches to politics competing for dominance within the UDF. The 
first approach, a Leninist one, called for popular pressure to force the state 
to introduce democratic reforms or the seizure of state power by black 
opposition organisations in order to push through major political, economic 
and social reforms. This approach, according to Frost, leads to an 
authoritarian political culture and would result in replacing one autocratic state 
with another. The second approach, a Weberian one, called for the erosion 
of state power from below by a popular democratic movement and 
encouraged the development of a democratic political culture. 
Frost argues that the UDF initially used "only those methods of opposition" 
which encouraged a democratic political culture "and which resisted the 
democracy-killing centralization of a Leninist approach". This approach involved 
drawing together numerous community organisations in a front organisation 
which did not seek to overthrow the state directly. Instead, the UDF used 
"conventional lobbying, boycott strategies, civil disobedience, and passive 
resistance", while encouraging "meaningful democratic participation" in its 
2 
Frost,M. (1988); "Opposing apartheid: Democrats against the Leninists", in Theoria, (Vol. LXXI, 
May), pp.1S-22. 
3 
affiliate organisations. However, in later years the UDF tended "to understand 
itself and its role in South Africa in a Leninist way" . The UDF began to see 
its task as the smashing of the state, identified its aim as the achievement 
of hegemony, and met any form of opposition with violence. 
In a rejoinder to Frost's paper, Louw3 questions the validity of the "binary 
opposition" of "democrats versus Leninists". In Louw's view, the adoption of 
the two-stage theory of revolution by Leninists in the South African 
Communist Party (SACP), and the SACP's participation in the broad anti-
apartheid alliance contradicts Frost's argument that Leninists automatically 
oppose democracy. 
Louw draws attention to the distinction between "popular" and "populist" 
politics. Popular politics (represented by the UDF and its affiliates) "attempts 
to generate a grass-roots and decentralized approach towards mobilising 
popular resentments". By contrast, populist politics (represented by Inkatha and 
the BCM) represents a "top-down" manipulation "of popular resentments which 
are then welded into a politica·1 force for change". According to Louw, 
organisations affiliated to the UDF had the right to "try and 'push' their own 
particular strategy, approach and/or policy within the alliance as long as it" 
was "not destructive to the broader goals of the alliance". These features of 
the UDF's political practices are seen as the very basis of democracy as 
understood by Weberians. 
In this view, any "Leninist" tendencies which emerged were the result of the 
search for the best measures to use "when confronting a state characterised 
by a far-rightist government". Frost's failure to take into account the 
authoritarian practices of the South "African government leads to a misunder-
3 
LouW,P.E. (1988) ; 'Rejoinder to "Opposing Apartheid": Building a South African Democracy 
through a popular alliance which includes Leninists', in Theoria, (Vol. LXX II , October), pp.49-60. 
4 
standing of the forces which led to the adoption of Leninist tactics. In Louw's 
view, either approach (Leninist or Weberian) is applicable under certain 
conditions which make them a useful and/or workable strategy for opposing 
the ruling hegemony. Furthermore, one cannot simply equate political practices 
in the pre-revolutionary situation with the post-revolutionary society: a Leninist 
(vanguard-clandestine) approach may have as its long-term goal the creation 
of a democratic society. 
Finally, according to Louw, the works of Gramsci4 and Poulantzas5 provide 
the theoretical texts which influenced the Marxists and/or Leninists within the 
broad anti-apartheid alliance during the 1980s. 
Without adopting the latter view held by Louw, Von Holdt6 argues that the 
period of the 1980s was a "concrete elaboration in practice, of Gramsci's 
schematic concept of war of position". This strategy, accord ing to Von Holdt, 
is a struggle "to establish ideological and organisational leadership in 
institutions of civil society" by "building a broader and broader alliance in 
opposition to the rul ing class, and seeking to establish the leadership of the 
working class party over this alliance". 
Von Holdt argues that in South Africa this strategy involved: the creation of 
powerful , militant mass organisations in the townships, factories and schools, 
with the aim of constantly challenging oppression and exploitation , and 
building people's power; establishing a multi-class, non-racial united front 
under the hegemony of the ANC; extending the influence of the front into 
4 
Gramsci,A. (1978); Prison Notebooks, (London, Lawrence and Wishart). 
5 
Poulantzas,N. (1979); Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, (London, Verso) and Pol itical Power 
and Social Classes, (London, Verso). 
6 
Von Holdt,K. (1990); "Insurrection, negotiations and 'war of position"', in South African Labour 
Bulletin, (VoI. 15, No.3, September). 
5 
many spheres, such as sports, culture, education, etc. ; building an even 
broader anti-apartheid alliance in order to isolate and weaken the regime; and 
encouraging division in the ruling bloc. 
Similarly, Orkin points out that the UDF strategy conformed to three of 
Gramsci's central requirements for a revolutionary movement in its struggle 
for hegemony.7 These are the need "to begin with the concrete particulars 
of people's everyday lives" (which was done by focusing on rent and 
education issues), the need to be "prepared to seek durable alliances that 
transcend a class base" (which the UDF did by gathering organisations 
"under the broad Charterist rubric of non-racial democracy"), and the need 
to "transform the particular, often economic, demands of interest groups into 
a universalistic political challenge of the dominant system" (which the UDF 
did in its popular campaigns which "systematically sought to unite participants 
in the expression of national political demands") . 
Orkin points out, however, that the UDF fell short of the Gramscian model 
in its declining phase. In this view, under state repression , the UDF failed 
to conform to Gramsci's model of mass politics when it was forced to 
change in its operations from a mass movement to a party. 
None of these authors set out to prove their arguments through a detailed 
analysis of black opposition politics in the 1980s. This study traces the 
formation, policies and aims, membership and structure, and practices of the 
UDF during the period 1983-1987. The central problem investigated is the 
relation between revolutionary theory and praxis and the aims, policies and 
practices of the UDF. More particularly, in what respects does the formation 
of the UDF and revolutionary developments thereafter meet the strategic and 
7 
Orkin,M. (1995), "Building democracy in the new South Africa: Civil society, citizenship and 
political ideology", in Review of African Political Economy, No.66, pp.533-4. 
6 
tactical requirements of Lenin and Gramsci's theories of revolutionary strategy? 
This poses serious questions about the theoretical basis and main elements 
of the United Front strategy, the relationship between Lenin and Gramsci's 
theories of revolutionary strategy and tactics and the strategy and tactics of 
the ANC-Ied alliance, and the relationship between revolutionary strategy and 
tactics and opposition politics in the country during the 1980s. 
It is argued here that the main foundations of the United Front strategy 
within Marxism-Leninism are to be found in Lenin's two-stage theory of 
revolution, and his recognition of the importance of revolutionary alliances and 
of political struggle during the first stage. It is further argued that Gramsci's 
theory of the "war of position" expanded the Leninist concept of alliances 
and their role in advancing the revolutionary struggle, particularly in countries 
where civil society is highly developed. 
The essential requirements of the LeninistlGramscian model of a United Front 
strategy are as follows: 
(1) the necessity of mass mobilisation and organisation around all struggles 
in civil society which are primarily directed against the ruling bloc; 
(2) the necessity of creating a broad alliance of social forces under a 
minimum programme during that stage of struggle which leads to a 
democratic revolution; and 
(3) the necessity for political and ideological struggle in which revolutionary 
consciousness is promoted and expanded. 
The main intention of this study is to prove that the formation of the UDF 
and revolutionary developments during the period of review accorded with the 
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LeninistlGramscian model of a United Front strategy.8 This is done, firstly, 
by locating certain features of the ANC-Ied alliance's revolutionary strategy 
within the LeninistlGramscian model of a United Front strategy. 
The ANC's strategy and tactics placed emphasis on political mobilisation and 
the formation of a mass-based national front, which would increasingly be 
drawn to political positions aligned to the' ANC. 
This reflects a conscious effort on the part of ANC activists to achieve these 
objectives. 9 This is also indicated by a number of other factors. These 
include the ANC's earlier efforts to influence certain legal and semi-legal 
organisations inside the country; the proven existence of clandestine ANC 
members as leaders in some of the UDF affiliate organisations, and the 
leadership role in these organisations played by convicted ANC members after 
their release from prison. 
However, this does not imply that the UDF leadership consciously enacted 
the ANC's strategic objectives. There were too many leaders at local, regional 
and national levels who came from diverse backgrounds and operated under 
diverse conditions and in a wide variety of organisations for this to be true. 
Above all else, the reform package introduced by the apartheid government 
in the early 1980s was a major factor behind the formation of the UDF. 
Many organisations and individuals joined the UDF in response to the reforms 




This does not imply that the formation of the UDF and the events thereafter were consciously 
based on Leninist and Gramscian revolutionary theory and praxis. Rather, it is argued here that 
revolutionary developments within the country which related to the UDF and its affiliates met the 
strategic requirements of the LeninistiGramscian model. 
However, it is not the intention of this study to examine the extent of the ANC's influence and/or 
participation in the formation of the UDF and popular mobilisation and struggle thereafter. 
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What does become evident, however, is that some of these strategic 
objectives became central in the UDF's strategy and tactics. These include: 
the creation of the broadest possible national front around a minimum 
programme to unite all classes and strata in the struggle against apartheid; 
the creation of community organisations; the mobilisation of the masses to 
actively resist apartheid ; and the establishment of people's power in black 
areas. 
The ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance's strategy was directed at the 
insurrectionary seizure of power. Although revolutionary developments in the 
1980s did include mass mobilisation and organisation, the formation of a 
united front, and widespread insurrection punctuated by guerrilla warfare, it 
did not lead to a general uprising and the seizure of state power. 
Instead, the formation of the UDF and revolutionary developments thereafter 
are best explained by the LeninistlGramscian United Front strategy -
increasing the complexity of civil society by establishing mass organisations, 
creating a historical bloc in opposition to the ruling bloc, and expanding the 
revolutionary consciousness of the masses. These do, however, have their 
parallels in the ANC's emphasis on political mobilisation and the formation 
of a mass-based national front, which would increasingly be drawn to political 
positions aligned to the ANC. 
This is followed by an analysis of the conditions underlying the emergence 
and proliferation of community organisations, and the formation , principles and 
objectives, strategies and tactics, and structure and membership of the UDF 
to demonstrate this point. It is argued here that the strategic and tactical 
requirements of the LeninistlGramscian model of a United Front strategy were 
met by the emergence and proliferation of community organisations during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the formation of the UDF and revolutionary 
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developments during the period of review. These included, among others, the 
creation of township organisations, the formation of a historical bloc with 
united objectives and strategies, the development of a common national 
political culture based on opposition to apartheid, and its spread throughout 
black civil society through the increasing political and ideological leadership 
of the UDF. 
The "civil-society debate" between Steven Friedman and Mark Swilling raises 
another set of important questions.10 In broad terms, these writers adopted 
different views of the relationship between an "independent civil society" and 
the nature of post-apartheid society. The central issue here is the possibility 
of creating an independent civil society in an ANC-Ied South Africa. This is 
not the place to deal with this debate in great detail. However, it is 
necessary to mention some of the points of disagreement which are relevant 
to this study. 
Friedman points to a number of limitations in the popular perceptions of "civil 
society" put forward by writers like Swilling. Friedman rejects the notion that 
civil society can be identified with the numerous mass-based community 
organisations which were affiliated to the UDF. In the first place, Friedman 
argues that Swilling incorrectly identifies civil society with civic associations 
which are defined by their "independence from big capital", their ability to 
"govern their members" and to negotiate, and "their allegiance to the ANC 
camp".11 In his view civil society is more than these organisations and 
includes organised business and other non-aligned or unorganised sectors of 
10 
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society. 
In addition, Friedman questions the representativeness of, and absence of 
"diversity of opinion or interest" in some of these organisations, in particular, 
civic associations. In his view, civic associations do not "represent all of 
'township opinion'" because of the existence of other organisations in the 
townships with a different membership and interests. The absence of diversity 
is seen to be a consequence of the struggle for hegemony in which a 
common set of objectives and interests drew people into community 
organisations. This has led to a situation in which diversity of opinion and 
interests are sacrificed in order to achieve the primary objective: the 
destruction of the apartheid system. 
By contrast, Swilling argues that Friedman disregards the existence of the 
large number of civic associations in the country and the role they have 
played in civil society. In his view, these associations have played a central 
role in transforming civil society by participating in the national liberation 
struggle without losing their autonomy, and therefore their recognition as one 
of the most important components of organised civil society with objectives 
and roles that differ from those of major political organisations. Friedman thus 
ignores the "independent" origin of civic associations and other community 
organisations. 
In addition, Swilling points out that civic associations provided an important 
means of achieving certain objectives for their members. Here he identifies 
their "capacity to organise, get resources, achieve goals, mobilise pressure, 
negotiate and express policy positions". 12 The role played by these 
organisations in local government negotiations also demonstrated the 
12 SWilling,M. (1992); "Quixote at the windmills", op.cit. , p.101. 
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importance accorded to civic associations by the authorities as well as a 
recognition of their representativeness. 
The UDF was an alliance of a broad range of autonomous organisations of 
differing class origins and with differing political and ideological agendas which 
came together having identified a common cause - opposition to the 
apartheid system of domination and exploitation. The investigation of the 
relation between revolutionary theory and praxis, and the emergence and 
proliferation of community organisations poses another set of questions. More 
particularly, what was the role played by community organisations in the 
struggle against apartheid? This raises questions about the factors underlying 
the emergence and proliferation of community organisations, their principles 
and objectives, and the nature and role of these organisations - their support 
base, their structure and their activities during the period of review. 
The LeninistlGramscian model's emphasis on the importance of the political 
and ideological struggle to promote and expand revolutionary consciousness 
sets it apart from other models of a United Front strategy and reflects one 
of the most fundamental achievements of popular resistance during the 1980s. 
Here the stress is on: mobilising and organising people around the concrete 
particulars of their everyday lives (rent increases, bus-fare increases, education 
issues, women's issues, etc.); uniting the separate currents of protest into a 
single stream; and, most importantly, transforming the "particular, often 
economic, demands of interest groups into a universalistic political challenge 
of the dominant system" which aims at national liberation. This results in the 
spread of a revolutionary consciousness. 
The people's war strategy of the ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance also focused 
attention on the mobilisation and organisation of the working class, women, 
the rural masses, and the youth and students, and the formation of civic 
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organisations. 13 The objective was to mobilise various forces in the country 
to participate in the liberation struggle. This strategic objective has its parallel 
in the LeninistlGramscian emphasis on mass mobilisation and organisation 
around all struggles in civil society which are primarily directed against the 
ruling bloc. 
This study focuses on the emergence and proliferation of student and youth 
organisations, trade unions, civic associations, and women's organisations in 
many parts of the country during the late 1970s and the 1980s. These 
organisations emerged in response to a wide variety of factors, largely related 
to political, social or material grievances and, in certain cases, as a result 
of the conscious organisational efforts of activists. 
More important, however, is the role that these community organisations 
played in the struggle for national liberation. Here special attention is placed 
on Gramsci's strategy of the "war of position". The war of position, according 
to Gramsci, is a struggle to achieve ideological and political leadership 
(hegemony) by a shift in the balance of social and cultural forces to the 
working class. This has its parallel in the ANC's strategic goal of winning 
members of the front's affiliates and the front itself politically to the ANC's 
positions. It also has its parallel in the LeninistlGramscian emphasis on the 
political and ideological struggle in which revolutionary consciousness is 
promoted and expanded. 
It is argued in this study that the period of the 1980s represents a distinct 
shift in the balance of social and cultural forces towards the UDF. It 
becomes important, then, to examine how this shift occurred. One way of 
13 
The focus here is not on the question of whether or not these organisations had a conscious intent 
upon ~ollowing ANC strategy, nor the extent of ANC influence over and/or participation in the 
form~tlon , nature .and activities of these organisations Rather, it is on the extent to which they 
acquired a revolutionary consciousness. 
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approaching this is to look at the history of affiliates of the UDF by focusing 
on their formation and structures, principles and objectives, and membership 
and activities, and changes in these in order to demonstrate the shift towards 
the UDF. This is also demonstrated by the revival of various community 
organisations and the proliferation of new community organisations after the 
formation of the UDF. 
Another aspect of this approach is to look at the role they played in 
achieving both mass mobilisation and organisation, and the spread of 
revolutionary consciousness (including the mobilisation of people to actively 
resist apartheid). It is here that the analysis of the history of these 
organisations demonstrates the manner in which the masses were mobilised 
and organised to actively resist apartheid , resulting in a universalistic political 
challenge of the apartheid system and which was directed at the national-
democratic revolution. 
It is argued, firstly, that some community organisations experienced significant 
changes in their structures, leadership and membership, aims and objectives, 
and in their strategies and activities. These changes demonstrated a marked 
shift towards, and led to their affiliation to, the UDF. They subsequently 
adopted the strategies and tactics of the UDF political tradition, leading to 
the transformation of their activities into a universalistic political challenge of 
the apartheid system. The shift towards the UDF was also apparent in the 
mobilisation and organisation of people in many parts of the country through 
newly-formed organisations. 
Secondly, these organisations played a hegemony-building role by promoting 
mass mobilisation and organisation, and developing and facilitating the spread 
of a national political culture based, among others, on the rejection of, and 
opposition to, apartheid structures and the development of alternative 
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structures and practices by the mass-based organisations to govern their own 
daily living; the adoption of a strategy based on "unity-in-action" and the 
mobilisation of grass-roots organisations formed around local issues; an 
ideological system expressed in such documents as the Freedom Charter; and 
the articulation of a set of common demands such as the release of political 
prisoners, the unbanning of organisations and the establishment of a non-
racial, non-sexist, democratic and unitary South Africa. Thus, it is through 
these organisations that the particular demands of interest groups were 
transformed into a universalistic political challenge of the apartheid system. 
Within the ANC-Ied revolutionary . alliance, revolutionary consciousness can be 
identified at two levels: the ANC's emphasis on the national-democratic 
liberation struggle; and the SACP's emphasis on socialism. However, the 
ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance emphasized not the inculcation of socialist 
consciousness among the masses, but the consciousness of political 
domination and economic exploitation under apartheid and the goal of national 
liberation. 
Revolutionary consciousness developed unevenly within the various civic 
associations, trade unions, etc. , as well as between the different types of 
organisations, for example, between student organisations and civic 
organisations. Politicisation lay emphasis either on the goal of national 
liberation, without including a socialist content, or included a socialist content. 
Thus, the two main elements of revolutionary consciousness, the struggle for 
national liberation and the struggle for socialism, are to be found in the 
various organisations investigated below. 
Finally, the analysis of student and youth organisations, trade unions, civic 
associations, and women's organisations reveals the type of democratic 
organisations which were emerging during the course of the 1980. 
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Although the UDF only formally disbanded in 1991, the period 1983-1987 was 
chosen because it represents a period of the most heightened activity of the 
UDF at local, regional and national levels. By the end of 1987 many UDF 
affiliates had been weakened by repression during the state of emergency 
and large numbers of UDF leaders remained in detention throughout 1988. 
The momentum of local resistance diminished once local organisations were 
crushed . Thus, the period from 1988 provides relatively little insight into the 
activities of local affiliates of the Front. 
In addition, on February 22, 1988 the government imposed restrictions on 18 
organisations, including the UDF and 14 of its affiliates. These organisations 
were prohibited from engaging in a wide range of political activities such as 
encouraging boycott campaigns or stirring up public opinion against the Black 
Local Authorities. The restricted organisations could only act to preserve their 
assets, perform certain administrative duties or take legal advice or judicial 
advice or judicial steps. The UDF underwent a revival in 1989 when it joined 
with COSATU (in the Mass Democratic Movement) in a civil disobedience 
campaign against government-controlled hospitals and schools. Thus, during 
1989 the emphasis was on national campaigns of the Mass Democratic 
Movement (with the main organisational base provided by trade unions) rather 
than on actions which involved local UDF affiliates. 
More important, however, was the effect of state repression on the structure 
and activities of the UDF. Firstly, it resulted in the transformation of the 
Front from a mass organisation to a political party. The detention of leaders, 
mass arrests, the banning of meetings, etc. resulted in the centralisation of 
decision-making and the transformation of the UDF into a vanguard party. 
Secondly, state repression and counter-mobilisation resulted in the virtual 
destruction of local affiliates and forced many UDF activities underground. 
These changes brought to an end the period of resistance which corre-
I 
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sponded to the LeninistiGramscian model of revolutionary strategy and tactics. 
Instead, the UDF became a Leninist vanguard party, with its affiliate 
membership operating largely underground. 
1.2. The major hypothesis 
The united front strategy, introduced by Lenin , and extended by Gramsci, 
found expression in South Africa with the formation of the UDF in 1983. The 
formation of the Front and revolutionary developments during the period of 
review conformed to the LeninistiGramscian model of revolutionary praxis in 
the following ways: the general drive to establish mass-based community 
organisations (increasing the complexity of civil society by establishing mass 
organisations); the formation of the UDF in August 1983 (creating a historical 
bloc in opposition to the ruling bloc during the phase of democratic struggle); 
and the spread of a common national political culture (the promotion and 
expansion of revolutionary consciousness). 
During the period under review, the UDF-Ied opposition to apartheid domina-
tion and exploitation resulted in the organisational and ideological penetration 
of the Front into almost every major sector of black civil society. The major 
forces behind the increasing political and ideological leadership of the UDF 
were the affiliated civic associations, trade unions, and student, youth and 
women 's organisations. 
1.3. Organisation and central concerns of the Thesis 
Chapter 2: THE UNITED FRONT STRATEGY AND REVOLUTIONARY 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical foundations of the United Front 
strategy; the revolutionary strategy of the SACP/ANC alliance; the relationship 
between Leninist and Gramscian revolutionary strategies and tactics and revol-
utionary developments in South Africa during the period under review; and 
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the economic and political conditions of social transformation in South Africa 
during the 1980s. 
The central argument is that the United Front strategy within Marxism-
Leninism has its basis in Lenin's theory of alliances. It is further argued that 
Gramsci extended Lenin's theories by emphasising the importance of ideology 
and class alliances in revolutionary praxis. This is followed by an analysis 
of the revolutionary strategy of the SACP-ANC alliance. Finally, it is argued 
that revolutionary developments in South Africa during the period of review 
conformed to the LeninistlGramscian model of revolutionary strategy. 
Chapter 3: POPULAR STRUGGLES AND THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC 
ORGANISATIONS, 1960-1987. 
This chapter focuses on the anti-apartheid struggle during the period 1960-
1987 with an emphasis on the activities of black political organisations, 
community organisations and trade unions. The central argument of the first 
section of this chapter is that the absence of a mass-based national political 
organisation within the country between 1960 and 1983 placed limitations on 
the ability of the dominated classes to effectively challenge the apartheid 
state. 
During the late 1970s and 1980s, however, a number of cond itions and 
forces gave rise to the emergence and proliferation of political , studentlyouth, 
trade union, women's and community organisations. The focus in the second 
section is on five interacting variables which were largely responsible for the 
growth of democratic organisations. It is argued here that the emergence and 
proliferation of community organisations during the late 1970s and the 1980s 
led to a highly complex civil society. Such a highly complex civil society met 
one of the requirements of the LeninistlGramscian United Front strategy, 
which set the basis for the formation of a United Front and for the 
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subsequent upsurge in mass mobilisation and politicisation. 
Chapter 4: FORMATION, POLICIES AND AIMS OF THE UNITED 
DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
This chapter focuses on the events leading to the formation of the UDF and 
the policies and aims of the Front. Here the emphasis is on the formal 
processes leading to the formation of the UDF, the evolution of its policies 
and aims under conditions of struggle, and transformations in resistance 
strategies and tactics during the period under review. 
It is argued here that the formation of the UDF, the elaboration of certain 
united aims and objectives, and the adoption of specific strategies and tactics 
conformed to certain strategic requirements of the Leninist/Gramscian United 
Front strategy: the creation of a historical bloc of all classes and strata 
opposed to the ruling bloc, united with common political , intellectual and 
moral objectives, and engaged in a universalistic political challenge of the 
dominant system which was directed at a democratic revolution. It is argued 
that by 1987 the UDF had drawn close to ideological positions held by the 
banned ANC, thus bringing together a large variety of social forces under a 
minimum programme, with common political, intellectual and moral objectives. 
It is further argued that the popular struggles of the 1980s eventually evolved 
into a universalistic challenge of the apartheid system. 
Chapter 5: MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
Here an analysis is made of the membership of the Front in order to 
describe the support base and nature of class and race forces making up 
the UDF. In this chapter an attempt is made to demonstrate the extent of 
the UDF's influence in South African society, the extent to which it was able 
to draw under its political leadership a wide variety of organisations, 
consisting of leaders and with membership drawn from every race and 
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virtually every class group in most parts of the country. The purpose is to 
determine the extent of organisational and political leadership achieved by the 
UDF during the period under review. 
Chapter 6: STUDENTIYOUTH ORGANISATIONS 
Young black people were among the leading forces in the struggle against 
apartheid in South Africa during the 1980s. In this chapter an analysis is 
made of the formation , structure, membership and policies of the Congress 
of South African Students (COSAS) , the Azanian Students Organisation 
(AZASO)/South African National Students Congress (SANSCO), and the South 
African Youth Congress (SAYCO). 
The focus of this chapter is the role of student and youth organisations in 
the political and ideological struggle to promote and expand revolutionary 
consciousness within the country. These organisations focused on particular 
sectors of civil society, drawing them into the struggle for national liberation 
and developed (or incorporated) certain features of a revolutionary con-
sciousness leading to its spread inside South Africa. The emphasis here is 
on their role in mass mobilisation and organisation around the immediate 
issues affecting students and their principles and objectives in order to 
illustrate the extent of their penetration of civil society and the main features 
of the revolutionary consciousness developed or incorporated by the student 
and youth organisations. Underlying this was the central role the student and 
youth organisations played in expanding the hegemony of the UDF in civil 
society. Finally, the analysis of student/youth organisations reveals the type 
of democratic organisations which were emerging during the course of the 
1980s: their structures, practices and membership. 
Chapter 7: DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS 
The democratic trade unions which expanded rapidly during the late 1970s 
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and the early 1980s were an important element of the internal forces 
opposing the apartheid system. In this chapter an analysis is made of the 
formation , structure, membership and policies of selected trade unions which 
were affiliated to the UDF. In addition , an investigation is made of the 
democratic trade union movement, in particular the Federation of South 
African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU). A particular focus is placed on the role of trade unions 
in the national political struggle against apartheid . 
The emphasis in this chapter is on the role of trade unions in promoting 
mass mobilisation and organisation as well as the spread of revolutionary 
consciousness within South Africa. These organisations also played a role in 
expanding the hegemony of the UDF. Finally, the analysis of trade unions 
reveals the type of democratic organisations which were emerging during the 
1980s. 
Chapter 8: CIVIC ORGANISATIONS 
The numerous civic organisations which emerged prior to the formation of the 
UDF made up one of the most important forces behind the genesis of the 
Front. Civic organisations were also key affiliates of the UDF. It is important, 
therefore, to focus on these organisations in order to come to a better 
understanding of the UDF. This chapter focuses on the nature and role of 
civic associations, and the formation , structure, membership, policies and 
strategies and activities of selected civic associations. 
Here the emphasis is on the role the civic associations played in mobilising 
and organising people around the concrete particulars of their everyday lives 
(rent increases, bus-fare increases, etc.) and transforming their particular 
. interests into a universalistic political challenge of the dominant system 
(raising the revolutionary consciousness of the masses). In addition, an 
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analysis is made of changes in ideology, structure, and practices of certain 
civics in order to demonstrate a shift towards the UDF. Underlying all these 
processes was the central role played by civic associations in establishing the 
UDF's hegemony in civil society. Finally, the analysis of civic associations 
reveals the type of democratic organisations which were emerging during the 
course of the 1980s. 
Chapter 9: WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS 
Organisations consisting exclusively of women became important constituents 
of the UDF after its formation in 1983. This chapter focuses on the nature 
and role of women's organisations, and analyses selected women's 
organisations which were affiliated to the UDF in terms of their formation, 
structure, membership and policies, and activities. 
The focus is on the role of women's organisations in the political and 
ideological struggle to raise the revolutionary consciousness of women in 
South Africa. This is done, firstly, by examining the issues which confront 
women as a specific group and their responses to this, and, secondly, by 
examining the formation , membership and structure, and policies and aims of 
selected women's organisations which were affiliated to the UDF. The former 
analysis leads to an understanding of the general factors underlying the 
formation of women's organisations, the general role of women and of 
women's organisations in the national liberation struggle, and the general 
nature and aims and objectives of these organisations. The latter analysis 
leads to an understanding of the strategies used to draw women into the 
national liberation struggle, and the nature of the revolutionary idea within the 
UDF women's organisations and its spread through these organisations. 
Finally, the analysis of women's organisations reveals the type of democratic 
organisations which were emerging during the course of the 1980s. 
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Chapter 10: CONCLUSION 
This chapter draws together the various conclusions of the study. 
POSTSCRIPT 
A brief look at the disbanding of the UDF. 
1.4. The importance of the study 
The UDF was a major force in the South African liberation struggle, 
introducing a new era of struggle by co-ordinating numerous democratic 
organisations and struggles and providing an impetus for the formation of 
new organisations. The UDF pursued an alternative to the apartheid system 
in South Africa, encouraged the formation of grass-roots organisations, and 
co-ordinated mass-based opposition to minority rule. However, no detailed 
attempt has been made to investigate the nature of this organisation and its 
relation to revolutionary theory and praxis. Important factors which determine 
the nature of a liberated society include the aims and policies of the national 
liberation movements, their institutional practices, and strategies. This study 
is an attempt to partially fill this void by investigating the relation between 
the nature and practices of the UDF and selected affiliates on the one hand, 
and revolutionary theory and praxis on the other. 
1.5. The constraints on the study 
This study has its origins in research begun in the late 1980s at a time 
when the UDF bore the brunt of state repression in the form of vigilantes, 
detention, treason trials, and other harassment. For this reason many of the 
affiliates and members of the organisation, operating clandestinely, were 
suspicious of those who asked questions about the organisation. It was 
therefore difficult to obtain information directly from members of these 
organisations without arousing suspIcion. The end of the UDF was directly 
related to the shift towards "negotiation politics" in which the state prohibitions 
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on organisation and individuals were largely done away with . 
The vast majority of leaders of the UDF at local, regional and national levels 
became involved with the time-consuming and difficult task of building ANC 
structures and, more recently, participating within the national negotiation 
process. Many UDF activists became visibly absorbed into and, in the opinion 
of some observers, form a distinct bloc within the ranks of the ANC. As a 
result, this study has not been able' to avail itself of the very rich sources 
of oral evidence that do exist. Hence, it relies largely on documentary 
material. 
1.6. The limitations of the study 
The UDF was a very loosely organised and diffuse Front organisation with 
more than 700 affiliated organisations. In addition to the problems of covert 
operation by some of its affiliates and members and suspicion, it is 
impossible within the parameters of this study to analyze all the affiliated 
organisations. Thus, research is restricted to the trade unions, student/youth 
organisations, women and community organisations. In addition, it is also 
necessary to make case studies of only a few of these organisations. The 
problem is that these organisations may not be characteristic representations 
of the affiliates of the UDF as a whole. To overcome this problem this study 
investigates a number of similar organisations (i .e. a number of trade unions, 
a number of youth organisations, and so on) in order to determine their 
similarities and differences. 
1.7. Research Method 
The method of study is historico-empirical involving the use of primary and 
secondary sources. The main primary sources - documents, pamphlets, 
newspapers and magazines of the ANC, UDF and affiliate organisations under 
study - provided a valuable insight into the organisational structure and 
24 
membership, policies and objectives, and practices of these organisations. In 
addition , various newspapers and magazines (in particular, SASPU NATIONAL) 
provided a number of useful statements made by UDF leaders, as well as 
interviews with UDF leaders and members. Political trials also provided 
another valuable source of documents of the UDF and its affiliates as well 
as information on their activities. In large part the secondary sources consist 
of political-historical studies of the period under review. 
Most of the chapters (or sections thereof) in the main body of the study 
(chapters 3 to 9) are dealt with in terms of a chronological progression. This 
approach was adopted in order to emphasize the significant factors underlying 
the formation of the UDF and selected affiliate organisations, and significant 
changes in the structure, aims, policies and activities of these organisations. 
1.8. A Note on Historiography 
Numerous articles and books have been published on township politics and 
community organisations during the 1980s. Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson, 
Anthony Marx, Martin Murray and Robert Price provide the only book-length 
reviews of this period of any value.14 However, the majority of existing 
literature on popular resistance and organisation consists largely of journal 
articles and book chapters. This study attempts to partially fill this gap by 
focusing exclusively on the most significant extra-parliamentary organisation of 
this period. 
Studies of the UDF have tended to focus on the formation , structure, 
strategies and policies, leadership and membership, and activities of the Front 
14 
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without relating these to the development of revolutionary strategy in South 
Africa or to theories of revolutionary strategy and tactics.
15 
Mention is made 
of the close personal and ideological linkages between the ANC and the 
UDF. However, no attention is given to the revolutionary strategy and tactics 
of the exiled movement and related developments within the country. 
Most of these studies view the UDF as a protest movement which arose 
purely in response to internal material and political grievances. The focus is 
on the emergence and development of community organisations, and the 
material and political grievances which gave rise to mass mobilisation and 
protest. They ignore the relationship between the intentions and activities of 
the ANC/SACP alliance, and mass protest and organisation. In other words, 
this approach underplays the role of revoluti~nary strategy and tactics in the 
formation, nature, and role of the UDF and its affiliates. 
Mike Hough 16, in an analysis of township revolt between 1984 and 1988, 
identifies the factors underlying unrest as political and socio-economic factors 
as well as the attempts by the ANC/SACP alliance to "integrate unrest as 
part of the revolutionary process". For Hough, "it would be futile to diagnose 
the present unrest in South Africa only as a well co-ordinated attempt to 
create ungovernability and chaos in the townships" . Instead , "it is important 
to analyze township conditions within the wider structure of South African 
society". Hough proceeds to list a number of political and socia-economic 
15 
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conditions including unemployment, the educational system, economic recession 
and inflation, mobilisation by activists in political organisations, feelings of 
relative deprivation, overcrowding in townships, opposition to local authorities, 
inadequate policing , urban reforms, rapid urbanisation, etc. 
On the other hand, the government and its partners tended to view the UDF 
as a front for the banned ANC. In this view, the two organisations had the 
same revolutionary objective. Such accusations were made by the government, 
senior security force officers, leaders of Indian and coloured political parties 
participating in the tri-cameral parliament and Inkatha's Chief Buthelezi. 17 This 
approach reduces internal political protest to an externally-led conspiracy 
without taking into account the material and political grievances which gave 
rise to mass organisation and protest. 
The focus here is on the link between ANC and SACP publications in which 
protest, the formation of township organisations, 
establishment of "people's power,,18, and the 
they called for mass 
ungovernability, and the 
activities of community organisations within the country. Popular protest and 
organisation are reduced to the intentions of the ANC/SACP alliance. They 
ignore the role of structural factors (material and political grievances) behind 
the formation of community organisations and their activities. 
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traced to the attempts of the ANC/SACP alliance to reconstitute itself within 
the country. According to McClure, this was done by targeting , penetrating 
and manipulating "a well-developed series of front groups and individuals". 
McClure gives the impression that community organisations were manipulated 
by the revolutionary alliance and that township revolt became highly organised 
and co-ordinated from mid-1985. According to McClure, the UDF was 
"invented" to give coordination to the various "front groups". He draws 
attention to the close ties in leadership, symbols and political slogans of the 
internal and external groupings. 
Finally, Howard Barrell20 investigates the relationship between changes in the 
strategy and tactics of the ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance during the late 
1970s and the formation of the UDF. In this view, the strategy and tactics 
of the revolutionary alliance were among the most important factors underlying 
the formation of the UDF and the events of the 1980s.21 
This study combines these approaches by looking at the role of revolutionary 
strategy and tactics as well as material and political grievances in generating 
popular protest and organisation. In order to explain the emergence, nature, 
role and activities of the UDF and its affiliates, then, it is necessary to 
examine both the intentions and activities of the ANC and the structural 
factors which shaped popular protest and organisation . 
In addition , there are a very limited number of studies of affiliates of the 
UDF. Two broad approaches dominate the study of the UDF's civic 
associations, trade unions, student/youth and women's organisations. The first 
describes the general characteristics of these organisations without taking into 
20 
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account their differences.22 The second approach consists of case studies 
of particular organisations and tend to focus on the local structural conditions 
which gave rise to community organisations.23 
In the former approach, there is a tendency to overlook the vast differences 
between analogous organisations such as civics , and differences between the 
regional and local levels of organisations with a national structure, (e.g. 
COSAS). Firstly, the emphasis on general characteristics overlooks the 
different motives for mobilisation, and the differences in structure, membership 
and activities of these organisations. Secondly, no account is taken of the 
"regional specificity" of national organisations. There were immense differences 
in the membership, support and activities of regional and local structures of 
national affiliates of the UDF. 
This study focuses on a number of case studies of different organisations, 
namely, civics, trade union and women's organisations. In addition, 
organisations such as COSAS, AZASO and SAYCO are analyzed to take into 
account the regional specificity of national organisations. The focus is on 
general characteristics as well as differences between analogous organisations 
and differences within the same organisation. 
Secondly, case studies of UDF affiliates have focused largely on the 
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dynamics of political mobilisation, structure, and activities of specific 
organisations. These studies have tended to ignore the impact of the UDF 
on local mobilisation and struggles, and the relationship between local 
organisations and the regional and national structures of the Front. The case 
studies also ignore the impact of local organisations on the regional and 
national structures of the UDF and on affiliates of the Front in other areas. 
The tendency has been to focus on structural conditions and the struggles 
these gave rise to. 
Studies of the various community organisations have focused largely on the 
dynamics of popular struggles and on the role of these organisations in such 
struggles. Most of these studies, as Seekings24 points out, focus on the 
specific forms in which conflict has been manifested, such as stayaways25, 
school boycotts26, transport boycotts27, rent boycotts28 , and consumer 
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boycotts29 , and centre around a number of key events, such as the Vaal 
Uprising in September 1984, the November 1984 Transvaal Regional 
Stayaway, the 1985 Black Weekend in the Eastern Cape, the 1985 school 
boycott in the Western Cape, and the declaration of Emergencies in July 
1985 and June 1986. It is necessary to investigate the impact of national 
political organisation and issues upon local organisations and struggles, as 
well as the impact of local struggles on national political struggles. In this 
study, we look at a number of national, regional and local community 
organisations in an attempt to explain the relationship between the UDF and 
its affiliates, and their local struggles and national political struggles. 
Liberal studies of popular politics during the 1980s have focused on popular 
struggles without "locating this in either a thorough analysis of township 
politics or any analysis of the South African political economy".30 Their 
primary emphasis, together with government publications and liberal newspa-
pers, was to highlight the use of violence, or what they termed "unrest".31 
The point of departure here are incidents of unrest without locating these in 
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Seekings points out, this tends to suggest a homogeneity which fails to take 
into account the diversity in township politics. 
Community organisations were formed in response to a wide variety of 
factors. Most township and village residents have similar material and political 
grievances. However, the reasons for the formation of specific organisations, 
their nature, and their activities were influenced by local conditions, as well 
as the general struggle against apartheid . This study also focuses on the 
material and political factors underlying the mobilisation , organisation and 




THE UNITED FRONT AND REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY 
AND TACTICS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first focuses on the united 
front strategy: its origin, history and main elements. Secondly, an analysis is 
made of the revolutionary strategy of the liberation movement. In addition, we 
look briefly at the relationship between Lenin and Gramsci's theories of revol-
utionary strategy and tactics and revolutionary developments in South Africa 
during the period under review. The third section focuses on the political and 
economic conditions of social transformation in South Africa. An analysis is 
made of the structural forces which influenced the revolutionary situation in 
the country. It is argued here that revolutionary developments in South Africa 
during the period of review conformed to a LeninistlGramscian model of 
revolutionary strategy. 
2.2. The United Front Strategy 
United fronts have emerged in a wide range of popular struggles around the 
world, initially in Europe in the 1930s and in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
thereafter. The numerous anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggles, and national 
liberation struggles combined with social revolutions, and adopted the form 
of "fronts", "united fronts" , "united national fronts" , "national liberation fronts", 
"national liberation movements", etc. 
Broadly speaking, this strategy can be defined as follows : "The united front 
is a policy of class alliances that seeks to bring together and unify all 
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potential social forces in the struggle against a common enemY".1 According 
to Greene, many popular struggles around the world did not succeed where 
only the workers were mobilized, or only the peasants, or only the middle 
class. They succeeded only where a critical mass of most or all of the 
major classes in the society were mobilized in the revolutionary process. In 
order to mobilize the broadest front of forces to achieve the aims of the 
majority of the population a civil war, class against class strategy cannot be 
adopted. It is necessary, therefore, to create a marriage of convenience of 
all the major subordinated social forces .2 
The theoretical origins and initial implementation of the united front strategy 
are open to debate. Horace Campbell identifies the first practical implementa-
tion of this strategy in the development of popular alliances against fascism 
in the inter-war years. These took two basic forms: 
(1) the proletarian united front where the advanced sections of the working class carried 
out the task of education, mobilisation and organisation of the other sections of the 
working class to build a united front and (2) the anti-fascist popular alliance which was 
more broad-based in class terms and included all the democratic forces, workers, poor 
peasants, professionals, urban petty bourgeoisie and sections of the liberal bourgeoisie.3 
In this view, then, the united front strategy has its origin in the theories of 
the proletarian united front and the anti-fascist popular alliance developed by 
Dimitrov.4 In a speech delivered to the Seventh Congress of the Communist 
International in 1935 he stated that the first task of the working class 




Booyse,W. (1989); ''The United Front Strategy: The Liberal Dilemma", in Southern African 
Freedom Review, (Vo1.2, No.4, Autumn), p.33. 
Greene,T.H. (1984); Comparative Revolutionary Movements, (Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey, 
Prentice-Hall) , p.39. 
Campbell ,H. (1986); "Popular alliance in South Africa", in Afahamu, (Vo1.15, Nos.1-2), p.59. 
Dimitrov,G.; The United Front Against Fascism, Speeches at the Seventh Congress of the 
Communist International , 1935. 
34 
workers on a national and international scale. Dimitrov argued that the 
establishment of unity of action of all sectors of the working class is a 
precondition of the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and fascism. A 
powerful united front of the proletariat would be able to influence other 
wavering strata of the population: the peasantry, the urban bourgeoisie, and 
the intelligentsia. 
According to Dimitrov, the only condition the working masses and their 
organisations must meet in order to become part of the proletarian united 
front is that unity of action must be directed against the class enemy. The 
working masses could be drawn into the united front by appealing to those 
slogans and forms of struggle which arise out of their vital needs, and not 
only by appealing for the proletarian dictatorship. While Communists must not 
abandon the work of Communist education, organisation and mobilisation of 
the masses, the road to creating the widest united front of workers is to 
strive for short-term and long-term goals with non-Communist worker parties, 
trade unions and other organisations of the working class. 
In this view, the anti-fascist People's Front must be developed by establishing 
an alliance between the proletariat on the one hand, and the peasantry· and 
the urban petty bourgeoisie on the other. This could be accomplished by 
defending the demands of these social groups, combining these demands with 
the demands of the proletariat in the process of struggle. Most importantly, 
Communists must avoid the mistake of ignoring the various organisations and 
parties of the peasants, artisans and the urban petty bourgeoisie. All efforts 
must be made to draw other social forces into the anti-fascist front. 
Willem Booyse gives credit to Mao Tse Tung for the idea of a united front 
and the formulation of the strategy to create such a front. According to 
Booyse, Mao's intention and his eventual success was based on an idea to 
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unite the broadest possible spectrum of opposition groups in China against 
the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek. The process of mobilising 
opposition groups was manifested in the creation of "organisations (alliances) 
throughout the country (China), developing mass movements of the workers, 
peasants, youth, children , winning over the intellectuals in all parts of the 
country, and spreading the movement as a struggle for democracy".5 The 
objective of this process was to ensure that the masses became aware of 
the necessity for joint action by all the social forces that oppose the ruling 
government. 
The Vietnamese Communist Party drew upon the Chinese experience and 
decided in 1941 to use the united front as the guiding strategy of the party 
in its struggle for power. At the heart of this strategy was the assertion that 
the demands of ideology and class war must be subordinated to those of 
the anti-imperialist struggle for national independence. To provide the vehicle 
for this new strategy, a new front organisation was established, the League 
for the Independence of Vietnam (Vietminh). All patriotic elements in Vietnam, 
regardless of class, were welcomed into the front against the common 
enemy. The decision to appeal for the support of patriotic but socially 
conservative elements was based on the belief that the petty bourgeoisie, rich 
peasants, and officials were suffering under dual French and Japanese 
oppression. 
An additional aspect of the new political strategy was the decision to 
establish a series of mass associations (called "national salvation associ-
ations") representing the various interest groups in society - workers, 
peasants, students, women, artists and writers. Such associations would be 
used to enlist popular support for the revolutionary cause and to funnel Party 
5 
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and front directives down to the mass of the population. Alliances would also 
be created in respect of specific issues, for example, rent increases, price 
increases, and living conditions, as a step towards unity.6 
The most comprehensive account of the Vietnamese revolutionary strategy 
was provided by Vo Nguyen Giap, faithful disciple of Ho Chi Minh and major 
strategist of the Vietnamese Communist Party. One central feature of Giap's 
theory of revolutionary strategy and tactics is the combination of military 
struggle and political struggle. This lies at the centre of his concept of 
"people's war". The people's war revolutionary strategy involved military action 
by forces of the revolutionary movement to destroy the enemy as well as 
the people's mass uprisings to regain administrative power. 
According to Giap, a people's war can only be conducted by mobilising the 
entire people to participate in a protracted revolutionary war against the 
enemy. 
Our political force is a force of all the people that participate in uprisings and wars in an 
organised manner under the Party's vanguard leadership. It includes revolutionary 
classes, patriotic elements, and nationalities in our country who have assembled in a 
broad, united national front, under working class leadership, with the worker-peasant 
alliance as a foundation .7 
In the people's war strategy emphasis is placed on the use of propaganda 
to motivate the organisation and development of revolutionary forces with the 
purpose of mobilising the entire population to participate in the struggle. The 
goal is the creation of a "mass political force", which 
6 
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revolutionary war, to protect the material and moral forces on the political , economic, and 
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Two important lessons can be drawn from the Chinese and Vietnamese 
experiences: firstly, the necessity of creating a broad united front which 
includes all patriotic elements of the population and is directed primarily at 
the goal of national liberation and; secondly, recognition of the dual 
importance of political and military struggle. The Vietnamese revolution proved 
that a strategy placing sole reliance on either political or military struggle 
would have been insufficient, and probably disastrous. The emerging 
revolutionary practices stressed the importance of a combination of the 
political mobilisation of the broadest possible range of forces against the 
enemy and a military struggle involving protracted guerrilla war in preparation 
for the final stage of general uprising.9 
In more recent times, the Sandanista revolution which saw the overthrow of 
the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979 demonstrated the practical 
application of the united front strategy. The Sandanista triumph also 
influenced Central American revolutionary strategy in the 1980s. The two 
central features of this strategy were the two phase theory of revolution and 
the idea of revolutionary class alliances.1o 
Revolutionary movements in the region recognised that the revolution is won 
in two phases: firstly , through the mobilisation of the masses under the 
banners of democracy and anti-imperialism; and , secondly, demonstrating to 
the masses that the democratic and anti-imperialist objectives of the revolution 
can only be secured and defended through the construction of socialism.11 
Thus, the first stage of the revolution , the national democratic stage, involves 
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a popular revolution against the alliance of imperialism with the ruling class 
or oligarchy. The popular revolution required the establishment of a 
revolutionary class alliance comprising all social classes opposed to the 
imperialist alliance and encompassing all popular struggles.
12 
The emergence of Eurocommunist Parties in Western Europe gave rise to a 
renewed interest in the writings of Antonio Gramsci on revolutionary 
organisation and strategy. These parties claimed that their political programme 
was based on the theoretical programme posed by Gramsci 's works. 
According to Gibbon 13, Eurocommunism dates 'historically from the dissolution 
of the Com intern in 1943, and perhaps even from the "fourth period" 
inaugurated in 1935, when the notion of the appropriateness of independent 
national roads to socialism was first broached '. During the 1940s and 1950s 
the growth of western parties and the splits between the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union and certain European countries in the wake of the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia accelerated the growth of this phenomenon. 
The Eurocommunist political position has been summarized by Gibbon as 
follows. Firstly, the predominant feature of bourgeois rule "is not coercion but 
establishing consent, both politically (through alliances) and ideologically 
(through control and influence)". Secondly, this consensus can be overturned 
by acting together with other class forces in a broad all iance against the 
consensus. Thirdly, the nature of bourgeois rule (consensual) and the political 
content of the broad alliance (democratic) indicates that the road to socialism 
must pass through the extension of democracy (which includes the right to 
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Finally, the role of the communist party in these objectives is to provide 
leadership and unity. In this context, it is argued, the sole organisational task 
of the communist parties and the permanent strategic horizon of the twentieth 
century was a programme of "counter-hegemonization", i.e., to counter the 
ideological and political domination of society by the bourgeoisie.
14 
In this 
view, the sole task of the communist parties in the twentieth century is to 
seek "consent" in order to secure the conditions for a democratic path for 
the achievement of socialism. This position justified the parliamentary route 
to power and, by implication, rejected the insurrectionary path to power put 
forward by Lenin. 
The Eurocommunists' criticism of Soviet foreign policy in the 1950s and 
1960s and their revisionist political programme - claimed to be inspired by 
Gramsci's theories and changing realities in Western Europe - brought into 
doubt the relationship between Marxist-Leninist and Gramscian theories. In 
particular, the way in which Gramsci related politics to consent and ideology 
has been counterposed to a Lenin who is seen as reducing political reality 
to dictatorship.15 The following analysis sets out to disprove this point and 
to develop a theory of a LeninistlGramscian united front strategy. 
2.2.1. Lenin on Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics 
Lenin was particularly concerned with the ways that the proletariat had to be 
organised and with the question of tactics and the kind of alliances the 
working class had to enter into in order to become the ruling class.16 
Lenin's theory of strategy and tactics develops from an analysis of the 
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possibilities of revolution in backward countries, that is, in societies where the 
level of development of the productive forces is relatively low and the 
working class is both numerically and politically insignificant. 
Lenin's Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution (1905) 
called for the revolutionary party to enter into a "democratic alliance of the 
proletariat and peasantry" whose task would be that of the bourgeois 
revolution . Lenin argued that Russia was on the verge of revolution but the 
bourgeoisie was incapable of carrying out its own revolution . By gaining 
control of the bourgeois revolution the proletarian and peasant alliance could 
achieve political power and prepare the ground for the proletarian revol-
ution.17 Lenin writes that: 
... the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has a past 
and a future. Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy and privilege. In the struggle 
against this past, in the struggle against the counter-revolution, a "single will" of the 
proletariat and the peasantry is possible, for here there is unity of interests. 
Its future is the struggle against private property, the struggle for the wage-worker against 
the employer, the struggle for socialism. Here singleness of will is impossible. Here the 
path before us lies not from autocracy to a republic, but from a petty bourgeois 
democratic republic to socialism.18 
Lenin perceived the huge revolutionary potential that lay in the peasants' 
unfulfilled demands, and he urged the Communist Party to exploit this. He 
thus accepted the notion of an alliance with the peasants. The social 
democrats would therefore share power with the peasantry, which was 
interested in overthrowing the autocracy, but not on the immediate transition 
to socialism.19 Thus, the process of revolution was a two-stage process, 
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proletariat and peasantry" and, secondly, the proletarian revolution .
20 
Lenin developed his two-stage theory of revolution from an analysis of 
capitalist development in Russia. Two points are important here. Firstly, 
despite the existence of a sizable and concentrated proletariat, Russian 
capitalism was relatively undeveloped. The small Russian bourgeoisie, unlike 
the bourgeoisie of the more advanced capitalist countries of the West, was 
incapable of carrying out a bourgeois-democratic revolution . Lenin cites a 
number of reasons for this, including their class position ("they are too 
heavily fettered by private property, by capital and land to enter into a 
decisive struggle") and their dependence on the autocracy "with its 
bureaucracy, police and military forces for use against the proletariat and the 
peasantry" .21 
Secondly, Lenin held the orthodox view that socialism could only be 
developed in countries with an advanced capitalist base. It was necessary, 
therefore, for the proletariat and the peasants to secure political power and 
establish the conditions for the rapid development of capitalism. In this view: 
In countries like Russia the working class suffers not so much from capitalism but from 
the insufficient development of capitalism. The working class is therefore most certainly 
interested in the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism. 
That is why a bourgeois revolution is in the highest degree advantageous to the 
proletariat. A bourgeois revolution is absolutely necessary in the interests of the 
proletariat. The more complete, determined, and consistent the bourgeois revolution, the 
more assured will the proletariat's struggle be against the bourgeoisie and for social-
ism.22 
Autocracy in Russia also accounted for the two stages in revolutionary 
strategy. In Lenin's view the aim of the working class movement was "the 
20 
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complete liberation of the toiling masses from every form of oppression and 
exploitation". This required both a "high development of the productive forces 
of capitalism and a high degree of organisation of the working class" . These 
could only be achieved in a society where political freedom prevails. Thus: 
The full development of the productive forces in modern bourgeois society, a broad, free, 
and open class struggle, and the political education, training and rallying of the masses 
of the proletariat are inconceivable without political freedom. Therefore it has always been 
the aim of the class-conscious proletariat to wage a determined struggle for complete 
political freedom and the democratic revolution .23 
In the first stage the revolutionary Party must not only gain the confidence 
of the working class. It must make itself the centre of all forms of protest 
against social oppression, concentrating all the energies directed against the 
ruling class regardless of their origin or what class interests they represent. 
Lenin states that the true revolutionary is 
a tribune of the people, able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, 
no matter where it takes place, no matter what stratum of people it affects; he must be 
able to generalize all these manifestations to produce a single picture of pol ice violence 
and capitalist exploitation .... 24 
Thus, the fact that the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat does not 
mean that it should be indifferent to the oppression and exploitation of other 
groups. 
Since the democratic revolution, although bourgeois in content, is to be led 
by the proletariat, it is the latter's duty to rally all the forces that aim to 
overthrow the autocracy. The Party must support bourgeois demands for 
political freedom, combat the persecution of religious sects, denounce the 
brutal treatment of students and intellectuals, support peasant claims, make 
itself felt in every sphere of public life, and unite the separate currents of 
23 
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protest into a single stream.25 In this role the Party must assume leadership 
of all exploited classes in the democratic revolution. In Lenin 's words: 
We must take upon ourselves the task of organising an all-round political struggle under 
the leadership of our Party in such a manner as to obtain all the support possible of all 
opposition strata for the struggle and for our Party.26 
Lenin's concept of alliances was reinforced by the Theses adopted at the 3rd 
Congress of the Communist International in 1921 , which broadened the basis 
of communist action by introducing the so-called "united front" tactics. 
Communists were to establish contact with the masses either by collaborating 
with the leaders of non-communist organisations, or by appealing to rank-and-
file members of such organisations over the heads of their leaders. 
Communist Parties were also urged to encourage their members to join trade 
unions with a view to obtaining control over them. In addition , "united front" 
tactics included various organisations which were created either to promote 
some particular object, or to unite a professional group such as writers, 
lawyers, or scientists, or to mobilise a particular section of the community 
such as women, youth , or students.27 
Finally, in What is to be Done? Lenin stressed the importance of political 
struggle, and of the role of the revolutionary Party in spreading socialist 
consciousness throughout the working class. Lenin was particularly conscious 
of the difference between trade union struggles ("economism") and sponta-
neity, and the development of a socialist consciousness. In the first place, 
Lenin opposed the view that the primary struggle was the working class's 
economic struggle through trade union organisations as opposed to a political 
struggle. While arguing that trade unionism had some positive aspects in 
25 
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helping to unite the working class, Lenin argued that it could divert the 
working class from revolutionary activity. The trade unions struggle, in his 
view, is essentially an economistic struggle, encouraging workers to concen-
trate their attention on narrow, short-term goals. 
In the second place, Lenin draws a distinction between spontaneous 
"outbursts of desperation and vengeance" evident in certain outbreaks of 
resistance of the oppressed , and socialist consciousness which is the 
consciousness of the "irreconcilable antagonisms" of the interests of the 
working class "to the whole of the modern political and social system".28 
Thus, because of economism and spontaneity, Lenin argued, revolutionary 
consciousness can only be brought to the workers "from outside the 
economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and 
employers". It is thus the task of a revolutionary Party to channel the activity 
of the working class towards revolution and thereby to socialism. 
To sum up: Lenin held the view that the undeveloped state of capitalism in 
Russia , the inability of the bourgeoisie to lead a bourgeois-democratic 
revolution , and the lack of political freedom in autocratic Russia made it 
necessary for the proletariat, in alliance with the peasants, to wage a 
bourgeois-democratic revolution as a prelude to the struggle for socialism. In 
the first stage, the proletariat must lead all struggles directed against the 
ruling class. Under the leadership of the Party, the proletariat must rally all 
forces opposed to autocracy and provide political leadership. This was 
reinforced by the "united front" tactics adopted by the 3rd Comintern 
Congress which called for communists to join other organisations with a view 
to obtaining control over them. The communists could use these organisations 
to infuse socialist consciousness into the masses, which Lenin viewed as a 
28 L . V enm .. 1. (1978); op.cit. p.37. 
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major role of the revolutionary Party. 
2.2.2. Gramsci on Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics 
Gramsci introduces two strategies in the process of revolutionary change from 
capitalism to socialism. In the first strategy, the "war of position", the aim 
of the working class is to undermine the hegemony of the bourgeoisie by 
increasingly assuming leadership in numerous social movements such as 
schools, churches, trade unions, political parties, etc. In the second strategy, 
the "war of manoeuvre/movement", the working class conducts a direct 
military assault on the bourgeois state and seizes state power. 
The distinction is based on a distinction between the "organic" and 
"conjunctural" dimensions of revolutionary change. The war of position 
corresponds to a gradual shift in the balance of social and cultural forces 
and is therefore related to the organic dimension of revolutionary change. The 
war of manoeuvre corresponds to a period of crisis in which political forces 
use political combat and force to seize state power and therefore relates to 
the conjunctural dimension of revolutionary change.29 
This argument rests on a distinction between civil society, the "sphere of 
consent", and the state, the "sphere of coercion" . In societies where civil 
society is very complex and where bourgeois ideology is highly institutional-
ized and widely internalized, a direct assault on the state can result only in 
disappointment and defeat. 30 However, where coercion is the major form of 
political domination, and where there is a lack of social movements in civil 
society, a frontal attack on the state for political power is more viable. 
29 
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The war of position , according to Gramsci, is applicable in situations where 
civil society is well developed and where the hegemony of the working class 
can be expanded by a shift in the balance of social and cultural forces to 
the working class. In this view, civil society is a central sphere of class and 
popular-democratic struggles, and of the contest for hegemony between the 
two fundamental classes.31 In Gramsci's view, class struggle is not the only 
aspect of struggle in bourgeois societies. There are numerous social 
movements engaging in popular democratic struggles that do not have a 
class character. These include the variety of movements for democratic rights; 
for freedom of speech and the right to vote; those which express the 
demands of women, students, young people and the unemployed; community 
movements of many kinds concerned with aspects of health , housing, and 
other issues. 
In order to establish its hegemony, the working class must go beyond the 
struggle for its own narrow class interests: it must establish itself as the 
guarantor of the interests of society as a whole.32 Before an attempt is 
made on state power, the proletariat must gradually assume leadership of all 
movements engaged in popular democratic struggles. It must assume 
leadership of all the social organisations of civil society in order to erode 
bourgeois ideological dominance. In Gramsci's words: 
A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning 
governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such 
power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds 
it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well.33 
In this respect, the working class must become the leading political and 
31 Loc.cit. 
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cultural force in a system of alliances with other classes and social forces. 
For the working class to win over other classes and social forces to the 
revolutionary movement it is necessary for it to make compromises and to 
strive for intermediate objectives. In other words, the working class must 
present itself as the leading movement in the struggle for the demands and 
objectives of other social forces and movements. 
This does not mean that the proletariat must "put off its class interests in 
the name of the immediacy of the moment" .34 In the process, proletarian 
ideology will be infused in the consciousness of other class groups and 
social forces providing the basis for a transformation of class and political 
relations . The war of position , therefore, is an ideological struggle at the level 
of civil society in which proletarian consciousness is promoted and expanded, 
and in which the hegemony of the working class is achieved. 
Gramsci's theory of hegemony is derived from the Leninist principle of 
political direction. For Lenin, hegemony or political direction is achieved by 
the working class under the leadership of its revolutionary Party. In other 
words, the revolutionary Party assumes political leadership of all struggles in 
society, provid ing political direction to all social forces opposed to Tsarist rule. 
Gramsci extends Lenin's concept of hegemony in two respects: firstly its 
extension to the bourgeoisie and then the addition of a new and fundamental 
dimension (since it is through this that unity at the political level will be 
achieved), that of intellectual and moral direction. In this sense, a hegemonic 
class is one which is able to articulate the interests of other social groups 
to its own by means of an ideological struggle.35 
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Gramsci's concept of hegemony starts from the point that a class exercises 
power over its subordinate classes by means of a combination of coercion 
(political domination) and consent (intellectual and moral leadership). 
Hegemony, for Gramsci , is achieved when a fundamental class (bourgeoisie 
or proletariat) has achieved its predominance through consent. A hegemonic 
class is one which , through political and ideological struggle, has gained the 
consent of other classes and social groups by fusing its economic, political, 
intellectual and moral objectives with those of other classes or social forces 
allied to it. The medium through which consent is achieved is ideology, and 
hegemony is achieved when the ideology has "spread throughout the whole 
of society determining not only united economic and political objectives but 
also intellectual and moral unity".36 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony goes beyond the idea of a simple class 
alliance. Hegemony for Gramsci is the indissoluble union of political leadership 
and intellectual and moral leadership.37 It refers to the process by which the 
working class establishes its leadership over all the forces opposed to 
capitalism , thereby creating "a new, homogeneous politico-economic historical 
bloc", united to achieve common economic, political , and intellectual 
objectives.38 
Furthermore, the war of position, according to Gramsci , is only a stage in 
the struggle, the one in which the new hegemonic bloc cements itself. Once 
the proletariat has established hegemony (providing political direction and 
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words, Gramsci is arguing that in Western societies the war of movement 
must be delayed until the war of position has borne fruit. Yet the war of 
movement remains the supreme goal. 
To sum up: Gramsci does not relegate the Leninist concept of direct military 
assault on the state to an insignificant position . Rather, his emphasis on 
ideology and class alliance in the war of position involves an extension of 
Lenin's concept of hegemony to include conditions in societies where civil 
society is complex and highly developed.39 This is not a departure from 
Lenin, but an important contribution to Marxist theory and practice under 
conditions where consent (ideological and moral control) is the major form of 
domination by the ruling class. In addition, Gramsci identified the war of 
position with "the formula of the United Front".40 
A few points need to be emphasized here. Firstly, Lenin placed emphasis 
on the formation of a revolutionary alliance in the first stage - the 
democratic revolution - of his two-stage theory of revolution . This would also 
bring the working class together with all forces interested in overthrowing the 
ruling bloc but not in the immediate transition to socialism. Thus, the 
demands of class war must be subordinated to those of the national-
democratic struggle. During this stage, the revolutionary Party must lead all 
forms of protest against the ruling bloc, uniting the separate currents of 
protest into a single stream, regardless of their origin or what class interests 
they represent. Lenin also stressed the importance of political struggle, and 
of the role of the revolutionary Party in spreading social ist consciousness 
throughout the working class. 
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Secondly, Gramsci placed emphasis on the formation of a historical bloc, 
united to achieve common economic, political, and intellectual objectives. Here 
the working class establishes its political , intellectual and moral leadership by 
fusing its economic, political , intellectual and moral objectives with those of 
other classes or social forces allied to it. Gramsci also stressed the role of 
political and ideological struggle through which the working class achieves its 
leadership (hegemony) over other classes or social forces allied to it. Here 
Gramsci is expanding both Lenin's concept of alliances and his theory of 
political direction through his strategy of the war of position and his theory 
of hegemony. Furthermore, both theories of revolutionary strategy give rise 
to United Front tactics. Since this is the case, it becomes possible to apply 
Gramsci's strategy of the war of position to Lenin's first stage - the 
democratic revolution - under very specific conditions. 
This would involve a revolutionary alliance striving for a national-democratic 
revolution in a higly complex civil society in which revolutionary consciousness 
is promoted and expanded through the formation of a united front 
organisation. Thus, a LeninistlGramscian model of a United Front strategy 
would have the following essential requirements: 
(1) the necessity of mass mobilisation and organisation around all struggles 
in civil society which are primarily directed against the ruling bloc; 
(2) the necessity of creating a broad alliance of social forces under a 
minimum programme during that stage of struggle which leads to a 
democratic revolution ; and 
(3) the necessity for political and ideological struggle in which revolutionary 
consciousness is promoted and expanded. 
The first requirement would lead to a highly complex civil society which 
makes the application of Gramci's war of position possible during the 
democratic revolution . The second would be the realization of Gramsci's 
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historical bloc through the formation of a united front during this stage. The 
third would be a political and ideological struggle to transform all popular 
struggles into a universal challenge of the dominant system, and which is 
aimed at a national-democratic revolution. 
2.3. Strategy and Tactics of the Liberation Movement 
The national question in South Africa came under discussion at the Sixth 
World Congress of the Communist International (Com intern) in 1928. South 
Africa was seen as an outpost of the imperialist-capitalist world with an 
indigenous form of capitalism in the making. The majority of the working 
population , the "native races" , were suffering under a combined system of 
economic exploitation and racial discrimination. It was necessary, therefore, 
to campaign initially for a democratic revolution to remove racial discrimination 
and , thereafter, a social revolution which would bring the major means of 
production under the control of the proletariat. The leading political force in 
the struggle for an "independent native republic, as a stage towards a 
workers' and peasants' republic" was to be the "native races". The 
Communist Party of South Africa should therefore strive to develop the 
awareness of the black population in collaboration with other organisations, 
in particular, the ANC.41 
The 1962 programme of the Communist Party defined social ism as the goal 
of a future South Africa ; called for alliances with all those struggling to 
overthrow the system of racist capitalism; accepted the goals of the ANC's 
Freedom Charter as the "immediate" aims of the liberation struggle; justified 
the use of specific forms of violence as a means to overthrow the 
government; and , finally, identified the Communist Party as the vanguard of 
41 
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the working class.42 South Africa was seen as a class-divided society and 
characterised by "colonialism of a special type" (CST), in which one group 
of people dominated another within the same geographical area . 
This has two significant consequences. Firstly, the colonial subjection of 
blacks by whites prevents the emergence with in the black working class of 
a class consciousness because they identify themselves not in class but in 
racial terms. This is not a false consciousness, however, but a reflection of 
the most "immediate contradiction within South African society - between the 
oppressed people and their rulers" .43 Secondly, national consciousness (as 
opposed to class consciousness) is promoted because of the common 
experience of subjection to racial domination and exploitation among all black 
people.44 As such, Lenin's strategic guidelines for national liberation were 
applicable to the South African situation . 
These guidelines called for a strategic alliance with all forces fighting for 
national independence. Thus, there is no immediate transition to socialism, 
but a phase of national-democratic struggle leading to a national-democratic 
revolution . The revolutionary struggle was divided into a number of phases. 
The first phase was the liberation struggle of the SACP/ANC alliance through 
the military wing of the ANC; the second was the national democratic era 
of the implementation of the principles of the Charter as a result of the 
• successful overthrow of the South African state; the third phase was the 
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lines of Marxism-Leninism in a pure socialist state.45 
The SACP has consistently held to the "two-stage theory" of revolution 
advocated by Lenin. The first stage. the national-democratic revolution. creates 
the conditions for. and is the transitional stage to. the socialist revolution.46 
The 1984 co"nstitution of the SACP declared that its aim is to lead the 
working class towards the strategic goal of establishing a socialist republic 
"and the more immediate aim of winning the objectives of the national-
democratic revolution which is inseparably linked to it". The main contents of 
the national-democratic revolution are 
... the national liberation of the African people in particular, and the black people in 
general. the destruction of the economic and political power of the racist rul ing class, and 
the establishment of one united state of people's power in which the working class will 
move uninterruptedly towards the social emancipation and the total abolition of the 
exploitation of man by man. (Author's emphasis}.47 
The ANC also argued that the path to socialism was through the national-
democratic revolution . with an emphasis on the latter. The ANC held that 
the chief content of the present stage of the revolution is the national liberation of the 
Black people. It is actually impossible for South Africa to make even that advance to 
socialism before the national liberation of the black oppressed nation.48 
Despite the similar positions held by the SACP and ANC with regard to the 
two stages in the revolution. it would be incorrect to view this as simply a 
reflection of dominance by the SACP. Both the ANC and the SACP viewed 
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struggle to achieve the economic and political aspirations of the ANC's 
Freedom Charter.49 The essential difference is the emphasis placed on the 
first stage by the ANC and on the second stage by the SACP. 
Within the ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance, revolutionary consciousness can be 
identified at two levels: the ANC's emphasis on the national-democratic 
liberation struggle; and the SACP's emphasis on the struggle for socialism. 
For the ANC, the revolutionary idea was based on opposition to all forms 
of apartheid exploitation and domination and was aimed at the destruction of 
apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial , non-sexist, democratic and 
unitary South Africa. 
For the SACP, however, revolutionary consciousness meant going beyond the 
phase of the national-democratic revolution, leading ultimately to the establish-
ment of a developed socialist state. However, it is only after a successful 
struggle for national democracy and the realisation of the aims of the 
Freedom Charter that the transition to socialism can be put on the immediate 
political agenda. Thus, there is no immediate transition to socialism, but a 
phase of national-democratic struggle leading to a national-democratic 
revolution . Consequently, the ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance emphasized not 
the promotion and expansion of socialist consciousness among the masses, 
but the consciousness of political domination and economic exploitation under 
apartheid and the objective of national liberation. 
An extensive amount of literature has been written on the relationship 
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between the Freedom Charter and socialism.50 Four views dominate the 
debate. The first rejects the Freedom Charter as a blueprint for socialism. 
The second view is that the aims of the Charter can only be realised in a 
socialist society. The third view sees the Freedom Charter as favouring 
neither socialism or capitalism at the explicit expense of the other. The final 
view sees the Charter as an expression of the will of the people. 
The SACP, however, did not see the Freedom Charter as a socialist 
document51 but included in the stage of the national-democratic revolution 
a phase which is the "national democratic era of the implementation of the 
principles of the Charter as a result of the successful overthrow of the South 
African state". This is to be followed by the establishment of a people's 
democracy and thereafter a pure socialist state. Thus, for the SACP, the 
Freedom Charter is the minimum programme around which the national 
democratic revolution can be organised and which sets out the economic and 
political basis for the transition to socialism. The ANC also argued that the 
path to socialism was through the national democratic revolution with an 
emphasis on the latter. In this respect, the goal of the national democratic 
revolution was the destruction of apartheid and the formation of a democracy 
on the lines of the Freedom Charter. 
The birth of Umkonto we Sizwe (MK) , the ANC's military wing , in December 
1961 marked a departure from the organisation's prior strategy of negotiation 
and passive disobedience. This departure in strategy occurred in an 
50 
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environment which eroded the possibility of a peaceful transition to a non-
racial society. Given the intransigence of successive apartheid regimes, and 
the constant harassment of organisations and their supporters, the armed 
struggle became one crucial element of the ANC's revolutionary strategy 
(which included other forms of opposition and protest). 52 
The ANC's 1969 strategic document, Strategy and Tactics of the South 
African Revolution, stipulated that economic exploitation and political domination 
in South Africa were maintained by the use of force. It went on to add that 
the "enemy" could draw on numerous internal and external resources to 
defend apartheid rule. Under conditions where there "is a vast imbalance of 
material and military resources between the opposing sides", guerrilla warfare 
was the most viable form of struggle.53 A sabotage campaign (directed at 
government installations) had three main purposes. It was intended to draw 
in suitable recruits for the guerrilla movement, to demonstrate an open break 
with previous methods of resistance and , finally, to indicate the ANC's 
intention to overthrow "white supremacy through armed struggle rather than 
spontaneous activity". 54 
The document acknowledged the importance of political struggle, stressing that 
"the continued support of the mass of the people has to be won in all-round 
political mobilisation which must accompany the military activities". Political 
mobilisation would be conducted by establishing organisational structures for 
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involvement was vital if the movement was going to present an effective 
challenge to the authorities: popular participation in the struggle and the 
"primacy of political leadership" over it would correct any tendencies towards 
militarism. 55 
During the early 1970s the ANC's internal political work involved the creation 
of a permanent network of ANC cells to undertake political duties. After the 
Soweto revolt, the focus of these cells was directed towards influencing 
potentially sympathetic legal organisations. The ANC focused on four 
organisations: the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), the Port 
Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO), the South African Allied Workers' 
Union (SAAWU), and Inkatha. From the beginning of 1978 the "Internal 
Reconstruction and Development Department" in Lusaka co-ordinated the 
formation of groups in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to .supervise the 
creation of an internal network of ANC cells.56 
In the late seventies, the upsurge of internal popular struggles and general 
acceptance within ANC circles that the armed struggle on its own was 
insufficient led to a transformation of revolutionary strategy. 57 In 1978 a high 
profile ANC delegation visited Vietnam and conducted a study of the 
revolutionary strategy the Vietcong used against France and the United 
States. According to Barrell, the delegation identified a number of general 
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... that political struggle was primary in all phases of revolution; that revolution could 
succeed only through the united strength of the "masses" of people expressing itself in 
organised political activity; that it was necessary to build the broadest possible national 
front around a minimum programme to unite all classes and strata in revolutionary 
struggle; that it was necessary at all times to try to create legal and semi-legal 
organisations, and for the revolutionary vanguard to try to lead these forces on the basis 
of what it considered the correct policies; that the revolutionary vanguard should maintain 
its own independence while working with other broader forces; that revolutionary armed 
struggle could succeed only if it grew out of a mass political base, and; that revolutionary 
violence was necessary for revolutionary victory, but that this violence had to be 
constantly assessed and controlled to maintain a correct relationship with the political 
struggle. 58 
In January 1979, the ANC appointed a commission to review its strategy, 
tactics and operational structures. The commission's recommendations were 
formally adopted by the ANC in August 1979.59 According to Barrell, this 
strategic review "was among the more important factors in the formation of 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 and , indeed, in the commence-
ment of many of the popular political campaigns which characterised anti-
apartheid activity in the 1980s". 60 
The new strategy, adopted in August 1979, the four-pillar people's revolution-
ary war strategy, involved: the international isolation of the apartheid regime; 
a sabotage campaign against state institutions to encourage people to actively 
support the armed struggle; the mobilisation of the masses to actively resist 
apartheid ; and the establishment of people's power in black areas.61 
By the beginning of the 1980s there was general agreement among members 
of the ANC's underground machinery and External Mission, as well as the 
wide range of independent anti-apartheid activists working legally inside the 
58 
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country on the need to transform resistance tactics. This followed from the 
recognition that the struggle would only be successful if the masses were 
actively involved.62 According to Barrell: 
... a new stress was laid on the ability of black working people to paralyse the South 
African economy; on the capacity of the youth and other militant popular forces to inflict 
heavy damage on the organs of state administration and coercion; and on the ability of 
'progressive' artists and intellectuals to undermine the ideological underpinnings of 
apartheid and promote alternatives. It provided a reasonably coherent model , under South 
African conditions, for what was described as 'people's war' - the full and protracted 
engagement of the widest possible spread of resistance and revolutionary forces in all 
political, economic, military and ideological modes of struggle for national liberation.63 
This position was reflected in a statement adopted by the Central Committee 
of the SACP in 1983. 
The road to people's power requires not only regional responses to unpopular measures 
but also a united national offensive, involving the mass of the people in town and 
countryside, uniting all the black oppressed and mobilising the support of all classes and 
strata who reject the rule of racist autocracy. The regime's attempt to perpetuate white 
minority rule by fragmenting our people and our country must be vigorously challenged 
by the masses and counterposed by the vision of one South Africa - united, democratic 
and non-racial.64 
The ANC dropped the notion that it would wage a guerrilla war similar to 
those conducted in Angola , Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Instead, the key to 
progress lay in what was termed "the development of insurrectionary forces 
and tactics", by expanding its internal political networks and the construction 
of a united political front to oppose apartheid .65 
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revolutionary base by carving open and occupying legal and semi-legal 
political space inside South Africa. This involved five objectives: to build a 
united front of anti-apartheid community organisations operating legally and 
semi-legally inside South Africa; to win members of the front's affiliates and 
the affiliates themselves politically to positions aligned to the ANC; to recruit 
from among promising members of the front's affiliates new cadres for the 
ANC underground; to deploy armed activity in the interim as a secondary 
means of stimulating political consciousness, combativity and organisation, and; 
to build a revolutionary political base inside South Africa enabling engagement 
in a protracted people's war punctuated by insurrectionary activity.66 
For the SACP, a "socialist content" would be established In the national 
democratic struggle by popularising socialism and promoting the acceptance 
and understanding of Marxist-Leninist ideology within the "national liberation 
movement"; consolidating underground Party structures and the establishment 
of an organised Party presence in all sectors and structures of the "national 
liberation movement"; and creating socialist forms of political and social 
organisation as represented by "organs of people's power".67 
The implementation of the people's war revolutionary strategy was preceded 
by a four-year organisational and propaganda campaign. The ANC declared 
1980 the "Year of the Freedom Charter", 1981 the "Year of the Youth", 1982 
the "Year of Unity in Action", and 1983 the "Year of United Action".68 
During the early 1980s the ANC embarked on campaigns "in alliance with 
a variety of groupings and constituencies which constituted a vital weaving 
66 
Barrell ,H. (1990); op.cit., p.70. 
67 
Styles,D. (1989); op.cit., p.22. 
68 
Booyse,w. (1989) ; op. cit. , p.35. Refer to Chapter 3, pp.115-117. 
61 
of diverse interests into the overall tapestry of struggle" .69 According to 
Fitzgerald, the ANC stimulated the development of a close working 
relationship between the churches and the broad liberation alliance; took the 
lead in the formation of a variety of cultural organisations, community art 
projects and discipline-based working groups; stimulated the formation of 
national and non-sectarian professional organisations; participated in the 
formation of women's organisations; gave critical all-round support to all 
initiatives of white democrats, including the organisational efforts of white war 
resisters; and opened up channels of communication with such groups as 
Jews For Justice and black businessmen.7o 
In June 1985, the ANC presented the people's revolutionary war strategy at 
its consultative conference at Kabwe, Zambia. Without totally abandoning its 
strategy of armed propaganda (the use of guerrilla activity to popularise the 
armed struggle as part of a general strategy71), the organisation placed 
greater emphasis on the mobilisation of various forces in the country to 
participate in the liberation struggle. In its strategic document, Our Strategy 
and Tactics, the ANC focused on the mobilisation of the working class and 
organised labour, women , the rural masses, and the youth and students, and 
the formation of civic organisations.72 The aim here was to increase 
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To sum up: firstly, the SACP adopted Lenin's "two-stage" theory of revolution 
based on the "colonialism of a special type" thesis. This gave rise to the 
strategic alliance between the SACP and the ANC and the focus on the 
national-democratic revolution under the ANC's Freedom Charter. Secondly, the 
alliance elaborated a "people's war revolutionary strategy" based, among other 
things, on the mobilisation of the widest possible coalition of forces in a 
broad national front of organisations to oppose the apartheid regime. Thus, 
the period of the national liberation struggle was to involve a programme of 
popular mobilisation and the formation of a united front, which would be 
punctuated by an intensified sabotage campaign and other forms of struggle. 
The ANC's four-year organisational and propaganda campaign culminated in 
the formation of the UDF in 1983.73 
The strategic and tactical aims of the revolutionary alliance were heavily 
influenced by the writings of Lenin and the practical experiences of 
Vietnamese revolutionaries. However, a complex relationship existed between 
revolutionary intentions and concrete developments in the country. The 
people's war strategy was "directed at the accomplishment of a particular 
political objective: an insurrectionary seizure of power". 74 Although revolution-
ary developments in the 1980s did include mass mobilisation and 
organisation, the formation of a united front, and widespread insurrection 
punctuated by guerrilla warfare, it did not lead to a general uprising and the 
seizure of state power. 
Instead, it is argued here that the formation of the UDF and revolutionary 
developments during the period of review accorded with the 
73 
74 
See Barrell ,H. (1990) ; op.cit. 





0S . In Moss.G. and Obery,l. (eds.); South African Review 5. (Johannesburg. Ravan Press). 
p . . 
63 
LeninistlGramscian model of a United Front strategy - increasing the 
complexity of civil society by establishing mass organisations, creating a 
historical bloc in opposition to the ruling bloc, and expanding the revolutionary 
consciousness of the masses. These strategic and tactical objectives have 
their parallels in some aspects of the ANC's new revolutionary strategy and 
tactics: mass organisation and resistance; the creation of a united front to 
challenge white minority rule; and winning members of the front's affiliates 
and the affiliates themselves politically to the ANC's positions. 
It is the LeninistlGramscian emphasis on the importance of the political and 
ideological struggle during the stage of struggle leading to a democratic 
revolution that sets it apart from other models of a United Front strategy. 
In addition, it is this factor which makes it the most appropriate model for 
an explanation of revolutionary developments during the period of review: the 
promotion and expansion of the revolutionary idea and its spread throughout 
civil society during the struggle for a democratic society. 
In Gramsci's war of position , revolutionary consciousness results from a 
gradual shift in the balance of social and cultural forces towards the working 
class. This is a political and ideological struggle in which the working class 
strives to achieve its political , ideological, intellectual and moral leadership 
over all classes and social forces allied to it. However, it is Lenin's two-
stage theory of revolution and the importance of the struggle for political 
freedom - the democratic revolution - that assumes significance here. Thus, 
the LeninistlGramscian model is the application of the war of position to that 
stage of struggle leading to a democratic revolution. In this sense, revolution-
ary consciousness arises from the transformation of the particular demands 
of various social classes and forces into a universalistic political challenge of 
the dominant system, and which is directed at a democratic revolution. This 
does not mean, however, that the promotion and expansion of socialist 
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consciousness is ignored. Rather, the demands of class ideology and class 
war are subordinated to those of the national democratic struggle. 
What were the main characteristics of the revolutionary situation during the 
1980s?75 Firstly, there was a general drive to create disciplined and highly 
structured township organisations with a strong commitment to mass participa-
tion, democratic practices and accountability. Civic associations, student, youth 
and women's organisations took root in scores of townships and villages 
throughout the country. These organisations emerged in response to a wide 
range of socio-economic and political issues, including unemployment, rent and 
bus-fare increases, working conditions, political reforms, etc. Community 
organisations were also formed as a result of the conscious organisational 
efforts of political activists.76 
Second was the formation of the UDF77 and a subsequent upsurge in 
popular resistance reaching almost insurrectionary levels by the mid-eighties.78 
Thirdly, the organisational developments and popular resistance gave rise to 
a common national political culture that had its roots in a long tradition of 
resistance to white minority rule. The main components of this political culture 
were: the rejection of, and opposition to, apartheid structures and modes of 
domination and the development of alternative structures and practices by the 
mass-based organisations to govern their own daily living (organs of dual 
power, people's courts , people's education, etc.); the adoption of a strategy 
based on "unity-in-action" and the mobilisation of grass-roots organisations 
75 
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formed around local issues; the consolidation of a political language with its 
own slogans, freedom songs and symbols; an ideological system expressed 
in such documents as the Freedom Charter; and the articulation of a set of 
common demands such as the release of political prisoners, the unbanning 
of organisations and the establishment of a non-racial , non-sexist, democratic 
and unitary South Africa.79 
What were the factors underlying these organisational and ideological 
developments? What were the forces which gave rise to the emergence and 
proliferation of community organisations? What accounted for the emergence 
of this national political culture? These questions are partially answered by 
looking at the structural conditions of social transformation which existed 
during the late 1970s and the 1980s. 
2.4. Conditions of social transformation 
It is necessary to examine the way in which the form, content and 
organisation of political struggle are structured by the specific form of the 
political terrain and state. The structural conditions which mark the character 
of a particular historical period provide the specific context against which the 
content and direction of political struggles can be understood.eo The main 
political and economic conditions of social transformation include the 
transformation of structural forces in the political terrain, along with changes 
in the form and functioning of the state and state reforms. 
2.4.1. Structural forces in the political terrain : Structural forces in the 
political terrain play an important role in determining the responses of social 
actors to state reforms. Among these structural forces were the transformation 
79 
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of the economy and within it, the transformation of the African working class. 
During the 1970s, the increasing development of monopoly capitalist relations 
in South Africa resulted in "the progressive deskilling and increasing 
subordination of manual labour" as well as "the creation of a minority of 
specialized supervisory and mental wage-earning places" for African 
workers. 81 This process of deskilling and the mechanization of skilled 
production tasks resulted in a highly complex and diverse African working 
class. This was a radical transformation of the African working class from the 
"homogeneous, largely migrant, and unskilled proletariat with little formal 
training or education" of the 1960s.82 According to Wolpe: 
The black working class of the 1970s was first of all better educated than previous-
ly .... Secondly. it contained a considerable proportion of semi-skilled and .. . stable urbanised 
workers. Therefore. it became less easily replaceable. particularly under conditions of 
labour shortages. Above all . its political formation took place in the relatively sheltered 
environment of the schools in which an oPPositional ideological movement. particularly 
in the form of Black Consciousness. was growing in the late 1960s and early 1970s.83 
African workers soon became aware of their power as a class. The late 
1970s and early 1980s was characterised by an unprecedented organisational 
drive and a wave of industrial action which epitomized this power. In 
addition, this period was marked by the increasing politicisation of African 
workers. 84 This was evident in the emergence of unions involved in 
mobilising around community and broader pOlitical issues, the formation of 
shop steward councils which mobilised around "nonproduction" issues, the 
mobilisation of consumer boycotts in support of strike-action, and the 
81 
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prominent role played by trade unionists in the formation and leadership of 
community organisations. 
Another important structural force was the transformation of the economy and 
the manner in which it affected the economic and other conditions of the 
black population. These transformations were reflected in the growing 
contradictory relationship between racial domination and capitalist exploitation, 
short-term economic crises, and the effects of a general crisis of capitalism. 
During the 1970s the South African economy underwent a restructuring 
towards a new phase of monopoly. Towards the end of the decade the 
significance of these structural changes became apparent as massive 
structural unemployment and sharply declining living standards were added to 
the other problems faced by the African population.8s Another effect was an 
increasing contradiction between the needs of the monopoly economic sector 
and racial domination as monopoly capitalists stepped up their call for the 
abolition of certain racist practices. Under these conditions the state was 
unable to stifle political opposition in the way and to the extent it had been 
able to do in the 1960s, thus providing space for the emergence and growth 
of community organisations.86 Furthermore, unfavourable economic conditions 
place constraints on the state's ability to make concessions to the black 
population, increase unemployment and make it more difficult for workers to 
successfully strike for higher wages. In addition, living conditions are 
subjected to rising costs in transport, rent, food , etc. The impact on the 
black population of the worsening economic conditions during the early to 
mid-1980s encouraged participation in the existing organisations. It also 
resulted in the emergence of new organisations where none existed . 
85 
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The economy moved into recession at the beginning of 1982 with GOP 
falling by almost 3 percent between 1981 and 1983. This was accompanied 
by a dramatic drop in the price of gold . Food prices rose sharply while a 
cash-strapped government, with reduced revenues from taxation , cut 
expenditure in all areas. This pressure on living costs was exacerbated by 
the government's attempt to raise revenue by increasing General Sales Tax 
in 1984. The state also reduced expenditure on black education and reduced 
contributions to township councils.87 This recession resulted in massive black 
unemployment, which reached three million in 1985.88 The resultant drop in 
the living standards of the black population gave rise to numerous struggles 
throughout the country. 
In addition, the country's dependence on the world economy - as exporter 
of minerals, secondary manufactures and agricultural products, as importer of 
oil and a wide range of technology and machinery - exposed it to the 
negative effects of global recession. This was exacerbated by a falling gold 
price and in the share of South African exports entering other African 
countries once the former Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe restructured 
their economies away from South Africa. 89 The structural limitations of the 
South African economy, characterised as well by a limited internal market, 
resulted in an economic crisis which fed black resistance. The late 1970s 
and early 1980s saw the emergence of numerous community organisations 
waging struggles around rent, food and transport increases, and against 
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2.4.2. Changes in the form and functioning of the state: During the late 
1970s and early 1980s changes were instituted in the form and functions of 
certain apparatuses of the state. These changes effectively reduced the role 
of the Cabinet, resulted in the penetration of the military and security 
apparatuses into the political decision-making institutions of the state, and led 
to an ever-increasing concentration of power in these institutions. In addition, 
the transformation of the state resulted in a centralisation of power in the 
executive as parliamentary control over the former was progressively 
weakened. 
In September 1978, P.W. Botha, the former Minister of Defence, became 
Prime Minister in the wake of the Information Scandal which reduced the 
power of conservative elements in the government. The new Prime Minister 
rapidly reorganised the structures and institutions of the state in order to 
institutionalise the centralisation of power. The first step in this process was 
the reduction of the number of government departments from 39 to 22. The 
replacement of the Cabinet as the executive decision-making authority was 
carried out by reducing the number of cabinet committees to four and 
making these committees responsible for Cabinet functions. The Prime Minister 
or his nominee headed each of these committees which effectively became 
the highest decision-making bodies in the government. The members of the 
cabinet committees, who were not necessarily drawn from Parliament, were 
appointed by the Prime Minister. The membership of these committees was 
a state secret and they had power over matters which were not subject to 
Parliamentary review. 
These changes resulted in the virtual abolition of the Cabinet as the highest 
decision-making structure in the state and reduced executive responsibility to 
Parliament. The permanent cabinet committees took over the functions which 
were constitutionally the prerogative of the Cabinet. In addition , power was 
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centralised in the executive with the Prime Minister, as chairman of all the 
committees, having the power to appoint members to the committees. The 
most powerful government body, the State Security Council (SSC) , consisted 
of senior Cabinet Ministers, senior military, police and intelligence personnel, 
and the heads of the main departments in the civil service and senior 
planners. The SSC became involved in almost every aspect of government 
as the definition of security was broadened. Security was defined as the 
preservation of the state against threat from any source and was therefore 
"broad enough to embrace virtually every area of government action both at 
home and abroad". 90 The SSC was mandated to scrutinise all aspects of 
policy ("regional policy, economic policy, man-power planning , constitutional 
planning") which were "influenced by security and internal stability consider-
ations".91 
The SSC was at the apex of a parallel system of government based on the 
National Security Management System (NSMS). The NSMS was first 
established in 1979 to eliminate competition between state departments but 
soon became an alternative to parliamentary and cabinet government. At the 
regional , district and local levels, the SSC was supported by a network of 
over 500 Joint Management Committees (JMCs) comprised of military, police 
and civilian officials, including business and black local government officials. 
The major function of these committees was state security and this was 
apparent in their committee structure. Three of the four committees which 
made up each JMC were concerned respectively with intelligence, security 
and communications. The JMCs provided a civilian political base for the 
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security forces and used detailed local information to formulate strategies to 
combat opposition.92 
By the early 1980s the South African state was characterised as "an 
institutionalised system of repression that is dedicated to preserving the 
political and economic superiority of an entire racial group" .93 South Africa's 
security system was designed to be a comprehensive response to revolution-
ary activity and was capable of extensive and systematic repression . The 
purpose of this system was to: 
[1] counter what the state believes is a revolutionary onslaught against it. In practice, this 
means crushing all popular organisations working for radical political and economic 
transformation outside official structures; [2] to contain political resistance on an ongoing 
basis ... [3] to co-ordinate a far-reaching "hearts and mind" strategy by improving social 
and material conditions in black areas ... [4] to act as an early warning system, spotting 
potential problems and dealing with them on a military or material level , before they erupt 
in open revolt.94 
The transformation in the form and functioning of the state resulted in the 
construction of "a parliamentary regime with great power centralised in a 
militarised executive".95 The rationale behind these changes lay in the policy 
of "Total Strategy" formulated by the security apparatuses of the state. This 
strategy was devised to counter what was perceived as a total internal and 
international onslaught against South Africa. 
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Organisation (SWAPO) in neighbouring Namibia (which began to escalate after 
1966), and its collaboration with the Rhodesian police and Portuguese military 
in the late 1960s against national liberation movements in Rhodesia and the 
former colonies respectively, shaped security thinking within the politico-military 
establishment. The military identified the main threat as external : that the 
Soviet Union was mounting an international campaign through the ANC and 
other liberation movements to bring about the spread of communism in 
Southern Africa. This led to another significant element of Total Strategy: the 
regional destabilisation strategy which aimed at undermining those African-
dominated governments on the borders of South Africa which were 
sympathetic to the ANC and PAC. These included direct military attacks on 
ANC and PAC targets in those countries, support for insurgent movements 
as well as economic pressure.96 
In addition to the reorganisation of the state apparatuses, "Total Strategy" 
included a restructuring of the recruitment of African labour and an attempt 
to transform the struggle of the black majority against white minority rule. 97 
These included the recognition of the permanence of Africans in the "white" 
urban areas, the extension of trade union rights to African workers , and the 
introduction of new urban local government structures and a new constitutional 
dispensation. 
The state recognised the permanence of Africans in the urban areas under 
the recommendations of the Riekert Commission (the Commission of Inquiry 
into Legislation affecting the Utilisation of Manpower). Africans living in and 
around the white urban areas were given the right to property, association, 
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movement and representation that had hitherto been denied to them.96 The 
state introduced freehold property rights for urban Africans, relaxed influx 
control for urban Africans between the white urban areas, and extended the 
powers of Slack Local Authorities (SLAs). 
The recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission (the Commission of Inquiry 
into Labour Legislation) , led to the recognition of African workers as bona 
fide workers, while African trade unions could apply for registration and were 
able to participate in the Industrial Council system. 
In 1977, the state introduced elected community councils which were made 
responsible for the administration of African urban townships. The Black Local 
Authorities Act (1982) provided for the upgrading of the community councils, 
presenting the new town councils as additional "political rights" for urban 
Africans. SLAs were to be politically autonomous and were thus given wider 
powers than the community councils . The new local authorities were also 
made self-financing , thus relieving the central state of the burden of financing 
urbanisation. SLAs, faced with enormous deficits inherited from the community 
councils, and without an effective tax-base in the form of local industries, 
were forced to increase rent and service charges to raise revenue.99 
A new constitutional dispensation provided for a tri-cameral Parliament 
including coloureds and Indians. Coloureds and Indians were given their own 
houses of Parliament linked to Ministers Councils which were responsible for 
the administration of "own affairs". Under this new dispensation , however, 
effective political power remained in the hands of the white government. The 
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introduction of the new constitutional dispensation and the BLAs provoked an 
unprecedented level of protest and mass organisation. National co-ordination 
to oppose the tri-cameral parliament and the BLAs escalated with the 
formation of the UDF. 
Thus, the main structural factors which shaped popular resistance in the 
1980s were the emergence of militant worker and youth contingents, the 
existence of an institutionalised political system maintained by a powerful 
regime with a considerable repressive capability, and the proliferation of 
community organisations born in the context of popular struggles. The ' 
formation of the UDF in 1983 revitalised nationalist politics leading to 
unprecedented organisational and ideological achievements. 
The following chapter provides an analysis of the internal political situation 
during the period 1960-1987. Five broad periods stand out in the develop-
ment of popular resistance. The first was the destruction of political 
organisations during the period 1960-1963, which was followed by a period 
of relative quiescence until 1973. From 1973 to 1977, popular resistance was 
revitalised by the 1973 Durban strikes and subsequent developments in the 
African trade union movement and trade union struggles. This period was 
also influenced by the BCM which laid the basis for the 1976 Soweto revolt 
and the development of the revolutionary idea. From late 1977 to mid-1979 
state repression placed constraints on popular resistance. Finally, the period 
1979 to 1987 was characterised by the emergence and proliferation of 
grassroots organisations and movements concerned with issues such as rent , 
transport, etc., and the increasing co-operation of trade union, student/youth 
and community-based organisations in popular protest. 
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Chapter 3 
POPULAR STRUGGLES AND THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITY 
ORGANISATIONS, 1960-1987 
3.1. Introduction 
The principal concerns of this chapter are the absence of an effective 
national political movement in the country during the period from 1960 to 
1983 and the emergence and growth of community organisations from 1979. 
The focus in the first section of the chapter is on the low level of political 
activity (with the exception of student struggles) during the 1960s; the 1973 
Durban strikes and subsequent developments in the African trade union 
movement and trade union struggles; the Black Consciousness Movement . 
(BCM) and the Soweto revolt; the emergence and proliferation of grass-roots 
organisations; and the increasing co-operation of trade unions, student and 
youth, and community-based organisations in popular protest. 
The central argument here is that despite increasing popular resistance during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, this period was one in which popular 
struggles were generally unco-ordinated and confined to single issues. The 
popular movements up to 1983 were characteristically small national activist 
groups with an original membership base measured in terms of tens of 
thousands of supporters at the most. There was no legal popular movement 
in the country which could coordinate the struggles of the subordinate classes 
and transform single-issue campaigns and national struggles into general 
opposition against white rule. 
The second section of the chapter explores the emergence and growth of 
community organisations from 1979 onwards. The emergence and proliferation 
of community organisations followed a resurgence in militant black opposition 
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which began in the late 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s. 
Community organisations sprang up as a result of both local and national 
popular struggles - against apartheid institutions and the terms of labour 
reproduction - and the conscious efforts of political activists. 
It is argued here that the emergence and proliferation of community 
organisations during the late 1970s and the 1980s led to a highly complex 
civil society. Such a highly complex civil society was one of the essential 
requirements of the LeninistlGramscian United Front strategy. It set the basis 
for the formation of a United Front which could then become the centre of 
the variety of popular struggles for democratic rights, and those which 
express the demands of workers, women , students, and young people, as 
well as community movements of many kinds concerned with rent, transport, 
housing, and other issues. 
3.2. The destruction of Black opposition, 1960-1970 
The year 1960 was a watershed year for the black resistance movements 
in South Africa. This marked the beginning of a decade in which black 
resistance was silenced and in which repression led to the establishment of 
underground insurgency organisations and missions-in-exile by the major 
political organisations. The major events of this decade were the Sharpeville 
massacre on the 21st of March, 1960, the march on Parl iament in Cape 
Town on the 30th of March, 1960, the banning of the ANC and PAC on 
the 8th of April , 1960, the anti-Republic Day strike between the 29th and 
31st of May, 1961 , and the first acts of sabotage carried out by the ANC's 
military wing , Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) on the 16th of December, 1961.1 
Refer . to Davenport:T. (1 987); South Africa: A modern history, Third Edition, (Johannesburg, 
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The Sharpeville crisis and the mass-stay-at-home called for by the ANC and 
the PAC in 1960 provoked a firm response by the state. At this time the 
state had a number of repressive laws which permitted the containment of 
any opposition? These repressive powers, together with those which were 
enacted immediately after the Sharpeville massacre, provided the state with 
the means to curb popular struggles in the early 1960s. 
The ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) , was formed in November 
1961 and carried out its first acts of sabotage on the 16th December. This 
marked a change in strategy in which carefully planned sabotage was used 
"to pressure the government and to show blacks that violence could be 
closely controlled and guided by political objectives and strategy" .3 The PAC 
launched its own military organ, Poqo, which did not restrict its activities to 
sabotage but was prepared to attack whites , as well as Africans who 
collaborated with the white regime. An uprising in rural Pondoland (1957-
1960), which began in opposition to the introduction of Bantu Authorities and 
betterment schemes, set the stage for further uprisings in Thembuland in 
1962-3. Poqo was able to influence this uprising and to direct it towards 
attempts to murder the Paramount chief of the Emigrant Thembus, Chief 
Kaiser Matanzima.4 In addition, a small group of white radicals in the 
National Committee of Liberation (later renamed the African Resistance 
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Town and Johannesburg.s 
The government responded to these acts with new security legislation. Among 
these were the Unlawful Organisations Act (1960) which made it possible for 
the government to declare any organisation unlawful and to convict any 
person who performed acts calculated to further the aims of an illegal 
organisation . The Sabotage Act of 1962 carried a maximum penalty of death, 
and included within its scope peaceful actions such as those aimed at 
"disruption". The General Laws Amendment Act (1963) provided for the 
detention of people without trial. With this vast array of repressive legislation 
some 20,000 people were detained between 1960 and 1963.6 
In July 1963, the headquarters of MK was raided , its leaders captured and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. By mid-1963 more than 3,000 alleged Poqo 
members had been arrested or detained by the government, and 124 had 
been convicted of murder.7 By the end of 1964 the leadership of the 
internal organisations of the ANC and the PAC had been crushed by the 
operations of the repressive apparatuses of the state. The central focus for 
these organisations shifted to the expansion of external missions. The African 
Resistance Movement was infiltrated and destroyed.8 
The state also focused attention on the trade union movement during the 
early 1960s. The state did not ban the South African Congress of Trade 
Unions (SACTU) when it banned other organisations of the Congress Alliance. 
S 
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However, the organisational base of the trade union federation was destroyed 
by its political stance and its relationship with the ANC. Thus: 
By the mid-1960s, the crackdown on its unions and the flight of its offi cials had so 
crippled SACTU that it no longer functioned: for almost a decade the only African worker 
organisations were a handful of small , conservative unions within the Trade Union Council 
of South Africa (TUCSA)".9 
The ANC and the PAC were able to establish bases in Zambia and 
Tanzania respectively, but it "was difficult to mount infiltration campaigns, 
given its terrain , the strength of the defence forces and the ring of 
surrounding countries allied to Pretoria" .10 Although the ANC conducted joint 
campaigns with the Zimbabwean African Peoples Union (ZAPU) in the late 
1960s, and the PAC attempted to conduct campaigns from Swaziland, they 
both failed to penetrate South Africa. 11 
In the latter half of the decade new legislation was introduced to tighten the 
security apparatus.12 These included the fourteen-day detention by any 
commissioned officer above the rank of Lt. Colonel , restrictions on publica-
tions on defence, police and prison matters, the Terrorism Act of 1967 with 
new provisions for indefinite detention, and the establishment of the Bureau 
of State Security (BOSS) in 1969. 
As well as repressive legislation specifically intended to contain popular 
struggles, the state enacted legislation providing for control of the social life 
of the African population, thereby effectively curbing African political dissent. 
This process was conducted at two levels: firstly, the application of the 
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homeland policy; and secondly, the tightening of labour and influx controls. 
These two measures operated to reverse the flow of African urbanisation and 
to restructure the industrial workforce into one composed principally of migrant 
labour as well as to break down existing networks of social solidarity and 
hamper the creation of new ones.13 
As the state demonstrated its control through the suppression of organised 
political and trade union opposition after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, 
foreign capital was attracted back to South Africa.14 Direct investors moved 
to protect their investments in the economy, and United States interests, in 
an attempt to oust British capital from its dominant position in the economy, 
provided an inflow of capital. 15 Thus, despite the crisis of initial investor 
confidence, the 1960s was a period of unprecedented economic growth for 
the country. The gross national products grew by 5 percent per annum while 
unemployment was relatively low.16 
In sum, the 1960s was a period in which the South African state flexed its 
muscle to suppress popular resistance, refined its mechanisms of repression 
and control and managed the economic revival leading to an unprecedented 
rate of economic growth. 
3.3. The revival of popular struggles, 1970-1983 
The 1970s and early 1980s saw an upsurge of black working-class militancy 
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a new era of internal extra-parliamentary opposition in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The two organisations responsible for the origin , popularization 
and direction of the BCM were the South African Students Organisation 
(SASO) and the Black Peoples Convention (BPC) . 
The years from 1963 to 1968 were a period of ferment for many African 
students. There were three African student political movements during this 
period: the African Students' Association, sympathetic to the ANC; the African 
Students' Union, sympathetic to the PAC; and the Progressive National 
Students' Organisation. 17 However, the principal student movement at the 
time was the white-led , multi-racial National Union of South African Students 
(NUSAS) . 
In 1967 disenchantment with NUSAS emerged among African students 
because the predominantly white leadership was unable to reflect the 
particular concerns of African students. 18 In July 1969, SASO was estab-
lished for students on black campuses. SASO's guiding philosophy was the 
psychological liberation of blacks (which included coloureds and Indians) in 
an attempt to eradicate dependency on white leadership in the liberation 
struggle and shape of the post-apartheid society. Underlying this were notions 
of group assertion as a response to oppression and a reliance on indigenous 
cultural traditions. Psychological liberation would lead to solidarity among black 
people, thus paving the way for their mobilisation towards liberation. 
The events that marked the revival of popular struggles were the large-scale 
African workers' strikes in 1973. Industrial action in the early 1970s was 
initiated by the strike of 10,000 workers on the Namibian diamond mines. 
17 
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This strike wave spread to Durban where approximately 60,000 workers struck 
against low wages in 1973. The strike was taken up in the East London 
and Port Elizabeth industrial areas, spreading to the Witwatersrand , Cape 
Town, and elsewhere. 
The Durban strikes provided the impetus for industrial action and growth in 
the independent trade union movement. The government responded to the 
strikes by raising the minimum pay for unskilled workers , gave African 
workers a limited strike right and introduced works and liaison committees. 19 
Four worker organisations were now recruiting Africans in the main industrial 
centres. By August 31 , 1975, 59,440 Africans had been organised into 24 
trade unions, the majority of the organised workers (29,120) were members 
of unions affiliated to TUCSA. 20 
Regional events also played a significant role in promoting resistance within 
South Africa. In the first place, South Africa's security situation was 
transformed by the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Mozambique 
and Angola in 1974. In this respect, black liberation movements which were 
sympathetic to the ANC and PAC came to power in these countries. This 
led to a growing challenge, including guerrilla attacks, to apartheid at 
home.21 
Secondly, the defeat of the South African invasion of Angola by the MPLA 
and Cuban forces in 1975, the success of the liberation movements in 
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country, created an optimistic mood among blacks within the country. This 
was evident in the pro-Frelimo rallies organised by the SCM in celebration 
of the installation of the Frelimo government in September 1974. As one SC 
leader put it: "We thought if [FRELlMO] can do it, so can we; it just needs 
another push. There was a high level of optimism".22 
Before 1976, however, the BCM was confined to small activist organisations 
with limited membership numbers. Its policy of non-confrontation limited 
opportunities for mass mobilisation and its membership was largely confined 
to the black intelligentsia and students. A turning point in black opposition 
occurred in 1976. The Soweto uprising ushered in an era of mass 
mobilisation indicated by a mushrooming of community organisations, a growth 
in the independent trade union movement, increasing co-operation between 
student organisations and other community organisations, including trade 
unions, and continuous agitation on specific demands related to labour 
reproduction costs (rent, transport, social welfare, health). 
However, on 19 October, 1977, every major BCM organisation was banned, 
including SASO and the BPC. Although the authorities placed the blame for 
the Soweto revolt on the SCM, there is no evidence that the movement was 
directly responsible for it. 23 However, it is widely accepted that the philos-
ophy of the BCM was a significant factor in the outbreak of resistance by 
African stUdents in 1976. According to Price: 
22 
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and focusing on the common enemy.24 
The Soweto revolt resulted in the destruction of the organisational base of 
the SCM. State response to the uprising, in the form of bannings, detentions, 
political trials, led to the elimination of every political, cultural or social Slack 
Consciousness institution. As Charney points out, the SCM had no structural 
base which could continue to build and sustain the momentum of struggle 
once its leaders had been detained and its organisations banned.25 
Nonetheless, the Soweto revolt signalled the radicalizing of black resistance 
in South Africa. After 1976 there was a resurgence in the growth of trade 
unions; increasing links between trade union struggles and the communities, 
in particular, the students; and an unprecedented growth in the number of 
community organisations engaged in struggles against rent and transport 
increases, the education system, etc. The state's response to the revolt was 
twofold: increased state violence, detentions, and bannings; and the relaxation 
of certain aspects of apartheid in an attempt to channel black communities 
into directions less threatening to the status quO.26 
During the second half of 1976 a process began which led to the virtual 
collapse of the independent trade union movement. These included , among 
others, a slump in the economy in the wake of the Soweto revolt resulting 
in wide-spread retrenchments, and the banning of twenty two trade union 
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activists in November 1976.27 
At the same time, it became evident that repression was inadequate to 
control black workers and to ensure high levels of productivity and the 
development of the potentially large internal market. 28 Certain employers 
began to demand the rationalisation of the industrial relations system because 
they realised that the absence of channels of negotiation and the relative 
lack of organisation of black workers promoted labour action . In 1977 the 
government set up a commission of inquiry to investigate labour laws (the 
Wiehahn Commission) and a commission to examine the use of manpower 
(the Riekert Commission) . 
The Wiehahn solution called for the recognition and registration of African 
trade unions as a means of controlling the pace of union development and 
drawing them into the established industrial relations structures. The Riekert 
Commission provided for the redivision of African workers between those with 
permanent resident rights and those without (i.e ., contract workers) .29 
The Wiehahn Commission's recommendations, subsequently adopted by the 
government in 1979, aimed at placing unions under state control by 
prohibiting political activities on the part of the unions. By separating the 
political sphere from the economic one, it was hoped that the politicization 
of the emergent unions would be prevented. However, by providing for the 
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opportunity for these unions to win space in their attempt to move beyond 
the struggle for recognition to direct negotiations at shop floor level.
30 
As 
the emergent unions grew in membership, some began to realise the 
advantage of negotiating at an industry-wide level and opted for participation 
in the system. 
In 1977 the independent trade union movement was organised into 25 unions 
with about 70,000 members. African membership in the independent trade 
union movement rose to 200,000 in 1982 and 300,000 in 1983.31 This 
period was also one of heightened trade union struggle, involving disputes 
over union recognition at plant level, unfair dismissals, wages and working 
conditions. 
At the same time, the independent trade union movement was confronted 
with the question of political action .32 On the one hand, industrial strikes 
were seen as an important component of resistance and the popular 
struggles in the schools, universities and townships began to impinge directly 
on the workplace. On the other hand, students and the black communities 
actively supported trade union struggles, providing material and other 
assistance as well as supporting strike-related consumer boycotts. 
Two important strikes signified the support of the community for industrial 
action. The first of these was the strike by coloured and African workers at 
a mill outside Cape Town owned by the Fattis and Monis company in 1979. 
The cause of the strike was the sacking of workers who called for the 
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began a campaign , backed by a call for a boycott of the company's 
products, for reinstatement and the recognition of the union.33 Cape Town's 
African traders responded to the boycott by refusing to stock the company's 
products. 
A second significant strike was the Cape Town meat-workers strike in 1980. 
Workers at the Table Bay Cold Storage firm walked off the plant following 
a call by workers in the meat industry (and other industries) for representa-
tion through unregistered, democratically elected worker committees.34 A call 
for a boycott of red meat was made at a meeting of meat workers on the 
21st May and this call was endorsed by a large number of community 
organisations, ratepayers associations, organisations of school and university 
students, and by butchers in the African townships.3s 
The strike occurred during a period of intense popular struggle, in particular 
the 1980 school boycotts and a community-wide bus boycott. At the outbreak 
of the strike the education boycott was two months old and the strike came 
as an opportunity for students to extend their struggle beyond the schools 
and universities and to unify their struggle with the workers' struggle against 
economic exploitation and political domination.36 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s strikes took on a political significance. 
Although wages and calls for democratic worker organisation formed the basis 
of these strikes, they can be seen as part of a wider popular challenge to 
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the dominant classes - a challenge which took place in the schools and 
townships as well. 37 
In April 1978 the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (AZAPO) was founded as 
the new major organisational manifestation of the SCM. Within four weeks 
of its foundation, with most of its national and local leaders in detention, 
AZAPO was effectively removed from the political arena.38 In September 
1979, a new executive was elected and the organisation re-emerged as the 
main internal national black political organisation. Unlike its predecessors, 
AZAPO incorporated a sophisticated class analysis into its policies and 
directed its activities towards the political involvement of black workers under 
the leadership of the organisation.39 
From the outset, AZAPO was plagued by internal ideological differences. Two 
issues dominated the ideological debate within the organisation .40 Firstly, the 
role of white democrats in the national liberation struggle and , secondly, the 
relationship between class and national struggles. AZAPO maintained that 
whites had no role in the liberation struggle because they are "part of the 
problem". The organisation also maintained that all blacks are workers and 
are exploited by whites who are all capitalists. Opposition to these viewpoints 
led to the expUlsion of the organisation's first president, Curtis Nkondo, by 
the executive in 1979. 
During the period under study AZAPO did not develbp any formal connections 
37 
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with significant labour organisations, nor did it develop a strong working-class 
following .41 According to Lodge, AZAPO officials' contempt of negotiated 
reforms involving bread-and-butter issues was the main reason for its inability 
to gain support from , or cooperation with, trade unions.42 AZAPO's popular 
following was insignificant during the period and was mostly drawn from some 
sectors of the black intelligentsia. In addition, it had very limited support in 
campaigns with only one sustained campaign against bus fare increases in 
the Pietersburg area in September 1981 .43 
Despite this, the period 1979-1983 witnessed widespread outbreaks of strikes, 
school boycotts, and protests against the terms of labour reproduction. 
Numerous community-based organisations emerged in response to rent, 
transport, and consumer boycotts. The impetus for mobilisation and 
organisation also emerged in the Free-Mandela Campaign , the Anti-South 
African Indian Council Campaign, and the anti-Republic Day Campaign. 
However, de La Harpe and Manson point out that: 
These (community organisations) were usually oriented to single issues, often to a Single 
area; their success was largely based upon the creation of local democratic structures, 
which involved organisation on a door to door level. .. . local and single-issue 
organisations are unable to effectively fight national political campaigns on their own.44 
Most of these were of limited duration, unable to maintain "ongoing 
organisation and structures". What was absent was a national organisation to 
provide coordination to the various struggles of the popular classes, and to 
mobilize and sustain resistance to apartheid. 
41 
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A country-wide school boycott in 1980 played a major role in transforming 
popular strategies and tactics.45 Student demands made during the boycott, 
which began in coloured schools in the Western Cape in April 1980, were 
directed at the reconstitution of society as a whole and included calls for 
changes in curricula; the ending of segregated educational systems; greater 
student control over their education; the release of all political prisoners; and 
for liberation from white minority rule. The boycott mobilised many students 
who joined youth groups of their local civic associations. The mobilisation and 
conscientisation of parents during the boycott also expanded the membership 
of community organisations. 
The boycott also generated a greater political awareness and critical approach 
to the education system and society among students. During the course of 
the boycott students took over their schools instead of leaving them. In 
addition, an embryonic alternative education programme emerged when 
students began to hold "awareness programmes" during the course of the 
school day. Another important development was the establishment of "action-
in-unity" as parents and teachers became involved in the boycott, while 
students became involved in community issues - such as the support for 
striking workers. Students also began to articulate a socialist consciousness, 
which included a belief in the vanguard role of the working class. These 
developments played a central role in the events of the eighties. 
In sum, the 1970s witnessed the revival of popular resistance to apartheid 
following a decade of relative quiescence. The SCM revived the revolutionary 
idea by "keeping alive and amplifying ideas about oppression and the 
inherent human right to liberation".46 The re-emergence of the independent 
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trade union movement after the 1973 Durban strike provided the impetus for 
the revival of extra-parliamentary organisation and resistance. By 1977/8, 
however, this movement was almost decimated by state reaction to the 
events in Soweto and elsewhere. In addition, the SCM and its progeny, 
AZAPO, failed to provide the organisational form to sustain popular resistance 
and mobilisation. 
Increasing co-operation between trade unions, student organisations and 
community-based organisations in the period thereafter resulted in extensive 
popular action against the state and capital. During the early 1980s, many 
organisations sprang up around the country waging struggles at local levels 
against economic exploitation and political domination. 
3.4. The Emergence of Community Organisations 
The emergence and proliferation of community organisations in South Africa 
followed a resurgence in militant black opposition which began in the late 
1970s and continued throughout the 1980s. Community organisations sprang 
up as a result of both local and national popular struggles (against apartheid 
institutions and the terms of labour reproduction) and the conscious efforts 
of activists. 
The process was accompanied by the revival of the ANC and the 
popularisation of its Freedom Charter. Many student groups such as COSAS 
and AZASO transferred their allegiance from the SCM to the ANC.47 The 
formation of the UDF brought many of these organisations under a national 
umbrella movement and provided a national focus to local struggles. 
Five interacting variables can be identified as the main factors responsible 
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for the emergence and proliferation of community organisations during the late 
1970s and 1980s: the changing material conditions within the country as a 
whole and their effects on the black population : state policy and popular 
resistance during the period; the numerous popular struggles against the 
terms of labour reproduction and apartheid policies; the political realignment 
of black activists away from the SCM towards the ANC and its Freedom 
Charter; and the formation of new organisations after the establishment of the 
UDF in 1983. 
3.4.1. Changing Material Conditions 
Changes in national economic conditions and their impact on the black 
population provoked the emergence and growth of community organisations. 
Economic changes had two important effects: they brought about alterations 
in state policy resulting in changes in popular struggles. Popular struggles 
emerged in response to the opportunities or constraints alterations in state 
policies placed on the black population. 
An economic upswing which began in the late 1970s followed a severe 
recession which began just before the 1976 uprising.48 This economic 
recovery was notable for a number of reasons. In the first place, the 
increased revenue accruing to the state through taxes permitted it to make 
concessions which improved the living conditions of Africans. This gave them 
the confidence to make further demands on the state. Such concessions 
included introducing ninety-nine year leaseholds for urban Africans. In addition, 
the state increased its expenditure on African education, thus giving some 
Africans a chance to improve their material conditions.49 
48 
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Concessions were linked to the government's Total Strategy, in particular, 
modifications of certain aspects of urban policy. The key elements of the 
changes in urban policy were: the recognition of the permanence of urban 
Africans with freedom of movement and association and the right to property 
and representation at the local level. In addition , the legal right to form trade 
unions was extended to African workers. 
The official recognition accorded to African trade unions made recruitment and 
organisation easier. This resulted in an explosion in black union membership. 
The reason for this is that once the state conceded through registration the principle of 
statutory legal recognition of black unions it summarily withdrew from the hands of 
employers a powerful weapon with which they had been able to beat their black 
employees - the threat of sanctions against them for belonging to unions which employers 
claimed were iIIegal".50 
In addition, because of the recognition of African trade unions and the 
growth in union numbers, unions were able to secure concessions from both 
employers and the state, including the right to strike and better material 
benefits. 51 
This brief period of economic prosperity also permitted unions to use 
collective action to increase the wages of their members. Once the unions 
had demonstrated this ability they were able to attract more workers. Trade 
union membership consequently increased dramatically during this period. 
Industrial concentration was another feature of the changing economic 
conditions in the country which encouraged the growth of the trade union 
movement.
52 
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manufacturing sector accompanied by increasing concentration of manufacturing 
concerns in a small number of conglomerates. Sixty percent of all non-state 
assets in the country were controlled by eight corporate groups in 1981 .53 
Industrial concentration promoted the need for a more settled , trained black 
labour force. This, in turn , meant a change in the industrial relations system 
and a transformation of laws relating to conditions under which Africans could 
remain in the urban areas of South Africa. This was accompanied by a 
"rapid rise in urbanisation and in the concentration of labour, enhancing 
opportunities for workers to discuss common concerns and to organise".54 
As we noted above, unfavourable economic conditions also encouraged the 
growth of community organisations.55 The resulting drop in the living 
standards of the black population gave rise to numerous rent and transport 
struggles in many parts of the country. 
3.4.2. State Policy and Popular Resistance 
The development of community organisations was also facilitated by the South 
African state's policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s: a mixture of 
reform and repression. These provided space for the emergence of community 
organisations and gave rise to popular struggles which promoted mass 
organisation. 
The government's policy for urban Africans and reform of local government 
also provoked mass mobilisation and organisation. The introduction of the 
community councils in 1977 prompted the first spate of widespread township 
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community councils took the form of an electoral boycott, calls on councillors 
to resign and physical attacks on some councillors or their property. 
The principal cause of popular resentment was the state's attempt to make 
these councils self-financing. Without a tax-base in the form of local 
industries, the major source of revenue for the community councils were rent 
and service charges. Increases in these charges prompted widespread 
resistance and was expressed in the formation of a number of community 
organisations and the growth in membership of existing organisations. 
In 1983, in an attempt to legitimize the system of local government, the 
state replaced the community councils with the BLAs which were provided 
with considerably more powers than their precursors. The BLAs were rejected 
by the urban African population for the same reasons that they rejected the 
councils: they were illegitimate and, because of their fiscal inviability, were 
likely to impose economic hardships on the urban African population. In 
addition , the state presented them as alternatives to representation of Africans 
in the central political system which was to be extended to the coloured and 
Indian populations. Once again, the boycott strategy was employed, with low 
polls registered for the elections of BLAs in most urban townships. 
The administration of Africans in the "white areas" of South Africa cannot be 
understood in isolation from another significant area of state reform during 
the early 1980s: constitutional reform. In 1983 the South African parliament 
passed a Constitution Act which introduced three separate parliaments for the 
white , coloured and Indian populations. African political rights were linked with 
the homelands. The UDF was formed in August 1983 to bring together all 
forces opposed to the new constitution, as well as the so-called "Koornhof 
Bills" (which included the Black Local Authorities Bill) . A national anti-elections 
campaign resulted in widespread rejection of the new constitution with low 
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polls recorded in the majority of areas where elections were held . 
The state's reform policies during the period were accompanied by the 
rigorous application of its repressive policies. State repression took two forms: 
state violence, vigilante actions, detention without trial , etc.; and the policies 
of influx control , forced removals and homeland consolidation . 
Repression also has a counter-productive aspect for the state. According to 
Gottschalk, state violence and vigilante attacks anger as much as they 
intimidated; closures of schools, colleges and universities disperse an 
increasingly revolutionary intelligentsia throughout rural South Africa; assaults 
on black youth increased recruitment and support for MK; forced conscription 
alienated some white youth from the state; and the security forces were 
weakened by widespread deployment while their deployment became 
increasingly predictable to the opposition .56 
State repression during the various emergencies resulted in the emergence 
of a number of civics and the expansion of the support base of many 
existing ones. During the country-wide revolt which emerged in the wake of 
the Vaal Triangle uprising in 1984, communities in many parts of the country 
responded to state repression by forming youth congresses and mass-based 
organisations. In towns and villages previously insulated from political activity, 
youth groups rapidly sprang up to defend their communities against state 
repression. 57 
The state's separate development policy, in terms of which all Africans were 
linked politically and socially with one of the homelands, also promoted mass 
56 
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organisation. This policy was linked to influx control , which controlled the 
conditions under which Africans were permitted to enter and remain in the 
urban areas of South Africa, and forced removals. 
Between 1960 and 1983 an estimated 3,548,900 people were forcibly moved 
by the state through these measures.58 Resistance to forced 
removals/relocation took a variety of forms. Communities employed legal 
means to fight against removals. Communities also sought the help of 
support groups to bring publicity to their plight. In some cases communities 
reacted violently to the state's efforts to have them removed .59 
Resistance to forced removals generated earnest efforts to organise in some 
of the communities involved and in some cases communities were able to 
get a reprieve because of their degree of organisation . For example, the 
residents of Huhudi, near Vryburg , resisted the threat of removal to 
Pudumong in Bophuthatswana through the Huhudi Civic Association, formed 
in 1983.60 Residents of the illegal squatter settlement of Crossroads outside 
Cape Town also organised themselves to oppose relocation to Khayelitsha 
township. 
Resistance and popular mobilisation were also provoked by the homeland 
policy. All the homelands had certain common features which provoked 
widespread resistance. These included excessive repression , corruption, and 
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occupied in the policy of separate development, led to the widespread 
rejection of the homeland system by the African population in general and 
the citizens of the homelands in particular. 
The independent homelands presented a number of obstacles to mass 
mobilisation and politicisation. Among these obstacles were the repressive 
activities of the homeland authorities (often surpassing even those of the 
South African security forces).61 In a number of homelands, trade unions 
and other organisations were banned.62 Rural resistance was directed largely 
against apartheid in general and features of the homeland system in 
particular. Examples of these are the anti-independence campaigns in Venda 
and KwaNdebele and struggles against homeland repression and corruption. 
The focus of rural resistance were the tribal authorities and the homeland 
authorities. Resistance was characterised by attacks on chiefs kraals and 
businesses, tribal authority offices, the chiefs and indunas, and security 
personnel living in the villages. Many chiefs were forced to flee their villages, 
some were killed , while others were forced to resign from the tribal 
authorities.63 
Some chiefs responded to the violence directed against them by recruiting 
vigilante squads. In KwaNdebele, for example, resistance to incorporation into 
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Mbokodo, a vigilante group closely connected to the homeland authorities.
64 
In Lebowa, the so-called Thari ya Sechaba was formed to "flush out 
opposition and make Lebowa a safe place for the smooth running of the 
bantustan divide and rule system" .65 The activities of such groups, together 
with the harassment of activists by the security forces, politicised rural 
villagers and contributed to rural resistance, mobilisation and organisation. 
In some cases, chiefs and tribal authorities joined the progressive forces in 
their popular struggles. In KwaNdebele and Moutse, progressive chiefs came 
together to form the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa 
(Contralesa) in 1987.66 Contralesa aimed to unite all traditional leaders in 
the country, to build and deepen democratic relationships with the youth, 
workers and all sections of the population and to take up demands jointly 
with their communities. The new organisation was seen as a revival of the 
tradition of resistance held by chiefs in the past and a rejection of apartheid-
created structures by progressive chiefs. 
3.4.3. Popular Struggles 
Numerous popular struggles over a wide range of issues played a leading 
role in mass politicisation and mobilisation during the late 1970s and early 
1980s. These issues include economic exploitation, the apartheid education 
system, and changes in the terms of labour reproduction . These struggles 
were also influenced by changing economic conditions which created 
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Popular struggles took both national and local forms: resistance to state 
reform initiatives and the education system often involved large parts of the 
country; resistance to hikes in rent and service charges, bus fares, and food 
prices, and resistance to forced removals and incorporation into the 
homelands were generally local, with some notable exceptions. They also took 
a number of forms - rent, transport, consumer, school, and electoral boycotts 
and the withdrawal of labour were the most common strategies employed. 
During the period under review, township communities waged numerous local 
struggles over the terms of labour reproduction. Such struggles were not 
novel to South Africa. However, what was new was the extent to which 
these struggles gave rise to community organisations within the resisting 
communities as well as increasing cooperation among student/youth, civic and 
trade union organisations. Most of these struggles were fought in the African 
townships, which 
are the setting for class conflict. Established as part of a network of controls that are 
meant to regulate the movement, location, housing, employment/unemployment, health, 
welfare, recreation, education, political participation, citizenship, and relocation of the 
African working class and their families, the structure and functioning of the townships 
has been disrupted by the playing out of contradictions and class struggles.67 
3.4.3.1. Rent Struggles: A significant aspect of popular resistance during the 
early 1980s were the townships struggles against increases in rent and 
service charges. The increase in rent charges, coupled with general opposition 
to the BLAs and an economic recession prompted widespread rent boycotts 
in the Vaal Triangle townships in September 1984. 
The rent boycott soon spread to the Orange Free State, with Tumahole, near 
Parys, and townships in Vredefort, Kroonstad , Bothaville and Viljoenskroon 
following suit at the beginning of 1985. By June, residents of the Eastern 
67 Joffe,A. (1986); "Aspects of the Struggle: Youth", in Monthly Review, (Vo1.37, No.11 , April) , p.89. 
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Transvaal townships of Ethandukukhanya (Piet Retief), Silobela (Carolina), 
KwaThandeka (Amsterdam) , KwaZanele (Breyten), Wesselton (Ermelo), and 
Umgwenya (Waterval Boven) were refusing to pay rent.66 
While most of these boycotts were in response to increases in rent and 
service charges, by mid-1986 they took on a strategic significance. Rent 
boycotts were now used as a general weapon of protest and boycotting 
communities began to link national political demands with their local 
demands.69 According to Marx: 
Given the immediate benefit of saving on rent, boycotts and related protests spread 
quickly, requiring little enforcement. Occasional police attacks reinforced popular support 
for the boycotts. By acting collectively, the boycotters were reassured that evictions or 
attempts to place new residents in their homes would be jOintly confronted and, if 
necessary, resisted . By 1986, up to fifty-four townships with over a half-million households 
were withholding their rent, with 9S percent of those polled in Soweto supporting the 
boycott even if not all partiCipated in it.70 
Rent boycotts increased support for local organisations and in some cases 
gave rise to new organisations.71 The Durban rent boycott of 1983 led to 
the formation of the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) , while the 
Tumahole Civic Association was formed in October 1984 in response to the 
rent issue. The Sharpeville, Bophelong, and Boipatong Civic Associations were 
also formed to negotiate with officials over rent boycotts.72 In Soweto a rent 
boycott, coordinated by the Soweto Civic Association, led to a sharp increase 
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prompted the formation of defence committees, increasing participation in 
grassroots structu res. 73 
3.4.3.2. Transport Struggles: Bus boycotts have been a feature of popular 
resistance in South Africa since the early 1940s when the residents of 
Alexandra township near Johannesburg engaged in a bus boycott against 
sharp increases in bus fares. 74 Most transport struggles are the result of 
a fundamental contradiction in transport policy.75 South Africa's urban African 
townships are generally located large distances from the places of employ-
ment. The continued operation of the cheap labour system depends on the 
maintenance of a cheap transport system. This cheap transport system relies 
on substantial state subsidies - a major drain on the state's resources. Any 
increases in bus-fares places demands on the limited resources of poorly-paid 
township residents. 
On a number of occasions entire townships boycotted the public transport 
system in response to hikes in bus-fares. They often used private transport 
or walked the long distances to get to their places of employment. In some 
instances resistance to higher transport costs brought entire communities 
together and gave rise to community organisations. For example, the bus 
boycott which broke out in Durban in December 1982 resulted in the 
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the boycott. These LCC's later formed the core of JORAC.
76 
During the 
East London bus-boycott in 1983, which linked up shop-floor and community 
issues, the idea of establishing a civic organisation in Duncan Village was 
first mooted.77 The bus boycott set the stage for building a civic associ-
ation. An interim committee was established and the idea propagated 
throughout the township through discussions among residents.78 
The 1983 bus boycott also led to the development of organisations in 
Mdantsane, the dormitory township located near East London and under the 
rule of the "independent" Ciskei government. 79 The idea of forming civic 
associations in Mdantsane emerged during this boycott and alliances were 
established between organised workers and the community prior to the 
formation of the UDF in the Border region in September. 
3.4.3.3. Consumer boycotts: Activists also used consumer boycotts as a 
means of resistance and promoting mass politicisation and organisation. 
Consumer boycotts were generally directed against price increases but at 
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The consumer boycotts, like the rent boycotts and the early stayaways, served to unify 
and broaden popular mobilisation around local economic needs, and only later around 
more explicitly political demands. The initial nexus of these activities was the grass roots, 
reflecting the pragmatic concerns of a populace not principally concerned with 
ideology.eo 
The first of these consumer boycotts occurred in 1985 in Port Alfred , where 
local organisations initiated a boycott against white retailers following a price 
increase. This boycott ended when local businessmen agreed to end 
segregation in town council meetings and in stores and lobby for the 
withdrawal of police from the townships and the construction of a new 
school.81 The success of this boycott led to the spread of its use to other 
towns in the region and by August at least 23 centres were affected, 
including the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage industrial complex. By the end of the 
year all the major centres - Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban 
- and scores of small towns throughout the country had been affected by 
consumer boycotts. 82 
Initially, consumer boycotts involved entire townships withholding their 
purchasing power from the white, and sometimes coloured and Indian retailers 
in the area in response to price increases and local socio-economic 
issues.83 However, activists soon realised the potential uses of the consumer 
boycott and soon began to link local demands with national political demands. 
Since the success of the boycott depended on the widest possible 
participation by the community, organising committees representing all sectors 
of the community sprang up in a number of areas. The boycotts also led 
80 
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to mass politicisation and mobilisation, particularly in the Eastern Cape 
townships, where support for the boycotts came from almost the entire 
population of the participating townships.84 The linkage of political demands 
to socio-economic demands also raised the political consciousness of township 
residents. 
Consumer boycotts also involved coercion and intimidation by the youth 
responsible for organising and enforcing boycotts. White, however, argues that 
the media consistently exaggerated the level of coercion involved in 
boycotts.85 By contrast, Seekings points out that in certain instances, such 
as Crossroads in 1986, the enforcement of boycotts by the youth provoked 
violent conflict.86 In such instances, coercion and intimidation promoted 
opposition to community organisations involved in the organisation of the 
boycott. 
3.4.3.4. Education struggles: Since 1976, resistance to the apartheid 
education system has played a central role in mass mobilisation and 
politicisation in the black townships .87 Education struggles were directed 
against both the state's education policy and the resulting conditions in black 
schools. This resistance has been directed largely against Bantu Education , 
which is the clearest manifestation of the shortcomings of the apartheid 
education policy. Resistance to the Bantu Education system involved 
widespread and lengthy boycotts of schools by students, the destruction of 
classrooms and school property and , ultimately, the elaboration of an 
84 
Refer to Chapter 8, pp.357-9, 390 and 364-5 below. 
85 
White,R. (1986); "A tide has risen; A breach has occurred: Towards an assessment of the 
strategic value of consumer boycotts", in South African Labour Bulletin , (VoI. 11 , No.5, May). 
86 
Seekings,J. (1986) ; "Workers and the politics of consumer boycotts", in South African Labour 
Bulletin, (VoI. 11 , No.6, June), pp.25-6. 
87 
Refer also to Chapter 6 below. 
106 
alternative education system. 
It is widely accepted among scholars that Bantu Education was introduced 
by the state in 1953 to maintain the political domination and economic 
exploitation of the African people. According to Molteno, the goal of Bantu 
Education was to "bring greater numbers of black youth into the ambit of 
direct control" in an "attempt to subvert the political and economic aspirations 
of the oppressed".88 By ensuring central control of the educational system 
and thereby providing the required ideological control, Bantu Education was 
utilised to maintain the political subjugation of the African population. 
Resistance to this ideological domination and state control of the educational 
system have been features of popular struggle since the inception of the 
system in 1953. 
The racial division of the education system in South Africa also gave rise 
to inadequate and unequal government spending on education . The results 
of inadequate state spending on African education are the terrible conditions 
which prevail in African schools. 
Grossly overcrowded classrooms are taught by ill-qualified teachers in authoritarian 
schools; pupils who survive monumentally high drop-out and failure rates are forced into 
deadening reliance on rote learning of heavily ideological syllabi. 
And not surprisingly, the short-term or immediate demands of student movements - from 
SASa and SASM through to CaSAS - have addressed themselves directly to the 
manifest shortcomings of the education system. Highly specific demands about textbooks, 
school equipment, corporal punishment and sexual harassment have been joined by calls 
for elected StUdent Representative Councils, for the scrapping of age restrictions that 
disqualify older (and frequently politically active) students, and for the non-victimisation 
of student leaders.89 
School boycotts also erupted in support of local community stl"(Jggles _ 
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against state repression , in support of striking workers and rent, transport and 
consumer boycotts - and nationally in opposition to the education system and 
apartheid. 
During the post-Soweto period, the first significant boycott by school students 
occurred in Cape Town in 1980. The boycott began in Cape Town's coloured 
schools in protest against inferior education and school facilities. The boycotts 
spread to coloured and Indian schools elsewhere in the country, especially 
on the Rand , and subsequently to Department of Education and Training 
(DET) schools which controlled African school education .90 
In Cape Town, the boycotting students formed a "Committee of 81" , which 
represented all participating schools. Community organisations came out in 
support of the boycott and the first Parent-Teacher-Student Associations 
(PTSAs) were formed during this protest action. These PTSAs played a 
central role in creating a greater degree of student-community solidarity than 
was experienced elsewhere in the country. 91 
The school boycott in the Western Cape was notable for the high level of 
politicisation : students participated in political struggles outside the classroom, 
developing their own organisations and links to the community groups; they 
attacked the class basis of the education system and its role in reproducing 
cheap labour; and they challenged the role of the school by organising 
alternative curricula and "awareness programmes", and challenging teachers' 
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authority.92 
Another wave of student boycotts began during the middle of 1983 and 
continued to the end of 1986. An important feature of this wave of protest 
was the linkage of demands around educational issues with national political 
issues. This can be attributed to the central role played by CaSAS in the 
boycott and the general nature of political protest in the country during the 
period. With the economy in the midst of a deep recession , and widespread 
resistance to the state's introduction of the BLAs and the new constitution, 
the wave of student boycotts which began in 1983 intensified the political 
crisis in South Africa. 
The boycott, which began in Atteridgeville in the Transvaal and Cradock in 
the Eastern Cape, was taken up by CaSAS, which, along with the matric 
issue, made other demands around educational issues.93 As the boycott 
spread over the country, student demands shifted from demands for radical 
reforms of the existing education system, to a contestation with the state 
over control of the school - for "people's power" in education .94 
The 1983 school boycotts marked three main developments in the student 
movement which dramatically sharpened the form and intensity of national 
struggle.95 Students increasingly focused on the question of power and 
control over the educational process; the emergence of youth congresses 
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infused a deeper militancy into student and community politics ; and a growing 
alliance was established between students, youth and the democratic and 
trade union movements. 
The elections for the coloured and Indian Houses of Parliament in August 
1984 sparked the boycott of up to 800,000 students in the coloured and 
Indian schools, with limited support from the DET schools. Township protests 
at the beginning of September led to the extension of the school boycott to 
other townships in the Vaal Triangle. Anger was directed against police action 
which resulted in a number of deaths, and the deployment of the SADF in 
this area transformed school boycotts into a leading component of a national 
revolt. 96 
The school crisis and the occupation of Sebokeng, Sharpeville and Boipatong 
by the SADF in October led to a COSAS call for a mass stayaway. In the 
process, COSAS organised a parent-student meeting on the 10 October to 
explain its demands. In KwaThema a parent-student committee, which included 
several trade unionists, was formed . In effect, with the backing of the trade 
unions, most of the township's workers supported the KwaThema stayaway 
on the 22 October. 97 
The success of this stayaway led to a suggestion by COSAS that a regional 
stayaway be organised to back a wide range of student and community 
demands. These included student demands for SRCs and an end to age 
limits, and community demands for an end to rent and bus-fare increases 
and calls for the withdrawal of the army from the townships. An estimated 
thirty-seven organisations - including trade unions, local UDF affiliates, church 
96 
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97 
Friedman,S. (1987); op.cit., p.447. 
110 
bodies, etc. - formed the Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee. The two-
day stayaway, which took place on the 5-6 November, involved an estimated 
400,000 students and some two million workers .98 
During 1985 the school boycott of DET schools spread countrywide: at one 
point some 650,000 students and hundreds of schools were involved. The 
DET responded to the school crisis by closing schools, following students' 
rejection of the Department's offer to establish a form of student representa-
tion including teachers, principals and official school committee members.99 
The government proclaimed a partial state of emergency in July 1985 in 
response to the school boycott and other popular struggles in many parts of 
the country and banned COSAS in August 1985. 
In the latter half of 1985 the boycott spread to coloured schools in the 
Western Cape. Within a week of the declaration of the state of emergency 
coloured schools began boycotting in protest against it. They were soon 
joined by DET schools in the area, leading to three months of street fighting 
between students and police, mass rallies and consumer boycotts. 100 
The school boycotts of 1985 were significant for a number of reasons. In 
the first place, they lent support to other popular struggles in various parts 
of the country. Students often played a leading role in consumer boycotts 
and stayaways, and , together with the young unemployed, were generally 
responsible for organising and enforcing boycotts and stayaways. In the 
second place, they precipitated the politicisation of the youth and promoted 
mass mobilisation around educational and other local and political issues in 
98 MurraY,M. (1987); South Africa: Time of agony, time of destiny, (London, Verso) , p.258. 
99 Wolpe,H. (1988); op.cit., p.206. 
100 Ibid., p.195. 
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the townships. Thus, 
During 1985 it became clear that the student movement had shifted its focus from 
educational demands as such to broadly pol itical ones. Amongst short-term demands, the 
calls for the withdrawal of troops from the townships and the release of detainees became 
prominent. At a wider level , it was apparent that immediate and educational demands 
were now seen by large numbers of students as mobilising issues which were just a facet 
of a wider struggle to overturn the existing social order. 101 
Thus, by the end of 1985 the educational struggle had become an important 
component of the national political struggle against apartheid . Widespread 
boycotts and the closure of DET schools in many parts of the country made 
a national response to the educational crisis vital. A number of problems 
which emerged during the wave of boycotts made it absolutely necessary for 
other sectors of the community to become involved in educational issues. 
The beginnings of a national response to the crisis in education occurred 
with the formation of the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC) in 
October 1985 to negotiate student demands with the DET. A conference held 
in December gave rise to a new national body to coordinate the education 
struggle - the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) . A new slogan 
was devised ("People's Education for People's Power") coupled with the call 
for a return to school, the setting up of local crisis committees and the 
establishment of alternative educational authorities in schools, the PTSAs. 
The student struggles during this period had a number of implications for 
organisation and for the general struggle against apartheid . The boycotts led 
to the widespread radicalizing and politicising of the youth and the 
community. Student demands during the boycott included wider community 
issues and general political demands while the community dramatically 
increased its involvement in the education struggle. The call for People's 
Education reflected a demand for control over the education system by the 
101 L . 
OC.CIt. 
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community and a new perception of the role of education itself. Students 
who participated in the boycotts later became members of youth , trade union 
and other community organisations, investing these organisations and their 
popular struggles with a militancy derived from the education struggles. 
3.4.4. Political Realignment 
The SCM was the major black extra-parliamentary political movement in South 
Africa during the 1970s. The late 1970s, however, was a period during which 
political activists increasingly transferred their allegiance from the SCM to the 
ANC. We can identify a number of factors which led to this political 
realignment. One was the destruction of the SCM in the immediate aftermath 
of the Soweto uprising in 1976 and activists' growing awareness of the 
limitations of the movement's role in the revolt. The second was the 
increasing popularisation of the ANC as it escalated its guerilla attacks and 
embarked on a programme to popularise itself. The third was the impressive 
successes of the revolutionary movements in Mozambique, Angola and 
Zimbabwe.102 
The Soweto revolt resulted in the destruction of the organisational base of 
the SCM. State response to the uprising, in the form of bannings, detentions, 
and political trials, led to the elimination of every political , cultural or social 
institution which adopted the philosophy of Slack Consciousness. 
In the wake of the Soweto revolt young black activists increasingly became 
disillusioned with the tactics and policies of the SCM. More particularly, young 
student activists began increasingly to reject the elite student and intelligentsia 
core of SC and to identify with the black working class. Thus, according to 
a young activist: 
102 
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the key transition was the 1980 school boycott in Cape Town. The leaders said we must 
learn the lessons of 1976. Those lessons were [the failures of] black exclusivism, the 
failure to see the working class as vanguard , and [the reliance on] chari smatic 
leadership.103 
Many activists, conscious of the lack of organisation of the 1976 uprising, 
began to stress disciplined strategic action and the need to return to 
grassroots work around specific local conditions.104 Local struggles against 
rent and bus-fare increases, "the shortage of houses and their poor condition, 
the corrupt and controversial activities of the government-controlled community 
councils, refuse removal , water and electricity all offered real and ready 
possibilities for organisation, mobilisation, and politicisation" .105 Student 
leaders of the 1980 school boycotts in Cape Town, called for "a new 
revolutionary strategy" that would build on the achievements of the BCM and 
in which workers, parents, and students would "stand united as one 
community" .106 
Another feature of this political realignment was the replacement of the 
exclusivist black nationalism of the BCM by a commitment to non-racialism. 
This was justified by the need to "isolate the regime" and to draw the 
widest possible number of people into the anti-apartheid struggle. All South 
Africans who shared a commitment to the ideals of a non-racial , democratic 
country were encouraged to join the "national democratic struggle" against 
apartheid . Young activists also began to justify multi-class cooperation in the 
same manner as they did the principle of non-racialism.107 Thus, business 
103 Quoted in Marx,A. (1 992); op. cit. , p.112. 
104 Joffe,A. (1986); op.cit., p.90 and Marx,A. (1 992); op. cit. , p.112. 
105 Joffe,A. (1986); op.cit., p.90. 
106 Marx,A. (1992); op.cit., p.112. 
107 Ibid., p.126. 
114 
leaders were encouraged to participate in or support popular struggles. At the 
same time, the new organisations avoided the question of economic 
transformation by focusing attention on the more immediate need to destroy 
apartheid .108 
The increasingly successful guerilla attacks by the ANC's armed wing, a 
propaganda campaign to popularise the ANC and the Freedom Charter, 
discussions among activists in prison and the population as a whole, and the 
emergence of ANC leaders as leaders of the new community organisations 
increased the popularity of the ANC. 
The resurgence of MK guerilla attacks began during the 1976 Soweto 
uprising with 12 reported attacks between October 1976 and March 1978, 
and an average of one small bomb exploding each week for the five months 
after November 1977.109 In 1979 MK turned its attention to state personnel 
when it conducted attacks against police stations. In the following year, a 
number of attacks were made against government installations, including 
electrical plants, the Sasol oil-into-coal refineries , oil depots and the Koeburg 
nuclear power plant. 110 
In 1980 the ANC also began to link its guerilla attacks with popular 
struggles in the township: the January 1980 attack on the Soekmekaar police 
station, at a time when residents there were fighting forced removals; the 
October 1980 bombing of the railway line between Soweto and Johannesburg 
on the day residents called a stayaway to protest rent increases; the 
108 Loc.cit. 
109 Lodge,T. (1983) ; op.cit., p.340. 
110 Klug,H. and Seidman,G. (1985); op.cit. , p.19. 
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demolition of the Ciskei consulate during the Mdantsane bus boycott in 
1983.11 1 
This resurgence of guerilla warfare placed the exile movement at the centre 
of the liberation struggle in the minds of many black South Africans. Media 
reports of MK activities and the state's condemnation of the ANC and its 
armed wing also influenced this trend . Although these activities were not 
aimed at achieving mil itary victories they did serve to shake the confidence 
of the reg ime and to bolster both internal resistance and the ANC's 
reputation .112 At the same time, the revival of MK activities during this 
period was both a cause and effect of a growth in external and internal 
support of the exile movement. 
In the wake of the Soweto uprising thousands of young activists left the 
country to escape repression and to prepare themselves for the armed 
struggle against the state. Although many of these activists were influenced 
by the SCM, the only movement ill exile with the necessary infrastructure 
and funds to organise shelter, food and training for the new young exiles 
was the ANC.113 This influx of new recruits to the ANC's camps increased 
the ANC's exile population from an estimated one thousand in 1975 to nine 
thousand in 1980.114 These young exiles provided the core of new recruits 
to MK in the period . 
Equally important was the work of underground structures which infiltrated 
11 1 Ibid., pp.19-20. 
112 Marx,A. (1992); op.cit. , p.93. 
113 Lac. cit. 
114 Davis,S. (1987); Apartheid 's rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War, (New Haven Yale 
University Press) , pp.57 and 28. Cited in Marx,A. (1992); op. cit. , p.93. ' 
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organisations in order to guide them and obtain recruits for the ANC. The 
execution of Solomon Mahlangu, an MK cadre, on 6 April, 1979, provided 
the movement with its first contemporary martyr. According to Lodge, his 
funeral and subsequent wakes "attracted already politicised young people at 
a time when BC organisations and leadership had been seriously eroded by 
government repression" .1 15 
The ANC also embarked on an internal propaganda campaign to complement 
the armed struggle. This was directed at laying the organisational and 
ideological support base of its peoples war revolutionary strategy. The ANC 
declared 1980 the "Year of the Freedom Charter", 1981 the "Year of the 
Youth", 1982 the "Year of Unity in Action", and 1983 the "Year of United 
Action". The propaganda campaign took two main forms. In the first place, 
the ANC encouraged a resurgence of its popularity in the late 1970s by 
drawing attention to itself through appeals to symbolic loyalties that had been 
overshadowed by BC.116 During the early 1980s copies of the Freedom 
Charter began to circulate in the black townships. Secondly, the ANC 
encouraged a renewed interest in its jailed leaders, in particular Nelson 
Mandela and others who were jailed for life in 1963. Accord ing to Marx, 
"these prisoners provided a powerfu l symbol of the ANC's long commitment 
to the struggle, unsullied by association with any of the shortcomings of 
internal or exile opposition in the intervening years" .117 
In 1980, the Release Mandela Campaign and a campaign celebrating the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Freedom Charter's adoption both provided the 
115 Lodge,T. (1991); "Rebellion : The turning of the tide", in Lodge,T. and Nasson,B. (eds.); All , Here, 
and Now: Black politics in South Africa in the 1980s, South Africa Update Series, (Cape Town 
David Philip), p.44. ' 
116 Marx,A. (1992); ap. cit. , p.95. 
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means for focusing attention on the ANC and its policies.
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A number of 
organisations took up the Freedom Charter Campaign in response to the 
ANC's call for the popularisation of this statement of its aims and objectives. 
CaSAS, one of the first mass organisations to adopt the Freedom Charter, 
together with NUSAS, played a central role in this campaign. Copies of the 
Freedom Charter were distributed by both high school and university students 
to the masses of South Africans. This was the first time many people had 
access to this document and many new supporters were drawn to the ideals 
of the ANC. 
The effect on the black population was dramatic with widespread demonstra-
tions of ANC support. 
ANC songs and slogans could be heard in mass meetings across the country; by 1982, 
the ANC colours were appearing regularly at activists' funerals, which became a common 
setting for what were essentially political rallies. Despite the danger to those who openly 
expressed support for the ANC, thousands of people participated in mass commemor-
ations of important ANC events and personalities, and in memorials held in township 
churches for ANC members killed in South African attacks on neighbouring countries.119 
According to Phillips, the Freedom Charter Campaign was a highly successful 
and very important development in resistance politics in South Africa. The 
popularisation of the Charter was seen as a means of providing political 
direction and content and rejuvenating ANC cadres, structures and resolve in 
the context of a revival of resistance. 120 According to Phillips: 
The sentiments expressed in the Freedom Charter are also meant to provide the basis 
of unity in action and purpose and to provide a 'common political base from which to 
proceed' in the ongoing conflict with Pretoria. (ANC (1985); 'Political Report of the 
National Executive Committee to the Second Consultative Conference' in ANC Documents 
of the Second National Consultative Conference of the African national Congress, 
118 Klug,H. and Seidman,G. (1 985); op.cit. , p.20. 
119 Marx,A. (1992) ; op. cit. , p.95. 
120 Phillips,1. (1991); "The Political Role of the Freedom Charter" , in Steytler,N. (ed.); The Freedom 
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Zambia, 16-23 June 1985, London, ANC).121 
The ideological appeal of the ANC was also extended by elder statesmen 
of the movement serving lengthy prison sentences, particularly those on 
Robben Island. In the wake of the Soweto revolt, hundreds of BC activists 
were detained and imprisoned where they came into contact with imprisoned 
members of the ANC. Through discussions with older prisoners and in their 
readings, many Be adherents altered their political allegiance and on their 
release from prison , were ardent supporters of the ANC. Some of these 
became leaders of the new organisations which were emerging throughout the 
country. They took with them the ideas they had generated while in prison 
and subsequently affected the direction taken by these organisations. 122 
In addition, ANC activists resurfaced to play a prominent role in these 
organisations. All of these factors conspired to revitalise the internal debate 
on the strategy and tactics of the struggle. By the early eighties, many 
activists were committed to grassroots organisation around local issues, to a 
non-racial, democratic struggle, and to the policies of the ANC. Above all 
else, people were drawn towards the ANC's people's war revolutionary 
strategy which included building a united front of anti-apartheid community 
organisations operating legally and semi-legally inside South Africa. 
3.4.5. The influence of the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
The formation of the UDF also promoted the development of community 
organisations in South Africa. This national umbrella organisation brought 
together numerous local community struggles and a large number of local, 
regional and national organisations. It also led to increasing cooperation 
121 Ibid., pp.62-3. 
122 Marx,A. (1992); op. cit. , pp.98-9 and Klug,H. and Seidman,G. (1985); op.cit., p.21. 
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among different organisations in local and national struggles: student, trade 
union, women, and community organisations coordinated their actions in a 
wide range of struggles at the local level. Moreover, national opposition to 
the BLAs and the tri-cameral parliament involved the cooperative efforts of 
a wide range of local organisations under the UDF umbrella. In addition, 
young activists in many parts of the country used the models of 
organisations affiliated to the UDF in the formation of civic, youth and 
women's organisations in their townships. The second half of the 1980s, in 
particular, has seen the proliferation of community organisations in small 
towns previously insulated from political mobilisation. 
Prior to the formation of the UDF, townships conducted numerous struggles 
in relative isolation from each other. Since most of these isolated struggles 
were over local issues the organisations they gave rise to tended to exist 
only for a limited period . Thus, 
Organisations had mobilised people and grown during campaigns but at the end of the 
campaigns, membership and participation fell off. The problem of keeping people involved 
on an ongoing basis did not seem to be affected by the success of the campaign. Victory 
or failure, people drifted out of organisations. This was blamed on the issue-oriented 
nature of the campaigns, which also limited organisations' ability to make members aware 
of the root causes of their daily problems.123 
It was only through a national political organisation that isolated struggles 
could be linked together and directed against the entire system of exploitation 
and oppression. When some 600 organisations came together to form the 
UDF, it became possible to provide national co-ordination of local struggles. 
Thus, 
Issues affecting only one category of people in one place at one time become issues 
affecting wider categories of people at different times in different places. Finally they are 
defined as issues affecting all oppressed people, issues that will continue to affect those 
people so long as racial oppression and economic explOitation remains unchallenged on 
a national scale.124 
123 SASPU, State of the Nation, August 1983, p.12. Quoted in De la Harpe,J. and Manson,A. (1983)' 
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In conclusion, this chapter focuses on the emergence and development of 
community organisations. The emphasis is on material and political grievances 
which gave rise to mass mobilisation and protest. Mention is also made of 
the ideological shift from the Black Consciousness Movement to the ANC and 
the impact of the UDF on popular mobilisation and organisation. Thus, 
changing economic conditions, state policy, popular struggles, the political 
realignment of black political activists, and the emergence of the UDF all 
contributed to the emergence and proliferation of community organisations 
during the late 1970s and 1980s. 
This analysis of the emergence and development of community organisations 
demonstrates the existence of a highly developed and politicised civil society. 
It also demonstrates the conscious efforts of activists and organisations to 
mobilise and organise among the dominated classes. More importantly, 
however, such a highly complex civil society met one of the requirements of 
the Leninist/Gramscian United Front strategy which set the basis for the 
formation of a United Front and for the subsequent upsurge in mass 
mobilisation and politicisation. 
This was the emphasis placed on mass mobilisation and organisation around 
all struggles in civil society which were primarily directed against the ruling 
bloc. The existence of a highly complex civil society provided the opportunity 
to direct the particular struggles of various popular movements in society 
towards a united struggle for the destruction of apartheid and the introduction 
of a democratic society. During the late 1970s and early 1980s trade unions, 
student/youth organisations, women's organisations and civic associations 
sprang up in many parts of the country. The struggles of these organisations 
found their nexus in the national struggle against the apartheid system of 
oppression and exploitation after the formation of the UDF. 
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Chapter 4 
THE FORMATION, POLICIES AND AIMS, AND STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
OF THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
4.1. Introduction 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, black opposition underwent a 
significant revival with the growth and consolidation of the independent trade 
union movement and the emergence of numerous student/youth and 
community organisations. In addition , co-operation between trade unions, 
student and community organisations increased dramatically. However, with the 
exception of COSAS, many of these organisations had a limited membership 
and were unable to maintain sustained political action. What was lacking was 
a national political organisation which could coordinate the activities of the 
growi'ng number of organisations opposed to apartheid. The formation of the 
UDF in late 1983 provided the conditions under which this could be 
achieved. 
It is argued here that the formation of the UDF, the development of certain 
united aims and objectives, and the adoption of specific strategies and tactics 
conformed to certain strategic requirements of the Leninist/Gramscian United 
Front strategy: the creation of a historical bloc of all classes and strata 
opposed to the ruling bloc, united with common political , intellectual and 
moral objectives, and engaged in a universalistic political challenge of the 
dominant system which is directed at a democratic revolution . These have 
their parallels in the ANC's strategic objective of creating a mass-based 
national front, winning members of the front and its affiliates to positions 
aligned to the ANC, and promoting internal resistance to apartheid . 
Thus, it is argued that by 1987 the UDF had drawn close to ideological 
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positions held by the banned ANC, thus bringing together a large variety of 
social forces under a minimum programme, with common political, intellectual 
and moral objectives. It is further argued that the popular struggles of the 
1980s eventually evolved into a universalistic challenge of the apartheid 
system. 
4.2. Formation of the UDF 
The introduction of the new constitutional dispensation and the "Koornhof 
Bills" - the Black Local Authorities Act, the Black Communities Development 
Act and the Orderly Movement and Resettlement of Black Persons Bill - led 
to an upsurge in black political activity in opposition to these measures. 
According to Irvine, white domination has the effect of forging a broad unity 
in opposition among Africans, coloureds, and Indians, even of differing 
classes. The new constitutional proposals were designed to destroy this unity, 
and did indeed lead to divisions between blacks and within the Indian and 
coloured communities.1 Despite these divisions, the UDF, formed in August 
1983, represented an organisational fusion of groups representing different 
class forces of the black communities as well as a number of whites into 
a broad opposition to these measures. 
The political incorporation of coloured and Indian people was on the agenda 
of the ruling National Party for some time. In 1976, the Theron Commission 
recommended the direct political representation of coloured people at all 
levels.
2 
However, nothing came of these recommendations until the beginning 
of the 1980s. Two reports emanating from the Constitutional Committee of 
the President's Council , an advisory body established in 1981 and charged 
2 
McKinnon Irvine,D. (1984) ; "South Africa: Federal Potentialities in current developments", in 
International Political Science Review, (No.4), p.439. 
Republic of South Africa; Verdrag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na Aangeleenthede 
Rakendend die Kleurlingsgroep, RP, 38/1976, p.513. 
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largely with the task of framing new constitutional proposals, recommended 
the extension of political rights to the Indian and coloured communities.
3 
Finally, in a speech to the National Party Congress in mid-1982 the Prime 
Minister, P. W. Botha, laid down the guidelines for the new constitutional 
dispensation which were embodied in the Bill that was enacted by Parliament 
in 1983.4 
The new constitution , which came into effect on September 3, 1984, was 
designed to draw so-called coloureds and Indians into a political alliance with 
the white minority in opposition to the African majority. In Adelman's words: 
It was hoped that the basis of a black middle class with a vested interest in stability might 
be generated through the co-optation of certain petty bourgeois elements in the coloured 
and Indian communities, making them share-holders in apartheid, partners in their own 
oppression.5 
The need to co-opt these strata of the dominated classes stemmed from 
several factors.6 First, there was the collapse of separate political structures 
for coloureds in 1980 when the Labour Party, which held a majority of the 
elected seats in the Coloured Persons' Representative Council , withdrew its 
cooperation from the government. By 1982, both coloured and Indian political 
rights were in a limbo. Secondly, there was a need to offset the increasing 
unity of Africans, Indians and coloureds following the Soweto revolt by 
drawing the latter two communities into the apartheid structure. Finally, 
security considerations linked the extension of political rights of the Indian 





Republic of South Africa; First Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council 
PC, 3/1982; Second Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council on th~ 
adoption of Constitutional Structures in South Africa, PC, 4/1982. 
Welch,D. (1984); "Constitutional changes in South Africa", in African Affairs , (VoI.83, No.331 , 
April) , p.147. 
Adelman (1985); "Recent events in South Africa", in Capital and Class, (No.26, Summer), p.23. 
Welch,D. (1984) ; op.cit. , pp.147-1S0. 
124 
whites. 
For the African majority, who were excluded from the constitutional 
dispensation, Black Local Authorities (BLAs) in the African urban townships 
of South Africa were given a degree of "autonomy" and presented as a 
partial substitute for representation at parliamentary level. It was hoped that 
the problem of the political rights of urban Africans would be partially solved 
by giving them control over affairs in their own communities. The "autonomy" 
of the BLAs would mirror in miniature the kind of "autonomy" (called 
"independence") offered at a higher level.7 In addition, these Local Authorities 
enabled the state to shift the administration of the worst effects of its 
apartheid policies - for example, the provision and allocation of housing and 
evictions - to African councillors. 8 
The state's reform package was an attempt at the ideological level to gain 
the people's (or at least important sectors of it) acceptance of the apartheid 
system. The Constitution Act and the Black Local Authorities Act were 
attempts to legitimize the apartheid system by incorporating certain strata from 
the dominated majority. The provisions of the Orderly Movement and 
Resettlement of Black Persons Bill , based on the recommendations of the 
Riekert Commission , entrenched divisions between urban and migrant African 
workers by providing stricter influx control measures. Under the terms of the 
Black Labour Regulations of 1980, "qualified" urban African residents were 
provided with freer horizontal movement. Section 10 (1) (a) , (b) , and (c) - of 
the Native (Urban Areas) Act - rights were made transferable from one urban 
7 
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area to another, providing "established" workers with a virtual monopoly over 
jobs in secondary industry. 
The Orderly Movement and Resettlement of Black Persons Bill shifted 
emphasis to the prosecution of employers of illegal entrants to the urban 
areas in an attempt to reduce the incentive for such activities. Fines of up 
to R5,OOO were to be imposed on employers of African workers who entered 
the urban areas illegally. In addition, workseekers from the homelands would 
be permitted to enter the urban areas only if they had a firm offer of 
employment, approved housing was available and there was a shortage of 
suitable local workseekers. This Bill was therefore an attempt to reduce 
African numbers in "white" South Africa, linking their political rights to the 
homelands and to entrench divisions between "established" urban and migrant 
African workers. 
Under the terms of the Black Communities Development Act, Administration 
Boards (subsequently called development boards) were placed under the 
control of the Department of Co-operation and Development and made 
responsible for influx control, local government in African areas, housing, and 
co-operation with other government departments in their areas of jurisdiction. 
In 1979 the ANC-Ied alliance adopted a new revolutionary strategy - the 
people's war revolutionary strategy. The objectives of this strategy included 
building a united front of anti-apartheid community organisations operating 
legally and semi-legally inside South Africa. The implementation of the new 
revolutionary strategy was preceded by a four-year organisational and 
propaganda campaign . The ANC declared 1980 the "Year of the Freedom 
Charter", 1981 the "Year of the Youth", 1982 the "Year of Unity in Action", 
and 1983 the "Year of United Action". This resulted in a major realignment 
of internal support away from the BCM towards the ANC. Increasing numbers 
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of people and organisations began to support the ANC and its ideological 
appeal became increasingly evident inside the country.9 
The new revolutionary strategy and realignment towards the ANC were 
important factors behind the formation of the UDF. The formation of a United 
Front was one of the central elements of the people's war revolutionary 
strategy and the organisation's "Year of United Action" culminated in the 
formation of the UDF. Among the leading organisations which participated in 
the processes leading to its formation was COSAS, the first organisation 
inside the country to adopt the Freedom Charter. 
Three important national anti-apartheid campaigns in the early 1980s provided 
the initial organisational basis for the formation of the UDF. These were the 
anti-Republic Day, anti-SAIC (South African Indian Council) and Anti-President's 
Council campaigns. The first of these was directed against the twentieth 
anniversary celebrations of the formation of the Republic of South Africa on 
the 31st May 1981 . Ad-hoc Anti-Republic Day Committees emerged to voice 
opposition to these celebrations. 
The nationwide Anti-SAIC campaign followed , mobilising opposition , especially 
in the Indian communities, to the SAIC elections scheduled for the end of 
1981 . The decision to revive the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) was taken 
at the Transvaal Anti-SAIC conference in Johannesburg on the 23rd January 
1983. The need was recognised for the creation of an organisation able to 
"convert into programme and action" the political work done in the Anti-SAIC 
campaign.10 
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At a meeting in Eshowe in January 1983, the congress of the Labour Party 
voted overwhelmingly in favour of participating in the new constitutional 
arrangement. This provided the impetus for the formation of an Anti-
President's Council (Anti-PC) Committee in the Transvaal. The idea of an 
organisation to mobilize various community organisations against the 
President's Council proposals was first mooted at a conference held in 
Roodepoort during the middle of 1982.11 However: 
The feel ing then by the people present at the meeting was that the reform proposals were 
a non-issue and the community would not be hoodwinked and would not support any of 
the proposals and therefore there was no need to go out and organise organisations into 
a Front. 12 
A subsequent meeting on the 6th of January 1983 in Johannesburg, attended 
by members of community organisations, discussed "the response to the 
reform proposals and the decision at Eshowe" . "That group of 50 people 
then set up an ad hoc committee, to plan and assess the situation within 
the coloured and other communities". 13 In May 1983, the ad-hoc Transvaal 
Anti-President's Council committee was formally inaugurated at a meeting at 
Coronationville, Johannesburg. The purpose of this committee was to mobilise 
and organise people against the constitutional proposals. According to its 
Chairman, Dr. I. Mahomed: 
11 
Initially the anti-PC was a very small body. It had organised people in various areas and 
met with Labour Party dissidents. It set up local committees to explain to the people what 
the decisions of the Labour Party mean - conscription of their children, divisions of the 
whole democratic struggle. It has issued pamphlets in various areas and has set up 
working committees in a number of areas and it has carried out, on a small scale, house 
to house visits .... Initially support (for the Anti-PC) came mostly from radical young 
people, determined to see changes in our country, involved in various struggles and it 
came from various organisations like the ad hoc Anti-Republic Day Committees, COSAS, 
AZASO and so on. But there are also people who've come from other community 
organisations, grass roots organisations like residents' committees, church committees, 





student/school organisations. People have come as individuals, not as representatives 
of any organisation.14 
The anti-Republic Day, anti-SAIC and Anti-President's Council campaigns were 
similar in form if not in degree to other struggles waged by the dominated 
classes (rent, transport and consumer struggles) during the early 1980s. They 
were single issue struggles, often of short duration. 
On the 23rd January 1983, the Transvaal Anti-SAIC Committee held a 
conference in Johannesburg where Dr Allan Boesak called for unification of 
the forces opposed to apartheid and the formation of a "united front" . Boesak 
pointed out that: 
There is ... no reason why the churches, civic associations, trade unions, student 
organisations and sport bodies should not unite on this issue, pool our resources, inform 
people of the fraud that is about to be perpetuated in their name and, on the day of 
election, expose their plans for what they are.15 
The conference endorsed Boesak's proposal and appointed a commission to 
investigate the feasibility of a united front. The conference adopted a 
statement presented by the commission laying down the basis of the internal 
organisation for the initial regional structures of the UDF. It also drew up 
guidelines for the new organisation which included dedication to the "creation 
of a non-racial, unitary state, undiluted by racia l or ethnic considerations as 
formulated in the bantustan policy", the adoption of a non-racial form of 
organisation and the need to consult with "all democratic people wherever 
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A steering committee was set up to establish the Front. This was followed 
by the election of an interim national UDF executive. Organisations 
represented at the meeting such as the Natal Indian Congress, the Joint 
Rent Action Committee and individuals who were members of the Cape 
Housing Action Committee contacted their members in other regions. The idea 
was passed on and mobilisation took place especially in Natal, the Transvaal 
and the Western Cape. 17 In these areas UDF regions were being formed 
at meetings in April , May and June respectively. 
Numerous meetings were also held by organisations intending to affiliate to 
the UDF, where discussions covered such topics as policy, structure and 
strategies. A Natal regional UDF was established on the 14th May with 40 
affiliated organisations. A week later 28 organisations committed themselves 
to a Transvaal UDF, although this was only formalised subsequently. In the 
Western Cape, a regional UDF was formed on 24 July out of 22 
organisations. By the year's end, regional UDFs had also been constituted 
in the Border and Eastern Cape and a Northern Cape UDF was at an 
advanced stage of development. 18 
The following is an account of events which occurred in the setting up of 
the Transvaal UDF: 
17 
18 
What was initially set up was essentially a council of representatives to represent each 
of the participating organisations .... 
What happened was that the council was set up as a consultative body, functioning as 
an executive committee but called a consultative council , made up of six representatives 
from the trade unions, six from community organisations, three from church organisations, 
three from women's organisations, three from residents' organisations and three from 
student organisations. The trade unions and community organisations will receive greater 
representation as more organisations come in. That council was set up to basically plan 
Interview with Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, publicity secretary of the UDF, at Khotso House, Johannesburg 
on the 13th October 1983; "The UDF on the Unions", in South African Labour Bulletin, (Vol. 9, 
No.2, November 1983), p.79. 
Barrell ,H. (1984); op.cit. , p.1 1. 
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the kind of activity that would be carried on. There was also a secretariat of five people -
so by and large the work was actually being done by the secretariat and the consultative 
committee. A conference was convened, the third meeting of the UDF, to plan the 
Transvaal UDF structures and also to work towards a national UDF.19 
Consultations with the regional UDFs led to the decision to launch the UDF 
nationally and in late July, the UDF ad hoc national executive announced the 
national launching of the organisation . The inaugural conference was to be 
held in Cape Town on the 20th August. A commentator points out that: 
One of the most extensive propaganda campaigns in the history of resistance to apartheid 
followed. More than 400,000 UDF newsletters, posters and pamphlets were distributed 
nationally to advertise the launch. The gist of the propaganda was to inform people of the 
national political dimension of their fractured struggle and the need to reconstruct formal 
country-wide resistance to the new government manoeuvres".20 
Within a month of the announcement of the inaugural conference, 1,000 
delegates representing 575 organisations from all over the country came 
together on August 20, 1983 at Rocklands Civic Centre, Mitchells Plain, to 
launch the National UDF.21 Represented at this conference were political, 
women's, community, civic, trade union, student, youth , sport, religious, 
professional and other organisations from many areas of the country. The 
subsequent "people's" rally which unanimously endorsed the decisions taken 
at the conference comprised between 10 and 15 thousand people. Thus, by 
the end of 1983 a United Front organisation had been set up in the 
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4.3. Principles and Objectives 
The principles and objectives of the UDF were not fixed , but evolved over 
the years. Principles and objectives were determined at national conferences 
attended by delegates of all organisations affiliated to the UDF. 
The commission appointed by the Transvaal anti-SAle conference to 
investigate the feasibility of a united front set out the broad principles of the 
Front. 
We declare that the broad principles on which this UDF is constituted are: 
1. a belief in the tenets of democracy; 
2. an unshakeable conviction in the creation of a non-racial , unitary state in South Africa 
undiluted by racial or ethnic considerations as formulated in the bantustan policy; 
3. an adherence to the need for unity in struggle through which all democrats, regardless 
of race, religion or colour, shall take part together; 
4. a recognition of the necessity to work in consultation with and reflect accurately the 
demands of democratic people wherever they may be in progressive worker, community 
and student organisations.23 
The concept democracy, as articulated by the UDF, involved two related 
aspects. Firstly, it referred to the internal organisation and practices of 
affiliates and of the Front itself. Secondly, it referred to the democratic aims 
of the UDF and the organisations and individuals which participated in the 
Front. 
In the first place, the UDF and its affiliates would practice the principles of 
accountability, mass participation and recall of leadership. Murphy Morobe 
listed the following basic principles which characterised the democratic 
character of organisations affiliated to the UDF: 
1. Elected leadership: leadership of organisations must be elected (at all 
levels), and re-election must be held at periodic intervals. No single individual 
must be irreplaceable. Elected leadership must also be recallable before the 
23 
Statement by the "Commission on the Feasibility of a United Front against the Constitutional 
reform proposals", at the Transvaal Anti-SAIC Conference. Quoted in Barrell H (1984) ' op cit 
p.10. ' . , .., 
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end of their term of office if there is indiscipl ine or misconduct. 
2. Collective leadership: This involves continuous, ongoing consultation at all 
levels. Leadership skills, experience and knowledge must be spread , not 
hoarded . 
3. Mandates and accountability: Leaders and delegates have to operate within 
the delegated mandates of their positions and delegated duties. 
4. Reporting : Reporting back to organisations, areas, units , etc., is an 
important dimension of democracy. 
5. Criticism and self-criticism: Regular evaluations must be held , questions 
must be asked and constructive criticism encouraged.24 
Secondly, individuals and organisations which could join the UDF would have 
as their objective the creation of a non-racial , non-sexist and democratic 
South Africa. According to the UDF, the first step in the creation of a 
democratic society in South Africa was the abolition of all discriminatory 
legislation and the extension of democratic rights to all its citizens. According 
to Morobe: "A democratic solution in South Africa involves all South Africans, 
and in particular the working class , having control over all areas of daily 
existence - from national policy to housing , from school ing to working 
conditions, from transport to consumption of food" .25 
Underlying this conception of democracy is the concept "people's power". 
People's power arises when people "feel that they have some direct control 
over where and how they live, eat, sleep, work, how they get to work, how 
they and their children are educated , what the content of that education is· , 
and that these things are not done for them by the government of the day, 
24 





but by the people themselves"?6 In practice, people's power refers to the 
assumption of administrative, judicial, welfare and cultural duties by "organs 
of people's power" - street committees, defence committees, shop-steward 
structures, SRCs, and PTSAs. 
In its Working Principles, determined at the inaugural conference in 1983, the 
UDF listed the following aims and objectives: 
1. To oppose the Constitutional and Koornhof Bills as decided at the first national 
conference held in Cape Town on 20 August 1983 and any future conference; 
2. To develop the maximum possible participation in the front; and 
3. To encourage and assist democratic and full participation in the UDF. 
Opposition to the Constitutional and Koornhof Bills was a short-term aim of 
the UDF. The long-term objective of the Front was included in its Declar-
ation, also made at the inaugural conference. The UDF declared that: "we 
stand for the creation of a true democracy in which all South Africans will 
participate in the government of our country; we stand for a single, non-
racial, unfragmented South Africa, a South Africa free of bantustans and 
Group Areas; we say all forms of oppression and exploitation must end". 27 
Initially the prevailing view on the role of the UDF was that it would 
coordinate opposition to the government's reforms. By 1985, however, it 
became clear that the Front's role was more extensive and , in a report to 




1. to take the ideological initiative out of the hands of the state; 
2. to unite our people across class, colour, ethnic and organisational lines to oppose the 
apartheid reforms; 
3. to coordinate the activities of all organisations opposed to apartheid; 
4. to advance the mobilisation and to deepen the organisation of our people; 
5. to prevent the state from implementing its so-called reforms, or at least, to make it 
Ibid., p.34. 
"UDF Declaration", in South African Labour Bulletin, (Vo1.9, No.4, February 1984), p.72. 
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difficult for them to do so; 
6. to deepen the understanding of our people on issues affecting their lives, such as the 
P.C. Proposals and Koornhof Bills, the Community Councils and Black Local Authorities, 
the Coloured Management Committees and the new housing policy, etc.; 
7. to establish a broad front to serve as the voice of our people; 
8. to link politics with the day to day experience of our people; and 
9. to draw into the front groupings operating outside the government structures?8 
This view of the Front's objectives extended the life of the organisation 
beyond resistance to the government's reforms. Its role became more 
comprehensive and included coordinating resistance to apartheid and 
advancing mobilisation and organisation. In 1987, the UDF stated that: 
Now our broad aim is to unite the broadest mass of the people, black and white, in an 
unstoppable tide towards liberation. Millions of people are yearning for a new South 
Africa. The UDF has to organise these forces in the most effective way, so that our 
people can act as one, while the regime itself is divided and isolated from the over-
whelming majority of the people.29 
In terms of both its principles and objectives, the UDF sought to unite "all 
democrats", regardless of class or race, in the struggle to create a "non-
racial, unitary South Africa". The UDF worked quite openly with whites and 
with predominantly white organisations such as NUSAS, the Johannesburg 
Democratic Action Committee (JODAC) and the Black Sash .30 UDF publicity 
secretary Mosiuoa Lekota said: 
Many of us see that we are not ruled just by whites but by a section of whites in 
collaboration with a section of blacks. Some of those committed to apartheid are not 
white ... and those committed to a free and democratic society are not only black.31 
However, the Front called for the unity of all oppressed groups (Africans, 
Indians and coloureds), but called for participation by individual white 
democrats. It was argued that achieving both the immediate and the long-
28 
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29 
United Democratic Front (1987); "Build the Front", in Isizwe (The Nation), Discussion Paper, p.13. 
30 
Laurence,P. (1984); "South African Black party politics", in Africa InSight, (VoI.14, No.4), p.274. 
31 
Interview with Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, (1983); op.cit., p.79. 
135 
term advantages of white inclusion required that the liberation struggle itself 
be nonracial.32 According to Lekota: 
By 'a truly national character', the UDF means that we are non-racial , which means we 
embrace all races, and that we bring together all classes.
33 
The UDF identified the black working-class as the largest component of the 
dominated classes in South Africa. In early August 1983, the interim 
executive of the UDF emphasised that while it articulated the view-point of 
a broad section of people, it accepted that "the main burden of exploitation 
and discrimination" fell on the African working class. It pointed out that the 
main thrust of the organisation should be towards the participation of workers 
in the broad struggle against apartheid.34 
In its resolution on workers, the UDF called for the leadership of the working 
class in the democratic struggle for freedom. The organisation resolved to 
encourage the building of genuine democratic trade unions, and strengthen 
the unity between genuine democratic trade unions and all patriotic and 
freedom loving people in the struggle for political rights for al1. 35 UDF 
spokesmen repeatedly called for the participation of workers in the movement. 






We are not satisfied that we have achieved as much trade union support as we had 
hoped for. But we see the participation of workers in the UDF as important. The more 
workers come in the closer we are to gaining a truly national character. South Africa is 
still under colonial conditions and the struggle against imperialism is a struggle against 
capitalism. For this reason the working class must provide the backbone of the 
struggle.36 
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Nevertheless, the UDF in practice clearly rejected distinct class mobilisation 
and maintained instead that the issues of class should be largely subsumed 
under the broader umbrella of the popular struggle against apartheid.
37 
Lekota put it bluntly: 
The UDF is not a class organisation. It doesn't claim to work in the interests of the 
working class, the capitalist class or the peasantry. It is an alliance of these classes. All 
those who don't have political rights and who are willing to do battle, have a home in the 
Front. We have never claimed to be led by the working c1ass.38 
Several middle-class business groups affiliated to the Front, including the 
Western Cape Traders Association. Furthermore, in an attempt to isolate the 
National Party government white businessmen were encouraged to join or 
support the UDF and eventually major industrialists such as Tony Bloom of 
Premier Milling and Chris Ball of Barclays Bank provided the UDF with 
much-needed resources.39 To appeal to these groups the UDF avoided 
discussions of economic transformation and did not recommend an immediate 
transformation to socialism.40 
The UDF identified its immediate role in uniting opposition to apartheid. The 
fragmented and localized struggles of the dominated classes - rent, transport, 
consumer, trade union, student, unemployed, women, etc. - were organised 
under a "national structural form which guarantees the broadest possible unity 
in action of different social groups". The UDF thus emerged as "a 
mechanism that ensures the maximum concentration of energies and 
resources of organisations previously acting independently" .41 
37 
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Most of the community organisations which became the organisational 
foundation of the UDF developed out of local popular struggles that took 
place before and after the formation of the Front. In most cases, 
organisations which combined to form local structures of the UDF included 
youth and student organisations, a civic association, a women's organisation 
and local branches of sympathetic trade unions which often acted indepen-
dently. In addition, however, there were a number of ad hoc and constitu-
ency-based committees dealing with single issues involving squatters, hostel 
dwellers, traders, detainees, unemployed groups, professionals, and various 
Crisis Committees dealing with issues ranging from education to problems 
such as housing grievances and crime.42 
Initially, it was felt that adherence to the goals of the Freedom Charter was 
not a necessary condition for affiliation to the UDF. Instead , in order to 
achieve the desired maximum unity, the UDF articulated its own moderate 
declaration of intent in a move designed to accommodate liberal groups 
unable to reach consensus on the document.43 According to a prominent 
UDF member: 
the basis of any organisation coming in [to the UDF - G. H.] must be an acceptance of 
the declaration and any application to come into the UDF will be considered - we will of 
course look at the history and tradition of the particular organisation. It cannot simply be 
a verbal statement to the effect that we accept this declaration. There will have to be 
tangible evidence of the kind of struggle that they have been engaged in .... it will have to 
be debated whether in fact they are advancing the progressive movement in the 
country.44 
Thus, the UDF Declaration served as the initial minimum programme around 
which the UDF was formed, and adherence to which was the basis for 
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The organisations which affiliated to the UDF were diverse in their nature 
and historical tradition. Organisations which declared their opposition to the 
new dispensation and the "Koornhof Bills" included the Western Cape African 
Traders' Association , CUSA, JODAC, the Black Sash, church groups, and 
sports groups. However, as Lodge points out, "from the beginning , adherence 
to the Charter was viewed by most UDF leaders as signifying an advanced 
stage of ideological progress". In consequence, the early years of the UDF 
were characterised by repeated reference to the Freedom Charter by 
prominent UDF leaders.4s The Front was closely identified with "Charterism" 
by the end of the first of its existence while Black Consciousness-inclined 
organisations united to establish the National Forum. 
A number of references were made of the Freedom Charter by the UDF 
over the years. In an editorial in the UDF's journal Isizwe ("The Nation") in 
1985, the Front depicted its struggle as an attempt along the lines of the 
Freedom Charter, to "fuse two strands of the South African movement for 
liberation - the national (for the people to rule their own country) and the 
workers' struggle for socialism".46 In July, the UDF took the position that 
the Freedom Charter was "the most democratic document expressing the 
wishes and aspirations of our people".47 In this view, "Charterism" links the 
national struggle for liberation and the workers ' struggle for socialism while 
the Freedom Charter is seen as an expression of the will of the people. 
Policy decisions made at a National Working Committee in 1987 included a 
call on all affiliates to discuss the adoption of the Freedom Charter by the 
45 
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Front. It was noted that a large number of key affiliates had already adopted 
the Charter. According to the Committee, if the Charter was adopted, "it 
would provide the UDF with a political programme". In addition , it contained 
"all the popular demands of the people which the UDF has been articulating 
over the past four years". The Freedom Charter had also served "as a 
unifying document" and could be "a tool for education, for mass mobilisation, 
and for building organisation and unity". It was also seen as "the people's 
alternative to various divisive and undemocratic schemes".48 The UDF 
officially adopted the Charter in August of the same year. 
Accusations that the UDF was a front for the ANC were made by the 
government, senior security force officers, leaders of Indian and coloured 
political parties participating in the tri-cameral parliament and Inkatha's Chief 
Buthelezi. In 1983 Lekota said that the two organisations could never be 
affiliated because the one was illegal and had a strategy encompassing 
violence while the other was committed to non-violence. However, ANC 
support was welcome as was that of others opposed to apartheid.49 
The UDF admitted to being in the tradition of the ANC but denied being a 
front organisation. Many UDF leaders were close to the ANC, or were even 
ANC members before it was banned. However, the UDF was too diffuse and 
loosely organized to be considered a conspiracy and too popular to be 
considered no more than a tool of ANC sympathizers among its leaders.so 
The UDF did, however, provide a linkage with the tradition of struggle 
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and the ANC. 51 
There was a strong convergence at both the personal and ideological level 
between the ANC and the UDF. Its three presidents, Archie Gumede, Oscar 
Mpetha and Albertina Sisulu, were all supporters of the ANC before it was 
banned in 1960. Its patrons included the imprisoned ANC leaders, Nelson 
Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki, as well as imprisoned members 
of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the underground fighting wing of the ANC. Many, 
though not all, affiliates of the UDF endorsed the Freedom Charter before 
it was formally adopted by the Front in 1987. Many of the aims espoused 
by the ANC before it was banned were adopted by the UDF. 
The UDF contended that people like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and 
Oscar Mpetha as well as the aims espoused by the ANC are part of a 
long-standing tradition of black resistance in South Africa. Any movement 
which opposes apartheid and seeks the support of black people must reflect 
this tradition.52 
However, these comments must be seen in the context of the period during 
which they were made. The UDF had to publicly distance itself from the 
ANC in order to avoid the fate of the latter organisation . This does not 
imply that the ANC and its policies did not play a role in the formation of 
the UDF, or in its activities thereafter. 
The major difference between the two organisations was that the UDF had 
to reject violence whereas the ANC advocated armed struggle. Many of the 
680-plus organisations affiliated to the UDF could not be described as 
51 
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revolutionary. They included several middle class business groups, such as 
the Western Cape Traders Association, many church groups, and many 
cultural and sporting bodies, as well as the mainline township and civic 
associations which provided the core of the UDF. 
What is significant here, however, is that by the end of the period of review 
the UDF had moved beyond its minimum programme of intent to develop 
ideological coherence around the aims and objectives of the ANC's Freedom 
Charter. Furthermore, the evolving principles and objectives of the UDF gave 
rise to a set of common objectives which were aligned to the ANC's 
position. These included: the achievement of democracy, including the creation 
of a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa, maintaining democratic 
practices within affiliated organisations, and the establishment of "organs of 
peoples power"; mass mobilisation and organisation by linking politics to the 
day-to-day issues concerning people such as worker, rent, transport, group 
area, community council , and other local issues; unity in struggle through 
which all democrats, regardless of race, religion or colour, shall take part 
together; and the achievement of the economic and political aspirations of the 
Freedom Charter. 
This also met one of the strategic requirements of the LeninistlGramscian 
model of revolutionary strategy: the creation of a broad alliance of social 
forces with united political , intellectual and moral objectives, while drawing the 
affiliates of the Front and the Front itself to the ANC's Freedom Charter. 
4.4. Strategy and Tactics 
An understanding of the UDF's strategies and tactics must include an 
analysis of the strategies and tactics of its affiliates. The UDF did not make 
policy for its affiliates nor did it impose particular strategies on them. The 
affiliates took up campaigns in ways suited to their own activities and 
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constituencies. In many cases tactics arose spontaneously. However, in some 
instances, a broad consensus on particular strategies arose among UDF 
affiliates. 
The UDF and its affiliates used a wide variety of strategies and tactics 
during the period under review. Strategies and tactics changed many times 
and varied from affiliate to affiliate, from region to region, from time to time, 
and with varying degrees of success. These included boycotts of institutions, 
extensive mass mobilisation and organisation, the formation of alliances, 
challenge and confrontation, withdrawal of economic support, negotiation, 
clandestinity, and the creation of alternative administrative structures. The 
following analysis of the evolution of strategies and tactics demonstrates a 
shift from opposition and protest, to confrontation and challenge, resulting in 
a universalistic challenge of the dominant system. 
4.4.1. Boycotts of institutions: The first purpose of the UDF was to oppose 
the new constitution and the "Koornhof Bills". During its campaign against 
these reform measures discussions were held over the strategies and tactics 
to be used by the Front and its affiliates. 
On the 2nd November 1983, the South African government consulted the 
white electorate on the new constitution in a referendum. The white electorate 
endorsed the adoption of the constitution with a 66 percent majority support 
for the government. In mid-December 1983, the UDF held its first national 
conference in Port Elizabeth to discuss its strategy towards possible referenda 
for the Indian and coloured communities. At the centre of discussion was 
whether members should participate in the racial referenda and register a 
"no" vote, totally boycott the referenda, or allow each region freedom of 
choice. The conference was unable to reach a decision and regions indicated 
that they wanted to consult their membership. The UDF unanimously accepted 
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that if elections were held instead of referenda, it would call for a boycott. 53 
Regional differences emerged on the question of the Front's participation in 
the racial referenda. The Natal UDF in particular argued that the majority of 
Indian voters in Natal would reject the new constitution .54 They thus 
proposed that the UDF contest the issue in the referenda for Indians and 
coloureds. The Western Cape and Transvaal regions opposed participation in 
the referenda because they felt that their communities might vote in favour 
of the new constitution. This reflected an awareness of divisions within the 
Indian and coloured communities in these areas as well as uncertainty about 
the attitudes of these communities to the new dispensation. The Western 
Cape UDF pointed out that contesting the referenda was tantamount to 
participating in the new Parliament.55 A decision, taken by the UDF national 
executive on the 25 January 1984, called for a non-racial referendum, a 
boycott of ethnic referenda, but left the way open for affiliates to take part 
in ethnic referenda if this was appropriate in terms of "local conditions".56 
However, with evidence of mounting opposition to participation in the tri-
cameral constitution , Indian and coloured leaders opting for participation 
persuaded the government to abandon the idea of referenda for their 
communities. 
The elections for the first 26 BLAs were scheduled for November and 
December 1983. The UDF and its affiliates stood at the forefront of the anti-
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conducted house-to-house campaigns in some African townships. In this 
campaign the pattern was set for meetings at houses in the townships where 
eligible voters were encouraged to boycott the elections. Despite new 
government efforts to break the tradition of boycott and election apathy within 
the townships, percentage polls were generally lower than the 1978-79 
elections for the former community councils.57 Percentage polls in the 
elections to the new Local Authorities were exceptionally low, for instance, 
in Soweto, 10,7 percent, Lekoa, 14,7 percent and Evaton, 5,9 percent.58 
Elections for the coloured and Indian chambers were scheduled for the end 
of August 1984. The UDF and its affiliates, together with other major anti-
apartheid movements, such as the National Forum (NF) and several major 
trade unions not affiliated to the UDF, decided on a boycott campaign. But, 
as a test of its support and of opposition to the reform proposals, the UDF 
launched a "Million Signatures Campaign" on the 21 January 1984. This 
campaign involved large numbers of UDF members who were charged with 
collecting signatures throughout South Africa indicating the rejection of the 
new constitution and the Koornhof Bills and demanding a non-racial , unitary, 
and democratic South Africa. The campaign offered an opportunity to educate 
South Africans about the aims and objectives of the UDF and the 
implications of the constitution , to bu ild unity, to establish grassroots support, 
and inform the international community of the mass rejection of apartheid. 59 
By October just under 400,000 signatures had been collected . The UDF 
claimed that police harassment of UDF supporters was largely responsible for 
the shortfall. The campaign had also been overtaken by the anti-election 
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campaign.6o 
The Million-signature campaign was initially over-shadowered by debate among 
Indian and coloured members of the UDF on whether to vote or abstain if 
given an opportunity to vote in a referendum on the new constitution. More 
importantly, however, Lodge points out that the Soweto Youth Congress 
(SOYCO) was unenthusiastic about the tactic used during the campaign. 
SOYCO felt that the "signature blitz" (UDF canvassers visiting households in 
the townships to popularize the UDF) was too moderate.61 This demonstrates 
that the UDF did not have the capacity to direct the activities of its affiliates 
and may have contributed to the fa ilure to achieve the objective of one 
million signatures. Eventually the focus shifted to a boycott of the elections 
for the Indian and coloured chambers. 
The campaign took the form of a two-pronged attack. On the one level there 
was the direct mobilisation of Indian and coloured people through the UDF 
and its affiliates. This involved a series of mass rallies, house-to-house 
campaigns, distribution of literature and the holding of public meetings in 
which UDF spokesmen urged those attending to boycott the new constitutional 
dispensation. On another level, the UDF mobilised every potential anti-
apartheid force through the trade unions, youth, student, women , religious, 




The essence of the campaign was the basic grassroots mobilization of the people. It is 
here that the dynamism of the UDF and its affiliated bodies was displayed. The activity 
which provided the main thrust was meeting the people in their homes, churches, streets, 
sports grounds and elsewhere.62 
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On the weekend of 29/30 October 1983, the UDF held mass rallies in 
Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. On the eve 
of the November whites-only referendum, the UDF held a "people's weekend" 
- which comprised rallies in most major cities voicing opposition to the new 
constitution and Koornhof Bills - and was attended by about 30,000 people. 
Altogether, about 20,000 people attended UDF rallies in Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg , Durban, and Port Elizabeth called over the 
weekend of 17 to 20 August 1984 to highlight. opposition to the elections 
and to mark the UDF's first anniversary.53 
The tactics used by the UDF in these campaigns - grassroots mobilisation 
through house-to-house meetings, meetings in churches, streets, and 
elsewhere, and mass rallies - are exactly the type of Weberian tactics that 
Frost talks about. Essentially, these tactics served two main purposes - they 
popularized the UDF and mobilized opposition to the new political dispensa-
tion . 
The results of the elections for the tri-cameral parliament indicate the 
widespread opposition to the new dispensation: the official percentage poll in 
the coloured election was 30 percent and in the Indian election 20 percent. 
The UDF put the figures at 17,5 percent in the coloured election and 15,5 
percent in the Indian election. Following the election, the UDF claimed a 
large victory for the "forces of democracy" and called upon the newly-elected 
Members of Parliament to resign on the grounds that they did not have a 
mandate.54 
The debate over strategy was renewed in 1987 when general elections were 
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held for the tri-cameral parliament. UDF president Archie Gumede argued that 
the Front should reconsider its position because of the state of emergency. 
According to Gumede, contesting the' elections would permit the UDF to 
operate publicly and openly express its views. In addition, because of the 
popularity of the Front, there would be little chance of losing. Elected UDF 
representatives would then refuse to take their seats and thereby destroy the 
legislature. These suggestions provoked an uproar within UDF circles but led 
to no change in strategy. Most UDF leaders continued to favour boycotting 
the elections and the Front decided not to participate in the general 
elections.65 
4.4.2. Mass mobilisation and organisation : During the late 1970s and early 
1980s widespread popular struggles gave rise to a number of organisations 
in the black townships. This was in part a result of a conscious effort by 
anti-apartheid activists to establish broad-based, grassroots structures. 
Organisations also emerged in the aftermath of spontaneous township-wide 
struggles against the shortage and inadequate nature of housing; against 
increases in rent and transport costs; against forced removals and relocation 
in the homelands; against incorporation into the homelands; against squatter 
removals; and against Bantu Education.66 The majority of these organisations 
were student organisations, youth congresses, and civic associations. 
The UDF consciously used the tactics utilised by activists before its 
formation , i.e., it began to organise communities around concrete local issues 
and problems. The UDF drew attention to the "essential linkage between 
worker, rent, transport, group area, community council , and other local 
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issues".67 UDF organisers, such as Terror Lekota in the Orange Free State, 
and Mathew Goniwe in the Eastern Cape, assisted in forming civic 
associations, youth congresses and student organisations by bringing people 
together on the issues which directly affected them. 
The UDF's theme for 1985, "From Protest to Challenge: Mobilisation to 
Organisation", shifted the emphasis from mass mobilisation to mass 
organisation. The Front identified the need to develop "well-knit, cohesive 
mass organisations" to take advantage of widespread popular mobilisation 
during the previous year. This theme emphasised the need for organisational 
coherence and UDF activists proceeded to establish numerous community 
organisations. According to Friedman: 
Before the early 1980s black resistance relied on mobilisation rather than organisation , 
on rallying protest rather than wielding power. Successive resistance movements were 
often able to mobilise large numbers of people around specific issues or behind 
charismatic leaders but they did not wield them into an organised and discipl ined 
movement which could press for change. Numbers are no automatic guarantee of 
strength and these movements were crushed when the government acted against their 
relatively small group of leaders.68 
Large mass meetings were a key organisational tool of the UDF and its 
affiliates, particularly the civic associations which held regular mass meetings. 
Funerals for victims of clashes with the security forces also served as 
another form of recruitment for mass organisation. At these mass meetings 
and funerals, large crowds of UDF supporters and other mourners were led 
through speeches by leaders of the Front, while freedom songs were sung, 
and flags of the banned ANC and SACP openly displayed. 
In 1985, UDF affiliates in the Eastern Cape introduced the street committee 
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system into their structures. Each street formed a cell , headed by a 
committee, which formed the pillars of the civic associations and youth 
structures. These committees played two central roles: they assessed the 
feelings of the community with regard to certain issues and they mobilised 
support for political campaigns. 
In 1987, in the wake of state repression and a clampdown on extra-
parliamentary organisations following the declaration of a state of emergency 
in mid-1985 and another in the middle of 1986, the UDF decided on a 
change in strategy. Two factors were responsible for this change. Firstly, UDF 
activists realised that the state was nowhere as weak as it appeared before 
mid-1986 and that the fight for change would be protracted.69 Secondly, the 
state clampdown on the UDF and its affiliates during the emergency provoked 
a search for new strategies to surmount the setbacks of the previous year. 
The debate over new strategies took place at a conference of the UDF 
National Working Committee. The conference adopted the theme DEFEND! 
CONSOLIDATE! ADVANCE!! 
The UDF resolved to consolidate its organisational base by: (1) developing 
strategies and tactics, including underground work, and building organisations 
that were best able to weather the onslaught of repression ; (2) deepening 
ideological and organisational unity within the UDF; (3) developing powerful, 
sector-based national affiliates; and , (4) developing political centres 
("organisational collectives that are capable of providing political leadership") 
at every level of the UDF. The Front aimed to establish political centres by 
transforming all coordinating structures - the zonal, area and township 
structures, regional and national executive committees - into structures that 
69 Friedman,S. (1988); "Shifting strategies in black politics", in Optima, (36, September), pp.148-9. 
150 
provided political leadership in all popular struggles.70 
Thus, unlike the organisations leading the previous decade of resistance, the 
UDF committed itself to the formation of strong mass-based organisations, 
including sector-based ones, while establishing co-ordinating political centres 
to lead the political struggle. This commitment to strong organisation rather 
than the previous reliance on mass mobilisation led to sustained political 
involvement, thus providing greater opportunities for political education while 
providing the UDF with the dedicated foot-soldiers required to challenge the 
apartheid regime. 
4.4.3. The creation of alliances: The formation of the UDF itself was the 
result of alliances between a broad range of community, political , church and 
other organisations. Although alliances are not new to extra-parliamentary 
opposition in South Africa - the most significant was the Congress Alliance 
of the 1950s - the alliance formed in the UDF is without precedent in its 
sheer magnitude. In 1983, the UDF brought together close to 600 
organisations with a combined membership of two million people. It also 
brought together people from almost every walk of life, young and old , male 
and female, educated and uneducated, petty bourgeois and working class, 
socialist and liberal , religious and non-religious, Christian and Muslim, and 
black and white. 
Tactical alliances also emerged during local, regional and national campaigns. 
Such alliances were of short duration and normally created as issues arose. 
These included campaigns against the tri-cameral parliament, the BLAs, Bantu 
Education, the various emergencies, etc. They took the form of alliances of 
numerous organisations to boycott elections, to organise mass stayaways, to 
70 See United Democratic Front (1987); "Build the Front", op.cit. 
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co-ordinate consumer boycotts, etc. 
The UDF also began to consider tactical alliances with groups outside the 
"broad democratic movement" in order to broaden its political and moral 
influence over the widest possible range of South Africans. The UDF aimed 
to spread its influence by developing a working relationship with groups such 
as taxi-owners, traders, sports bodies, and religious and cultural groups and 
increasing the Front's influence over sectors within the ruling bloc - members 
of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) , professionals, big business, etc.71 
For the UDF, the most important strategic alliance was with the organised 
labour movement. From the outset, the UDF called on organised labour to 
join the Front. This call was rejected by sectors of the trade union 
movement, in particular FOSATU. However, the pressure of events in the 
townships and from members of the federation resulted in increasing 
cooperation between organised labour and the UDF in 1984.72 The formation 
of COSATU in December 1985 strengthened this relationship . A resolution 
taken at the UDF's 1987 national conference, calling for the building of 
united front structures which included COSATU affiliates at all levels, aimed 
at drawing COSATU members into the UDF. 
4.4.4. Challenge and confrontation: The introduction of the new constitution 
and the "Koornhof Bills" also provoked a violent response by townships 
residents. The Vaal Triangle uprising, which began on 3 September 1984, 
was a popular response to the reforms as well as school-related grievances. 
In particular, residents of the African townships of the Vaal Triangle resented 
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of 1984. A wave of student protests, which began in Atteridgeville at the 
beginning of the year, combined with the volatile position resulting in a 
stayaway on the 3 September in the Vaal Triangle. Amidst calls on town 
councillors to resign , township youth attacked their houses and businesses 
and a number of councillors were murdered. The invasion of the townships 
by the security forces - an estimated 35,000 troops in 93 townships -
provoked widespread clashes between the security forces and township youth. 
This marked the beginning of the involvement of the SADF "on a continuous 
and country-wide basis in suppressing township resistance" .73 It set the stage 
for the widespread deployment of troops during the various states of 
emergency which followed from mid-1985. Consequently, the SADF 'assumed 
a major and permanent role in township control , in some cases surpassing 
the police as the primary elements of "Iaw and order''' . 74 
In addition to the national campaigns against the new political dispensation 
and the "Koornhof Bills", a large number of UDF affiliates were involved in 
a wide range of local popular struggles during the first years of the Front's 
existence. The wave of resistance which took place during the second half 
of 1984 and the first half of 1985 finally resulted in a crackdown on the 
extra-parliamentary opposition and the declaration of the first state of 
emergency on 21 July 1985. The repression and harassment of community 
organisations, the UDF in particular, led to transformations in the strategies 
and tactics of the Front. In particular, a major transformation of tactical 
responses to apartheid occurred as the UDF was drawn into an uprising 
73 
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which took the form of a revolt. 75 
The wave of popular struggles waged by UDF affiliates during the uprising 
transformed the Front from an organisation formed to oppose the new 
constitution and the "Koornhof Bills", to the political centre of the internal 
struggle against apartheid. The majority of internal struggles waged against 
racial domination and capitalist exploitation were fought under the UDF 
banner. In addition, violent confrontation with the security forces reflected a 
transformation of tactics from resistance to revolt. 
The characteristic features of this revolt involved school, rent and consumer 
boycotts, attacks on town councillors and collaborators, and street-fighting with 
the security forces. During this period, however, the notorious "kangaroo 
courts", "necklacing" of informers, and intimidation of residents who opposed 
or disobeyed calls for stayaways and consumer boycotts became widespread, 
particularly in the Eastern Cape. From September 1984 to May 1987, the 
"unrest" situation in South Africa was marked by widespread violence. 
There is no universally accepted definition of the term political violence. 76 
Nieburg defines political violence as: 
Acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, 
surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have pOlitical significance, that 
is, tend to modify the behaviour of others in a bargaining situation that have conse-
quences for the social system.77 
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political violence by opposition groups is provided by Gurr in Why Men 
Rebel. Gurr defines political violence as: 
All collective attacks within a political community against the political reg ime, its actors -
including competing pol itical groups as well as incumbents - or its policies.78 
A working definition of political violence by opposition groups would combine 
these two definitions and read as follows: political violence by opposition 
groups includes all acts of disruption, destruction, injury against the regime, 
its actors, or its policies, which are intended to modify the behaviour or 
policies of the regime that have consequences for the social system. Such 
a working definition includes mass stayaways, school boycotts and consumer 
boycotts which, although not inherently violent, often end in violence because 
of other factors, particularly, the actions of the security forces.79 Other 
obvious examples of political violence are attacks on personnel and property, 
and bomb attacks. 
The first phase of this revolt began in the Vaal Triangle townships on 3 
September 1984 and reached a climax with a ninety percent successful mass 
stayaway strike on November 5 and 6. The violent upheaval in the African 
townships of the Vaal Triangle was directed towards elected town councillors. 
Town councillors were called on to resign , while the rejection of the councils 
was often expressed violently. Three town councillors were murdered while 
others were subjected to continuing physical and psychological pressure to 
resign .80 
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Eastern Cape resulting in a virtual collapse of the town councils. The ANC 
also made its call on the struggling masses to make themselves ungovern-
able at this time.81 During the first half of 1985, popular resistance to local 
government spread to small rural communities and by June, only two African 
townships still had functioning councils.82 A wave of student boycotts began 
during the middle of 1983 and continued to the end of 1986. An important 
feature of this wave of protest was the linkage between demands around 
educational issues and national political issues. 
Although the UDF officially opposed violence - any attempt to officially 
support violence would have resulted in a swift crackdown on the 
organisation and possibly its banning - violence became an integral element 
of the revolt. With the spread of the revolt from the Vaal Triangle to almost 
every part of the country, violent confrontation with the security forces 
became widespread . Violent clashes with the security forces , barricading of 
streets, attacks on town councillors and their property, and destruction of 
government property became a characteristic feature of township struggles. 
The black youth were at the forefront of this confrontation with the security 
forces and apartheid agents.83 
According to the Bureau of Information, between September 1984 and May 
1987, 374 people were killed by the necklace method .84 4,638 private 
houses, 1,549 schools, 1,048 shops/factories, 1,021 houses of policemen, 111 
offices, 64 post offices, 47 churches and 27 clinics were damaged during 
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unrest incidents.8s 9,704 private delivery vehicles , 8,368 buses, 3,634 police 
vehicles and 198 Post Office vehicles were damaged.86 Between January 
1985 and December 1986, 4,140 attacks were made on the security forces, 
including 2,485 incidents of stone throwing and 816 petrol bomb attacks in 
1986.87 
The emergence of vigilantes - e.g. the African Parents' Concerned Committee 
in Uitenhage - and the activities of municipal policemen, as well as clashes 
with other political organisations led to the formation of defence systems 
around street committees in some areas. The first of these self-defence units 
were set up in the Transvaal, Cape, and Natal townships as a means of 
protecting leaders from vigilante and police attacks. These units soon became 
responsible for enforcing consumer boycotts and stayaways .88 
The uprising initiated a change in tactics for many local affiliates of the 
UDF. According to Murray: 
... the tactical focus on large-scale mass mobilisation (rall ies, marches, street agitations, 
and so forth) gradually gave way to low-profile highly mobile hit-and-run actions .... the 
cycle of mass mobilisation/police killings/public funerals reached a point of exhaustion in 
every community transfixed by the political upheaval. Small groups of self-conscious 
activists experimented with new organisational forms, modifying their tactics to respond 
to the particular situation they faced .89 
This tactical shift involved the search for more radical solutions that required 
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resonance, replacing and superseding the vague commitment to nonviolence that had 
historically deep roots amongst the oppressed in South Africa.
90 
On the one hand , the UDF was confronted by a spontaneous wave of 
militancy over which it had no control. The violence which erupted during the 
revolt was driven by the demand for action and retaliation on the part of 
young blacks who were raised in an era of conflict, harassment, and 
torture. 91 The UDF had to tread carefully on the issue of violence, for fear 
of losing influence with the militant youth they wanted to restrain .92 On the 
other hand, any overt support for the violent activities of the youth would 
have increased the possibility of the proscription of the Front. 
4.4.5. Creation of alternative administrative structures: Violence during the 
revolt was directed specifically against local government structures and town 
councillors. Between September 1984 and the end of March 1985, there were 
243 acts of violence against community councillors, including 66 petrol-
bombings which totally destroyed 32 homes.93 Between September 1984 and 
June 1985, 240 town councillors, including 27 mayors, resigned .94 'Within a 
short time, action against "collaborators" became elevated into a tactic which 
purportedly aimed to make the townships "ungovernable" by driving from them 
anyone who was seen to be "making apartheid work" by collaborating with 
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firstly , as pointed out above, to make apartheid unworkable; and , secondly, 
to establish "people's power" in the townships. 
In early 1984, ANC president Oliver Tambo put forward this strategy in an 
address entitled "Liberation is in Sight". He said : 
We must begin to use our accumulated strength to destroy the organs of government of 
the apartheid regime. We have to undermine and weaken its control over us, exactly by 
frustrating its attempts to control us ... rendering the enemy's instruments of authority 
unworkable ... creating conditions in which the country becomes increasingly ungovern-
able.96 
The concept of "ungovernability" became a regular theme of UDF speakers 
thereafter. For example, Thami Mali , chairman of the Transvaal Regional 
Stay away Committee, echoed this theme in the following words: 
No amount of intimidation can stop us on our way to liberation ... our duty as the 
oppressed people is to step up our resistance and create an ungovernable situation.97 
4.4.6. Withdrawal of economic support: The uprising was also accompanied 
by a rent boycott in the Vaal Triangle townships. The rent boycott soon 
spread to the Orange Free State and the Eastern Transvaal. While most of 
these boycotts were in response to increases in rent and service charges, 
by mid-1986 they took on a strategic significance. This followed a meeting 
of civic associations convened by the UDF at the beginning of the year. 
Rent boycotts were now used as a general weapon of protest and boycotting 
communities began to link national political demands with their local demands. 
The highly successful mass stayaway in the Transvaal on 5 and 6 November 
1984 radically altered the character of co-operation between community 
organisations and trade unions. The COSAS-initiated stayaway drew support 
from a number of affiliates of FOSATU. On the weekend of 16 and 17 
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March 1985, workers and residents of Port Elizabeth heeded PESCQ's call 
for a stayaway from work and a boycott of white shops, despite the rejection 
of the action by organised labour. In 1986, two mass stayaways, called by 
Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth community organisations, were widely supported . 
Consumer boycotts were introduced in 1985 in the Eastern Cape coastal 
town, Port Alfred, where local organisations organised a boycott against white 
retailers following a price increase.98 The success of this boycott led to the 
spread of its use to other towns in the region and to the rest of the 
country by the end of the year.99 
4.4.7. Negotiations 100 : Popular struggles during 1985 and early 1986 intro-
duced a new tactic at the local level, particularly in the Eastern Cape 
townships (in Uitenhage, Port Alfred and Cradock) and Tumahole (near 
Parys) . A number of UDF-aligned community organisations entered into local-
level negotiations with private as well as government bodies. These included 
local Chambers of Commerce and Industry, businesses, white local authorities 
and the police. Such negotiations were directed towards gaining concessions 
- stemming from a wide range of popular demands - from the government. 
In particular, the collapse of the SLAs and popular support for local UDF 
campaigns persuaded the white business-community and white authorities to 
negotiate with UDF-aligned boycott committees. According to Friedman: 
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have been compelled to deal with the only organised bodies in the townships that seem 
to enjoy legitimacy - or by the consumer boycott, which has prompted business and 
municipalities to deal with its local organisers. These talks are significant because they 
give local black communities an opportunity to influence township conditions for the first 
time and so represent a shift of power, albeit a limited one, from whites to blacks.101 
4.4.8. Clandestinity: The widespread detention of UDF members and leaders, 
removal of UDF leaders through political trials and imprisonment and a 
nationwide clampdown on extra-parliamentary opposition soon began to take 
their toll on the UDF's operations. In August 1987 it was estimated that 75 
per cent of the 30,000 detainees at the time were members of the UDF or 
its affiliates. In addition , numerous UDF activists were also killed or 
"disappeared" in mysterious circumstances. 102 The net result of this was to 
force many UDF activists underground, with many affiliates of the organisation 
operating semi-clandestinely. Organisations developed "a structure of shadow 
leaders who were never publicly identified and thus were less vulnerable to 
harassment". 103 
The banning and disruption of public meetings during the second state of 
emergency (declared in mid-1986) had a negative affect on organisational 
practices. Many affiliates of the Front conducted meetings in secrecy, often 
without recording minutes. National conferences and workshops of the UDF 
had to be held in secrecy during the emergency. In addition , some UDF 
affiliates had to be launched secretly, including SAYCO and the Women's 
Congress, both launched in 1987. 
In some instances, community organisations stepped into the power vacuum 
101 F ' d S ne man, . (1986); op.cit., p.6. 
102 0 . R O'M . . aVles, ., eara,D. and Dlamlnl,S. (1 988); The struggle for South Africa: A reference guide to 
movements, organisations and institutions, (London and New Jersey, Zed Books Ltd.), p.452. 
103 
See Lodge,T. (1991); op. cit. , p.95. 
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created by the disintegration of local state structures. Certain civic 
organisations took over some of the functions of local councils, including 
refuse removal, policing the townships, and the establishment of parks. From 
mid-1985 onward, community organisations set up street committee structures, 
designed to ensure "people's power", or mass participatory democracy. 
Townships governed by people's power were often called "liberated zones", 
which became no-go areas for state apparatuses, including the police and 
white authorities. 
During the middle of the 1980s, civic organisations began challenging the 
state's authority by forming people's courts as an alternative means of 
administering justice in the townships. People's courts effectively removed 
issues from the jurisdiction of the state and placed them under the 
jurisdiction of community organisations. People's courts became increasingly 
acceptable to township residents as the lack of confidence in the police grew 
with the spread of civil unrest at the end of 1984. The functions of people's 
courts included: resolving disputes between neighbours and resolving family 
arguments; trying petty criminals; imposing curfews to lower the incidence of 
street brawling and alcohol-related violence; and disciplining young comrades 
guilty of "hooliganism and criminal behaviour" during campaigns.104 
In sum, the strategies and tactics which stressed the formation of alliances, 
mass mobilisation and mass politicisation during the early years of the UDF 
conformed to the LeninistlGramscian model of revolutionary strategy. Indeed, 
these tactics became a central goal of UDF activists through most of the 
period under review where there was a conscious effort to establish 
organisations, to link all popular struggles and to create alliances around 
104 S k· J e~ Ings, . ~1989) ; "People's courts and popular politics", in Moss,G. and Obery,l. (eds.); South 
African ~evlew ~ , . (Johannesburg, Ravan Pres~) , p. ~ 20. and Lodge,T. (1 987); "The United 
Democratic Front , In Brewer,J.D. (ed.); South Africa: Five minutes to midnight (London Verso) 
pp.220-226. ' , , 
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organisations formed in response to these struggles (in other words, to 
promote unity-in-action) . This is also demonstrated by some of the principles 
and objectives of the UDF and its affiliates, the role of activists like Mathew 
Goniwe and Terror Lekota, and the structural transformations of the UDF (the 
formation of area committees) and the activities of affiliated organisations.105 
However, this was punctuated by significant episodes of confrontation and an 
insurrectionary mood became more evident during the last years of the period 
under review. This was a result of both the level of struggle throughout the 
country (the successful creation of areas of "people's power" in many parts 
of the country) and the resulting clampdown by the authorities. What has 
been demonstrated, however is that the strategies and tactics of the UDF 
and its affiliates eventually evolved "into a universalistic political challenge of 
the dominant system", thus meeting an essential requ irement of the 
LeninistlGramscian United Front strategy. In this sense, the particular interests 
and demands of affiliates of the UDF were transformed into popular struggles 
and universal political demands aiming at national liberation. 
In conclusion , this analysis has demonstrated that the formation of the UDF, 
its objectives and aims and its strategies and tactics met certain essential 
requirements of the LeninistlGramscian United Front strategy: a historical bloc 
of all classes and strata opposed to the ruling bloc, united with common 
political , intellectual and moral objectives, and engaged in a universal political 
challenge of the dominant system. Here we see in practice the necessity of 
creating a broad alliance of social forces under a minimum programme during 
that stage of struggle which leads to a democratic revolution . 
105 Th' d . 
IS . oes not Imply that all affiliated organisations were formed or led by people who were 
conscIous of these ~rinciples and objectives but that conditions of struggle (such as the strong 
nee.d for . ~he ~stablJshment. of local organisations to engage in struggles involving material or 
soclo-po.lJtIC~1 Issues, the eXistence of other organisations in the area, etc.) promoted the formation 
of organisations and of unity-in-action. 
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In the first place, the UDF was formed in 1983 by a large number of anti-
apartheid forces consisting of members from every racial and virtually every 
class group. Its formation was provoked by the introduction of a new 
constitution, which excluded Africans from the central political system, and the 
so-called "Koornhof Bills". Initially the prevailing view on the role of the UDF 
was that it would coordinate opposition to the government's reforms. In this 
sense it was a broad alliance of social forces under a minimum programme. 
In 1985, however, it became clear that the Front's role was more extensive 
and included coordinating resistance to apartheid and advancing mobilisation 
and organisation. Its role became one of promoting mass mobilisation and 
organisation around all struggles in civil society which are primarily directed 
against the ruling bloc, thus meeting another essential requirement of the 
LeninistlGramscian model. In 1987, the UDF claimed a prime role for itself 
in the struggle for liberation: that of organising the masses of the people "in 
an unstoppable tide towards liberation". Its role now was that of a broad 
alliance of social forces which was directed primarily at the goal of a 
democratic revolution. 
Secondly, by the end of the period of review the evolving principles and 
objectives of the UDF had given rise to a set of common political, 
intellectual and moral objectives. These included: the achievement of 
democracy, including the creation of a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic 
South Africa, democratic practices within organisations, and the establishment 
of "organs of peoples power"; mass mobilisation and organisation by linking 
politics to the day-to-day issues concerning people such as worker, rent, 
transport, group area, community council , and other local issues; unity in 
struggle through which all democrats, regardless of race, relig ion or colour, 
shall take part together; and the achievement of the economic and political 
aspirations of the Freedom Charter. These objectives were also closely 
aligned to the objectives of the ANC. 
164 
Finally, the evolution of the UDF's strategies and tactics culminated in a 
universalistic challenge of the dominant system. At first the UDF stressed the 
formation of alliances and mass mobilisation. These are exactly the type of 
Weberian tactics that Mervyn Frost talks about. Essentially, these tactics 
served two main purposes - they popularized the UDF and mobilized 
opposition to the new political dispensation. From 1985 onward , the UDF 
stressed the formation of mass-based organisations as a means of sustaining 
political activism. This new tactic was accompanied by a wave of popular 
struggles, beginning in September 1984, which soon took the form of a 
country-wide revolt as community organisations engaged in numerous struggles 
which challenged the state's authority. Violent clashes with the security forces, 
barricading of streets, attacks on town councillors and their property, and 
destruction of government property became a characteristic feature of township 
struggles. 
This violent uprising was accompanied by a transformation of rent and 
consumer boycotts from a weapon of protest to a challenge of the dominant 
system as boycotting communities began to link national political demands 
with their local demands. The uprising, which continued into 1986, gave rise 
to two important shifts in tactics which reflected a limited shift in the locus 
of power in the African townships: firstly, the establishment of "peoples 
power", when certain civic associations took over the running of local 
administration and justice; and negotiations with white authorities and 
businessmen. The combined effect of all these was a universalistic political 
challenge of the dominant system, thus meeting an essential requirement of 
the LeninistlGramscian United Front strategy. In this sense, the particular 
interests and demands of affiliates of the UDF were transformed into popular 
struggles and universal political demands aiming at national liberation. This 
also met the ANC's strategic objective of intensifying internal resistance. 
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Chapter 5 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
5.1. Introduction 
One of the essential requirements of the LeninistlGramscian model of 
revolutionary strategy was the political and ideological struggle to raise 
revolutionary consciousness. This is a struggle for hegemony, in which the 
United Front increasingly acquires political and ideological leadership through 
a shift in the balance of social and cultural forces towards it. For both Lenin 
and Gramsci, this is done by taking leadership of all organisations in civil 
society engaged in popular democratic struggles and uniting all protest against 
the ruling class into a single stream. It is necessary, then, to examine the 
membership of the UDF in order to determine the extent of its organisational 
and political leadership within South African civil society. 
5.2. Overview 
The United Democratic Front was essentially a coalition of close to 700 
organisations varying in function , size and popular impact. In terms of the 
UDF's constitution, membership was only open to organisations and not to 
individuals. The UDF's Working Principles outlined the conditions of 
membership of the Front: 
* All organisations present at the first national conference otherwise than as observers, 
shall be members of the UDF subject to: 
their right to withdrawal 
- review by the National Executive Committee in consultation with regional councils 
or by the National General Council from time to time. 
* All organisations which are prepared to commit themselves to the declaration policy 
and to the programme of action will be eligible to make an application for affiliation 
through the regional councils. 
* In t~rms of membership of national organisations which are not members of regional 
committees shall be decided from time to time by (the) National Executive Committee in 
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consultation with regional councils.1 
In order to qualify for membership organisations had to have: a belief in the 
tenets of democracy; an unshakeable conviction in the creation of a non-
racial, unitary state in South Africa undiluted by racial or ethnic considerations 
as formulated in the bantustan policy; an adherence to the need for unity 
in struggle which all democrats regardless of race, religion or colour shall 
take part together; a recognition of the necessity to work in consultation with, 
and reflect the demands of democratic people wherever they may be - in 
worker, community and student organisations. 
At the inaugural conference of the UDF in 1983, five hundred and sixty-five 
organisations, totalling 1,5 million supporters registered delegates.2 These 
organisations can be divided as follows: 
1. Student/youth organisations: Forty-seven student and 313 youth 
organisations registered at the conference providing the majority of partici-
pants. 
2. Trade unions: Only eighteen trade unions were represented at the 
conference. 
3. Civic organisations: Representatives of eighty-two civic organisations 
participated. 
4. Women's organisations: Thirty-two women's organisations were represented. 
5. Other organisations: including political organisations such as the Transvaal 
Indian Congress; religious organisations; sports organisations, etc. Some 
2 
United Democratic Front (1 983); National Launch, (Cape Town, United Democratic Front), August 
20, pp.8-9. 
Lodge,T. (1991); "Rebell ion : The turning of the tide", in Lodge,T and Nasson,B. (eds.); All . Here. 
and . Now: .Black politics in South Africa in the 1980s, South Africa Update Series, (Cape Town, 
David Philip), p.S1 . Refer also to Appendix A below. 
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seventy-three such organisations were represented at the launch.
3 
"At its peak the UDF would claim the adherence of about seven hundred 
affiliates grouped in ten regional clusters embracing every major concentration 
of population throughout the country.,,4 The UDF claimed a membership of 
close to two million. However, a number of factors make it virtually 
impossible to determine the actual membership of the Front. One of the main 
obstacles to establishing the membership of the UDF was the fact that many 
of its affiliates could not provide verifiable membership figures. Many UDF 
affiliates did not have membership numbers (they did not give out cards, did 
not collect dues) and this, coupled with fleeting membership in many cases 
and state repression , rendered any estimate of UDF membership unworkable.5 
Another difficulty lay in the widespread practice of individuals with membership 
in more than one local affiliate of the UDF. However, as Njikelana points 
out: 
The mass base of organisations which are unable to issue membership cards, collect 
dues, have dues deducted, pay full time organisers and operate through formal 
structures, can only be assessed according to the support their programmes enjoy. 
Therefore it is primarily in the struggles waged by these organisations that the extent or 
lack of mass base can be assessed .... lt is the organisation's ability to act and respond 
in struggle that exposes the degree of support, or the mass base, that it can call upon.6 
Support for the UDF was not confined to the membership of its affiliate 
organisations. There were large numbers of unorganised people who 
supported the policies and objectives of the UDF. Some of these people 
participated in national campaigns of the UDF such as the anti-tricameral 
parliament campaign and the million signature campaign while many 
3 




Lodge,T. (1987) ; "The United Democratic Front: Leadership and Ideology", in Brewer,J.D. (ed.); 
After Soweto: An unfinished journey, (Oxford, The Clarendon Press), p.207. 
6 
Njikelana,S. (1984); "Unions and the UDF", in Work in Progress, (No.32, July), p.31 . 
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participated in campaigns initiated by local affiliates of the UDF, e.g. 
consumer, rent, and transport boycotts. 7 Thus, it is necessary to focus on 
the support the UDF was able to command rather than membership to 
determine the mass base of the organisation. 
The UDF conducted a number of national campaigns during the period of 
review. 8 The first of these, the "Million Signature Campaign", led to the 
collection of 400,000 signatures indicating the opposition of close to half-a-
million people to the introduction of the tri-cameral parliament. The UDF's 
anti-election campaigns in 1984 also contributed to the low polls recorded in 
the elections for the new parliament and the BLAs. 
Another indication of support for the UDF can be drawn from the numerous 
local mass campaigns conducted largely by UDF affiliates. These campaigns 
centred around local issues and involved rent, consumer and transport 
boycotts as well as mass-stayaways.9 According to Kotze, from mid-1984 to 
12 June 1986, at least 49 boycott actions took place. 10 However, this is 
an inadequate means of assessing support for the UDF because boycotts 
have been a central feature of popular culture since the 1940s. The growth 
and development of this political culture is manifested, among other popular 
struggles, in the 1973 Durban strikes, the 1976 Soweto revolt, the 1980 
school boycotts, and the numerous local protests between the period 1979-
1984 which were generated by diverse and disparate grievances. Furthermore, 





Lodge,T. (1987); op.cit. , p.207. 
Refer to Chapter 4, pp.142-7 above for an outline of national campaigns of the UDF. 
Refer to Chapter 8 below. 
Kotze,H. (1990); "The support base of the ANC: Myth or reality?", in Esterhuyse,W. and Nel ,P. 
(eds.); The ANC a~d its leade~s , (Cape Town, Tafelberg Publishers), p.79. Refer to chapter 8 
below for an analYSIS of campaigns by local civic associations. 
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underlying these campaigns - such as high rents, bus-fare increases, etc. 
and may not necessarily have been supporters or members of the UDF. 
Another means of determining support for the UDF is through the use of 
opinion polls. However, careful use must be made of surveys as indications 
of political support. With the climate of suspicion and fear which prevailed 
in South Africa during the 1980s, and an unprecedented level of state 
repression, surveys of political opinions underestimated the real measure of 
support for resistance movements. 11 Fear of persecution, arrest and imprison-
ment renders many opinion surveys in South Africa unreliable. Nevertheless, 
certain preferences can be observed by focusing on a number of surveys. 
In 1984, two surveys were conducted into support among urban Africans for 
various political groups. Table 1 below provides the results of these surveys. 
Table 1: Support among urban Africans for political organisations. 1984 
Political Organisation HSRC Survey Schlemmer Survey 
ANC/Mandela 20,0% 27,0% 
UDF 19,8% 11 ,0% 
AZAPO 19,6% 5,0% 
Inkatha/Buthelezi 18,9% 14,0% 
Other/None 55,0% 43,0% 
So~rc~:. De Kock,C.J., Rhoodie,N. and Couper,M.P. (1985) ; 'Black views on socio-political change. in South 
Afrrca , In Van Vuuren,J. et.a!. (eds.) ; South Africa: A plural Society in Transition , (Durban, Butterworths); 
an~ .Schlemmer,L. (1984) ; Black Workers' attitudes to disinvestment, (Durban, Butterworths). Cited in 
SWllhng,M. (1988) ; op.cit. , p.107. 
In a 1985 study of African political preferences in the urban areas, Orkin 
11 /bid., p.71 . 
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found that Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha drew 8 percent of support, Bishop 
Tutu had 16 percent of support, the UDF and so-called "radical groups" 14 
percent, Nelson Mandela and the ANC 31 percent, and others 3 percent, 
while 8 percent said they didn't know and 13 percent supported none.12 
In September 1985, the Institute of Black Research, based in Durban, and 
the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, based in Johannesburg , conducted 
a survey into black attitudes to change in South Africa . The following are 
the results of the responses to the question: Which one leader or 
organisation would you most like to represent you in solving your problems 
or grievances?13 
Mandela (23) and ANC (8) .......... .. ............ ........ .. .. .................. ....... ... ............ .... .. . 31 
Bishop Tutu (16) .... ......... ...... .... ........... ..... ................... ... ........ ..... ......... ..... ....... ...... 16 
UDF (8) and other anti-investment groups (6) .. .. .... ... .... ...... ....................... .... ... 14 
Buthelezi (6) and Inkatha (2) .... .......... .......... .... .............. ..... ........... .......... ........ .... 8 
P.W.Botha/Government (5) ....... .... ............. ...... ... ... ....... ..... ..... ..... .... ................. .... .... 5 
Other pro-investment groups ..... ... ........... ... ... ...... ....... .. .. .... ........ ......................... ... 3 
Other. .... .. ........ ....... ... .. ................... ..................... .. .... .. ... .. ...... .. ......................... ..... ... 3 
None .. ..... ... ......... .... ... ..... ...... ... .. .... .. .... .... ...... ...... ..... ..... .... .. ... .... .. ....... ......... .. .. ..... ... . 13 
Don't Know ... .... ...... ...... ......... ... .. ..... ......... .......... .... .... ..... .... .... ..... ....... .... .. ....... .... .... 8 
Table 2 below provides the results of a 1987 nationwide Government poll on 
African support for organisations. This survey revealed that the UDF drew 28 
per cent of the support in the Eastern Cape and 23 per cent of the support 
12 
Orkin,M. (1986); Disinvestment, the struggle and the future: What black South Africans really think 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press). Cited in Kotze,H. (1990); op.cit., Figure 1, p.73. ' 
13 
Meer,F. (ed.) (1989); Resistance in the townships, (Durban, Madiba Publications), p.274. 
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in the Western Cape.14 
Table 2: Government 12011 on sUQQort for organisations among Africans, 1987 
Organisation Support Metropolitan Urban Rural 
ANC 30,9% 49,3% 30,3% 20,0% 
Inkatha 14,1% 3,8% 11 ,0% 20,3% 
UDF 10,2% 14,1% 9,5% 6,6% 
Trade Unions 1,2% 1,4% 1,9% 0,8% 
AZAPO 1,3% 1,7% 0,8% 0,8% 
COSAS 1,2% 1,4% 0,6% 0,7% 
NP 1,0% 0,6% 1,8% 0,9% 
PFP 1,4% 1,7% 1,5% 1,1% 
PAC 0,9% 2,4% 0,1% 0,3% 
Uncertain 33,5% 18,3% 36,1% 44,7% 
Refused 2,8% 3,3% 4,4% 2,2% 
Other 1,5% 2,0% 2,0% 1,6% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Kotze,H. (1990); op. cit. , Table 5, p.76. 
Most of the surveys above tend to obscure the extent of support for the 
UDF. A large number of supporters of the ANC were also likely to be 
members and supporters of the UDF. But it is clear from these surveys that 
the Charterist tradition - which the UDF was clearly identified with by the 
end of its first year of existence - enjoyed widespread support. 
The Front's membership was drawn from almost every major anti-apartheid 
tradition in the country. The older members were largely people who grew 
up under the Congress tradition and brought into the UDF their experiences 
of the 1950s Defiance Campaign. These included members of the ANC, the 
South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the Coloured 
People's Congress. The Front's membership included a small number of 
defectors from the coloured Labour Party and the Western Cape-based Unity 
14 Kotze,H. (1990); op.cit., p.76. 
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Movement. But the overwhelming majority of UDF members were the students 
and youth who grew up during the heyday of Black Consciousness. 
5.3. Leadership 
The UDF had three levels of leadership: national, regional , and local. The 
national leadership consisted of the patrons and the National Executive 
Committee (NEC). The NEC comprised a Presidency consisting of three 
Presidents, an executive chairperson appointed by the NEC from time to 
time, two vice-presidents appointed by each duly constituted region , the two 
secretaries of each constituted region, two executive members elected by 
each region and two national treasurers. The NEC was responsible for 
implementing the policy and programme of the UDF. The UDF also had two 
full-time officers - a General-Secretary and a Publicity Secretary, who were 
also members of the NEC. The NEC was also empowered to co-opt persons 
at its discretion from the regions which were not constituted at the time, or 
any other person likely to make a significant contribution to its functions. The 
NEC, which consisted of approximately 30 people, met every two months 
while the secretariat carried out the day-to-day work of the Front. 
At the regional level there were ten Regional Executive Committees (RECs): 
Transvaal, Natal, Western Cape, Border (East London and environs), Eastern 
Cape (around Port Elizabeth) , South Coast (southern Natal) , Southern Cape, 
Northern Cape, Orange Free State, and Northern Transvaal. The RECs 
consisted of a president, two secretaries, a treasurer and a number of 
additional executive members as determined by the Regional General Council 
(RGC). The day-to-day work of the region was carried out by the Regional 
Secretariat. 
The major authority for decision-making lay at the local level with affiliate 
organisations grouped under the regional committees or, in some cases, 
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under more localised sub-regions or area committees.
15 
In the Western Cape 
sub-regions were created for Cape Town, Northern Suburbs, Southern 
Suburbs, Athlone, Mitchells Plain , Townships, Stellenbosch, Paarl and 
Worcester. In the Transvaal, sub-regions were established for Soweto, 
Pretoria, Johannesburg, Vaal Triangle, West Rand , and East Rand . In Natal, 
UDF sub-regions were established for Western Areas, North Coast, Merebank 
and Pondoland. 
The UDF National Patrons were prominent public individuals and leaders of 
large organisations. Patrons had no duties or function in the structure but 
their prominence in the anti-apartheid struggle and high profiles permitted 
them to make statements on behalf of the organisation . The Launching 
Conference elected 20 Patrons. The three founding presidents were Archie 
Gumede, son of a former ANC leader, Albertina Sisulu, wife of Walter Sisulu, 
life-prisoner in Pollsmoor prison, and Oscar Mpetha, the veteran trade 
unionist. There were six vice-presidents: Christmas Tinto and Joe Marks from 
Cape Town; George Sewpersadh and Virgil Bonhomme from Natal; and 
George du Plessis and Frank Chikane from the Transvaal. The six regional 
secretaries were Yunus Mohamed, Joe Phaahla, Trevor Manuel, Cheryl 
Carolus, Mohamed Valli and Moss Chikane. Po po Molefe was elected national 
secretary of the UDF. The treasurers were Mewa Ramgobin and Cassim 
Salojee. Other executive members were Prof. Jerry Coovadia, Rev. Mcibisi 
Xundu , A.M. Salojee, Aubrey Mokoena, Mildred Lesia, and Rev. M.A. Stotile. 
Patrick ("Terror") Lekota was elected publicity secretary.16 
According to one commentator: 
In schematic terms, the upper echelons and middle-range organisers of the UDF consist 
15 
Lodge,T. (1991); op.cit., p.52. 
16 
"The UD~ Advance", in Africa Confidential, (VoI.26, No.25, 11 Dec, 1985), p.3 and United 
Democratic Front (1983); National Launch, op.cit., p.6. 
174 
principally of three general types: (1) an older generation, veterans of the popular 
struggles initiated by the Congress Alliance in the 1950s and early 1.960.s; (2) a you~ger 
generation of radical/Marxist university-trained white intellectuals with little or n? dl ~ect 
experience of earlier phases of struggle but firmly committed to the programmatic alms 
of the Freedom Charter; and (3) a youthful contingent of black people - the Soweto 
generation - impatient for radical change and seeking an organisational focus for their 
anti-apartheid energies.17 
Tom Lodge made a study of the national executive of the UDF, together 
with the leadership of the five most developed regions in 1985. He found 
that only eight of the sixty-one leaders were women. They were mainly 
young , with six in their twenties, seventeen in their thirties, eleven in their 
early forties, four were in their fifties and ten were over sixty. Fifteen were 
ANC veterans which included those involved in clandestine ANC activities in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Of the ANC group, five were also members of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, seven were involved in SACTU (in some cases the 
same people) , and seven served long prison sentences for political offenses. 
Four executive members were associated with the Natal and Transvaal Indian 
Congresses, two with the Liberal Party, two with the Coloured Labour Party, 
six with the Black Consciousness Movement, and one with the New Unity 
Movement. 
Lodge found that the leadership was heavily middle class: eleven from highly-
paid professional backgrounds (legal , medical or academic) , and three priests, 
eight teachers, a nurse, a legal clerk, a social worker, a researcher, and two 
technicians; 17 were workers (including four full-time trade union officials) , 
three of them skilled artisans and the rest labourers or industrial workers. Six 
executive members were professional activists, mainly youth or student 
congress organisers. However, the leadership did not contain people from 
middle-management, modern commercial occupations, township business, and 
petty trading. Finally, the UDF leadership was predominantly African, though 
17 
MurraY,M. (1987); South Africa: Time of agony, time of destiny, (London, Verso), p.216. 
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the five executives included six Indians, eight coloureds, and five whites. 18 
Mark Swilling investigated the 62 UDF leaders from six regional UDF 
executives. He found that 33 were in economic positions that could be 
defined as working class, while sixteen were teachers/lecturers, four were 
doctors/nurses/ social workers, five were lawyers, two priests, two technicians 
and two students. Swilling concluded that "this profile reflects the existence 
of a working class and intellectual/professional leadership".19 Most of the 
leaders owed their positions to their activities in political , trade union and 
other local organisations. According to Swilling, twenty were active in civic 
associations, sixteen in political organisations (including the ANC and Indian 
Congress), fourteen in trade unions, ten in youth organisations, eight in 
student organisations, five in white organisations and three in women's 
groupS.20 
Lodge found that the Western Cape regional executive was almost evenly 
balanced between workers and professionals, with three of the seven 
professionals from working-class backgrounds.21 Nine members of this 
regional executive were teachers, lecturers and students, according to 
SWilling.
22 
The Eastern Cape's executive comprised two old SACTU/Umkhonto 
stalwarts, two teachers, a factory worker, and a technician with some 
experience as a trade union organiser. The Transvaal executive included a 
high proportion of young members and had an unusually high proportion of 
18 
Lodge,T. (1987); op.cit. , p.207. 
19 
SWilling,M. (1988); "The United Democratic Front and Township Revolt", in Cobbett,W. and 




Lodge,T. (1987); op.cit., p.208. 
22 
SWilling,M. (1988); op.cit. , p.97. 
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people (ten) with some experience of working in youth organisations during 
the 1970s and 1980s. A large proportion of the Natal executive fell into the 
professional/middle class categories, with most having experience in leading 
local organisations. This executive also contained a number of young leaders 
but contained very few representatives of organised labour.23 
Leadership at the local level reflected the diversity of affiliated organisations 
and their membership. Local leaders were drawn from every race group and 
from virtually every class group. Thus, the multi-class and multi-racial nature 
of the leadership at all levels reflects the wide-ranging participation within the 
UDF of people from different class and racial backgrounds. Furthermore, the 
UDF was able to draw into its leadership ranks people from a wide variety 
of political traditions. 
5.4. Regional Characteristics 
The 1980s was a period of mass political organisation with most organisation 
taking place in the urban areas. However, political organisation in the 
townships developed unevenly with differences within the townships, between 
townships near the same city, between cities in the same region and 
between reg ions. The UDF's membership was derived exclusively from its 
national, regional and local affiliates and its support was a reflection of the 
ability of these organisations to promote and sustain popular organisation. 
This depended to a large extent on the peculiar local cond itions.24 
There are a number of factors which contributed to differences in promoting 
23 
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and sustaining political organisation between various areas.25 These include 
the differences: in roles played by specific affiliates of the UDF in their 
areas; in political traditions; in the relationships between local organisations; 
in functioning at local and regional levels; in the relationships between 
organisations and the community; and in the levels of and responses to state 
repression at the local level. 
In some townships the existence of strong student and youth organisations, 
trade unions or civic associations played an important contributing factor to 
political mobilisation. For example, SAAWU played an important role in 
promoting political mobilisation in East London, while PEBC) was able to 
mobilise Port Elizabeth's township residents during 1979-80. In townships 
where these were absent political mobilisation tended to lag behind other 
areas in the region. This was apparent in the Pietermaritzburg townships 
where local activists failed to develop strong civic associations while the 
absence of a strong trade union movement was one factor behind the 
organisational weakness of the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) during its 
early years. 
The UDF was most successful in drawing support from communities which 
have a long history of political resistance and which have trad itionally been 
ANC strongholds. Regions and townships which played a significant role in 
the squatters, bus boycotts and other popular resistance movements of the 
1940s and the Defiance Campaign of the early 1950s tended to form strong 
local organisations with widespread community support. These areas also 
tended to support the UDF because of the Front's association with the ANC's 
Freedom Charter. 
25 Th' . 
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Limited support for the UDF arose in some areas where strained relations 
developed between local affiliates of the UDF, between local affiliates and 
allied organisations, and between local affiliates and hostile political 
movements. In a number of areas differences arose between civic associ-
ations and local youth organisations, particularly over the tactics used by the 
youth to enforce campaigns such as consumer boycotts. 
A problem which arose during the UDF's first year was the conflict between 
studenUyouth organisations and local trade union organisations, particularly 
those affiliated to FOSATU, over strategies to be used during political 
campaigns. In a number of instances, the unions felt that they were not 
adequately consulted when the youth called for mass-stayaways. Ideological 
conflicts between the UDF and other organisations, namely Inkatha and 
AZAPO, and the contest for hegemony, misdirected the organisational energies 
of UDF affiliates and prevented the consolidation of grassroots structures in 
certain regions. 
The differences in functioning at local and regional levels also contributed to 
differences in local and regional support for the UDF. Where strong 
leadership and organisational expertise existed , the UDF generated a much 
greater political influence. In certain areas local organisations were extremely 
successful in drawing wide-spread popular participation in their activities and 
decision-making processes. In addition, membership and support of local 
organisations at times depended on their performance in bread-and-butter 
struggles. 
Accountability to the community, widespread participation by residents in the 
decision-making process and the capacity of the organisations to respond and 
act upon community needs and issues are factors which promoted support 
for the UDF. Strained relations between UDF affiliates and the community 
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arose largely in areas where unrestrained coercive measures were used to 
sustain campaigns. In particular, communities resented the use of excessive 
violence by "people's courts" and by the youth during community boycotts 
and stayaways. 
State repression played a major role in retarding or promoting membership 
in, and support of, the UDF. In some areas, severe repression in the form 
of bannings, imprisonment, detentions, political trials and state violence 
resulted in the removal of political activists, a reduction in political activity 
and diminishing support for the UDF. In others, state repression led to an 
increase in support for the Front as well as a strengthening of local 
structures. 
During the various emergencies, the UDF suffered serious setbacks in its 
ability to transform widespread rebell ion into organisational gains. Over two-
thirds of the nearly eight thousand people detained during the first emergency 
in 1985 were UDF members. Night-time curfews were imposed in certain 
centres, while daytime curfews operated to keep school students off the 
streets and in the classrooms. The army occupied a number of townships, 
set up roadblocks, conducted house-to-house searches, and maintained twenty-
four-hour patrols. In August 1985, CaSAS, the UDF's largest affiliate, was 
banned. Detention, deaths and political trials immobilised forty-five out of 
eighty national and regional leaders. 26 
Finally, in later years the UDF suffered much more serious setbacks as the 
state supplemented repression with other counter-insurgency techniques. These 
included certain measures to create dissension within the UDF and among 
blacks in general (e.g. widespread media coverage of conflict between UDF 
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and AZAPO supporters, extensive media coverage of Inkatha coupled with 
censorship of the media's coverage of the unrest, the use of vigilantes, 
encouraging disinformation about the extent of anti-Indian sentiment within the 
UDF, and the distribution of fake pamphlets to create confusion within the 
UDF). Media coverage of UDF and ANC violence (in particular, the so-called 
"necklace" murders) were manipulated by the government to alienate more 
conservative blacks. Finally, upliftment programmes were instituted in selected 
townships in an attempt to "win the hearts and minds" of township dwellers 
by providing them with concrete improvements in their living conditions.27 
The UDF drew its strongest support from the Eastern Cape, which has a 
long tradition of sympathy for the ANC. Sy mid-1986, the approximately 40 
Eastern Cape organisations were by far the strongest in the country due to 
the skill and energy of the leaders, the level of support the organisations 
enjoyed, and the extent to which the communities had been drawn into 
various structures of the UDF's local affiliates. The Eastern Cape also has 
a rich history of mass struggle and this contributed to a high level of 
political consciousness in the region. This political consciousness was a vital 
factor in the development of mass organisation and mobilisation during the 
1980s. The country's first mass-based civic organisation , PESCO, was formed 
in this region, while SAAWU played a major role in political mobilisation in 
East London during the early 1980s. In addition, by the middle of the 
eighties, student/youth , women's and civic organisations had surfaced in many 
small Eastern Cape towns. 
The Eastern Cape was the first region to develop embryonic organs of 
people's power to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of government-
created bodies. The Eastern Cape is also notable for the response of its 
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people to calls for national campaigns. It has been estimated that the 
average response to stay away calls in the region from mid-1985 onwards was 
90 percent in the African areas (compared to 73 percent in the Transvaal 
and 65 percent for Natal) .28 
In the Western Cape, the UDF enjoyed comparably limited support because 
of the relatively insignificant number of Africans living in the region. In 
addition, there was a noticeable lack of support for the organisation from 
organised labour. During 1985-6 class differences led to a split in the 
leadership of the African organisations in the region . In the coloured 
townships, the residents associations split along ideological lines between UDF 
affiliates and those supporting the New Unity Movement. Factors which limited 
mass organisation in the region include the "Coloured Labour Preference 
Policy" - which resulted in the Western Cape being the only region in the 
country where Africans are a minority (15 percent compared to over 50 
percent coloured people and 30 percent white in 1980); the political divisions 
created by the differences in national oppression of the coloured and African 
people; a historical tradition of weak, ultra-left political organisation , particularly 
among the coloured people; and a weak tradition of trade union organisation. 
These combined to minimise the impact of the UDF in the Western Cape. 
Thus, for national actions where figures are available, average support by 
coloured workers in the region was less than 15 percent, while the average 
support by the African workers was about 51 percent.29 
The existence of Inkatha in Natal was a major factor limiting UDF 
organisation in the region. During the early 1980s, Natal's African townships, 
particularly those in Durban, experienced massive mobilisation as the commun-
28 
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ities became embroiled in struggles against rent and transport increases. By 
the end of 1985, however, confrontation with Inkatha over the incorporation 
of certain African townships into KwaZulu resulted in an organisational decline. 
The conflict between the UDF and Inkatha derived from differences which 
arose between the ANC and the Zulu movement. 
Inkatha's leader, Chief Buthelezi , maintained a cordial relationship with the 
ANC even after he became Chief Minister of KwaZulu in 1976. During the 
1970s he continued to hold meetings with the mission-in-exile in spite of 
being condemned by the BCM as a government stooge. This relationship 
changed in 1979 after Buthelezi publicised discussions with the ANC which 
the latter had intended to keep secret. In an attempt to increase his political 
credibility, Buthelezi claimed that the ANC had recognised Inkatha's role and 
sanctioned its non-violent strategy and participation in homeland structures. 
The rift was deepened when Buthelezi condemned the 1980 school boycotts. 
By 1983, relations between Inkatha and ANC-oriented organisations had taken 
a violent turn.30 
The divisions in the African townships because of confrontation with Inkatha 
prevented the consolidation of grassroots structures and organisational gains 
made during the period 1982-3. Leaders and members of local organisations 
such as JORAC and of other local UDF structures faced a wave of 
"economic and military intimidation and terror" , thus preventing these 
organisations from "effectively harnessing their mass support".31 By the end 
of 1985, local UDF structures in Durban's African townships were unable to 
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operate successfully because township residents, aware of the dangers of 
being associated with the UDF, distanced themselves from the Front.32 
During the first half of the 1980s, the UDF in Natal had no relationship with 
powerful worker organisations and trade unions and very little effort was 
made to forge links with FOSATU affiliates. It relied largely on community-
based affiliates, particularly in the small townships of Lamontville, Chesterville 
and Hambanathi. The largest contingent of UDF support in the region came 
from young people.33 In the capital city, Pietermaritzburg, civic organisations 
were not created, while local youth congresses were at the forefront of the 
conflict with Inkatha. The position changed during 1986 as the conflict with 
Inkatha incorporated local COSATU affiliates in the region . Natal's African 
population began to challenge the power of Inkatha, particularly in areas 
around Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Midlands. Once people in the 
townships realised that active involvement in the structures of the UDF was 
the only way to turn the tide of Inkatha repression, they began to build 
structures to defend themselves (defence committees, street committees, 
etc.).34 
An important consequence of the clashes between Inkatha and the UDF in 
the African townships was an enhancement "of the importance of the 
relatively protected Indian activists". These activists began to play a very 
important role in UDF politics, particularly at the regional level. 35 This, 
together with the removal of many leading African members of the UDF 
through detentions as well as the banning of meetings, later led to 
32 
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accusations that the Indian leadership had formed a cabal. 
The UDF enjoyed widespread support in the industrial centres of the 
Transvaal, "but the sheer size of the urban centres, their social complexity, 
and the uncertainties of the UDF's relationship with a well-established trade 
union movement, make its own capacity for marshalling disciplined support 
questionable". However, the UDF's local affiliates in the region were much 
stronger than those in Natal or Cape Town, but not as coherent or active 
as those in the Eastern Cape.36 
By 1986, local organisations in the PWV region were particularly strong in 
most areas surrounding Johannesburg and Pretoria, and in many small towns 
in the Eastern Transvaal. Local UDF affiliates in other areas in the Transvaal 
enjoyed considerable legitimacy despite relatively weak and incoherent 
structures at grassroots level. The strength of the Transvaal UDF was a 
result of the absence of ideological divisions which plagued the UDF in Natal 
and the Western Cape, and because of the "massive size, steady deteriora-
tion and bankruptcy of the PWV townships" .37 
After the declaration of the 1986 Emergency, a shift in the centre of political 
gravity from the Eastern Cape to the Transvaal occurred. In itially, the region 
was plagued with differences between local trade unions and local affiliates 
of the UDF over campaigns, conSUltation and co-ordination . By the middle of 
1986, however, these differences were swept aside as the trade union 
movement was drawn into political activity by the tide of events in the 
region. This was demonstrated by an unprecedented degree of political unity 
and support for a programme of united action of the UDF and COSATU. 
36 




Increasingly, workers were drawn into leadership positions in the civics, street 
committees, youth congresses and the UDF itself.38 
In February 1986 the rural Northern Transvaal region of the UDF was 
formed. This region , consisting of sixty-three affiliates, was situated in and 
around the Lebowa, Gazankulu, Venda and KwaNdebele homelands. These 
included women's organisations, parents' committees, civic associations, trade 
unions and youth congresses in Lebowa, and youth and village committees 
in Kwandebele. The youth organisations were the most developed and most 
active. The Sekhukhune Youth Congress (SEYCO), for example, based in 
central Sekhukhuneland, consisted of fifteen village committees. 
Mass mobilisation in the region was promoted by the demographic dominance 
of the very young , a high level of youth unemployment, the widespread 
collapse of the moral authority of traditional leaders, opposition to homeland 
"independence", the effects of forced resettlement to the homelands (poverty, 
over-population, drought), hostility to local white farmers arising from low 
wages and poor working conditions, the emergence of trade unionism in the 
region , a radical leadership with trade union experience, and a tradition of 
support for the ANC and SACP. The resulting social movement represented 
a combination of two themes: the working-class nationalism of the cities and 
the peasant rebellion of the countryside.39 
However, the rural regions in the Eastern and Western Transvaal were poorly 
organised by the end of 1987. The Western Transvaal reg ion, in particular, 
which borders Bophuthatswana, was crippled by the state of emergency. Very 
few organisations were established in this area and it was relatively inactive 
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during the period under review. The Eastern Transvaal was divided into the 
Highveld with 13 affiliates and Lowveld with eight affiliates in 1987. Most of 
these were youth structures and the region had no civic organisations. 
In early 1984 the UDF had only 2 affiliates from the Orange Free State -
one youth and one student. Mass mobilisation soon spread in the region with 
the emergence of six major community/educational organisations in Bloemfon-
tein and about ten more in several small northern Free State towns during 
1984-86.40 However, throughout the 1980s the level of UDF political 
organisation in the region remained relatively insignificant. The Orange Free 
State is essentially a rural region with the majority of Africans living on the 
farms where they work. Because the African population was totally dependent 
on the white farmers for employment and shelter, political organisation was 
extremely difficult. Problems of organisation were further compounded by the 
disparate and isolated nature of life for the region 's African population.41 
However, the Free State was not isolated from the national pol itical crisis of 
the mid-1980s. For example, the rent boycotts, which began in the Vaal 
Triangle in September 1984, soon spread to Free State towns. The small 
and medium-sized towns of the Northern Free State were also hit by the 
waves of student boycotts which occurred throughout the country during 1985. 
In addition , during 1984-86 mass mobilisation occurred extensively in 
Botshabelo, a township that lies about a forty-five minute drive east of 
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The independent homelands proved exceptionally difficult for the urban-based 
UDF to draw into its organisational structures. Although these areas have a 
history of resistance to apartheid, resistance has largely been spontaneous 
and generally failed to give rise to efficient organisations. More importantly, 
the homelands presented a number of obstacles to mass mobilisation and 
politicisation. Among these obstacles were the repressive activities of the 
homeland authorities (often surpassing even those of the South African 
security forces) , numerous practical problems (such as the non-availability of 
venues for community meetings, difficulties in publishing pamphlets, shortages 
of skilled speakers, and a general inexperience in dealing with security force 
repression) , and the necessity for dealing with traditional and conservative 
elements within the community.43 
In a number of homelands, the UDF and many of its affiliates were banned 
by the authorities. For example, in addition to the proscription of the Front, 
the Transkeian government banned AZASO and COSAS, and targeted their 
activists.44 The independent trade union movement was particularly affected 
by repression in the homelands. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, which 
made no provisions for trade unions or employer organisations, operated in 
the Transkei. Venda's trade union legislation passed in 1982 did not make 
provision for unions.
4s 
In 1983, the Ciskei government banned SAAWU, while 
Bophuthatswana passed a law to ban all South African-based unions in the 
homeland in 1984. 
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"independent" homelands. In Bophuthatswana, for example, local protests gave 
rise to organisations and mass activism on a wide scale. Large-scale protests 
took place in Garankuwa, Mabopane and Winterveld on a range of issues. 
The Huhudi Civic Association coordinated a rent boycott; a bus boycott was 
implemented in Garankuwa; and school protests resulted in many detent-
ions.46 The Garankuwa Youth Congress (GYC) was formed at the end of 
1985 to defend the youth from the repressive activities of the authorities. 
In the "non-independent" homelands, the extension of the state of emergency 
to these areas in 1986 increased the repressive powers of homeland 
authorities. The authorities were given powers to restrict meetings, ban 
organisations, censor publications, prohibit "actions furthering the aims of a 
banned organisation", and to remove and restrict people.47 However, 
resistance in these rural homelands provoked the development of grass-roots 
organisations and resistance to homeland authorities. 
In KwaNdebele, for example, resistance to the proposed "independence" of 
the homeland in 1986 provoked widespread resistance and mass mobilisation. 
Opposition to "independence" increased support for the UDF in this area, 
particularly through structures such as the KwaNdebele Youth Congress 
(KWAYCO). Concerted resistance, involving the militant youth in co-operation 
with sympathetic traditional leaders, forced the Pretoria government to 
postpone plans for "independence" in 1986.48 
The residents of Moutse in the Northern Transvaal vigorously opposed 
46 
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incorporation into the homeland.49 In the township of Ekingale, a local 
Residents Action Committee was formed to coordinate opposition to incorpor-
ation into Kwandebele. In Lebowa, UDF-aligned organisations led opposition 
to the homeland system and homeland repression during the second half of 
the 1980s. Widespread resistance and state repression eventually led to the 
outbreak of a revolt in 1986.50 
Despite this regional diversity, it is clear that for most of the period under 
review the UDF enjoyed widespread support throughout South Africa. It was 
able to penetrate virtually every part of the country, thus indicating the extent 
to which its influence extended throughout South Africa. 
5.5. Affiliate Membership 
Affiliation to the UDF depended on the geographical scope of organisation, 
i.e., local , regional or national. Organisations which the UDF identified as 
national were those with regions and branches in most parts of the country. 
Some UDF affiliates, SAAWU for example, had national structures. However, 
the union's membership was limited to certain sectors of the country. This 
meant that the union only had representation on local or regional 'structures 
of the Front. By contrast, COSAS had a national membership with branches 
throughout the country and was granted representation at the national level. 
The most important national organisations were COSAS, SAYCO, AZASO 
(later renamed SANSCO), and the UDF Women's League. Membership of 
these organisations differed from region to region and from area to area. 51 
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At the time of the banning of COSAS in August 1985, journalists estimated 
that the organisation represented more than half of the six million black 
students in the country.52 At the end of 1986 there were some 600 youth 
congresses countrywide and , at the time of its formation in March 1987, 
SAYCO claimed a membership of between 500,000 and 700,000 (and a 
support base of two million).53 AZASO members were present in all 
universities in South Africa except for Afrikaans ones. At the end of 1986 
AZASO claimed that it had 67 branches. The formation of the UDF's 
Women's League in April 1987 brought together eight reg ional women's 
organisations, which drew together numerous urban and rural women's groups. 
Other significant national organisations include the Release Mandela 
Committee, NUSAS, the Black Sash, the National Medical and Dental 
Association (NAMDA) , the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), the 
Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC) , and the End Conscription 
Campaign (ECC). At the regional level were reg ional trade associations such 
as the Western Cape African Traders' Association, political organisations such 
as the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses, and women , youth and civic 
organisations such as the Federation of Transvaal Women (FEDTRAW), the 
Natal Organisation of Women (NOW), the Northern Transvaal Youth Congress 
(NOTYCO), and the Northern Transvaal Peoples Organisation (NOTPECO). 
At the local level the organisational impetus provided by popular struggles 
during the mid-1980s led to the growth of civic organisations in every major 
city and in almost every small and medium-sized town in the country.54 
These ranged from the large, mass-based civics of Port El izabeth to the 
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small rural village committees. By the end of 1987 the UDF had some 200 
urban and rural civic organisations. The emergence of civic associations was 
often preceded or accompanied by the development of student/youth and 
women's organisations. In addition, COSATU's increasing political involvement 
as well as joint campaigns of COSATU and UDF affiliates generated trade 
union membership of the UDF. Finally, local church, political and other local 
organisations encouraged the mobilisation of "non-mainline" support. 
The affiliate membership of the UDF included some of the most important 
sector-based organisations in the country in terms of their membership and 
support base, as well as their activities. In addition, the majority of mass-
based and highly active civic associations in the country were UDF affiliates. 
Organisational links and cooperation with COSATU extended the Front's 
political influence into organised labour.55 Finally, the non-mainline affiliates 
of the UDF brought into the front a wide variety of organisations with varying 
degrees of membership and interests. These demonstrate the significant 
organisational leadership of the UDF in South African civil society. 
5.6. Race and Class 
The UDF drew into its structures members from virtually every class and 
every race group in South Africa. Some of the central issues in South 
African resistance politics related to questions of race and class. The 
differences in approach to these issues were the main disagreements between 
the Black Consciousness-oriented National Forum (NF) and the UDF. The 
UDF views on race and class are reflected in a number of areas. The UDF 
aimed at uniting the widest possible coalition of disparate groups in 
opposition to the new constitutional dispensation and the "Koornhof Bills". This 
meant that the Front did not restrict itself to a narrow set of beliefs but 
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d rth 'd 56 opened membership to all organisations oppose to apa el . 
The UDF had one of its objectives the creation of a nonracial South Africa. 
This implied that membership of the organisation was open to all , regardless 
of race. According to Terror Lekota, publicity secretary of the UDF: 
In political struggle ... the means must always be the same as the ends .... How else can 
one expect a racialistic movement to imbue our society with a non-racial character on the 
dawn of our freedom day? A political movement cannot bequeath to society a characteris-
tic it does not itself possess. To expect it to do so is like asking a heathen to convert a 
person to Christianity. The principles of that religion are unknown to the heathen, let 
alone the practice.57 
A relatively small number of whites joined the UDF, as members of 
predominantly black organisations, e.g. the Federation of Transvaal Women 
(FedTraw), or as members of white organisations, e.g. NUSAS. Most whites 
who participated in the UDF were drawn from petit bourgeois, English-
speaking university backgrounds and brought into the organisation their skills 
for research and their access to funds, transport, printing facilities, and so 
forth. In large part, white members of the UDF tended to organise along 
racial lines, for example, the Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee 
(JODAC) and NUSAS.58 This was largely due to residential segregation and 
the Front's call on whites (and other race groups) to organise in their own 
communities. In addition , mobilisation was based on local community concerns 
and problems which differed from one race group to another. 
The UDF acknowledged the reality of state imposed racial distinctions and 
local structures were developed along racial lines according to segregated 
residential areas. In addition , social realities in South Africa justified the 
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continued existence of "ethnic" organisations such as the Natal and Transvaal 
Indian Congresses. The revival of the TIC was justified in the following 
terms: 
Methods had to be adopted that would successfully mobilise the people with in the Indian 
community and thus facilitate the possibility of them uniting in a common national 
struggle .... The reality of political struggle is such that one cannot mobilise the people 
politically on the basis of some abstract notion of politics. Organisation begins from where 
the people themselves are - from their perceptions of the burning issues of the 
movement, and proceeds from there. Organisations can only successfully mobilise the 
broad masses of people if they take these realities into account. The reality of South 
African racism is that it has succeeded in dividing the oppressed people "racially" - by 
imposing separation and a hierarchy of racial oppression.59 
The UDF pointed to the historical reality of four separate "national" groups 
and referred to itself as "non-racial" . The NF rejected this conception of 
"multi-national" and/or "multi-ethnic" by arguing that this implied an acceptance 
of apartheid ideology and the terms in which the state has divided and ruled 
the oppressed people. The NF saw the UDF as a "multi-racial" rather than 
a "non-racial" organisation.60 Despite this criticism, the UDF did draw into 
its ranks a large number of people from the white, Indian and coloured 
communities, while the overwhelming bulk of its membership were drawn from 
the African townships. 
The UDF was also a multi-class organisation, consisting of affiliates which 
ranged from petit bourgeois to worker organisations. Many of the 
organisations affiliated to the UDF were far from working class in their make-
up and included several middle-class business groups. The UDF identified the 
black working-class as the largest single bloc amongst the millions who suffer 
from apartheid. Nevertheless, the UDF in practice clearly rejected distinct 
class mobilisation. Indeed, the UDF was extremely unsuccessful in mobilising 
59 
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support from organised labour. However, this did not imply that the working 
class rejected the Front. 
The overwhelming bulk of the rank-and-file membership of UDF affiliates was 
drawn from the African working class. This was indicated by the capacity of 
the UDF to call on large numbers of workers to support its campaigns and 
to participate in its affiliate organisations and their activities, the focus on 
bread-and-butter issues which concerned the working class and the large 
number of working class organisations affiliated to the UDF. 
5.7. Appeal of the UDF 
There are a number of reasons why the UDF emerged as the major extra-
parliamentary opposition organisation in South Africa during the 1980s. Among 
others, the re-emergence of the ANC as a leading force in the liberation 
struggle61, and the close identification of UDF and ANC policy, objectives 
and leadership are the most significant.62 For many people, the formation 
of the UDF was seen as the revival of the tradition of resistance established 
by the ANC during the 1950s and early 1960s. 
In striving to promote a broad coalition against apartheid , the UDF tended 
to de-emphasize class and to promote the multi-class and non-racial nature 
of the liberation struggle. While this gave rise to criticism of the Front and 
to conflict within the broad anti-apartheid movement, it also boosted the 
membership of affiliate organisations. The UDF's criteria for membership were 
so broad that its affiliates included such organisations as the Black Sash, 
and JODAC, a white-led , left-liberal body. 
61 
Refer to Chapter 3 above for an analysis of the political realignment towards the ANC. 
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However, the multi-class nature of the Front, and the large number of 
middle-class people in leadership positions, led to criticisms that the UDF was 
furthering middle class interests. In answer to such charges, UDF publicity 
secretary Terror Lekota argued that there were common problems which 
confronted both the working and middle classes, such as the lack of political 
rights, lack of housing and lack of educational facilities. In addition, many 
middle class leaders of both the UDF and unions had working class 
backgrounds. According to Lekota, such leaders abandoned their class 
positions and adopted the consciousness of a different class.63 
Another factor which accounted for widespread support for the UDF was its 
focus on bread-and-butter issues. The ability of UDF affiliates to give support 
to the struggles of their communities on socio-economic issues increased 
support for the Front. In Port Elizabeth, for example, the overwhelming 
majority of African and coloured residents considered the local affiliates and 
the UDF itself as the most helpful organisations in solving their problems. 64 
The UDF consciously organised communities around concrete local issues and 
problems. The existence of the UDF gave rise to the emergence of a large 
number of new organisations as UDF activists engaged in an organisational 
drive during UDF campaigns and other community actions. Successful 
campaigns initiated by local affiliates of the UDF, e.g . the Eastern Cape 
consumer boycotts, promoted the organisational drive and added large 
numbers to the Front. 
The UDF faced a number of challenges in its struggle to dominate the 
63 
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internal resistance political scene in South Africa. Firstly, the state employed 
repression and economic reform to limit the support for, and activities of, the 
UDF and its affiliates. The widespread detention of activists, security force 
activity, vigilante actions, and upgrading programmes eroded UDF support and 
activity. Secondly, government "collaborators" in the urban areas and the tribal 
homelands were used to suppress the UDF. Thirdly, the initial reluctance of 
organised labour to participate in the Front and its programmes inhibited 
attempts to draw trade unions into the UDF. Finally, UDF dominance was 
undermined by the existence of other mass organisations, in particular, 
lnkatha, the Be-oriented organisations and the New Unity Movement, which 
were also struggling to acquire support in the black townships. 
In conclusion, it is clear that for most of the period under review the UDF 
enjoyed widespread support throughout South Africa. It was able to penetrate 
virtually every part of the country, thus indicating the extent to which its 
influence extended throughout South Africa. Furthermore, it drew into its 
structures people from every race group and virtually every class group. By 
the end of 1987, the UDF had close to 700 affiliates with a total member-
ship of over two million and a wider support base. UDF affiliates were 
mainly student and youth organisations, civic associations, trade unions, 
women's organisations, political organisations, religious organisations, and 
sports and cultural organisations. 
Many of the affiliates of the UDF existed before its formation . The leaders 
and members of the Front were drawn from affiliate ·organisations. Member-
ship of the UDF was based on the membership of affiliate organisations and 
differed from organisation to organisation and from region to region. Some 
organisations were national in scope with a large constituency while many 
more were local with small numbers of activists. Some regions drew in large 
numbers of people while others had relatively small UDF constituencies. The 
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leadership of the UDF at all levels was also drawn from the ranks of its 
affiliates. Finally, the UDF drew together thousands of people from differing 
racial and social groups. The overwhelming majority of UDF members were 
working class and were drawn from the African population . 
The most important affiliates of the UDF in terms of membership were the 
student/youth organisations, trade unions, civic associations and women's 
organisations. These organisations were dominant in terms of numbers and 
the support they were able to galvanize for campaigns of the UDF. It was 
through these organisations that the Front was able to extend its influence 
to virtually every part of the country. 
It is argued in this study that the period of the 1980s represents a 
discernible shift in the balance of social and cultural forces towards the UDF. 
It becomes important, then , to examine how this shift occurred. One way of 
approaching this is to look at the history of selected affiliates of the UDF 
by focusing on their formation and structures, principles and objectives, and 
membership and activities, and changes in these in order to demonstrate the 
shift towards the UDF. Another aspect of this approach is to look at the role 
they played in achieving both mass mobilisation and organisation , and the 
spread of revolutionary consciousness (including the mobilisation of people to 
actively resist apartheid) . It is here that the analysis of the history of these 
organisations demonstrates the manner in which the masses were mobilised 
and organised to actively resist apartheid , resulting in a universalistic political 
challenge of the apartheid system. 
It is argued, firstly, that some community organisations experienced significant 
changes in their structures, leadership and membership, aims and objectives, 
and in their strategies and activities. These changes demonstrated a marked 
shift towards, and led to their affiliation to, the UDF. They subsequently 
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adopted the strategies and tactics of the UDF political tradition, leading to 
the transformation of their activities into a universalistic political challenge of 
the apartheid system. The shift towards the UDF was also apparent in the 
mobilisation and organisation of people in many parts of the country through 
newly-formed organisations. Secondly, these organisations played a hegemony-
building role by promoting mass mobilisation and organisation , and developing 
and facilitating the spread of a national political culture based on the 
rejection of, and opposition to, apartheid structures and the development of 
alternative structures and practices by the mass-based organisations to govern 
their own daily living; the adoption of a strategy based on "unity-in-action" 
and the mobilisation of grass-roots organisations formed around local issues; 
an ideological system expressed in such documents as the Freedom Charter; 
and the articulation of a set of common demands such as the release of 
political prisoners, the unbanning of organisations and the establishment of 
a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and unitary South Africa. Thus, it is 
through these organisations that the particular, often economic, demands of 
interest groups were transformed into a universalistic political challenge of the 
dominant apartheid system and which aimed at national liberation. 
Although it is difficult to estimate the extent of politicisation achieved through 
these organisations, the aim is to demonstrate that these organisations 
mobilised and organised large sectors of black civil society and were able 
to draw people into a highly politicised challenge against the dominant 
apartheid system which was directed at the goal of national liberation. Finally, 
this analysis reveals the type of democratic organisations which were 
emerging during the course of the struggle: their structures, practices and 
membership. The following four chapters provide an historical analysis of 
selected stUdent and youth organisations, trade unions, civic associations and 
women's organisations. The focus is on their formation , principles and 
objectives, structures and membership, and practices. 
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Chapter 6 
STUDENT AND YOUTH ORGANISATIONS 
6.1. Introduction 
The 1976 Soweto uprising propelled the black youth to the forefront of the 
South African liberation struggle during the late 1970s. School-related 
grievances which initiated the revolt grew to include support for striking 
workers, township struggles and the broad struggle for liberation from white 
minority rule. At the same time there was a progressive development of 
socialist consciousness and a greater understanding of class struggle among 
the black youth. These developments gave rise to a number of student and 
youth organisations and an increasing number of committed young political 
activists. 
The focus of this chapter is the role of student and youth organisations in 
the political and ideological struggle to promote and expand revolutionary 
consciousness within the country and to increase participation in the national 
liberation struggle. These organisations developed (or incorporated) certain 
features of a revolutionary consciousness and focused on particular sectors 
of civil society, drawing them into the struggle for national liberation resulting 
in the spread of revolutionary consciousness inside South Africa. The 
emphasis here is on their role in mass mobilisation and organisation (with 
a focus on their organisational tactics, membership and political leadership) 
and their principles and objectives in order to illustrate the extent of their 
penetration of civil society and the main features of the revolutionary 
consciousness developed or incorporated by the stUdent and youth 
organisations. 
Here the emphasis is on : mobilising and organising the youth around the 
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issues which immediately affect them; uniting the separate currents of protest 
into a single stream; and, most importantly, transforming the particular 
demands of students and the youth into a universalistic political challenge of 
the apartheid system. This results in the spread of a revolutionary conscious-
ness. Underlying this was the central role the student and youth organisations 
played in expanding the political and ideological leadership of the UDF in 
civil society. Finally, this analysis reveals the type of democratic organisations 
which were emerging during the course of the struggle: their structures, 
practices and membership. 
6.2. Overview 
The African youth in general were tied by the circumstances of apartheid to 
two features of domination. As students they were faced with an inferior 
education system that confined them to the poorly-paying , unskilled sectors 
of employment (inadequately-trained and unqualified teachers , overcrowded and 
poorly constructed classrooms, age restrictions, lack of textbooks, high school 
fees, bush colleges, etc.) . As Africans they were faced with the effects of 
apartheid domination and exploitation (structural unemployment, forced 
removals, overcrowded townships, repression, bantustans, etc.). These were 
the main factors which influenced the political attitude of the African youth. 
According to Bundy, there are three principal reasons for student/youth 
militancy in South Africa. Firstly, militancy among the youth stems from the 
"notion of a self-conscious 'generation unit"'. Young militants in the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers' Union, the radicals who formed the Independent 
ANC, and the young intellectuals of the ANC Youth League all chafed 
against the restraint of their elders and were the precursors of the Black 
Consciousness ideologues, the enrages of 1976, and the township comrades 
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of the 1980s.1 Secondly, there are the social and political pressures which 
arise from the demographic predominance of the young . These are related 
to the third factor, the underlying causes of political opposition and resistance 
on the part of the youth. These are: (i) the glaring defects of black 
education; (ii) the very substantial expansion of black schooling over the past 
couple of decades; and , (iii) the issue of unemployment among black school-
leavers.2 
The short-term demands of student organisations indicated the shortcomings 
of the education system: ill-qualified teachers, high drop-out and failure rates, 
shortages of textbooks and classrooms, the widespread practice of corporal 
punishment and sexual harassment, the lack of democratically elected Student 
Representative Councils (SRCs), age-restrictions that disqualified older students, 
and the victimisation of student leaders.3 The growth of black enrolment at 
high schools and tertiary institutions resulted in the decline in the overall 
quality of black education . The number of African students at secondary 
schools increased from 45,598 in 1960 to 1,001 ,249 in 1984. Student 
enrolment at tertiary institutions increased from 1,871 to 36,604. Finally, 
increases in the number of school leavers during a period of mounting 
unemployment also generated radicalism among black school students and 
school leavers. In 1985, unemployment was somewhere between 15 percent 
and 30 percent while almost two out of every three unemployed blacks were 
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among the youth between the ages of 18 and 26 years was 80 percent.s 
School boycotts have been a major feature of resistance to apartheid since 
1976. Since the initial outburst of student resistance in Soweto, the 
"education struggle" has been a central component of the struggle for 
national liberation. Schools and tertiary institutions for blacks became "sites 
of struggle as increasingly politicised students" challenged "the state's authority 
and" contested "discriminatory education".6 
Monica Bot depicted the education struggle during the ten year period which 
followed the Soweto revolt in the following terms: 
Pupil demands have shifted over the past ten years from an initial rejection of Afrikaans 
and Bantu education to a demand for equal, 'free and compulsory education' in 1980; 
from the slogan 'liberation now, education later' in 1985 to this year's [1986 - G.H.] 
rallying cry of 'people's education for people's power'. Prior to the (select) state of 
emergency of 1985, pupils' short term demands centred around education-related issues 
such as democratically-elected SRCs, grievances regarding corporal punishment and age 
limit restrictions. Once the state of emergency was imposed, however, issues generally 
focused nationally on the release of detainees, the removal of troops from the townships, 
and the unbanning of political groupS.7 
One of the central aspects of the student struggle was the Education Charter 
which clearly spelt out the demands of the disenfranchised majority and the 
need for a unified and democratic system of education .8 During late 1985 
and early 1986 students boycotted classes in support of the struggle for 
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preparing students for political rule in post-apartheid South Africa. People's 
Education calls for alternative curricula , democratic SRCs, student participation 
in the management of schools, and grassroots participation by students and 
youth groups, and civic and street committees.9 
From 1980 students forged a close working relationship with workers, 
providing support for striking workers and calling on workers to support 
political campaigns. The African youth in particular identified the working class 
as the leading element in the struggle for liberation. The nature of Bantu 
Education and high levels of unemployment taught the African youth that they 
have a common struggle with the working class. Youth congresses, which 
drew their membership from the unemployed youth, students and young 
workers, sprang up in the major urban centres and spread to the rural areas 
during the second half of the eighties. 
Student/youth organisations were the most militant and active organisations in 
the mass democratic movement. According to one commentator, 
Dominant in terms of demographic importance, dominant also in terms of pol itical and 
social activity within the townships, African youth are and will remain one of the single 
most important and radical factors within the broad-based coalition opposing the apartheid 
regime.10 
About 50 per cent of the black population of South Africa is less than 
twenty-five years old.11 The participation of organisations of the youth in the 
mass democratic movement, their concern with democratic practices and 
socialist objectives, and their militancy, all contributed to the participation of 
the mass democratic movement in grassroots political action . Young blacks 
were a critical factor in galvanizing township resistance to all forms of 
9 
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apartheid oppression and exploitation .12 Young activists played a leading role 
in township mobilisation and organisation. They constituted the largest number 
of activists that popularised campaigns, mobilised support for organisations 
and monitored and enforced political action. 
Student/youth organisations played a prominent role in local structures of the 
UDF. In most regions, these organisations were strongly represented at area, 
zonal and regional levels and often acted as reinforcing mechanisms in the 
Front's organisational structures. The elaborate organisational networks they 
established and their ability to adapt to underground conditions made these 
organisations more readily able to respond to emergency conditions. In 
addition, 18 of the 62 leaders of the UDF regions in 1985 were drawn from 
student or youth organisations. Student/youth organisations were also 
prominent in the numerous ad hoc inter-organisational structures which 
coordinated local campaigns such as consumer boycotts and mass stayaways. 
These organisations also played a role in assisting other sectors of the UDF, 
in particular women and civic organisations. Because students and unem-
ployed youths are relatively unconstrained by responsibility, they are more 
able to respond to political issues than other sectors. Student/youth 
organisations also emphasized political education in their programmes. 
Newsletters, such as the COSAS National Newsletter, SANSCO Newsletter, 
and Mahlangu Detachment (SAYCO) dealt with issues of importance to 
members of the organisations, with the anti-apartheid struggle in general and 
with other popular struggles abroad. In addition, student/youth organisations 
held educational workshops and forums which dealt with politically relevant 
issues, campaigns and strategies. 
12 
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The significance of student/youth organisations lay, however, in the ideological 
contribution they made in producing a generation of people who rejected 
apartheid society and were prepared to make sacrifices to destroy it. The 
commitment to non-racialism, democracy, unity-in-action with other progressive 
organisations, and a commitment to the ideals of the Freedom Charter were 
introduced by these organisations. These principles soon spread to a large 
number of organisations which proliferated during the first half of the 1980s. 
The South African youth component is made up of young workers, 
professionals, students, pupils and unemployed people alike. In its broad 
sense, . the category includes children of pre-school age through to young 
adults. 13 The shared experience of apartheid domination and exploitation 
generated a sense of unity in struggle against the common enemy. This 
resulted in their total rejection of apartheid education and society as a whole. 
What follows is an analysis of three national student and youth organisations, 
COSAS, the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) - which was later 
renamed the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO) - and the 
South African Youth Congress (SAYCO). 
6.3. The Congress of South African Students (CaSAS) 
6.3.1. Formation 
COSAS was formed in May 1979 as a national organisation to represent the 
interests of black school students. In the wake of the Soweto uprising the 
South African Student Movement (SASM), together with a number of other 
organisations of the SCM, was banned. COSAS was formed to replace the 
banned student movement and soon had branches in the Eastern Cape, 
Western Cape, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal. COSAS organised 
13 
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black students at secondary and night schools, and technical , teacher training 
and correspondence colleges. 14 
The inaugural meeting of COSAS in Roodeport was attended by delegates 
from the East and West Rand, Soweto, Pretoria, the Northern Transvaal, Qwa 
Qwa, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth , and Natal. 15 Immediately after the 
formation of COSAS, two members of the executive committee were sent to 
the Eastern Cape, two to the Western Cape, two to the Free State and one 
to Natal. 16 These were charged with establishing branches in these areas 
and popularising the new organisation. 
Other progressive organisations in certain areas, such as the SRC of Natal 
University's Medical School in Durban, the Port Elizabeth Students' 
Organisation and the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO), the 
Soweto Student's League, and the Warmbaths Students Organisation, assisted 
in the formation of COSAS branches in their areas.17 
6.3.2. Policies and Objectives 
Initially, COSAS was a BC-oriented organisation (its predecessor, SASM, was 
originally formed by the BCM). However, in 1980 the student organisation 
declared its support for the Freedom Charter, becoming the first mass 
organisation since the crushing of internal resistance in the 1960s to do so. 
Although COSAS's convenors were products of Black Consciousness, by 
styling itself a "Congress" it was self-consciously identifying itself with the 
14 
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Congress tradition of the 1950s. Its first president, Ephraim Mogale, was 
actually a clandestine ANC member and was eventually convicted of furthering 
the aims of the ANC. 18 
COSAS's guiding principle was that the ANC was the "authentic liberation 
movement" of South Africa, and that the youth militants should plan their 
future activities as a continuation of that tradition.19 In its first two years 
COSAS took up two commemorative campaigns that the authorities saw as 
ANC-supporting: the 1979 hanging of MK guerrilla Solomon Mahlangu, and 
the centenary of the Zulu victory over British troops at Isandhlwana.2o In 
1980, COSAS, together with NUSAS, played a central role in the ANC's 
Freedom Charter campaign. Copies of the Freedom Charter were distributed 
by both high school and university students to the masses of South Africans. 
Underlying the Congress tradition was the principle of non-racialism. COSAS 
argued that the forces which oppress black students are "not colour as such 
but rather economic forces".21 COSAS's non-racial position emerged in the 
context of a country-wide political realignment coupled with the resurgence of 
ANC activities within the country. 22 The founding document of the 
organisation stipulated COSAS's non-racial policy. However, the constitution 
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which effectively meant African, Indian and coloured students. According to 
Lulu Johnson, executive member of the organisation: "The whole question of 
confining COSAS to black students was a strategic one. In principle, we 
maintained and upheld the non-racial policy of our organisation and of the 
liberation movement as a whole, and we made real gains in this area",23 
In 1983 the national organiser clarified COSAS's position: while whites could 
not participate in COSAS because the law did not allow that in terms of the 
Prohibition of Political Interference Act, COSAS's aim was the achievement 
of a non-racial, democratic South Africa, 24 
Before its banning in August 1985, the student organisation opened itself up 
to membership from all races. This was a token gesture, however, because 
legislation still prevented whites from becoming members,25 However, COSAS 
had earlier displayed a commitment to non-racialism, During 1980, COSAS 
worked with NUSAS in the Freedom Charter campaign and again in 1981 
on the Education Charter Campaign. 
COSAS policy was bent towards a philosophy that: "will determine the 
interests of all in the education of the country; will disseminate ideas that 
will lead the people towards an education which will leave everyone free to 
think, act and live; and will, in the final analysis, lead to total liberation in 
South Africa", COSAS envisaged: "A society where free and compulsory 
education will cease to be a privilege, but be a right and one that is 
democratically determined to teach the people to love one another, maintain 
their culture and dignity and honour human brotherhood".26 
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COSAS's general aim was to fight for compulsory, free and democratic 
education in a democratic society. The organisation's principal aims included 
alerting students and the wider community of the repressive nature of 
schooling in South Africa, and to participate in drawing up an educational 
charter for a future non-racial, democratic education system. 27 COSAS 
artic.ulated a set of short-, medium-, and long-term goals. During 1976, 
students sought the eradication of Bantu Education without articulating an 
alternative system of education. By contrast, COSAS's aims included 
immediate goals, such as books, better qualified teachers, better facilities, etc. 
The long-term objective of the student organisation was the creation of a 
non-racial and democratic education system in a non-racial and democratic 
society. COSAS held that a democratic education system could only be 
achieved in a democratic society based on the will of all the people; that 
the student struggle was but one site of struggle; and that students are part 
of a broader community. 
Although the organisation was primarily concerned with educational issues, 
COSAS viewed the education struggle as part of a much larger struggle 
against oppression and exploitation. COSAS was aware that Bantu Education 
was aimed at controlling and indoctrinating the youth and that this could only 
be changed by transforming the country's entire political structure.28 It was 
argued that "a non-racial democratic education" system could only be 
achieved in "a democratic society truly reflective of the will of all the 
people". 
COSAS identified the relationship between educational and social transform-
ation in its statement of beliefs: 
27 
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First, that students must be organised through democratically elected student representa-
tive councils (SRCs). Secondly, that students must serve the community: 'we are 
members of society before we are students' - and thereby demonstrate that students can 
playa 'progressive role in the broad democratic alliance'. Therefore, SRCs must relate 
the struggles in schools to the struggles in their communities. Thirdly, that in serving the 
community, students must recognise that they can play only a limited role in the overall 
struggle. That must be led by the working class; the duty of the students was to lend 
support to the trade union and community organisations.29 
This statement of beliefs reflected a concern with, firstly , the relations of 
authority in the schools. Schools are undemocratic institutions and are largely 
based on authoritarian notions of control. CaSAS demanded democratically 
elected SRCs as a way of increasing student power. SRCs were increasingly 
seen by student organisations as a fundamental right and as essential to the 
transformation of educational institutions. 
Secondly, the statement of beliefs defined CaSAS's role in the broader 
liberation struggle. A CaSAS activist had the following to say about the link 
between the education struggle and other struggles: 
COSAS does not see the students' struggle as our isolated issue, but as part of the 
broader struggle against oppression and exploitation. The problem of high school fees 
and expensive uniforms is linked with the problem of low wages and high prices, high 
rents and busfares. The poor quality of language teaching is linked to cultural domination 
of our people. Lack of genuine representation at school and the existence of an unpopular 
prefect system should be seen as part of the undemocratic domination over the majority 
of our people in our country. It is clear then that a struggle against corporal punishment, 
age restriction and the lack of representation is part of the overall struggle against lower 
wages, high rents, bantustans, puppet town councils and lack of genuine political rights 
by the majority.30 
However, CaSAS recognised the leading role of the working class in the 
broader struggle. CaSAS's initial attitude towards the working class was 
dictated by its Black Consciousness origins which emphasised student 
vanguardism in the struggle against apartheid. However, the organisation soon 
29 
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recognised that: 
students are a specific group and that they have to play a limited role in the broader 
struggle. Their role is to support the struggle of the workers ... especially in the trade 
union and community fronts.31 
Thus: "The working class, as the oppressed and most exploited class in 
society, therefore must first emancipate themselves, since the emancipation 
of the working class will ensure the emancipation of society as a whole".32 
This realization led to increasing cooperation with trade unions and community 
organisations. COSAS provided essential support to striking workers and 
community struggles around issues such as transport increases, rent hikes, 
etc. In 1982 COSAS adopted the theme "Student-Worker Action" for the year. 
This entailed organising students as "the workers of tomorrow" with an 
"obligation to serve the community". 33 With this in mind COSAS promoted 
the formation of youth organisations to serve the interests of the unemployed 
and young workers. 
The youth congresses, which were first established in 1983, facilitated 
cooperation between school students and young workers and the unemployed. 
In the first place, most of the members of the new organisations were 
former COSAS activists who had left school or finished their schooling. 
Secondly, a large number of the youth congresses drew their membership 
from school students who were also active in COSAS. This had the dual 
effect of drawing COSAS into issues which affected young workers and the 
unemployed youth and drew the congresses into school-related struggles. 
31 
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COSAS policy also extended to the fight against sexism and the building of 
women's leadership.34 The NEC included a women's organiser who was 
responsible for ensuring that every branch had a women's structure to 
facilitate the growth of women's leadership. COSAS also emphasized 
disciplinary action against harassment of women by its male members. In 
addition, the first national executive of COSAS included two women -
Khumutso Mogase and Mpho Masetla. Finally, the student organisation took 
up the campaign to end sexual harassment in schools. 
After Dr. Boesak proposed the formation of the UDF, COSAS welcomed the 
proposal and participated in the Front from the beginning. COSAS participated 
in meetings which led to the formation of regional UDFs in the Transvaal, 
Western Cape, Natal and other regions. The student organisation identified 
the UDF as a common platform for "all organisations that are committed to 
fighting against the new undemocratic constitution, the Koornhof laws, the 
Group Areas Act, bantustans, etc". According to a COSAS activist, the UDF 
was "a platform to fight for a free and democratic South Africa".35 
From 1983 up to its banning, COSAS was able to play a pre-eminent role 
in the educational struggle.36 The school boycotts led to a growth in the 
organisation's membership and support among black students. During this 
period, COSAS evolved a composite strategy of educational and political 
demands, the former enshrined in the Education Charter and the latter were 





"Interview of COSAS leaders", op.cit. , p.13. 
"United Action for Democratic Education", op.cit., p.80. 
Refer to Chap.3, pp.1 05-111 above for a periodisation of the education struggle and COSAS's role 
in this struggle. 
Johnson,S. (1989); op.cit., p.113. 
213 
years the organisation initially focused on educational issues. However, by the 
end of 1984 striking students were making demands around educational as 
well as political issues. Thus, the particular interests of students were 
transformed into a political challenge of the dominant apartheid system: a 
democratic education system could only be achieved in a democratic society. 
This could only be achieved through revolutionary struggle, which was the 
combined struggle of all groups and social forces opposed to the ruling bloc. 
At the end of 1984 CaSAS succeeded in drawing community support for the 
students' struggle when it successfully called on the community to participate 
in the Transvaal regional stayaway. This marked a significant departure in 
that it demonstrated increasing awareness of the links between the various 
elements of the struggle - i.e. that the education struggle was a community 
issue as well. Demands made included the withdrawal of the SADF and 
police from the townships; cessation of rent and busfare increases; resignation 
of all community councillors; unconditional release of all political prisoners and 
detainees; reinstatement of dismissed workers; educational reform ; and the 
termination of unfair taxation. During 1985, school boycotts rendered "the 
schools unworkable and ungovernable, a process which mirrored that occurring 
in the townships following the collapse of the BLAs. This shift of objectives 
of the education struggle from reform to control reflected, according to Wolpe, 
a transformation of school boycotts from a tactic to a strategy.36 
In 1985, the school crisis had assumed such proportions, with students 
supporting the slogan "Liberation Now, Education Later!", that community 
involvement in educational issues became necessary. The national response 
to the educational crisis culminated in the formation of the National Education 
Crisis Committee (NECC) in 1986. The government also addressed some of 
36 
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caSAS's demands. In 1984, the new minister responsible for African 
education, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, agreed to the formation of SRCs from the 
beginning of 1985. This was rejected by the student movement on the 
grounds that the constitutions of the SRCs had not been drawn up by 
students. CaSAS also insisted that SRCs should be allowed to affiliate with 
outside organisations. In addition, the removal of age limits in particular 
standards, which students saw as a way of getting rid of political activists, 
was also addressed, and refusal to readmission was restricted in its 
application to educational grounds.39 
6.3.3. Structure and Membership 
CaSAS had structures at the national, regional and local level.40 At the 
local level branches were formed at the schools or the particular institution 
concerned. A branch consisted of four or more students and had representa-
tion at Regional and National Committees. The National Congress (NC) was 
the supreme policy-making body of CaSAS and met at least once a year. 
It consisted of the National Executive Committee (NEC), and five delegates 
from each branch. The NEC, which met at least four times a year, was 
responsible for carrying out the decisions and purposes of the NC and the 
NEC. 
The NEC consisted of the members of the National Executive Council, two 
delegates from each regional committee, two representatives of the Executive, 
and any two members of every branch not included in a regional committee. 
Regional committees were formed in areas where three or more CaSAS 
branches existed. The constitution also provided for SRCs, which could 
affiliate to CaSAS. 
39 
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From the very beginning of its existence, COSAS expressed its dissatisfaction 
with, and rejection of, the following aspects of "inferior education"41: 
overcrowded classrooms, unhealthy study conditions, bad food at boarding 
schools, enforced brutal discipline, inadequate and poorly qualified teachers, 
shortages of textbooks, leakage of examination papers, high school fees, etc. 
A spokesmen claimed that COSAS aimed to build organisations around issues 
affecting students, rather than concentrate on issues affecting the community. 
In consequence, most of the early activities of the organisation were focused 
on educational issues, demonstrating an early commitment to mobilising 
around issues which immediately affect students. 
During this period COSAS focused attention on the organisation of students 
at high schools, particularly in the Eastern Cape, around such issues as the 
limits of compulsory education, unfair matric results, and the prohibition of 
students over 18 in standard eight and standard ten from attending schools. 
In 1981, both COSAS and AZASO mobilised students around the campaign 
to draw up an Education Charter. The envisaged Education Charter would 
contain students' demands and present a view of a viable alternative to the 
apartheid system of education. The campaign was also seen as a means of 
developing COSAS into a mass organisation by mobilising the support of 
students during the campaign. 
Tensions between parents and students during the 1980 school boycott 
resulted in a change of emphasis from mobilising purely around educational 
issues. Students realised that they needed the support of their parents and 
between 1980 and 1983 COSAS began organising students in various actions 
around community issues, often in collaboration with community organisations. 
41 
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In April 1981 the organisation led a protest march against rent increases in 
the Vaal, and mobilised support for a national consumer boycott of Wilson-
Rowntree Sweets to support the members of SAAWU who had been 
dismissed from an East London factory. Thus, the activities of the student 
organisation in its early years were twofold : firstly, the mobilisation and 
organisation of students around educational issues and , secondly, cooperation 
with community organisations and workers in an attempt to establish unity-in-
action and to gain the support and cooperation of the broader community in 
student struggles. 
In 1983 CaSAS claimed 44 branches nationally, with the Western Cape 
having the largest number.42 The following CaSAS branches were repre-
sented at the UDF inaugural conference in August 1983: Transvaal (Soweto, 
Pretoria, and Alexandra) ; the Western Cape (18 branches) ; Natal (Durban); 
CaSAS Eastern Cape and CaSAS Bloemfontein .43 By 1984 caSAS had 
developed a well-organised structure with branches in nearly fifty centres 
concentrated in the southern Transvaal and the Eastern Cape.44 
During 1984 CaSAS expanded from an activist group to a mass movement 
and the number of CaSAS branches increased dramatically. This was largely 
due to the organisation's role in educational struggles during the year.45 The 
organisation "was able to generalise student demands from one area of the 
country to another". However, although thousands of students responded to 
CaSAS campaigns, and many supported CaSAS demands, "that did not 
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organised into structures with regular and disciplined activity".46 
African secondary school students increased in numbers from 774,000 in 1980 
to over 1,192,900 in 1985. Primary school enrolment increased from 
4,063,900 in 1980 to 4,820,100 in 1985 bringing the total number of African 
students to 6,012,900.47 At the time of the banning of COSAS in mid-1985, 
journalists estimated that the organisation represented more than half of the 
six million African students in the country.48 COSAS's support and level of 
organisation differed from region to region. This was largely a result of 
differing local conditions and political traditions. 
The mobilisation of "progressive" school students in Natal was both hindered 
and stimulated by the dominance of Inkatha in the region 's politics. Inkatha's 
Youth Brigade claimed a membership of half a million in 1986, with many 
young members recruited in KwaZulu schools .49 The KwaZulu Department 
of Education encouraged recruitment for Inkatha in KwaZulu schools. Patterns 
of mobilisation in Natal's African schools were determined by the degree of 
authority and/or support the KwaZulu government and Inkatha enjoyed in the 
townships. so For instance, in KwaZulu-administered schools in Umlazi and 
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townships such as Lamontville, Hambanathi, Chesterville, and Klaarwater, 
which were administered by the Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB), and 
where schools were run by the Department of Education and Training (DET), 
support for CaSAS was relatively high. apposition to Inkatha in these 
townships (against repression of UDF activists and the threat of incorporation 
into KwaZulu) politicised the students, and promoted mass mobilisation in the 
schools. 
The 1980-81 school boycotts in the coloured and African schools in the 
Western Cape politicised scores of school students. In the course of the 
boycotts, school students became involved in community issues, provided 
support for striking workers, mobilised support for the Western Cape rent 
campaign and became involved in the Release Mandela Campaign. The 
boycotts and politicisation of students encouraged the formation of CaSAS 
branches in the region and, by the end of 1983, the Western Cape had 18 
CaSAS branches. 
caSAS in the Western Cape remained relatively inactive between 1981 and 
1985. However, the organisational foundation laid by CaSAS was evident 
during the school boycotts which began after the declaration of the state of 
emergency in mid-1985 and the banning of CaSAS.51 In particular, student 
groups involved in the boycott displayed a strong pro-ANC sentiment. 52 
In the Eastern Cape, the militant political tradition of the region, the 
emergence of powerful community and youth organisations, and the intolerable 
educational conditions found in the region promoted the widespread 
mobilisation of school students. African and coloured schools in the region 
51 
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also participated in the 1980-81 boycotts which lasted until January 1981 in 
the Eastern Cape. In addition, SAAWU in East London, and the Port 
Elizabeth Student's Organisation and PEBCO in Port Elizabeth , provided 
assistance in setting up COSAS branches in the region. COSAS branches 
rapidly grew up in the major urban centres and soon spread to rural 
townships in the region. Coloured students in the region were drawn into 
COSAS at the beginning of 1985 when they joined the nationwide boycott 
in support of democratic SRCs.53 
COSAS enjoyed widespread support in the PVN region as a whole. COSAS 
had strong branches in the West Rand , Pretoria (particularly in Atteridgeville-
Saulsville), Soweto and Alexandra before the formation of the UDF. However, 
in 1984, the Transvaal Region acknowledged that branches were experiencing 
problems which contributed towards weakening organisation in the region. 
These were the lack of direction and coordination on issues to be taken by 
branches, and the lack of constant communication between the branches and 
the regional executive.54 Nonetheless, by 1985 COSAS had spread to all 
major centres in the region. The country-wide school boycotts during the first 
half of the year also saw the spread of COSAS influence to the Northern 
and Eastern Transvaal regions. 
At the end of 1983 COSAS had only one branch in the Orange Free State 
as a whole. 55 By the beginning of 1985, however, COSAS had taken root 
in the province. The expansion of COSAS membership was evident during 
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Free State towns (Welkom, Kroonstad , Bultfontein, Wesselbron , Bothaville, 
Virginia, Odendaalrus and Bloemfontein) resembled battlegrounds with frequent 
clashes between police and students.56 
COSAS was not without limitations or weaknesses. In assessing COSAS's 
activities during the period , Hyslop57 found a number of flaws. First, was 
the relationship between students and other sectors of the community, in 
particular, their relationship with organised labour. Students were often 
accused of calling stayaways without consulting the trade unions. These 
stayaways were often badly advertised and physical force was often used to 
enforce stayaways. Student actions also led to the alienation of teachers who 
students saw as working for "the system". There was also a lack of 
adequate links between students and parents leading to a fragmentation of 
unity in the community. 
Second, the student movement was open to infiltration by unemployed young 
people because of organisational weaknesses which arose from weak or non-
existent political education and the lack of leadership after the COSAS 
banning . This led to a high level of politically destructive violence, and to 
clashes between students supporting opposing organisations. 
Nevertheless, education struggles during the first half of the 1980s built the 
foundation upon which a long-term strategy emerged. The enduring school 
crisis which continued after the banning of the student organisation led to a 
national response and the formation of the NECC. With the increasing 
involvement of the community, the educational struggle was transformed to 
a search for alternative education - "people's education". 
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In sum, COSAS, one of the founding organisations of the UDF, was a mass 
organisation by the time of its banning and had established branches in 
every province in the country. It had thus played a very significant role in 
mass mobilisation and organisation and was able to draw this large 
constituency into the ambit of revolutionary activity. 
The early commitment to the Freedom Charter and the ANC, and COSAS's 
activities in this regard , meant the student organisation played a significant 
role in the political and ideological struggle to promote and expand 
revolutionary consciousness. This, coupled with COSAS's large constituency, 
provided the UDF with one of the most significant means of mobilising and 
organising the youth around its political programmes and ideology. 
6.4. The Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO)lSouth African National 
Students Congress (SANSCO) 
6.4.1. Formation 
In the late 1970s Black students at tertiary institutions organised themselves 
into the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO) . College and 
university students were initially organised into AZASO, which was formed in 
November 1979 by students from Fort Hare, Zululand, Natal, Turfloop and 
Durban-Westville universities, and Mapumulo college. AZASO was the student 
wing of AZAPO. At the inaugural conference, organised by AZAPO, a 
preamble was adopted endorsing the philosophy of Black Consciousness and 
an interim executive elected to establish branches at the various campuses 
and to draft a constitution. s8 
The formation of AZASO was not representative of the black student 
community in South Africa. Only representatives of Turfloop were present at 
58 
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the AZAPO meeting which suggested the formation of the student 
organisation. However, students at other universities decided to heed the call 
for the new organisation and participated at AZASO's inaugural conference 
in Pietermaritzburg. 
6.4.2. Policies and objectives 
From the outset AZASO was involved in an ideological debate as leaders 
sought to extract and codify a political philosophy from the short history of 
BC. Their major concerns were the role of whites in the national liberation 
struggle and the question of socialism in a future South Africa.59 These 
debates occurred in the context of a national ideological debate as the ANC 
reasserted its primacy in the liberation struggle. 
At an annual General Council conference held at Wilgespruit in 1981 the 
issues of non-racialism and socialism dominated the discussions. The BC 
component was defeated and the organisation committed itself to the Freedom 
Charter and co-operation with COSAS, and confirmed the dominance of 
"united front" , non-racial politics among organised youth .60 It was argued that 
BC "has served its purpose. We must move on".61 
Like its counterpart in the schools, AZASO adopted a non-racial stance. 
Although whites were not permitted to become members of AZASO it was 
willing to cooperate with white student organisations. In 1981 AZASO bridged 
the distance that had existed between black student organisations and NUSAS 
by developing a working alliance with the latter on the Education Charter 
Campaign . One factor which strengthened cooperation between black and 
59 
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white student organisations was the growth in numbers of black students on 
liberal campuses after 1976. Black students changed the nature of student 
politics on liberal campuses by taking township struggles into these 
institutions. 
AZASO moved early to demonstrate its attitude towards workers and the 
notion of unity-in-action. At its 1981 conference, AZASO invited a number of 
representatives of community and labour organisations. According to an 
AZASO leader: "The presence of community and labour union leaders 
underlined the importance which AZASO attaches to [the] unity of all 
progressives. It is also significant that the activities of the students' movement 
are in line with the aspirations of the mass of the exploited workers".62 In 
support of this statement the student organisation involved itself in a number 
of community struggles and trade union support campaigns. 
AZASO saw the working class as the key instrument to "bring about a redis-
tribution of power" in South Africa.63 The organisation pledged to "seek a 
working policy relating directly to the struggle of the workers as conducted 
by the progressive trade union movement".64 Students could contribute to the 
workers' struggle, according to an AZASO leader, in a number of ways.65 
Because students are relatively unconstrained by responsibility, they are more 
able to respond to political issues than workers, who "usually react more 
readily to matters directly affecting their livelihood such as working conditions 
and wages". Students could also play a supportive role because they "have 
62 
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more time to research, collect data, analyze and compile information which 
can be used to strengthen the workers' theoretical understanding of their 
situation". In addition, the supportive role of students "extends to producing 
pamphlets, stickers, collecting funds and arranging meetings". 
In 1986, AZASO placed itself firmly in the tradition of organisations supporting 
the Freedom Charter when it changed its name to SANSCO. In a policy 
statement on the Freedom Charter, SANSCO National Coordinator, Jabi 
Skhosana, had the following to say: 
Socialism is a democracy for the majority of the people, the working people and instead 
of democratic rights being made formal , the material basis for realizing those rights are 
guaranteed . ... It is important if the democratic organisations struggling for the demands 
develop a working class leadership and convince themselves and other classes that there 
is a place for all under socialism, then it will become clearer that the establishment of 
democracy will deepen into socialism and this is exactly what the Charter is and is striving 
for.66 
This is a clear recognition that the ultimate goal of the struggle is socialism, 
which can be achieved by developing a working class leadership and 
convincing other classes that there is a place for all under socialism. Thus, 
the national democratic revolution, if these conditions are met, can deepen 
into socialism by implementing the political and economic aspirations found 
in the Freedom Charter. This statement indicates a process, which begins 
with the destruction of apartheid, leading to the implementation of the 
Freedom Charter which then deepens into socialism. For AZASO, then, the 
immediate political challenge was to destroy apartheid. 
Black students at tertiary institutions constitute a social category distinct from 
the majority of black people, who are predominantly working class. However, 
they share, alongside workers and other black dominated classes, a common 
experience of national oppression. In addition, the number of students from 
66 SANSCO National Newsletter, p.6. 
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working class families began to expand during the 1980s. For this category 
of students, "low wages for parents, unemployment, inadequate housing and 
services and poverty were lived experiences".67 
AZASO held the same view as COSAS with regard to the relationship 
between educational and other struggles. According to an AZASO activist: 
The problems and conflicts in South Africa are not narrowly found in political and 
economic factors. Factors such as consciousness, understanding society, perceptions of 
the work situation, etc., are all pOints of conflict in society. While education continues to 
perpetuate the oppression and exploitation of the majority in this country it will continue 
to be a focal point in the struggle for liberation. The 1953 Anti-Bantu Education campaign, 
Soweto '76, the 1980 Schools Boycott all attest to the fact that education struggles have 
contributed to our proud history of struggle. Similarly present and future struggles on 
education must link up to the broad national struggle for democracy. Otherwise they 
would be wasted energy.sa 
AZASO identified its guiding principle to be the struggle for the "creation of 
a democratic South Africa free of racist oppression and exploitation".69 And, 
in the view of the organisation: "Since the success of our struggle depends 
upon effective mobilisation of all people committed to democracy, we call for 
genuine unity of the oppressed against the oppressive system".70 
From the outset, AZASO was preoccupied with the question of student 
representation. When AZASO was formed in 1979, Fort Hare was the only 
black campus with an SRC. According to Badat: "At most universities, and 
particularly at technikons, teacher training colleges, and bantustan-based 
institutions, the democratic right of stUdents to autonomous student 
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student organisation could be formed without the permission of the university 
council , while students were barred from contacting or joining any 
organisations not recognised by the council. 71 According to an AZASO 
activist: 
Democratic student representation in the form of SRCs and COSAS and AZASO 
branches has been stifled by the racist education authorities. Instead of democratic 
representation, university students have been forced to accept 'dummy' SRCs. At school 
level, any form of student representation has been firmly crushed and as an alternative, 
prefect systems, etc., have been implemented. Students and scholars have neglected 
such representation from the top and today continue to strive for better and more 
grassroots representation.72 
In 1987, the campaign for SRCs shifted towards a call by the student 
organisation for the transformation of tertiary institutions into "People's 
Campuses".73 Its Programme of Action for the year included a call for the 
formation of committees of people's power at all levels - from the SRC down 
to hostel committees and floor committees, faculty councils, class committees, 
sports and cultural committees. These structures, which had their parallels in 
the street committees, people's courts, etc. , were seen as the foundations of 
people's power and democratic control of campuses. This marked a change 
from reform to control , from democratic representation in SRCs to People's 
Campuses, and presented a challenge to the authority of the apartheid 
regime. 
AZASO also focused on the Education Charter Campaign in 1981 . According 
to AZASO activists, the campaign was important because there was a need 
for stUdents to formulate a common set of educational demands. In addition, 
the campaign was important as a rallying point to mobilise students and 
make student structures more mass based. Furthermore: "The Education 
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Charter is important because it will be democratically formulated and so will 
embody the minimum education demands of the people". 74 The idea of an 
alternative education system marked the outright rejection of apartheid 
education and a vision of a democratically-based education system. This 
represented a desire to wrest political and ideological control of black 
education from the apartheid regime and to place it in the hands of the 
"people". 
AZASO welcomed the call for the formation of the UDF and participated in 
meetings which preceded the formation of the Front. AZASO members formed 
an important component of the foot-soldiers who popularised the UDF, 
promoted the anti-elections campaign, and collected signatures during the 
Million Signature Campaign . 
Nkosinathi Gwala perceives four common features of educational struggles at 
black universities during the 1980s.75 First, student struggles and the 
radicalisation of black students were shaped by the broader political struggle 
in spite of the geographical isolation of the universities. Second, the 
educational struggle was led and shaped by school students with most 
university boycotts occurring in response to the activities and issues raised 
by school students. Third , other struggles at black universities have been 
highly localised and isolated from each other. Fourth, university students failed 
to develop a programme of action directed at challenging the "bush 
character" of black universities. 
Opposition to the tri-cameral parliament and the BLAs, the formation of the 
UDF, and the declaration of a state of emergency and state repression 
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shaped student struggles in the first half of the 1980s. Student struggles 
were largely shaped by the events in the schools and communities around 
them. Thus, the most significant events of this period - the 1980s school 
boycott, the introduction of the tri-cameral parliament and BLAs, the 1984 
Vaal Triangle uprising and the 1985 school boycotts - involved widespread 
participation by black tertiary students. These national and regional struggles 
were punctuated by local struggles which led to sustained boycotts over the 
expulsion of student leaders, racist lecturers, and poor conditions on 
campuses. 
The ethnic universities were some of the focal points of resistance to 
apartheid since their establishment. By the mid-1980s, the "bush character" 
of these universities began to play a central role in student resistance. 
Unequal facilities, racist lecturers, control of the universities by conservative 
elements, police invasions of campuses were among the major grievances of 
black students. 
Black universities lacked legitimacy among black students for a number of 
reasons .76 Facilities at black universities are not equal to those at white 
universities. The racial separation of university education also fostered 
suspicions about the academic quality and status of ethnic universities. These 
universities also had a large complement of white South African staff at both 
the senior administrative and professorial levels. Resentment and unrest were 
also generated by the unsympathetic response of white-dominated administra-
tions to the demands of black students. The expulsions, arrests or bannings 
of politically active students and student organisations, and police intervention 
on campuses caused black students to view the university administrations with 
hostility. 
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6.4.3. Structure and Membership 
AZASO had structures at the national, regional and local levels.77 The 
supreme policy-making organ of AZASO, the Annual Congress, consisted of 
3 delegates from each branch. The General Students Council (GSC), which 
consisted of members of the NEC and 3 delegates from each branch, ran 
the affairs of AZASO between Congresses. The NEC, which was responsible 
for running the day-to-day activities of the organisation, consisted of a 
president, vice-president, and secretariat. 
Regionally, AZASO divided the country into four - Transvaal/Orange Free 
State, Natal, Eastern Cape, and Western Cape. In each region branches 
elected a Regional Council, which was responsible for coordinating the 
activities of the regions. The regions were further divided into subregions. For 
example, the Transvaal/OFS region had a northern subregion which included 
branches from the Universities of the North and Venda and a western sub-
region which included the University of Bophuthatswana, Medunsa and 
Mabopane Technikon. Constitutionally, branches consisted of at least ten 
members or any such number that the GSC decided upon. In addition to 
supervising all aspects and activities of the organisation within the area of 
its jurisdiction, each branch could submit to the GSC for consideration any 
recommendations concerning the principles, aims, objectives and goals of the 
organisation. 
Within a few years AZASO had established itself at black technical and 
teacher training colleges and all universities in South Africa except for 
Afrikaans ones. At the end of 1982, the organisation claimed that it had 
branches on 14 campuses and seven colleges.78 AZASO branch reports 
77 
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during the early years of its existence indicate a relatively low level of active 
participation in the organisation. However, at the level of identifying with, and 
supporting AZASO, a greater percentage of the black student population was 
attracted to the organisation. 
Black enrolment in tertiary institutions expanded rapidly from 1977. Among the 
reasons given for this expansion were the government and business's 
response to the skilled labour shortage and a politically-motivated initiative for 
the expansion of the black middle class. 79 After 1977, both capital and the 
government promoted black tertiary education in a number of ways.80 The 
state embarked on the construction of technikons and teacher training 
colleges for Africans in the "white areas", and provided financial assistance 
for the establishment of tertiary institutions in the homelands. South African 
capital provided funds to increase facilities at tertiary institutions and support 
for particular faculties. Finally, substantial increases were made in state-funded 
and private bursaries and loans to black students. 
Between 1977 and 1985, the total number of black university students 
increased three-fold from 25,140 to 78,017. The numbers increased most 
dramatically in black universities while a significant number of blacks began 
attending the English-medium universities.81 Black student enrolment at 
tertiary technical training institutions increased less dramatically between 1977 
and 1987. In 1987, out of a total of 54,316 students at technical college, 
only 13,794 were black. 82 In 1987, black enrolment at teacher training 
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colleges was as follows: 33,572 Africans at forty-one colleges run by the 
DET and the non-independent homelands; 9,209 Africans at eighteen colleges 
in the "independent" homelands (excluding Ciskei) ; 8,064 coloureds at thirteen 
colleges; and 1,174 Indians at two institutions which offered teacher 
training.83 
Black student mobilisation at the institutions was very uneven. This was 
largely a result of the different opportunities and constraints for organisation 
which were found in the different institutions. In addition , the advent of 
ideological differences on campuses led to splits in the black student body. 
Finally, state repression , expUlsions of student leaders and closing of 
campuses adversely affected student mobilisation. 
During the late 1970s black students at the white English-medium universities 
organised themselves into Black Student Societies (BSSs) . These BSSs 
formed the initial branches of AZASO on these campuses. Conditions on the 
English-medium campuses were more conducive to student mobilisation than 
the black campuses.84 The liberal administrations of the English-medium 
campuses provided student structures with greater space for their activities. 
In addition, the existence of SRCs, NUSAS, and other left-wing groups 
opened channels for student organisation. By contrast, conditions at black 
universities, technikons and colleges constrained organisation .8s Many black 
tertiary institutions lacked democratic SRCs while conservative educational and 
state administrations placed constraints on student structures. 
The rival BC-oriented student organisation, the Azanian StUdents Movement 
83 






(AZASM) , formed in 1983, split the black student body at all tertiary 
institutions. The ideological divisions amongst black students were exacerbated 
by the formation of the National Forum and the UDF. Students became 
involved in competition for political domination of the BSSs and SRCs, where 
they existed. 
The following branches of AZASO were represented at the UDF inaugural 
conference in August 1983: Transvaal (Turfloop, University of the Witwaters-
rand Black Students Society, Medunsa, Soweto Teacher Training College, 
Soweto College of Education, Student Tuition Society); the Western Cape 
(University of Cape Town, University of the Western Cape) ; Natal (University 
of Durban-Westville, University of Natal [Pietermaritzburg], University of Natal 
[Durban], Durban Medical School, University of Zululand , Natal Technikon 
SRC); Eastern Cape (Rhodes University Black Students Society).86 
AZASO's membership differed from campus to campus. In some cases the 
entire student body of an institution was affiliated to AZASO through the 
SRC, e.g. , the University of Durban-Westville in 1983. In 1983, AZASO was 
banned in KwaZulu, restricting its activities at the University of Zululand. In 
the same year, intense repression by the Medunsa administration forced the 
AZASO branch to operate off-campus. At Fort Hare, in addition to facing a 
history of repression, the organisation was effectively banned by the Ciskei 
authorities.87 
Tiego Moseneke, AZASO president in 1983, categorised the level of 
organisation as follows: 
86 
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today .... The other campuses have grown significantly in the last year or so, and the 
majority of students support AZASO. But some branches have not taken full root, 
especially those where students are hampered by repression. Some like Ngoye have 
managed to overcome this by good organisation but others are hampered by not being 
there, but not at the rate we would like, and AZASO cannot be said to be mass based 
there. But at Wits, Turfloop, Rhodes, Mongasotho Technikon and in Natal [University -
G.H.J, AZASO is to a large extent accepted by students willing to work within the 
structures.88 
In 1983, AZASO had affiliates at 13 institutions: University of Durban-Westville 
- mass affiliation (5,000 students); University of Natal Medical School - mass 
affiliation (800 students); University of Turfloop - branch; University of the 
Witwatersrand - branch; University of Fort Hare - working group; University 
of Cape Town - branch; University of the Western Cape - branch; University 
of Zulu land - working group; University of South Africa - branch; Mongosuthu 
Technikon - working group; Mapumulo Seminary College - working group; 
University of Natal - branch; and L.L. Sebe College - working group.89 In 
1985 AZASO claimed a presence on more than 50 campuses, colleges, and 
technikons.90 This figure grew to 67 in 1986. 
AZASO structures experienced a number of setbacks during the various 
emergencies. In 1988, the organisation stated that although it had been in 
a fairly strong position between 1983 and 1985, 
.. .the state of emergency has had a material effect on our organisation .. .. Our structures 
have been weakened by a systematic state onslaught: branches at Turfloop, Fort Hare, 
and Ngoye have been systematically destroyed.91 
During its early years, however, AZASO was the dominant student 
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for black students at white institutions. This occurred through the increasing 
mobilisation of black students at these institutions resulting in an increase in 
the number of AZASO branches. 
In sum, student activities were responses to a mix of educational and other 
local issues, and political issues. From the outset, however, the student 
struggle at tertiary institutions presented a challenge to the dominant apartheid 
system. This was a reflection of their early commitment to the Freedom 
Charter and the goal of national liberation, and the links they identified 
between educational issues and other forms of national oppression. 
6.5. The South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) 
6.5.1. Formation 
By far the most significant youth organisation in South Africa during the 
eighties was the South African Youth Congress. At the COSAS founding 
conference in 1979, attention was focused on the need to organise non-
student youths and to forge unity with students and pupils. 
COSAS leaders noted that many activists who had operated from the schools had 
dropped out either because of financial pressure, or hostility from the school authorities 
and the state. At the same time, over the years, many COSAS activists had completed 
school and were left with no organisational base in the community. Then there were the 
unemployed youths, as well as young workers, young married couples... people who 
shared the interests and aspirations of COSAS but could not belong to it.92 
This gave rise to a COSAS commission in 1982 to investigate the formation 
of a national youth organisation. The commission decided that individual 
townships and regions establish their own youth congresses which would work 
in close cooperation with COSAS and AZASO .93 These youth organisations 
would cater for young workers and the unemployed, most of these being 
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former COSAS members who had finished or left school. In 1983, twenty 
new youth organisations were launched.94 
In January 1984 a number of local and regional youth organisations came 
together to discuss the United Nations' International Year of the Youth (IVY) 
and the feasibility of creating a national youth coordinating body. Another 
meeting of five regional structures in November of the same year discussed 
the issue. At the beginning of 1985 a meeting of youth organisations in 
Durban agreed on a federal structure for the national organisation, and 
appointed a National Interim Committee. 
It was felt that local youth congresses were not fully prepared and leaders 
were told to go back and canvass their constituents in anticipation of a 
future launch. The July 1985 state of emergency "brought activities to a 
standstill" but attempts were made to revive the initiative at a meeting in the 
Western Cape in April 1986. In November, the Interim Committee announced 
that a "national youth organisation,,,. the voice of the young men and women 
of our country, channelling the militancy of the youth in a progressive 
political direction", would soon be launched.95 
At the end of 1986 there were some 600 youth congresses countrywide, and 
secretly-formed regional structures were in operation in the Eastern Cape, 
Western Cape, northern Transvaal and southern Transvaal, and preparations 
were advanced in Natal, the northern Cape, and Orange Free State. On 28 
March 1987, SA YCO was launched in great secrecy and representatives of 
94 
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the nine regional structures elected the National Executive.96 SAYCO adopted 
the Freedom Charter, pledged itself to work closely with COSATU and the 
NECC, and affiliated to the UDF. It claimed a membership of between 
500,000 and 700,000 (and a support base of two million) and had about 
1,000 local youth group affiliates.97 
6.5.2. Policies and Objectives 
The organisation's principal objectives included unifying and politicising all 
"progressive" youth, irrespective of race; encouraging the youth to join trade 
unions; and ensuring that women participated fully in the activities of the 
youth movement. 
Resolutions at the inaugural conference included demands for the lifting of 
the state of emergency, the withdrawal of troops from the townships, the 
unconditional release of Mandela and other political prisoners, and the 
unbanning of the ANC. These demands were similar to those made by 
virtually every organisation within the UDF at the time. They represented a 
challenge to apartheid , particularly with regard to the release of political 
prisoners and the unbanning of the ANC since these were calls for the 
leadership of the ANC in a democratic South Africa. 
SAYCO pledged to be part of a "class alliance .. . of organisational , unity led 
by the working class [involving] a principled working relationship with all 
progressive workers, community, women and student organisations with 
principles similar to ours".98 From the outset SAYCO adopted a class 
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analysis of the South African struggle. Thus: 
Our constitution's preamble depicts the current era as capitalist, in which the means of 
production are owned by a white minority and by foreign capitalists, with our people 
selling their only asset, their labour, for next to nothing. And it depicts a stage beyond 
capitalism, socialism. But the way to reach that stage is through the national-democratic 
revolution.99 
This statement provides an insight into the ultimate aim of the organisation, 
and the means to attain this goal. Socialism could only be achieved through 
the national democratic-revolution, which involved alliances with other 
organisations under the leadership of the working class. 
The aims and objectives adopted at the SA yeO launch reflected a growing 
identification with the working class. The congress resolved to: channel the 
militancy and resourcefulness of the youth to the benefit of the whole 
national and class struggle; to promote and deepen amongst the youth the 
outlook of the most progressive class, the working class; and encourage the 
working youth to join progressive trade unions which form part and parcel 
of the struggle for total political and economic liberation. 10o An alliance with 
eOSATU was high on the agenda of the youth organisation. For instance, 
the keynote address at the SA YCO launch was given by a eOSATU official. 
SA YCO's first president stressed the need for an alliance with workers in the 
following terms: 
The struggles of the past three years have clearly demonstrated the dynamic role ... of the 
youth ... [but) a clear understanding flows from the realities of national oppression and 
exploitation that while the youth continues to play a dynamic and energetic role in our 
struggle, it must accept ... working class leadership of the ... struggle ... . We have come 
together as the youth detachment of the democratic movement at a time of unprece-
dented state attacks.101 
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The youth had been at the forefront of the struggle since the Soweto revolt 
"in so far as they stimulated action and invariably shouldered the bulk of the 
practical work in implementing various campaigns". However, the youth 
acknowledged that: 
this should not be mistaken with the view that we are the vanguard of the struggle. That 
role belongs to our own working parents. The youth can be in the forefront of the 
confrontation between the state and the people, but working parents are the vanguard as 
they have the power to break the economy of the country ... they are the decisive force in 
the liberation struggle.102 
The central role given to the working class in the national-democratic struggle 
and the recognition of the supportive role of the youth by SA YCO mirrors 
the views held by the student organisations. This is a clear recognition of 
the centrality of class war in the "struggle". 
6.5.3. Structure and Membership 
SAYCO had a federal structure with leadership at the national, regional and 
local levels. At the national level, the National Congress elected the Central 
Executive Committee (CEC) out of whose ranks a National Executive 
Committee (NEC) was elected . Under the constitution, the NEC was to meet 
every fortnight and the CEC every two months. The supreme organ of 
SA YCO was the Congress, which met once a year. 
Regional congresses were established in the Southern, Northern and Eastern 
Transvaal, the Southern , Western and Northern Cape, Border, the Eastern 
Cape, Natal and the Orange Free State. 103 These regional congresses 
linked up local youth congresses. All branches in the region were represented 
in Regional conferences which elected a Regional Executive Committee (REC). 
The regions were further demarcated into sub-regions, zones and units. 
102 Interview with members of the National Interim Committee of the South African Youth Congress 
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103 Niddrie,D. (1987); op.cit., p.4. 
239 
SA yeo emerged nine months into the 1986 state of emergency and was 
forced to operate under emergency conditions. It was no longer possible to 
hold mass rallies, openly hold meetings, and maintain an identifiable 
leadership. "These restrictions certainly weakened us", Simon Ntombela, 
publicity secretary said , "because of the state of emergency we were not 
able to undertake rallies, put out publications and generate support for our 
campaigns". 104 
Born during a period of severe restrictions, SAyeO streamlined its operations 
to adapt to underground activity.1 05 The basic decision-making and executive 
structures remained unchanged but revisions were required in the face of 
increasing pressure from the state and the possibility of the detention of the 
national leadership. In order to expand decision-making structures and provide 
replacements for leaders lost through detention or death, eight departments 
were created to perform the functions once done by the officials charged 
with running the organisation's day-to-day activities. In addition, meetings of 
the NEe and eEe were not held as regularly as required under the 
constitution. 
At the national level, publicity and propaganda, education and training, sports 
and culture, women , secretariat, finance, religious and student liaison 
departments or sub-committees were established. However, although these 
departments were supposed to be set up at the regional, zonal and local 
levels, none existed by the end of 1987.106 
At the regional and local levels, leaders operated clandestinely during the 
104 "L . t ,. . h earning 0 Ive In t e shadows", op.cit., p.12. 
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state of emergency. According to Niddrie: 
The major thrust of local youth congress activity switched from high-profile, mass 
recruitment rallies to a system comparable to street committees. Living permanently 
underground, organisers established communication channels sufficiently strong, despite 
the emergency crackdown, to hold regional structures together.107 
At the local level, youth congresses displayed a wide diversity in their 
membership, functioning and activities. In general, the youth congresses 
consisted of a ten-member executive committee, an elected general council 
which was subdivided into coordinating committees representing zones. The 
zones were further divided into branches which were the lowest tier of the 
structure of youth congresses. 108 It was typical for the youth congresses to 
have seven sub-committees: Education and Cultural; Projects; Sports; Religion; 
Fund Raising; News gathering and distribution; and Young Women's 
committees. 
The general aims of the early youth congresses were: to normalise the 
relationship between youth and parents; to create a spirit of trust, responsibil-
ity and understanding among the youth; to directly involve the youth in 
community projects; to instil a spirit of health and determination in disil-
lusioned young people; and to encourage the youth to strive for a better 
system of education and complete their academic education full-time or part-
time. 
The first youth congresses to emerge in 1983 focused on the organisation 
of all youth (workers, the unemployed, and teenagers) in order to tackle their 
problems through united and collective action, and to develop a role for 
young people in their communities and in the broader democratic struggle. 
107 Niddrie,D. (1987) ; op. cit. , p.4. 
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Thus, from the outset the youth congresses had identified their political role 
in organising youth for participation in the broader democratic struggle. 
The first youth congress was formed in the Western Cape. The 1980-81 
school boycotts politicised students in the coloured schools and led to the 
formation of a number of youth groups in the coloured suburbs. During this 
wave of school boycotts, which included African schools in the area, student 
demands were integrated more explicitly with political demands. In addition, 
students became active in trade union struggles, in organising strikes and in 
support of the Free Mandela Campaign.109 The Cape Youth Congress 
(CAYCO) was formed in 1983 bringing together 35 youth groupS.110 
In the Western Cape, the youth increasingly identified with the country-wide 
growth in popular support for the ANC. Although historically the ANC was 
weak in the region , by 1985 a pro-ANC stance was widely evident in overt 
allegiance to the emblems, leaders and programme of the ANC. This was 
largely due to the existence of CAYCO and other UDF-affiliates in the 
region.111 
In the Eastern Cape, opposition to the new BLAs and proposed rent 
increases resulted in the revival of PEBCO and the formation of the Port 
Elizabeth Youth Congress (PEYCO) in June 1983 and the Uitenhage Youth 
Congress (UYCO) at the end of 1984. PEYCO was formed after "a small 
group of highly politicized educated unemployed youths, aged between 20 and 
26, and drawn from working class families, began to meet to discuss their 
109 
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political role in the community".1 12 UYCO, on the other hand, emerged to 
fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Uitenhage Black People's 
Organisation (UBCO) in 1983. 
PEYCO and UYCO rapidly established elaborate networks of organisation by 
the end of 1984. Leaders were drawn from the ranks of leaders of the 1976 
revolt and the 1980 school boycotts as well as from COSAS and were 
usually better educated than their followers. The primary constituents of these 
youth congresses were unemployed school-Ieavers with a tendency to 
concentrate on political campaigns. Both PEYCO and UYCO claimed a 
membership of one thousand card-carrying members in 1985.113 
PEYCO dominated community organisation in Port Elizabeth : "militant and 
increasingly engaged in physical confrontation with security forces , but lacking 
the tradition of democratic organisation of the unions".114 PEYCO organised 
the youth primarily around political issues as opposed to civic- or factory-
based issues. PEYCO's major objective was to provide the unemployed youth 
with a political home. Thus, in addition to mass meetings, PEYCO organised 
workshops to teach young people about the Freedom Charter, the meaning 
of the national liberation struggle, the causes of oppression and class 
exploitation, and methods of organisation. 115 
PEYCO played a key role in coordinating township struggles and was a 
prominent member of structures in the area. For instance, the congress often 
played the role of the local UDF area committee and acted as a reinforcing 
112 L b M ·t · a our Onl onng Group (1 985); op.cit., p.99. 
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mechanism in local UDF structures. In addition, PEYCO assisted other 
organisations in the townships, particularly women, the local UDF and defence 
committees. 
According to Swilling , UYCO, despite its name, became a civic, with support 
in the employed and the unemployed working class. 116 In addition, unlike 
other youth congresses, UYCO drew its membership from all age groups, 
thus making it the main community organisation in the city.117 The congress 
was strongest in Langa, where most of its members were squatters and 
others who resisted relocation to Kwanobuhle. It developed a sophisticated 
democratic grassroots structure based on street and area committees. At the 
apex of this structure was a township committee empowered to call meetings, 
formulate strategy and enter into negotiations. 
The Soweto Youth Congress (SOYCO) was formed in July 1983, becoming 
the third youth congress to be formed after the resolution taken by COSAS 
in 1982. SOYCO was initiated by former COSAS members when COSAS 
leaders appointed a core group of five people to organise the youth 
congress. This core group quietly recruited young people in church groups, 
dance groups, and soccer clubs. 118 The youth organisation transformed the 
nature of black resistance politics in Soweto by playing a significant role in 
marches, consumer boycotts, stayaways, and defiance campaigns.119 
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The Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO) was launched on 25 September 
1983.120 At the official launch, attended by approximately 200-300 people, 
a committee of eleven people was elected after the adoption of the constitu-
tion. Membership of AYCO was open to "all who fall with in the accepted 
definition of youth" , i.e., all young people between the ages of twelve and 
thirty-six years. The ages of founding members of the youth congress ranged 
from sixteen to twenty-four years old in 1984, and in 1986 the membership 
ranged in age from early teens to mid-thirties. Many of those involved in 
A YCO were former members of COSAS, as well as active COSAS members 
still in school. Many AYCO activists were children of working-class parents, 
and a number came from single-parent households. In 1985 many AYCO 
activists were in their early teens, and included young workers and the 
unemployed. 
The first AYCO General Council meeting, held at Wilgespruit in June 1984, 
was attended by approximately fifty people. In 1985, the organisation had 
approximately 100 paid-up and active members but it commanded much wider 
support in the township. In the wake of the "Six Day War" in 1986, the 
numbers of active AYCO supporters swelled into several hundred, and the 
number of young people engaged in "resistance" activity in the township into 
at least a thousand more. 
AYCO was also involved in a number of internal organisational activities, 
such as seminars, debates and workshops on political issues; sports events 
and symposiums with other youth congresses; and other contacts with like-
minded organisations and activists. In addition , AYCO was involved in political 
activity which was largely rooted in struggles taking place within Alexandra's 
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Congress Activists and the Freedom Charter, 1983-1985", in Journal of Southern African Studies 
(Vo1.17, No.2, June), pp.197-220. ' 
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schools. Finally, AYCO activists promoted a symbolic link with the banned 
ANC, while a number of AYCO activists were actively involved in under-
ground work.121 By the end of 1985, AYCO had become a significant 
political actor in the township. It had made a concerted effort to organise 
and educate its youth constituency by organising youth street-by-street and 
emphasizing the responsibility of youth activists in conscientising parents.122 
The Northern Transvaal UDF regional committee included 16 youth congress 
affiliates. These congresses, according to Lodge, had the most extensive and 
elaborate networks of all the region 's affiliates. The Steelpoort Youth Congress 
(STEYCO), for instance, claimed to have five branches located in the mining 
and cotton-farming communities on the eastern border of Sekhukhuneland. The 
congress played a central role in organising mine and farm workers in the 
area and in the Lebowa revolt of 1986. The congress also involved itself in 
more communal issues. For example, STEYCO members joined trade 
unionists to lead a campaign against a chrome mining firm that administered 
a company township.123 
At its launch SAYCO claimed just over half-a-million members in 1,000 local 
youth groupings. However, 
These figures are, by the nature of the organisation, virtually impossible to verify. The 
more efficient an organisation's adaptation to clandestinity, the more difficult it is to verify 
its claims - making exaggeration virtually compulsory for the few representatives out in 
the open.124 
In addition, SAYCO did not formally agree to sign up its membership with 
the result that it could only provide estimates. 
121 Ibid., pp.209-218. 
122 Jochelson,K. (1988) ; "People's power and state reform in Alexandra", in Work in Progress, 
(56/7, November/December), p.10. 
123 Lodge,T. (1991); op.cit., pp.119-120. 
124 "L . t I· . earning 0 Ive In the shadows", op.cit., p.13. 
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Furthermore, although SAYCO set out to establish ten regions, only five were 
formally launched and established full RECs. In these regions, SAYCO 
identified a number of highly populated areas which were unorganised. 125 
In the Southern Transvaal region , the national organiser identified 12 
unorganised residential areas. Thirty-nine unorganised areas were in the 
Eastern Transvaal while there were 46 unorganised residential areas in the 
Western Cape. 
Most of SAYCO youth congresses and branches were situated around cities 
and towns. The organisation acknowledged that very little organising was 
conducted in the rural areas of the Western Cape and the Southern 
Transvaal. This was largely due to the failure of regional structures to 
establish rural departments which were charged with organising rural areas. 
In addition, about 40 to 50 percent of SAYCO's local structures were 
interim.126 
The youth congresses which came together to form SAYCO differed vastly 
in their membership, ranging from small activist organisations, such as the 
Tumahole Youth Congress (TUYCO), to federations of several youth 
congresses, such as CAYCO and STEYCO. Within the organisation, there was 
no common understanding of what a branch should look like or what area 
it should cover. The Phalaborwa branch, for example, brought together youth 
in 40 residential areas and covered an area which should have been a 
zone.127 
125 
Document; SAYCO: Special National Central Executive Committee - Reports, 30 July - 1 August 
1990, p.14. 
126 L 'f ac.C/ . 
127 Ibid., p.12. 
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The definition of youth is so broad that it included any person between the 
ages of thirteen and thirty six years of age. The membership of the youth 
congresses consisted of young workers, school students and unemployed 
youth. In addition, SAYCa brought together members of trade unions, student, 
community and political organisations. 128 Since 1976, most young workers 
had experienced more than a decade of unprecedented militant resistance. 
Many of these workers came from the ranks of CaSAS and identified the 
activities of youth congresses as an extension of their student political 
activities. In addition, school students also participated in youth congresses, 
many of them combining membership in CaSAS. Finally, high failure and 
drop-out rates at schools, age-limit regulations at schools, and economic 
recession during the 1980s swelled the ranks of unemployed youth, which 
formed the major constituency of the youth congresses. 
According to Lodge, most of the leadership of the youth congresses came 
from the ranks of the former CaSAS activists, including a small number of 
veterans of the Soweto uprising. The leadership was also drawn from among 
the young, retrenched workers, sometimes with trade union experience. A few 
better-educated people also served in leadership roles. Mkuseli Jack, PEYCa 
president, was a hardware salesman; and in the Cape - according to Brenda 
Adams, a CAYCa activist - the leaders were "essentially middle class". 129 
In most cases, youth congresses were led by fairly well-educated unemployed 
youths or young employed skilled workers. 13o 
During the first year of its existence, SAYCa took up the Save the Patriots 
128 The New Nation, (2.4.87 - 8.4.87), p.1. 
129 Brenda Adams; "Building Working Class Power" , Ingaba va basebenzi (London) September 
1986, 32. Cited in Lodge,T. (1991); op.cit., p.37. ' 
130 Lodge,T. and SWilling,M. (1 986); "The year of the Amabutho", in Africa Report, (March-April). 
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Campaign (directed towards saving political prisoners on Death Row), a 
campaign to popularize the Freedom Charter, the unbanning of the ANC 
campaign, the unemployment campaign , and a literacy campaign. The youth 
organisation set out to assist COSATU in its efforts to organise "unemployed 
workers' associations". Such associations were also aimed at strengthening 
the alliance between the community organisations, including the youth, and 
COSATU. SAYCO also gave top priority to the struggle for a living wage 
and jobs for all in its programme of action for 1987. These campaigns were 
a mix of national political issues and issues which directly affected the 
organisation's core constituency. However, an Executive report submitted to 
a CEC meeting at the end of 1987 acknowledged the organisation's lack of 
success in these campaigns. 131 Most of the campaigns were not seriously 
taken up by regional and local structures of the organisation . 
Delegates at the inaugural conference in 1987 gave special attention to the 
intense repression in most regions of the country. The organisation gave top 
priority to the anti-vigilante campaign. It committed itself to initiating a 
campaign to counter the state indoctrination programmes at "education camps" 
and to resist attempts by the JMCs to co-opt youth leaders into government 
structures. 132 
SAYCO identified the lack of political education among the youth and 
widespread unemployment as major causes of the escalation of vigilante 
attacks on popular organisations. In order to overcome this problem, SAYCO 
structures set up a programme of political education at local, zonal , regional 
and national levels. According to a SAYCO activist, education departments 
were set up to engage members in political education on matters such as 
131 
Document; SAYCD Executive report presented at the 3rd CEC meeting, 22/12/87 . 
132 The New Nation, (2.4.87 - 8.4.87), p.1. 
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the Freedom Charter, "exchanging views about the youth 's understanding of 
the nature of South African society, the causes of exploitation and oppression 
and how the oppressed and exploited can change this sOciety" .133 
In addition to these national campaigns, regional and local affiliates of 
SAYCO participated in their own campaigns. For instance, the Northern 
Transvaal region campaigned to popularize SAyeO and the regional congress, 
engaged in anti-Bantustan and anti-independence campaigns, and campaigned 
for land rights, the release of political prisoners and childcare facilities. The 
youth congresses also set out to establish self-defence units to defend their 
organisations against attacks by vigilantes. In areas which were plagued by 
vigilante attacks, such as the Eastern Transvaal and Pietermaritzburg , self-
defence committees were established in major towns and villages. 
SAYCO's activities were adversely affected by the emergencies, detention of 
leaders and members, and the lack of resources. SA YCO intended to 
establish ten departments to implement, co-ordinate and give all-round 
direction to the organisation's membership and steering SAyeO properly. Only 
three departments functioned with some degree of success. Many sub-
committees or departments never got off the ground at regional , zonal and 
local levels. This was due, in large part, to the removal of layer after layer 
of leadership at all levels during the state of emergency. The continuous 
removal of the leadership meant that a number of regions were not 
constituted, or functioned ineffectively. 
The local youth congresses bore the brunt of repression during the 
emergencies. About eight thousand of the twenty-five thousand people arrested 
during the second half of 1986 were under the age of eighteen. By the 
133 "St . k' 
yeo IS wor Ing towards the people governing South Africa", in SASPU National , (Last Quarter, 
1987), p.4. 
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beginning of September 1987, 115 UDF affiliates - mainly civic associations 
and youth congresses - were affected by the detentions.134 In addition to 
the mass arrest of activists, the emergency led to the wholesale occupation 
of townships by the security forces, curfews, house-to-house searches and 
roadblocks. The occupation of the townships by the South African Police 
(SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF) led to daily clashes 
between young activists and the security forces in many parts of the country. 
These features of repression placed restrictions on the ability of youth 
congresses to hold meetings, distribute publications and generally mobilise 
their members. Meetings were held clandestinely, often without the recording 
of minutes, and secrecy and suspicion prevailed in youth organisations. 
However, the most devastating effects of repression occurred as a result of 
the removal of youth leaders from the townships. The executive committees 
of many congresses were depleted by detentions. The most dedicated and 
consistent activists were replaced by leaders which could not reconstitute the 
same levels of organisation and mobilisation and provide adequate leadership 
to the congresses. The new leaders often lacked the organisational and 
political skills of their predecessors. 
SA YCO acknowledged the poverty of political education amongst its 
membership. Very few branches or youth congresses understood what SAYCO 
was, let alone the basics of what an organisation was and what the struggle 
was all about. Most of the branch executive committees or local youth 
congress executive members had not seen most of the organisation's 
documents or had not read them at all. SA YCO members who were able 
"to articulate SAYCO or general debates" were "found in the NEC, RECs and 
134 
See Lodge,T. (1991 ); op.cit., pp.87-8. 
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very few BECs".135 This was a result of the absence of political education 
departments at regional and lower levels of the organisation , as well as the 
lack of resources and full-time education personnel to implement the 
programme on a day-to-day basis.136 
Despite these problems, the youth congresses played a central role in the 
struggle against apartheid. They were prominent in the education struggle, the 
rent, transport and consumer boycotts, campaigns against the new constitution, 
the Black Local Authorities, the struggles against forced removals and 
incorporation into the homelands, and homeland independence. They were 
also prominent in coordinating and sustaining popular campaigns and assisting 
other sectors such as women and the civics. 
In conclusion, the affiliates of the UDF that played the most significant role 
in promoting and expanding revolutionary consciousness and mass mobilisation 
and organisation were the student and youth organisations. Through CaSAS, 
SANsca and the youth congresses a large proportion of the youth 
assimilated a political consciousness and popular culture based on the 
rejection of, and opposition to, apartheid in general. Many of the features of 
the national political culture which became associated with the UDF were 
found in these organisations before the formation of the Front. They thus 
influenced both the direction in which the political tradition developed within 
the UDF and its spread throughout black civil society through their structures. 
The formation of CaSAS in 1979 was perhaps one of the most significant 
factors in the liberation struggle during the eighties. The student organisation 
was a major force in the popularization of the ANC within the country; in 
135 Document; SAYCO: Special National Central Executive Committee - Reports, 30 July _ 1 August 
1990, p.12. 
136 
Molekane,R. (1990); "NEC Report", in Mahlangu Detachment, (May 1990), p.14. 
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establishing "unity-in-action" with other progressive forces; and in the various 
popular struggles waged during the period under review. Former CaSAS 
members became leading activists in other progressive organisations -
SANSCa, youth congresses, trade unions, civic associations and women's 
organisations. 
Student and youth organisations played a very significant role in mass 
mobilisation and organisation and the development of revolutionary conscious-
ness and its spread in civil society leading to a shift in the balance of 
social forces towards the UDF. 
In the first place, student and youth organisations played a pivotal role in 
the development and spread of revolutionary consciousness in South Africa 
and in extending the political and ideological leadership of the UDF. In many 
respects, the student and youth organisations, and their principles and 
objectives presented a challenge to the dominant system. 
School boycotts have been a major feature of resistance to apartheid since 
1976. In the mid-1980s this developed as a challenge to apartheid when 
students ultimately developed their own conception of a unified and demo-
cratic system of education . People's Education was to be an alternative 
education, preparing students for political rule in post-apartheid South Africa. 
The 1981 Education Charter Campaign was seen as important because it 
would lead to a Charter which would be democratically formulated and so 
embody the minimum education demands of the people. A sustained school 
boycott, led by CaSAS and which began in 1983, focused on the demand 
for democratically elected SRCs, which was a direct challenge of the 
structure of control in schools. During the boycott students also began to 
look at strategic and tactical approaches to combat the inequalities in 
education. In 1985 student attitudes reflected a direct challenge to the 
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apartheid system after they adopted the slogan "Liberation now, Education 
Later!", and embarked on a wave of boycotts which led to the virtual 
collapse of African education. 
The demands of student and youth organisations also reflect a growing 
challenge to the dominant system. A two-day regional stayaway suggested by 
COSAS took place on 5-6 November, 1984 in the Transvaal and the 
organising committee included in its demands the withdrawal of the SADF 
and police from the townships; the resignation of all community councillors; 
and the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees. The 
declaration of the partial state of emergency in 1985 shifted the focus of 
student demands from issues such as democratically elected SRCs, griev-
ances regarding corporal punishment and age limit restrictions to a national 
focus on the release of detainees, the removal of troops from the townships, 
and the unbanning of political groups. In addition, school boycotts during 
1985 rendered the schools ungovernable, a process that mirrored that 
occurring in the townships following the collapse of local authorities, and led 
to a shift of objectives from reform of the educational system to control. 
AZASO also focused on the campaign for democratically elected SRCs and 
by the mid-1980s was challenging the "bush" character of the black 
universities. In 1987, the student organisation shifted the emphasis from the 
demand for SRCs to a call for the transformation of tertiary institutions into 
"Peoples Campuses". The establishment of committees of peoples power at 
all levels was seen as the foundations of peoples power and democratic 
control of campuses. 
COSAS became the first mass organisation to adopt the Freedom Charter 
since the crushing of internal resistance In the 1960s. In its guiding 
principles, COSAS declared that the ANC was the "authentic liberation 
movement" of South Africa, and called on the youth to plan their future 
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activities as a continuation of that tradition. In 1980, COSAS, together with 
NUSAS, played a central role in the ANC's Freedom Charter campaign. The 
organisation's long-term objective, the creation of a non-racial and democratic 
education system in a non-racial and democratic society presented a 
challenge to the apartheid system. Thus, the struggle for an alternative 
education system was identified as part of the broader struggle against 
oppression and exploitation. COSAS linked the struggle against corporal 
punishment, age restriction and the lack of democratically elected SRCs with 
the overall struggle against lower wages, high rents, bantustans, puppet town 
councils and lack of genuine political rights by the majority. 
AZASO's objectives were virtually similar to those of COSAS. It also 
committed itself to the struggle for a democratic society, free of exploitation 
and national oppression. In 1981 the organisation moved away from its Black 
Consciousness origins and committed itself to the Freedom Charter and co-
operation with COSAS. In addition, AZASO linked the education struggle to 
the broad national struggle for democracy. 
COSAS was one of the first mass based organisations to commit itself to 
united action with other community organisations. Beginning in 1980, students 
developed a close working relationship with workers, providing support for 
striking workers and calling on workers to support political campaigns. COSAS 
was also instrumental in the formation of youth congresses and of other 
community organisations. The shared experiences of apartheid domination and 
exploitation generated a sense of unity in struggle against the common 
enemy. This resulted in their total rejection of apartheid education and society 
as a whole. 
Of all the organisations reviewed here the student and youth organisations 
displayed the most advanced sense of class analysis and of socialist 
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consciousness. COSAS maintained that the emancipation of the working class, 
as the most exploited and oppressed class in society, will ensure the 
emancipation of society as a whole. The organisation recognised the limited 
role that students should play in the liberation struggle, a supportive role 
under the leadership of the working class. 
AZASO identified the working class as the key instrument to bring about the 
redistribution of power in South Africa and recognised its leadership in the 
struggle for liberation. In addition, AZASO spokesmen identified the leadership 
of the working class as the basis for realising socialism through the 
establishment of the democratic system enshrined in the Freedom Charter and 
its eventual deepening into socialism. SAYCO was overtly socialist in its 
objectives. The preamble of the constitution stipulated that the way to move 
beyond the stage of capitalism was through the national-democratic revolution. 
Thus, in this view, socialism could only be achieved through the national 
democratic-revolution, which involved alliances with other organisations under 
the leadership of the working class. 
Finally, student and youth organisations emphasized political education in their 
programmes. Their newsletters dealt with issues of importance to members 
of the organisations, with the anti-apartheid struggle in general and with other 
popular struggles abroad. In addition, student/youth organisations held 
educational workshops and forums which dealt with politically relevant issues, 
campaigns and strategies. 
However, there were limitations with regard to the extent to which these 
organisations were able to politicize their constituencies. COSAS, for example, 
despite becoming a mass organisation in 1984, had only a limited leadership 
fraction organised into structures with regular and disciplined activity. By 1985, 
however, students had responded to the popular slogan "Liberation Now, 
256 
Education Later!" and in their campaigns during that year committed 
themselves to the national-democratic struggle for liberation. Similarly, SAYCO 
acknowledged the poverty of political education and the lack of understanding, 
except among a relatively small leadership core, of what the organisation and 
the struggle was all about. At the very least, however, was the commitment 
among the youth to involvement in all aspects of struggle against the 
apartheid system. 
In the second place, the student and youth organisations played a vital role 
in mass mobilisation and organisation. Firstly, the initial basis for mass 
mobilisation and organisation in the schools were the glaring inequalities 
between the racially-based education systems and the resulting defects of 
African education in particular and black education in general. From the very 
beginning of its existence, CaSAS emphasized the organisation of students 
around issues affecting them. In consequence, most of the early activities of 
the organisation were focused on educational issues, including the Education 
Charter Campaign. However, after tensions arose between parents and 
students during the 1980 school boycott COSAS began organising students 
in various actions around community issues. Nevertheless, the main mobilising 
and organising tool for the student organisation until 1983 were issues which 
directly affected school students. 
Local structures of these organisations were also based on very small 
numbers, making it easy for students to establish a branch. For example, 
COSAS branch structures could be formed by a minimum of four students, 
while AZASa branches could be formed by ten or more students. In addition, 
CaSAS regional branches were formed in areas where three or more 
branches existed. 
The first youth congresses to emerge in 1983 focused on the organisation 
257 
of all youth in order to tackle their problems through united and collective 
action, and to develop a role for young people in their communities and in 
the broader democratic struggle. High failure and drop-out rates at schools, 
age-limit regulations at schools, and economic recession during the 1980s 
swelled the ranks of unemployed youth, which formed the major constituency 
of the youth congresses. Most youth congresses tended to concentrate on 
political campaigns which became the main organisational tool of the 
congresses. For instance, PEYCO organised youth around political issues as 
opposed to civic- or factory-based issues. 
The political campaigns student and youth organisations engaged in included 
campaigns against the BLAs, the tri-cameral parliament, homeland indepen-
dence, the threat of removals, state repression (the formation of defence 
committees), etc. However, youth congresses participated at the forefront of 
other campaigns which related to local material grievances, such as the rent 
boycotts (where the youth mobilised to resist evictions), and , in particular, the 
consumer boycotts and mass stayaways, which were largely enforced by 
youth congresses and (when coupled with school boycotts) student 
organisations. School boycotts also served as a major organisational tool 
where, for example, COSAS was able to generalise student demands from 
one area of the country to another during the sustained school boycott it led 
in 1984. 
The student and youth organisations extended their organisational role beyond 
that of organising the youth into student organisations and youth congresses. 
They also assumed responsibility for organising and conscientising their 
parents. This was directed towards the formation of street and area 
committees in the urban townships and rural villages. For instance, towards 
the end of 1985 the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO) played a central role 
in the formation of the Alexandra Action Committee (AAC). One of the 
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primary objectives of the youth congresses in the rural areas of the Northern 
Transvaal was the establishment of village committees while the local branch 
of AZASO (based at Turfloop) played a central role in establishing community 
organisations in the region. It was also a COSAS suggestion which led to 
the formation of youth congresses. 
The political leadership of these organisations is apparent in their support 
base and in the role they played in national, regional and local campaigns. 
COSAS, SANSCO, and SAYCO were the most significant student and youth 
structures of the internal resistance organisations. Their dominance in schools, 
universities and in local township and rural communities provided them with 
political and ideological leadership. 
During 1984 COSAS expanded from an activist group to a mass movement 
with a well-organised structure and branches in nearly fifty centres. At the 
time of its banning in 1985 COSAS had an estimated 3 million supporters. 
At the end of 1986 there were some 600 youth congresses countrywide and, 
at the time of its formation in March 1987, SAYCO claimed a membership 
of between 500,000 and 700,000 (and a support base of two million). 
SANSCO members were present in 67 branches at the end of the period 
of review. COSAS also played a leadership role in student campaigns and 
in certain community campaigns. The sustained school boycott which began 
in 1983 was led by COSAS and resulted in the virtual collapse of African 
education. COSAS also responded to the national call for a boycott of the 
elections for the tri-cameral parliament in 1984 by organising a school 
boycott, which was well supported by African, Indian and coloured students. 
The Transvaal Regional Stayaway in November 1984 was suggested by 
COSAS and it was supported by an over 400,000 students. 
Youth congresses were at the forefront of struggle in the urban townships 
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and rural villages. In Port Elizabeth, for example, PEYCO dominated 
community organisations and played a key role in co-ordinating township 
struggles until PEBCO was revived. It was also a prominent member of local 
structures in the area, and often played the role of the local UDF area 
committee and acted as a reinforcing mechanism in local UDF structures. 
UYCO emerged to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Uitenhage 
Black Civic organisation and dominated local township politics in the city. 
Youth organisations also transformed the nature of black resistance politics 
by playing a significant role in marches, consumer boycotts, stayaways, and 
defiance campaigns. They were prominent in the education struggle, the rent, 
transport and consumer boycotts, campaigns against the new constitution, the 
Black Local Authorities , the struggles against forced removals and incorpor-
ation into the homelands, and homeland independence. They were also 
prominent in coordinating and sustaining popular campaigns and assisting 
other sectors such as women and civics. 
Student/youth organisations played a prominent role in local structures of the 
UDF. In most regions, these organisations were strongly represented at area, 
zonal and regional levels and often acted as reinforcing mechanisms in the 
Front's organisational structures. In addition, 18 of the 62 leaders of the UDF 
regions in 1985 were drawn from student or youth organisations. Stu-
dent/youth organisations were also prominent in the numerous ad hoc inter-
organisational structures which coordinated local campaigns such as consumer 
boycotts and mass stayaways. 
The significance of student/youth organisations lay, however, in the ideological 
contribution they made in producing a generation of people who rejected 
apartheid society and were prepared to make sacrifices to destroy it. The 
commitment to non-racialism, democracy, unity-in-action with other progressive 
organisations, and a commitment to the ideals of the Freedom Charter were 
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introduced by these organisations. These principles soon spread to a large 
number of organisations which proliferated during the first half of the 1980s. 
Clearly, then, student and youth organisations played a central role in the 
political and ideological struggle to spread a revolutionary consciousness in 
the black suburbs and townships. These organisations played a role both in 
shaping the Front's ideology and spreading it in civil society through their 
capacity to mobilise, organise and politicize their communities. 
In essence, the youth were a major force in drawing support to the UDF. 
The leadership role played by the youth in various forms of resistance, their 
role in mass mobilisation and organisation, and the ideological contribution 
they made were central factors in establishing the hegemonic position of the 
UDF in black civil society. They played a central role in shifting the balance 
of social and cultural forces towards the UDF and in extending the latter's 
organisational and political leadership. Finally, all the student/youth 
organisations were strongly committed to establishing links with worker 
organisations and with worker leadership in the struggle. 
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Chapter 7 
DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
An important feature of South African society during the late 1970s and early 
1980s was the development of democratic1 trade unions and the growing link 
of trade union struggles (for independent organisation, recognition , wages, 
greater control over the conditions of production) with urban conflicts 
concerning education , rent, transport, housing, and the struggle for political 
rights. Equally important was the preoccupation of the democratic trade union 
movement with democratic practices that emphasize participation by the entire 
membership and rank and file control of the unions? 
During the 1980s, organised labour was increasingly drawn into highly 
politicised struggles around the terms of labour reproduction and opposition 
to apartheid . However, this process was charged with contradictions and 
conflicts within the .independent labour movement and was characterised by 
numerous debates on the political role of trade unions. In addition, the 
organisational and political strategies of the unions frequently clashed with the 
strategies of anti-apartheid and community organisations. 
In the middle of the decade, however, the unions and popular organisations 
were drawn closer together. The unions faced numerous pressures to take 
a direct political role while community organisations actively sought the 
support of organised labour in their organisations and activities. 
2 
Democratic trade unions are defined here as unions which were not affil iated to the white-led trade 
union federations (the so-called "parallel unions"). 
Lewis,J. (1986); "Aspects of the struggle: Trade Unions", in Monthly Review, (VoI.37, No.11 , April) , 
p.84. 
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Political unionism, although not new to South Africa, reached unprecedented 
heights during the second half of the eighties. One factor behind this 
development was the re-emergence of "political" or "community" unions during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. From their inception, these unions linked 
their workplace struggles to the struggles in the communities from which their 
members were drawn. During the second half of the eighties, the democratic 
trade union movement established formal links with community organisations 
and played a central role in popular struggles. This was largely due to the 
pressures of popular struggles in the townships, the demand for union 
involvement in popular struggles by union members, and the culture of 
community involvement established by the political unions. 
The focus in this chapter is on the role of the UDF trade unions in the 
political and ideological struggle to promote and expand revolutionary 
consciousness within the country and to increase participation in the national 
liberation struggle. These organisations developed (or incorporated) certain 
features of a revolutionary consciousness and focused on particular sectors 
of civil society, drawing them into the struggle for national liberation resulting 
in the spread of revolutionary consciousness inside South Africa. The 
emphasis here is on their principles and objectives and their role in mass 
mobilisation and organisation (with a focus on their organisational tactics and 
membership) in order to illustrate the main features of the revolutionary 
consciousness developed or incorporated by these organisations and the 
extent of their penetration of civil society. 
We begin with a brief examination of the democratic trade union movement 
during the period 1983-1987. Here the focus is on the differencess between 
FOSATU and the "UDF" unions. This is followed by an analysis of the 
formation, structure, membership and policies of selected unions which were 
affiliated to the UDF during the period under study. The focus is on five 
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major UDF unions: the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU), the 
Motor Assembly and Components Workers' Union (MACWUSA) , the General 
Workers' Union of South Africa (GWUSA), the General and Allied Workers' 
Union (GAWU), and the South African Railways and Harbours Workers' Union 
(SARHWU). Here a detailed analysis is provided of the nature and principles 
of these organisations to illustrate the main features of the revolutionary 
consciousness developed by the UDF unions. The membership of these 
unions illustrates their role in mass mobilisation and organisation . This 
analysis also reveals the type of democratic organisations which were 
emerging during the course of the struggle: their structures, practices and 
membership. Finally, we focus on COSATU's increasing involvement in political 
issues. 
7.2. Overview 
The 1980s was a period of rapid development of the democratic trade union 
movement,3 In 1981 the democratic trade unions were constituted into two 
federations, FOSATU and CUSA, and a group of unaffiliated unions with a 
membership of 60,000, 49,000 and 100,000 respectively. In 1985 these unions 
were constituted into three federations (COSATU with a paid-up membership 
of 454,749, CUSA with a membership of 180,000, and the Azanian 
Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU) with a membership of 79,230) and 
the unaffiliated unions with a total membership of 7,411 . By 1987 COSATU 
had increased its membership to 712,000 while the National Council of Trade 
Unions (NACTU), formed when CUSA merged with AZACTU, had 248,000 
members. This represents an increase of 751 ,000 in union membership over 
the six year period . 4 
3 
Refer to Chapter 3, pp.81 -2 and pp.85-6 above for an analysis of trade union development during 
the 1970s. 
4 
See ~av~es , R. et.~1. ~ 1988) ; The struggle for South Africa: A reference guide to movements, 
organisations and institutions, (VoI.2 , New Edition, London and New Jersey, Zed Books), pp.457-
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FOSATU, formed in April 1979, was the first major federation of democratic 
unions to be established in South Africa since SACTU was forced to 
disappear from the trade union scene in the early 1960s. Not long after its 
formation FOSATU experienced differences with other unions which remained 
outside of the federation . These differences were essentially over registration 
and participation in the Industrial Council system, and the relationship between 
economic and political struggles. These issues gave rise to polarisation and 
provoked intense debate within the democratic trade union movement. The 
first area of disagreement emerged in response to legislation arising from the 
Wiehahn Commission: over union registration and participation in the Industrial 
Councils system.s 
FOSATU's position on these two issues was taken in 1979 when it decided 
to apply for registration and to participate in the Industrial Councils system. 
Opposition to registration and participation in the Industrial Councils came 
largely from the General Workers Union (GWU) and the Black and Allied 
Workers Union (BAWU) and other newly emergent unions such as SAAWU.6 
Similarly, the unions which later joined the UDF all opposed registration and 
participation in government created structures, particularly the Industrial 
Councils. 
The FOSATU unions and the new trade unions also differed on the 
relationship between economic and political struggles. The formation of the 
UDF and the National Forum (NF) in 1983 added fuel to the debate 
S 
6 
464 and Randall ,E. (1 986); "Directory: South Africa's independent unions" in South African Labour 
Bulletin, (VoI.11 , No.3, January), pp.69-89. ' 
Refer to Chapter 3, pp.84-5 above. 
See ~onner,p . (1983); "Independent trade unions since Wiehahn", in South African Labour 
Bullet.rn, (Vol. 8, .N?,.4, February), and Fin~ , B . et.al. (1987) ; "Trade Unions and the State: The 
question ~f legality , rn Maree,J. (ed.); The rndependent trade union, 1974-1984: Ten years of the 
South African Labour Bulletin, (Johannesburg, Ravan Press). 
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following appeals by these mass-based organisations for trade union support. 
This debate gave rise to three stances on the issue. 
Firstly, there were those union which argued that the gains made by the 
independent trade unions in their struggles at the point of production would 
be lost if they participated in the broader political struggle. Secondly, certain 
unions maintained that they were willing to participate in political campaigns 
and support political organisations, but were not prepared to affiliate with any 
political organisation. A third grouping within the independent trade union 
movement, the so-called "political unions", committed themselves to active 
participation in the national liberation struggle, including affiliation with political 
organisations. 
The latter unions became increasingly involved in community struggles in the 
sphere of reproduction of labour while there was a reciprocal community 
support for striking workers . Community struggles were seen as aspects of 
the broader political struggle for national liberation. They contended that 
workers are tenants, commuters, parents, and consumers as well as the 
majority of the dominated and exploited classes. These unions argued that 
they had a common struggle with students and township residents and were 
therefore justified in joining the broad democratic front. In this respect, the 
political unions, particularly SAAWU, engaged in direct confrontation with the 
authorities.7 
For the political unions, the goal of struggle was national liberation and this 
could be achieved by uniting their struggles with all township struggles and 
partiCipating in the national democratic struggle as affiliates of the new 
7 
Webster,E. (1988); "The rise of social-movement unionism: The two faces of the Black Trade 
Union M~vement in South Africa", in Frankel ,P. et.al. (eds.); State, Resistance and Change in 
South Africa, (Johannesburg, Southern Book Publishers), p.189. 
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political organisations. Thus, narrow trade union interests were subordinated 
to the national political challenge of the dominant system. These unions thus 
presented a challenge to the dominant view held by the FOSATU unions. 
Although the UDF unions laid stress on the struggle for national liberation 
and the creation of a non-racial , democratic South Africa , they all laid 
emphasis on working class leadership in this struggle. Nowhere, however, do 
these unions explicitly state that they are struggling for the establishment of 
a socialist society. For the UDF unions, apartheid is seen as the central 
contradiction and national liberation and the establishment of a non-racial, 
democratic South Africa is seen as the primary and immediate objective. The 
older unions, by contrast, identified class as the central contradiction and 
viewed "racism and apartheid as a mask concealing capitalist exploitation". 
They thus counterposed the national democratic struggle and the class 
struggle for socialism. The only way to end capitalist exploitation and 
domination was through the struggle for socialism.8 
The "political unions" affiliated to the UDF when it was formed in August 
1983. They rejected registration and participation in the Industrial Council 
system and maintained strong links with other progressive organisations. The 
"UDF" unions were also "Charterist" in orientation and identified trade union 
struggles as an important component of the national liberation struggle, which 
included all other forms of popular struggle. 
The unions which affiliated to the UDF and the other more established 
unions differed significantly in their internal democratic practices and in their 
style of organisation . 
8 Refer to 8askin,J. (1991) ; Striking back: A history of Cosatu, (Johannesburg , Ravan Press), p.96. 
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The resurgence of black trade unionism in the wake of the 1973 strike wave 
was accompanied by rigorous state repression of the independent trade union 
movement. Survival for these unions meant the development of strong shop-
floor organisation accompanied by democratic worker control on the shop-floor. 
The lynch-pins of this organisational structure were the democratically-elected 
shop stewards and shop steward committees. These unions also placed 
emphasis on internal union democracy: shop steward accountability was 
ensured through the principles of mandates, report backs, and recal1.9 
By contrast, the "UDF" unions emerged in the late 1970s when industrial 
relations reforms coupled with a sharp economic upturn and an upsurge in 
township struggles provided uniquely favourable conditions for rapid union 
growth. These unions were able to make rapid increases in recruitment 
because of their success in winning material gains for workers during the 
economic upswing. In addition, support for these unions spread because they 
organised through strike waves and mass 
These organisational methods resulted in 
meetings in the townships.10 
a number of limitations in 
organisational structure and democratic practices. 
Firstly, the rapid gains in signed-up membership made by these unions were 
not accompanied by consolidation on the factory floor. Shop-floor structures 
and branch executives were generally weak resulting in weak linkages 
between the rank-and-file membership and the union leadership. The specific 
grievances of workers could not be adequately taken up because factory and 
9 
10 
Mar~e,J . (1987); "Overview: Emergence of the independent trade unions", in Maree,J. (ed.); 
Op.Clt., p.5 and Bonner,P. (1983); op.cit., p.31 . 
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union branch meetings were open to the rest of the public.
11 
With the 
onset of the recession in mid-1982, weaknesses in this method of organising 
workers began to show. In the face of retrenchments and mounting state 
attacks, all experienced a loss of factory membership and a weakening of 
worker participation in union activities.12 
Secondly, a major means of recruitment were mass meetings in the 
townships resulting in a particular form of democratic practice: "mass 
participatory democracy". In practice, mass participatory democracy involved 
taking union decisions at mass rall ies. However, mass participatory democracy 
gave workers few opportunities to speak, the presence of non-unionists could 
affect workers' willingness to raise issues which did not concern others and 
personality cults could develop because of the scope for powerful oratory by 
union officials. 13 
In addition, the officials of most of the newer unions were full-time officials: 
in the older unions they were workers. The older unions suspected that 
officials had a greater say than the workers they represented in the new 
unions. 14 In some of the newer unions, tensions between full-time officials 
often led to divisions in the entire union. Both SAAWU and MACWUSA, for 
example, experienced internal leadership crises which led to fractures and the 
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The "UDF" trade unions and the older unions differed significantly in their 
style of organisation . Firstly, the former unions emphasised regional 
organisation, while the latter group emphasised national organisation . Secondly, 
the UDF unions organised workers without any consideration of the economic 
sector while the older unions placed an emphasis on organising in a single 
industry.16 
Most of the older unions established a national presence with some having 
branches in all the major industrial centres. The "UDF" unions, by contrast, 
were regionally based, tending to organise in a particular township or area 
rather than nationally. Most of these unions were small new organisations 
with a presence in no more than one township and an organised member-
ship restricted to a small number of factories. 
The older unions tended to organise workers within specific industrial sectors. 
One of the advantages of organising on an industrial basis is the opportunity 
it opens for industry-wide bargaining . More importantly, unions representing 
large numbers of workers in one industrial sector have strong bargaining 
positions in industrial relations structures. In addition, industrial unions have 
the effect of uniting workers who are racially, residentially and regionally 
divided but occupy similar positions within production. 17 
By contrast, the "UDF" unions were all general unions - that is , open to 
workers from all sectors of the economy. Concentrating In one area, most 
"UDF" unions recruited membership regardless of the industrial sector 
concerned. This trend towards general unionism was also promoted by the 
practice of recruiting at mass rallies in the townships. 
16 
See Hindson,D. (1984); op.cit., pp.93-4. 
17 
Ibid., p.101 and Bennet,M. (1986); "The ins and outs of COSATU: The new state of the Unions" 
in Indicator SA, (Vo1.3 , No.4, Autumn), p.6. ' 
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Hindson points to three weaknesses in the form of general-unionism practised 
by the "UDF" unions.18 Firstly, such "unions find it difficult to unite with 
other unions, whether industrial or general, because they are actually or 
potentially in competition with all unions over all workers , organised or 
unorganised". Secondly, "the regional-general unions have gained followings 
mainly in townships which are racially and ethnically homogeneous and 
principally it seems amongst settled urban workers". Finally, the general 
unions tended to fracture because of the weak links between union members 
and officials and between factories organised by the union . 
Initially, the UDF unions were preoccupied with mass mobil isation rather than 
internal worker control of the unions or organisational practices that 
encouraged strong unions. The objective was to draw as many people as 
possible into these structures and/or their activities, including township 
residents who were not members of the unions. 
The organisational and policy differences between the old (FOSATU) unions 
and the newer unions surfaced during the "unity" talks which preceded the 
formation of COSATU. The thirteen meetings held in four years of talks 
between August 1981 and June 1985 were characterised by "debates over 
issues of registration , industrial demarcation, participation in industrial councils, 
when the federation should be launched, its form and voting structure, 
financing , affiliate voting strength, the role of paid officials, relations with the 
international trade union movement, and the role of whites".19 The following 
is an analysis of the formation, structure, membership and policies of 
selected unions which were affiliated to the UDF. 
18 
Hindson,D. (1984); op.cit., p.93. 
19 
Carrim,Y. (1987); op.cit., p.6. 
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7.3. The South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) 
7.3.1. Formation 
SAAWU was formed in March 1979 at the National Conference of BAWU 
held in Durban. A split developed in BAWU between supporters of BC 
philosophy (mainly the Johannesburg and Newcastle branches) and supporters 
of non-racialism (the Durban and East London branches) . Differences also 
arose over the representation of the union overseas and charges of financial 
mismanagement. The National Conference decided to expel the Johannesburg 
and Newcastle officials and changed the name of the trade union 
organisation to SAAWU. 
From the outset SAAWU was a general union and organised workers in the 
metal, building, food , motor, electrical , rubber, plastic, chemical , printing , 
distribution, municipal , power stations, railways , health , transport, furniture, 
education, services, paper, and wood sectors into 23 "sub-unions". The long-
term aim of the union was to form a federation and to develop affiliates 
along industrial lines. In 1981 the Natal-based National Federation of Black 
Workers split from BAWU and joined SAAWU adding a further 26 affiliates 
to SAAWU.20 SAAWU was originally based in Durban but moved its head 
office to East London in 1980. The union had affiliates in the Transvaal and 
in 1984 it began organising in the Western Cape. In 1984 SAAWU shifted 
its headquarters to Johannesburg following a split in the union. 
7.3.2. Policies and Objectives 
In broad terms, SAAWU's principles and policies were: a commitment to 
mass participatory democracy, non-racialism, and non-participation in 
government-instituted structures; a belief that the lines of struggle in South 
Africa were based on class terms; and a belief that there was no distinction 
20 D . R aVles, . et.a!. (1988); op. cit. , p.337. 
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between the trade union economic struggle and the broader struggle for 
national liberation. 
SAAWU was a non-racial trade union committed to mass participatory 
democracy. It emphasised the need for workers to directly control trade 
unions behind the twin principles of "mass participatory democracy" and 
"collective leadership". 21 I n principle, mass participatory democracy involved 
rank and file participation in decision-making at mass rallies in their areas. 
This commitment to mass participatory democracy was not restricted to the 
shopfloor. It included the participation of members of the community, 
particularly in Mdantsane, where union members and members of the 
community jOintly participated in SAAWU-organised mass rallies . The aim here 
was to draw as many people as possible into trade union struggles, while 
drawing workers into the struggles of the community. 
SAAWU also considered itself to be a part of the community and it 
participated overtly in community struggles. Union officials frequently appeared 
on public platforms with leaders of community organisations and expressed 
solidarity with their objectives. SAAWU officials became regular speakers at 
political rallies: the union's president Thozamile Gqweta addressed the meeting 
which revived the Transvaal Indian Congress in 1983. 
In addition, SAAWU's officials played a leading role in various campaigns 
against apartheid. For instance, in 1981 Njikelana took part in the anti-
Republic Day campaign when he visited Johannesburg to enlist support for 
a boycott of Wilson-Rowntree products.22 The Wilson-Rowntree boycott also 
gave further impetus to closer co-operation between the union and community 
21 
Davies,R. et.a!. (1988); op.cit., p.338. 
22 
Friedman,S. (1987); op.cit .. p.461 . 
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groups. Community organisations and student groups, for example, CaSAS, 
formed support committees in response to the boycott cal1. 23 
The organisation was also seen as a force through which to obtain political 
rights. As such, SAAWU committed itself to the establishment of a non-racial 
democracy in South Africa. As Maree pointed out: "SAAWU takes up a 
position on political matters more overtly and explicitly than other independent 
unions. It has demanded that black workers be granted political rights".24 
From the outset SAAWU had explicitly committed itself to linking trade union 
struggles with the political struggle and in 1980 became the first union to 
call for one-man-one-vote and the release of political prisoners. 
SAAWU identified the leading role of the working class in the political 
struggle in the following terms: 
South Africa's future is in the hands of its workers - only the workers in alliance with all 
other progressive-minded sections of the community can build a happy life for all South 
Africans. But workers should be the vanguard.25 
SAAWU stressed the class nature of South African politics, as well as its 
non-racialism, as follows : 
We are aware that workers see the bosses as white and we must show them that bosses 
are people that are exploiting them. Quite a sizeable number of blacks are becoming 
employers and people must not see them as our brothers ... people must not be fooled just 
because they are black - they are exploiters.26 
In principle, SAAWU claimed to be a non-racial trade union . However, the 
overwhelming majority of its membership was African . SAAWU failed to recruit 
workers from other race groups, particularly in East London. The 1981 
23 
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Wilson-Rowntree strike was crushed largely because of the failure of the 
union to recruit the company's coloured workers?7 SAAWU began to 
organise coloured workers in September 1984 when it set out to establish 
a base in the Western Cape. A successful strike by coloured workers in 
1985 at Continental China's Blackheath plant secured the recognition of the 
union.28 
In early 1979 the government presented the Wiehahn recommendations on 
labour laws in the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill to Parliament for 
consideration. SAAWU, which was less than two months old , joined the 
protest against the Bill. SAAWU secretary Samuel Kikine said the Bill would 
deprive a large number of blacks of their right to join trade unions because 
migrant workers and commuters were excluded from the definition of workers, 
would prevent unregistered unions from operating , and extended government 
control over black trade unions. The union, which drew most of its 
membership from the KwaZulu townships of Umlazi and KwaMashu at the 
time, was one of the unions which would have been affected by the 
exclusion of migrants and commuters.29 
SAAWU vigorously rejected registration as well as participation in the 
Industrial Council system. It saw registration as part of "all those draconian 
laws which amount to genocide against the working class, and the black 
workers in particular. We can't participate in our own exploitation and 
oppression".30 However, as an unregistered union SAAWU could not 
27 
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participate in the Industrial Council system. 
In 1983, SAAWU was the foremost political union in the Eastern Cape and 
the leading progressive organisation in East London. At the launching 
conference of the Border region of the UDF in Grahamstown on October, 15, 
1983, SAAWU affiliated to the Front. A union member, Bangumzi Sifingo, was 
elected vice-president of the regional executive. At its April 1984 national 
congress the union decided that all its branches should affiliate to regional 
structures of the UDF.31 General secretary Sisa Njikelana explained that: 
this is a matter of constitutional commitment, it's not a matter of convenience. We have 
no fears of being "swamped" by the UDF because we feel we can work out safety 
catches. The most obvious of these is to develop quality leadership. If the quality of the 
leadership in the union is weak, then yes, it will happen. The onus is on us to develop the 
links between the problems of the factory floor and community problems.32 
SAAWU's principles and policies together took the form of a challenge of the 
dominant apartheid system. They involved a commitment to mass mobilisation 
and organisation through the principle of mass participatory democracy, and 
a rejection of government-sponsored institutions for workers, and they linked 
the economic struggle of workers to the political struggle for democracy. In 
addition , SAAWU, like the student organisations which existed before the 
formation of the UDF, identified the need for unity-in-action with other 
progressive forces in the struggle for democracy. 
7.3.3. Structure and Membership 
At the lowest level of the union's structure was the workers ' committee. A 
workers' committee was established after more than sixty percent membership 
was achieved at a plant. Each department In the plant elected a shop 
steward , and the shop stewards, together with an elected CEC, made up the 
31 




workers' committee. The CEC negotiated with management while the shop 
stewards were the links between the workers and the CEC. The chairman 
and secretary of the CEC from each plant in the region , together with a 
Branch Executive Committee, made up the Branch Committee. The overarch-
ing authority was the NEC, consisting of a president, vice-president, general 
secretary, an under-secretary and treasurer.33 
SAAWU was a general union with branches in Natal, the Transvaal and East 
London. The organisational practices it inherited from BAWU as well as 
conditions in East London particularly lent themselves to this type of 
organisation . The organisations which developed in the area during the 
second half of the 1970s did so under the auspices of the Black People's 
Convention , with its strong community orientation. SAAWU inherited this 
emphasis on the community and began to organise people who were working 
in a variety of different factories and industries, but who lived in the same 
township. 
SAAWU's organisational activities in East London were confined largely to 
workers from Mdantsane. Mdantsane served as a labour reservoir for the East 
London area with most of its African workforce concentrated there. "Given 
these circumstances, and the appallingly high level of unemployment prevalent 
in the area, there was an obvious logic to establishing a general union, to 
emphasising strong community links, and ultimately to forming an unemployed 
workers union."34 The Natal and Transvaal branches of the union also 
inherited their organisational practices from BAWU and functioned as general 
unions as well. 
33 
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In principle, SAAWU intended re-constituting itself as an industrial federation 
by establishing regional and provincial committees that would function as 
intermediate structures between the branch executive committees and its 
national executive committee. 35 SAAWU's stated aim was to organise and 
unite workers employed in various industries and group them according to the 
nature of the work they were engaged in and thereby establish industrial 
unions, under the auspices of SAAWU as their national federation .36 The 
union never succeeded in achieving this aim. 
Local conditions in East London also influenced SAAWU's organisational 
practices. Firstly, its links with the community, in particularly Mdantsane, led 
to a reliance on mass meetings to refer decisions taken by the Branch 
Committee to the workers. Mass meetings appeared to be an appropriate way 
of communicating with the rank-and-file because of the union's participation 
in local community struggles. Secondly, since membership was confined 
largely to a single township , union organisers boarded buses and trains to 
and from Mdantsane, and during this journey union songs were sung, the 
functions of the union were explained and the union's address was distributed 
to commuters.37 Thus, the general-union form of organisation did have some 
advantages for mass organisation . It made recruitment easy. In addition, it 
drew the local community into trade union struggles while drawing workers 
into community struggles. 
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structure and practices. First, the highest union committees lacked worker 
majorities and were made up largely of union officials. The workers played 
a very limited role in the decision-making bodies with the shop stewards 
given an inferior role vis-a-vis the CEC. Secondly, decisions which were 
taken by the higher bodies passed through several layers before they were 
referred to the shop-floor members for ratification. Finally, mass meetings 
were an inadequate means of ensuring mass participatory democracy because 
of the limited opportunities they provided for ordinary workers to ask 
questions or voice their concerns.38 
SAAWU's initial membership was drawn largely from Durban, particularly the 
KwaZulu townships of Umlazi and KwaMashu. Two months after its formation 
in March 1979 the union claimed a membership of 12,000.39 Although 
SAAWU originated in Natal and had a small presence in the Transvaal, it 
experienced its most spectacular growth in East London . By July 1981 , 
SAAWU had a signed up membership of 20,000 and a paid-up membership 
of 5,000 in this area.40 Its membership was furnished from almost every 
working-class occupational subdivision of East London and the surrounding 
areas. 
In November 1980 the union won its first major victory when it signed a 
recognition agreement with Chloride (SA) , despite its unreg istered status. In 
the following year, SAAWU signed a recognition agreement with Johnson and 
Johnson, and was given informal recognition by 7 other firms. These 
successes were partially responsible for the rapid increase in the union's 
38 
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membership in East London up to the end of 1981 .41 
SAAWU was to experience a number of setbacks in the next few years. In 
1981 , despite the success it achieved in some areas, its membership was 
eroded by the dismissal of 1,100 striking workers from Wilson-Rowntree, and 
the dismissal of SAAWU members after four other strikes were crushed. 
Simultaneously, SAAWU experienced a mounting onslaught from the Ciskeian 
and South African security forces in which numerous workers were arrested 
and officials were repeatedly detained .42 In 1983, a bus boycott by workers 
and residents of Mdantsane provoked a massive wave of repression by the 
Ciskeian authorities. A state of emergency was declared on 3 August, and 
hundreds were arrested and charged with a variety of offenses rang ing from 
arson and public violence to breaking emergency regulations. In an effort to 
break the boycott the entire leadership of SAAWU was detained and in 
September the union was banned in the Ciskei.43 
At a national conference held in Soweto in April 1984 a clash between the 
East London branch of SAAWU on the one hand, and the Natal and 
Transvaal branches on the other, resulted in the expulsion of general 
secretary Sam Kikine, and executive members Herbert Barnabus and Isaac 
Ngcobo. All three had been suspended from their position by the union 
management committee in February and none attended the conference. The 
main reason for the disagreement between the two groups appears to have 
related to SAAWU's role in , and subsequent expulsion from , the union unity 
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at the conference the union resolved to commit itself to a programme geared 
towards the establishment of industrial unions - one of the requirements set 
by other unions for participation in the talks.44 
Two factions of SAAWU emerged, both laying claim to the name and to 
union property and records. In the wake of the expulsions, the new executive 
announced that it would move its head office from its East London base to 
Johannesburg. It also succeeded in having Kikine and Ngcobe removed from 
the union's Durban offices, forcing them to hand over the keys and any 
union property, and preventing them from acting as SAAWU members.45 
Such fractures were common to the newly formed unions, arising largely from 
divisions between full-time officials. 
At the 1984 annual conference the union claimed a membership of about 
100,000 in eighteen branches compared with 50,000 in 2 branches (East 
London and Durban) in 1980. These branches were spread across the 
Eastern Cape (4), Natal (10) and Transvaal (4) .46 However, Estelle Randall 
found that at the end of 1985, SAAWU's membership had declined drastically, 
with a total membership of 27,000 and a paid-up membership of 25,032.47 
This decline was largely due to the split in the union, as well as a country-
wide recession which reached its zenith during the mid-eighties. 
In November 1986 the two factions of the union settled their differences and 
re-united . This followed an agreement in 1985 that an order, forbidding Kikine 
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and Ngcobe from entering SAAWU offices or acting as SAAWU members, 
should be scrapped. All other court action against Kikine was also with-
drawn.48 However, prior to the re-unification conference, another dissident 
group emerged which claimed that they were unhappy with the leadership 
and political direction of SAAWU.49 
SAAWU reached its organisational peak during the early years of the UDF. 
It thus represented the inclusion within the UDF of a mass-based trade union 
organisation , with extensive support particularly in the East London area. 
However, leadership problems and the economic situation in the country 
adversely affected its ability to reta in its membership throughout the period 
of review. 
The formation of COSATU in December 1985 ushered in a transformation of 
the independent trade union movement which particularly affected SAAWU. 
From the outset COSATU aimed to organise workers along industrial lines 
as opposed to the general form of unionisation characterised by SAAWU and 
most other UDF unions. As this process unfolded SAAWU lost its member-
ship to other COSATU affiliates until its dissolution in 1987. SAAWU 
members were drawn into the Food and All ied Workers' Union (FAWU), 
formed on 30 May 1986; the Construction and Allied Workers ' Union (CAWU), 
formed in January/February 1987; the National Education , Health and Allied 
Workers' Union (NEHAWU), formed on 27-28 June 1987; the South African 
Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU), launched on 24-25 October 1987; and 
the TGWU. 
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7.4. Motor Assembly and Components Workers' Union of South Africa 
(MACWUSA) and the General Workers' Union of South Africa (GWUSA) 
7.4.1. Formation 
MACWUSA was the only UDF union which organised workers in one 
industrial sector - the motor industry sector. It initially restricted its organising 
activities to one area - Port Elizabeth. MACWUSA subsequently established 
branches in Pretoria and Uitenhage. The union was formed in October 1980 
in the wake of Port Elizabeth's Ford Motor Company strike. Striking workers 
formed a Ford Workers' Committee, which subsequently broke away from 
NAAWU over the latter's handling of the strike. 
NAAWU was formed in 1980 by the merger of three auto workers' unions, 
the National Union of Automobile and Rubber Workers of South Africa 
(NUMARWOSA), the United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers' Union 
(UAW), and the Western Province Motor Assembly Workers' Union (WPMAWU). 
NUMARWOSA was a TUCSA-affiliated union of coloured workers in the Port 
Elizabeth-Uitenhage automobile and components plants. NUMARWOSA formed 
UAW in September 1973 to organise the increasing number of African auto 
workers. By the late 1970s, the UAW had grown into a national union with 
branches in Port Elizabeth , Uitenhage, Pretoria and Durban.50 
The 1979 Ford Motor workers strike is well documented and a brief summary 
of the major events will suffice. 51 The strike began on the 31 October 1979 
at the Ford Struandale Cortina assembly plant. Seven hundred workers 
walked out in protest over the forced resignation of Thozamile Botha, 
50 
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president of PESCO. The striking workers demanded the unconditional 
reinstatement of Sotha. The UAW played a limited role in the three-day strike 
which ended with the reinstatement of Sotha. The union argued that it could 
not be involved in the strike because it was a community issue. The striking 
workers, on the other hand, accused the UAW leadership of siding with the 
management. 
A second strike at the plant on the 13th November was provoked by a 
strike threat by white workers. Three hundred African workers downed tools 
and presented a list of grievances to management which they demanded be 
resolved by November 21 . Sefore the ultimatum expired , however, industrial 
conflict in Port Elizabeth spread beyond the plant. On the 21 November, 
African workers in the plant walked out before the 12.00 p.m. deadline in 
protest against the dismissal of 9 workers a day or two earlier. Management 
responded by dismissing all the striking workers . 
The UAW had established a strong shop floor presence at the Struandale 
plant but its contact with the workers was "relatively superficial and 
formalistic".52 In addition , PESCO's role in the strike challenged the UAWs 
authority and representativeness in its own stronghold. Ideological and political 
differences added to the tension between the two organisations.53 At a 
meeting of about 300 of the dismissed workers on November 23, the workers 
criticised the union for not playing a more active role during the strike. The 
workers also elected a PESCO-affiliated "committee of seven" to negotiate 
with Ford for their reinstatement.54 This committee, led by Sotha, became 
52 
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known as the Ford Motor Committee. 
The first meeting between the Ford Motor Committee and management on 
January 9 led to an agreement to reinstate all workers at the same rate of 
pay. This success increased the Committee's importance as a negotiating 
party for workers at the plant. 55 The increasing prestige of the Ford 
Workers Committee, as well as the workers' dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the UAW, prompted the Committee to call a mass meeting. 
The meeting dismissed the UAW leadership. However, only workers at the 
Ford plant were present because the Committee failed to inform the other 
factories. Consequently, the rest of the union membership rejected its 
decisions because it was both unrepresentative and unconstitutional. The Ford 
workers then split from the UAW and formed MACWUSA. 56 
Soon after its formation , MACWUSA was approached by workers in various 
other industries in Port Elizabeth with requests for help in organising 
themselves. MACWUSA's links with PESCO, and the popularity of the latter, 
was largely responsible for these requests. Given that its organisational 
activities were confined to the motor industry, MACWUSA then formed 
GWUSA in May 1981. GWUSA was also based mainly in the Eastern 
Cape.
57 
The union was formed as a general union along the lines of 
SAAWU in East London and adopted similar organisational practices. 
7.4.2. Policies and Objectives 
MACWUSA and GWUSA maintained close links with PESCO and soon 
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African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU) , GAWUSA, and 
BMWU.58 These relationships both influenced and symbolised the policies 
and objectives of the two unions. These included a commitment to the 
principles of mass participatory democracy and collective leadership, rejection 
of government-sponsored institutions for workers , a commitment to the struggle 
for democracy and worker leadership in this struggle, non-racialism, and a 
commitment to the union's involvement in political struggle in cooperation with 
other community organisations. 
In a joint statement issued by the unions outlining their reasons for joining 
the UDF they stated that: 
It is our standing policy that our unions will co-operate with any organisation if it is 
relevant to our principles and beliefs. Our workers feel that they must have a say in all 
progressive organisations in order to strengthen the struggle. Broad and effective unity 
still has a long way to go. Workers must not be isolated from the progressive movement. 
We must strive for a non-racial society with church, youth and community organisations, 
such as those found in the UDF.59 
Both unions played an important role in local UDF structures. MACWUSA 
officials, for instance, were key leaders of the UDF in Uitenhage, while both 
unions had members on the first Port Elizabeth UDF executive. MACWUSA 
participated in local UDF campaigns, for example, the March 1985 stayaways 
in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage which were opposed by local FOSATU 
affiliates. MACWUSA, being the most significant trade union affiliate of the 
UDF in both Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, often had officials at meetings 
of other local UDF affiliates. In addition, MACWUSA meetings were often 
attended by leaders of UDF-affiliated organisations.60 
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Stemming from a civic organisation rooted in the African community, 
MACWUSA and GWUSA concentrated on mobilising on community issues 
such as rents and transport. This was justified by Dennis Neer, the general 
secretary of both unions, in the following terms: " ... workers , before they are 
workers, are members of the community and MACWUSA sees to those 
needs" .61 Consequently, the unions drew a direct relationship between 
factory-based issues and those affecting the community, and used the latter 
as a means of mobilising support from workers. 
7.4.3. Membership and Structure 
The organisational base of both unions was centred around Port Elizabeth. 
MACWUSA established branches in Uitenhage and Pretoria but its strongest 
support came from the Ford plant in Port Elizabeth. GWUSA, on the other 
hand, had branches in Port Elizabeth , East London and Pretoria and 
functioned as a general union organising in the chemical , leather, retail , 
building, textiles, and maintenance sectors. MACWUSA claimed a membership 
of 10,000 in 1983 but its membership at the end of 1985 was 3,100. 
GWUSA had 5,000 members at the end of 1985.62 
By contrast, NAAWU, a FOSATU affiliate - had a strong shopfloor presence 
in the Eastern Cape's motor industry. In 1982, the union had approximately 
10,000 members in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area. NAAWU conducted a 
sustained militant campaign for a living wage in that year. MACWUSA 
members scabbed on NAAWU strikers, intensifying tensions between the two 
unions. 
In the wake of the highly successful UDF-initiated "Black Weekend" stayaway 
61 
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in Port Elizabeth on the 16 and 17 March 1985, MACWUSA stepped up 
efforts to woo workers at key NAAWU factories. However, the union had 
misread worker sentiment in the area. Widespread support for the stayaway 
by workers did not mean support for the organisations calling the action, or 
agreement with their general policies and practices. MACWUSA failed to make 
~eadway on the factory floor, and NAAWU members remained committed to 
the union during the wave of strikes which began after the stayaway.63 
At the beginning of 1986, NAAWU's membership was 11 ,581 while 
MACWUSA had 3,100 members in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage region. 
MACWUSA had 700, 650 and 250 members at the Ford Cortina plant, 
General Motors and Firestone respectively. MACWUSA'S workers were also 
scattered among seven other motor assembly or components plants in Port 
Elizabeth and Uitenhage.64 
MACWUSA also planned to launch an Unemployment Association to cater for 
unemployed workers. According to the union's national organiser: 
The main object of the Association will be to keep up the morale of unemployed workers 
and to enlighten them about the economic situation in the country, to explain that the 
reason why the jobs are not there is that they (employers - GH) are not keen to create 
them.65 
Although MACWUSA professed a strong non-racial stance, it showed little 
disposition to recruit motor workers from other racially segregated commun-
ities. MACWUSA objected to coloured or white leadership in its ranks and 
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number of coloured workers are employed.66 This situation provided 
employers with the opportunity to divide workers along racial lines, particularly 
during strikes. 
Both MACWUSA and GWUSA relied on workers' committees as their basic 
units of organisation.67 Each workers' committee comprised a chairperson, 
secretary, treasurer and shop stewards. The number of shop stewards 
depended on the size of the factory and the number of members in each 
firm. These were weak shopfloor structures and accounted for the decline in 
membership as the economic recession took its toll on weakly organised 
unions. 
MACWUSA also experienced a leadership crisis in 1984. Five top executive 
members, including top unionist Government Zini , were stripped of their 
membership in May. The expulsions occurred after months of speculation that 
the union was splitting up and that a new motor union would be estab-
lished.68 
In sum, the two unions were unable to develop a strong shopfloor presence 
in the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage areas during the period under review. 
This was due in part to their weak shop floor structures, leadership problems 
and their links with PEBCO and the Uitenhage Black People's Civic 
Organisation (UBCO) and other UDF organisations in the two towns. 
Recession, the threat of fracture, and mounting repression as the state 
cracked down on progressive organisations from mid-1985 all contributed to 
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the decline of these unions. 
7.5. General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU) 
GAWU was founded in 1980 after a split from BAWU, leading to the 
disintegration of the latter in the Transvaal. The union was established as 
a coordinating body for workers in the Transvaal. GAWU organised workers 
in the transport, building , engineering, services, and local government sectors. 
Although GAWU was a general union, it organised several industrial unions 
such as brush, copper, mining houses, cleaners, scooter drivers , petrol and 
transport.69 
In 1984 the union had branches in Johannesburg , Krugersdorp , Kuruman and 
Vryburg . Unions affiliated to GAWU included SARHWU, the South African 
Mine Workers' Union (SAMWU) and the South African Scooters Drivers Union 
(SASDU). In the Kuruman area, GAWU concentrated on organising the mines, 
furnishing and municipal workers. In Vryburg , membership of the union was 
drawn largely from food and municipal workers .70 
GAWU was committed to the formation of industrial unions which were seen 
as the form of organisation which guaranteed efficiency compared to general 
unionism. The union acknowledged, however, that restructuring on industrial 
lines was a long process. It argued that unions experience interruptions, 
some coming from the government, in their operations. In addition , other 
problems which relate to material and human resources affected the process 
of restructuring making it difficult for the organisation to form industrial 
69 
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unions.71 
In terms of the constitution the union was non-racial, thus membership was 
open to all workers. The union's membership was 20,620 in 1983 but grew 
to 34,000 at the end of 1985.72 GAWU described its policy as "one of mass 
participatory democracy and collective leadership. The members must under-
stand what trade unionism is, and , as members, participate in the leadership 
of the union". It rejected registration on the grounds that: "The state is 
against all progressive trade unions and still relies on the same means as 
it did with SACTU in the past".73 Registration was thus seen as a means 
of controlling trade unions and, in particular, restricting them from political 
activities. 
GAWU identified economic exploitation as the essential problem in South 
Africa. However, the specific form which capitalist exploitation (apartheid 
economic exploitation and political domination) takes establishes a link 
between the issues which workers organise themselves around - on the 
factory floor and in political oppression.74 Consequently, the union linked the 
struggles on the shop floor with the political struggle for democracy. The 
union also emphasised involvement in community issues. GAWU contended 
that union issues extended beyond the factory floor because "workers are 
exploited from the factory to the home". 75 Issues such as high rents, bus-
fares, etc., were linked to the general system of racial exploitation. 
71 
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According to Sydney Mufamadi, general secretary of the union, GAWU held 
the view that it was involved in a national democratic struggle wherein it 
places emphasis on the leadership role which has to be played by the 
working class.76 The union's policies linked it to the ANC-Ied alliance 
externally and the UDF internally. 
According to Mufamadi, trade union organisation has some limitations which 
can be overcome by forming alliances with other community-based 
organisations such as the UDF. Mufamadi argued that the sphere of 
operation of trade unions is limited to the factory floor. However, there are 
people who are not working in factories who are waging a working class 
struggle which serves to undermine the class relations upon which the 
present society is built. In addition , trade unions are unable to reach people 
who live and work in the rural areas. Mufamadi argued that the UDF had 
the infrastructure to reach people in these areas, providing the means to 
instil working class consciousness into the rural masses.77 
At its AGM in 1984, GAWU expressed its commitment to "one powerful, 
united, national trade union and the leadership of the working class in the 
broad popular struggle for both political and economic liberation".78 The 
union outlined three complementary avenues through which it would achieve 
its goals: full participation in the planned new national federation of 
independent trade unions; working in the UDF; and building GAWU. 
For GAWU, affiliation to the UDF was important in the light of the union's 
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class in both these struggles, and the need of working class organisations 
to identify and link up with progressive allies in these struggles" .79 The 
union also identified the general meeting as an important development in 
building the union into industrial branches. 
Gawu was disbanded after its membership was drawn into other COSATU 
affiliates in 1987. GAWU lost its membership to the Construction and Allied 
Workers' Union (CAWU) at the latter's launch on 6-12 February 1987; the 
National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) on 22-4 May 
1987; and the National Education , Health and Allied Workers' Union 
(NEHAWU) at its launch in June 1987. 
7.6. South African Railways and Harbours Workers Union 
7.6.1. Formation 
SARHWU was launched in October 1986 in Grahamstown. SARHWU officials 
claimed , however, that the new union was a revival of the SACTU affiliate 
which was formed in 1936. The old SARHWU was originally affiliated to the 
Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU). The union was officially 
launched in 1944. In an attempt to limit the impact of SARHWU, the South 
African Railways and Harbours initiated a Staff Association for its employees 
in 1950. It soon became apparent, however, that the Staff Association looked 
mainly after the interests of whites. During 1955 SARHWU was revived in 
Pietermaritzburg and soon gained support on a national scale. During the 
same year the union affiliated to SACTU and by 1962 SARHWU had become 
a national body.80 
The SACTU union was the first independent trade union to organise railway 
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workers . According to Luckhard and Wall "it was one of the most difficult 
industries to penetrate ... ", partly because every region posed particular 
problems and partly because of sustained repression on the part of the 
railways administration . The old SARHWU claimed a membership of 4,677 in 
Durban, Port Elizabeth , Cape Town and Johannesburg in 1960. In 1963-64 
several SARHWU officials (who were also key political activists) were 
detained, banned or jailed. Two - Caleb Mayekiso of Port Elizabeth and 
Laurence Ndzanga of the Western Cape - died in detention .81 The SACTU 
leadership went into exile after the banning of the ANC in 1960 and the 
suppression of trade union activities during the early 1960s. 
In 1981 a number of unions once again began to organise the railway 
sector. In the Transvaal , GAWU and MGWUSA started to organise railway 
workers. Because these unions included several officials who had been 
members of the old SARHWU in the sixties, a decision was taken to re-
launch the union. In mid-1983, one organiser was employed and an interim 
committee was set up. Various committees were elected in the process of 
organising workers from different Stations/Depots or Compounds. 
SARHWU's interim committee participated in discussions with other unions in 
the railway sector with the aim of transferring workers from these unions to 
the union. The first Interim National Executive of SARHWU was set up and 
included the new regions which were emerging as a result of the transfer 
of workers from other unions. The first NEC was composed of representatives 
from each region , as well as various officials who were part of a National 
Management Committee. SARHWU adopted its final constitution at the national 
launch in October 1986.82 
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The inaugural congress of the union, held in secret in the Grahamstown 
area, elected Justice Langa as union president, and Ntai Sello as general 
secretary.83 In addition to the above office-bearers, the constitution provided 
for two vice-presidents, an assistant secretary and an educational secretary. 
SARHWU adopted the Freedom Charter at its founding congress. The union 
soon established close links with the UDF-affiliated GAWU in the Transvaal 
and SAAWU in East London. Union officials took great pride in the history 
of the union, its SACTU traditions and its historical links with the nationalist 
movement. Names like Moses Mabhida, Calber Mayekiso and Laurence 
Ndzanga were frequently mentioned and on the steering committee of the 
new union were old activists like Rita Ndzanga and Catherine Mavi.84 
7.6.2. Principles and Policies 
In its Declaration of Principles, SARHWU stated that its aim was "to achieve 
a non-racial, democratic South Africa". It felt "that the growth of democratic 
unions - which encourage participation and decision making - is a vital 
contribution to the struggle for a free and democratic South Africa". But this 
struggle must be led by the working class since: "Only the working class, 
in alliance with other progressive sections of the community, can build a 
happy life for all South Africans, a life free from unemployment, insecurity 
and poverty, free from racial hatred and oppression, a life of vast opportun-
ities for our people". 
SARHWU thus identified the national-democratic struggle under the leadership 
of the working class as the main focus of the 1980s, and the establishment 
of a democratic South Africa as the primary objective of the union. 
SARHWU, like the other UDF unions, did not limit its role and objectives to 
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the purely economic interests of the working class. Included among 
SARHWU's aims and objectives were the following: 
To co-operate with and assist other progressive organisations in the general 
interest of the members and the working-class movement in bringing about change in the 
economic and industrial situation in South Africa. 
To advance the democratic rights of all workers.
85 
At its inaugural conference the union resolved : 
That the Federation [COSATU - G.H.] must strive to ensure that workers have 
the opportunity to participate in any organisations or campaigns that are struggling 
against oppression and economic exploitation. 
That the Federation must do whatever it can to promote working class leadership 
in the struggle. 
That the Federation will join hands with other democratic forces in furthering their 
struggle against oppression and exploitation.86 
Thus, from the very beginning SARHWU was committed to influencing 
COSATU to ensure that workers participate in the general struggle against 
apartheid and to ensure co-operation between COSATU and other 
organisations involved in this struggle. 
SARHWU general secretary, Sello Ntai, justified affiliation to the UDF in the 
following terms: 
The UDF was formed not as a political organisation but as an anti-apartheid front. As a 
union organising in SATS we have a direct interest in opposing apartheid. The most 
oppressed workers have an interest in full and direct leadership of the anti-apartheid front. 
Which other class can solve these problems? If we are not in the UDF other classes with 
different interest [sic] will lead it. If we are fighting for a classless society then the very 
people exploited must lead. And finally membership of the UDF does not mean that 
normal trade unionism cannot take place to the fullest. 87 
SARHWU, which emerged after the formation of the UDF, adopted the same 
principles and objectives held by those trade union affiliates of the UDF 
which emerged before the formation of the latter. These principles and 
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objectives were a challenge to the apartheid system because they involved 
the rejection of apartheid structures, the combining of trade union and other 
popular struggles, and the struggle for a democratic South Africa. 
7.6.3. Structure and Membership 
SARHWU's branch, regional, and national structures were patterned on the 
work situation found in SATS. SATS was structured into 12 different 
departments nationally - Road Transport, Airways, Harbours, Mechanical 
Engineering , Civil Engineering , Electrical Engineering , Signals and Telecom-
munications, Petroleum Products Pipelines, Stores, Publicity and Travel, 
Catering, and Medical Scheme. It was also structured into 9 different 
geographical regions - Western Cape, Cape Midlands, Northern Cape, Eastern 
Cape, Orange Free State, Natal, Southern Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, and 
South West Africa/Namibia .88 
The union's members were organised along departmental lines, with one shop 
steward for every fifteen members sitting on the central shop steward 
committee. Two or more central shop steward committees, representing at 
least 200 paid-up members, constituted a branch. The Branch Executive 
Committee (BEC) met once a week while branch general meetings were held 
at least once every three months. The BEC consisted of a chairperson, 
secretary, treasurer and delegates from each central shop steward committee. 
Three or more branches in a region , with at least 1,500 paid-up members, 
made up a regional structure. Each branch in the region elected one 
delegate for every 100 or part of 100 members of the branch (up to a 
maximum of 20 delegates from a branch) to the Regional Congress. The 
Regional Congress, which was held at least once a year, elected a Regional 
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Executive Committee (REC). The REC consisted of the chairperson, vice-
chairperson, secretary, treasurer and delegates from each branch - one 
delegate for branches with less than 1,000 members and two delegates for 
branches with more. 
Each branch sent one delegate for every 200 (or part of 200) members (up 
to a maximum of 10 delegates per branch) to the annual National Congress 
(NC). The NC was the highest decision-making body in the union and 
elected the NEC. The NEC, consisting of the National Management 
Committee (president, vice-president, 2nd vice-president, treasurer, general 
secretary, assistant general secretary) and delegates from each region , met 
at least once every three months. The National Management Committee, 
which was responsible for the national work of the union, met at least once 
a month. 
The union also placed emphasis on the principle of worker control in its 
structures. All delegates to meetings at all levels of the union were required 
to have a mandate from the people they were representing . This means that 
delegates had to make sure that proper discussions take place with their 
fellow workers before they went to a meeting. Officials did not have a vote 
in union meetings and workers were required to ensure that officials did not 
dominate discussions. These organisational principles represented a change 
from the practices of earlier UDF unions. 
SARHWU membership was open to all workers who were employed by 
SATS. SATS included railways, harbours, pipelines and the South African 
Airways. Although SARHWU subscribed to a non-racial policy concerning its 
membership, the overwhelming majority of its members were African. The 
union included in its ranks workers who did a variety of jobs, e.g. drivers, 
maintenance work, signals, etc., but the vast majority were classified as 
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ungraded labourers. 
SARHWU's initial organising focus was in the Transvaal, where it claimed 
10,000 members, as well as 4,000 members in the rest of the country at 
the beginning of 1986.89 The union 's relative strength in the Transvaal and 
its weakness in other parts of the country was the result of regional 
differences in SATS. In addition , some sectors of the workforce were keener 
to start their own union than join one which they believed was too heavily 
dominated by officials at the expense of railway workers. Organisational 
problems emerged soon after the launching of the union, particularly in East 
London and Port Elizabeth.90 
SATS workers in East London and Port Elizabeth began organising 
themselves into committees prior to the launch of SARHWU. The East 
London committee, which represented about 3,000 railway workers in the city, 
was suspicious of existing trade unions because of "a bad experience of 
trade unionism, especially of SAAWU, to which most of them belonged". The 
committee was also suspicious of SARHWU because of its close links with 
SAAWU. They also felt insulted because SARHWU failed to contact their 
committee when it first arrived in the city. In addition, SARHWU submitted 
copies of its constitution only one week before the launch and they objected 
to clauses in the constitution which did not give local branches sufficient 
control. Instead, the committee planned to form the National Union of Railway 
Workers (NURW), which would include committees from other parts of the 
country.91 
89 






The Port Elizabeth committee was established after SATS dismissed striking 
workers in the wake of a May Day strike. The committee approached the 
COSATU local to determine which organisation they could affiliate to. 
COSATU referred them to the TGWU but the committee opted instead to 
seek assistance from the East London committee. The committee's contact 
with SARHWU officials had been problematic and , following discussions with 
East London workers, they decided to form their own union. Not a single 
member of the workers' committees in both cities attended SARHWU's launch. 
SARHWU officials, while acknowledging its organisational problems in the 
area, stated that the launch in Grahamstown was the "first step to becoming 
a national union".92 
After SARHWU's first national congress in 1986, a number of discussions 
were held to form a united transport union.93 In order to do so, SARHWU 
would have to merge with the TGWU. Differences between the two COSATU 
affiliates prevented this process from occurring . TGWU was a workerist-
oriented union, while SARHWU was a "charterist" union. SARHWU realised 
that the larger TGWU would dominate the new union and was therefore only 
prepared to merge with the latter if the membership was restricted to 
transport workers. SARHWU also noted that it is difficult to characterise the 
transport sector as one industry. It characterised the TGWU as a general 
union and therefore opposed integration . 
In 1987, one of the largest strikes the country has seen led to the rapid 





SARHWU Discussion Document, 1987. Cited in Slabbert,JA and Bruwer,A.J. (1 990); op.cit. , 
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strike was provoked by the dismissal in March 1987 of a SATS worker from 
the City Deep railway depot. After a three month long strike an out of court 
settlement was reached on 5 June. The settlement was a victory for the 
union and included recognition of the right of workers to democratically elect 
their own representatives. 
Throughout the strike SATS refused to negotiate with SARHWU and 
contended that SARHWU'S legal team represented individual strikers. Nor did 
SARHWU gain recognition by the corporation . After the settlement was 
reached the Minister of Transport said that the settlement had nothing to do 
with SARHWU. His claims that the agreement was between SATS and its 
employees was seen as an attempt to give credit to the Black Trade Union 
(BLATU) , the SATS "in-house" union.95 A SARHWU challenge to have a 
ballot to prove representivity was ignored by SATS.96 The corporation's 
concern over demands for democratic union representation prevented it from 
negotiating with both SARHWU and COSATU. Instead, SATS negotiated with 
a BLA TU grade steward committee, to which a number of people with 
SARHWU sympathies had been elected. 97 
Thousands of SATS workers joined the union during the course of the strike. 
In July, SARHWU's membership had reached 34,411 , with the total in the 
Transvaal reaching 22,000. By the end of the year the union's membership 
had grown to around 45,000 from the 15,000 at the beginning of the 
strike.
98 
The tremendous explosion of membership during and after the strike 
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transformed SARHWU into a national organisation with branches across the 
country. In most regions, workers were eagerly signing up with the union and 
it was only in smaller outlying areas such as the Northern Cape, Western 
Cape, Northern Transvaal and Northern Natal, that the union had to go out 
and recruit members.99 SARHWU rapidly established branch offices in 
Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Germiston, Springs, Kroonstad , East 
London, Bloemfontein, Kimberley, Pretoria and the Vaal. 1OO 
However, the rapid growth of the union and its transformation into a national 
organisation created enormous strains. It was still in the process of building 
and consolidating and the union had to accommodate the different back-
grounds, strengths and weaknesses of each region and distribute resources 
appropriately.101 
During and after the strike, SARHWU experienced harassment arising from 
collusion between SATS management and the security police, and leadership 
problems. 102 During the strike workers were detained, evicted from hostels, 
shot in Germiston and Johannesburg, and besieged in COSATU offices by 
the police. In addition, a systematic propaganda campaign against the union, 
the detention of the leadership, and the 150 court cases involving over 1,000 
union members were designed to disorganise if not crush the union.103 
SATS' refusal to recognise SARHWU was a major limitation on the union's 
organisational capacity. It became difficult to consolidate structures following 
99 
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the rapid rise in membership and the union's resources were stretched when 
it was forced to collect subscriptions by hand.104 
The strike won the right for workers to resign from the Black Staff 
Association, and the de facto right of SARHWU members to be represented 
by democratically elected shop stewards. However, even these limited rights 
were not automatically extended to all regions. SARHWU had to fight for 
these rights step by step in each region . At the very least SATS appeared 
willing to accept SARHWU representation of the majority of workers in a 
particular racial category. Under these conditions the union would have to 
register under the Labour Regulations Act before SATS would recognise the 
union.10s In areas where strong union structures existed , managers 
recognised shop stewards elected by SARHWU members. This was not the 
case in areas where workers were not sufficiently organised. SARHWU 
officials alleged that managers and the Joint Management Committees were 
collaborating in intimidating workers not to join the union.10G 
In sum, the UDF was able to include workers from one of the most difficult 
state sectors, the railway sector, in its membership through this affiliate. 
Despite initial difficulties relating to the formation of other organisations in the 
railway sector, the union experienced a dramatic increase in membership 
during the course of the 1987 strike. By the end of the period of review 
SARHWU had established branches in almost every part of the country where 
SATS had workers. 
104 Loc.cit. 
10S Ibid., pp.76-7. 
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7.7. COSATU and the increasing political involvement of Unions 
During 1984 FOSATU'S resistance to involving its affiliates in political 
campaigns began to dissipate in the face of the revival of militant resistance. 
The wave of resistance which began with the Vaal Triangle uprising 
stimulated the federation 's support for political campaigns.107 At the centre 
of FOSATU'S increasing political role were the federation's locals, which were 
created to promote cooperation between affiliates and later developed into an 
organising tool. 108 
Although tensions did arise within locals, and between locals and community 
organisations, the pressure of events in the townships placed new stresses 
on the unions and one result was a blurring of the divide between the old 
and new unions.109 A deepening recession , increasing industrial 
monopolisation and sophistication of management strategies, tightening state 
repression and the dramatic escalation of township struggles increased the 
pressure on industrial unions to take up political issues and on general 
unions to establish a strong shop-floor presence.11 0 The "unity talks" finally 
culminated in the launching of COSATU in December 1985, bringing together 
three political traditions: the well-organised industrial unions drawn from the 
shop-floor tradition ; the general unions drawn from the national-democratic 
tradition; and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) , which broke away 
107 Van Niekerk,P. (1989); "The trade union movement in the politics of resistance in South Africa" 
in Johnson,S. (ed.); South Africa: No turning back, (Bloomington and Indianapolis Indian~ 
University Press), p.1S7. ' 
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from CUSA to join COSATU.111 
Eighteen of the 33 unions which joined to form COSATU in December 1985 
were UDF affiliates, while one trade union affiliate of the UDF remained 
outside the federations. These unions had a paid-up membership of 93,186 
and a total membership of 141 ,760 in 1985.112 With in COSATU they 
comprised 23 percent of the total membership, but occupied 49 percent of 
the voting delegates seats on the Central Executive Committee (CEC). The 
disproportionate voting power of this group, together with high levels of 
political confidence promoted by the UDF-dominated political upsurge, provided 
the UDF unions with considerable influence within COSATU's national 
structures. In addition , these unions were politically united both by previous 
loyalties and a common outlook.113 
A second bloc, representing 168,907 paid-up members (37 percent of 
COSATU's total) and occupying only 19 percent of the voting delegate seats 
at CEC level, comprised the "centre" within COSATU. Th is group included 
NUM and the FCWU as well as a number of former FOSATU unions such 
as the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union (SFAWU), the Paper, Wood 
and Allied Workers Union (PWAWU) and the TGWU. Although this group was 
dominated by an ANC/UDF political tradition, they differed from the "UDF" 
unions in a number of respects. 
These unions were launched with narrow economic trade union perspectives, 
they differed on questions of style of organisation and union work, 
111 F' A 
me, . and Webster,E. (1 989); "Transcending traditions: trade unions and pol itical unity", in 
Moss,G. and Obery,l. (eds.); South African Review 5, (Johannesburg, Ravan Press), p.260. 
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emphasizing the importance of strong grassroots organisation and representa-
tive democracy and were often suspicious of the UDF's rhetorical and 
sloganeering style of politics. The UDF unions, in turn , frequently viewed this 
bloc as lukewarm in their support for the ANC, and accused them of making 
a fetish of "mandates" and "democracy".114 
The third group comprised unions strongly located in the early FOSATU 
political tradition. They constituted an "independent worker" bloc, and included 
MAWU, the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU), the 
Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) and the National Union of Textile 
Workers (NUTW).115 
The pressure of events in the country and mounting pressure by COSATU's 
membership to participate in political campaigns led to an early recognition 
that the new federation must work closely with the community organisations. 
This was recognised in the keynote address by Cyril Ramaphosa that the 
"struggle on the shopfloor cannot be separated from the wider political 
issues". The inaugural conference adopted a resolution calling for close 
relations with other organisations of the mass democratic movement, including 
the UDF.116 However, no resolution was passed on COSATU's political 
direction. Instead, the federation formally committed itself to ideological 
neutrality with Cyril Ramaphosa pointing out that COSATU would take an 
active role in national politics in alliance with other progressive organisations. 
However, COSATU's leaders soon displayed their ideological preferences in 
public statements and in discussions with the ANC and SACTU in Lusaka 
114 1b 'd I ., pp.102-3. 
115 Ibid., p.103. 
116 F ' d ne man,S. (1987); op.cit., p.413. 
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in March 1986. The Lusaka meeting led to an agreement "that lasting 
solutions can only emerge from the national liberation movement, headed by 
the ANC and the entire democratic forces of our country of which COSATU 
is an important and integral part" .117 
This clear identification with the ANC revived ideological divisions within the 
labour movement. Critics argued that the COSATU leadership had acted 
without a proper mandate in visiting Lusaka. In addition, by implying that 
Cosatu was "operating under the leadership of the ANC", a spirit of 
sectarianism could develop towards alternative political traditions. Some critics 
went further and argued that the national-democratic tradition stood in 
absolute contradiction to working-class politics. It was argued that the 
organisational style and political content of "populist" organisations must lead 
to the surrendering of trade union independence and failed to prepare 
workers for socialism.118 
From COSATU's inception, the leadership of the federation embarked on a 
series of political initiatives without the sanction of the CEC.119 These 
initiatives included calling for the nationalisation of major industries, supporting 
the divestment/disinvestment campaign , threatening to organise mass pass 
burning unless pass laws were repealed within six months, and the meeting 
with the ANC and SACTU in Harare. 
Pressure from the federation 's membership to define its political direction 
117 
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mounted in the first half of 1987.120 In March 1987, NUM adopted the 
Freedom Charter at its annual congress. Two months later, COSATU's 
National Union of Metal Workers (NUMSA) adopted a political resolution at 
its founding congress which endorsed the Freedom Charter as "a good 
foundation stone on which to start building our working-class programme". At 
COSATU's second national conference, held in July 1987, a resolution put 
forward by NUM was adopted , endorsing the Charter as "a guiding document 
which reflects the views and aspirations of the majority of the oppressed and 
exploited in our struggle against national oppression and economic exploita-
tion" .121 
The political resolution represented a "firm decision to adopt a higher political 
profile, and to strengthen alliances with organisations within the national 
democratic tradition". COSATU affirmed its ties with the ANC-SACTU-SACP 
alliance in exile and the UDF internally. It called for the building of alliances 
with "progressive organisations", defined as having "a proven record of 
struggle and history of mass mobilisation and action in our struggles". These 
organisations should have "principles and policies compatible with those of 
organised workers in COSATU and the working class in general". The 
federation resolved to build permanent structures with such organisations at 
all levels to strengthen "disciplined alliances" and "to promote the role of the 
working class in the united front alliance".122 
COSATU's political resolution called for the building of worker leadership, both 
in the struggle for national liberation and in the struggle against capitalist 
120 See Baskin,J. (1991); op. cit. , pp.215-? for the Freedom Charter "Debate". 
121 Fine,A. and Webster,E. (1 989); op.cit. , pp.261 -2. 
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exploitation, with both processes given equal priority. The resolution noted that 
the federation saw these struggles as "complementary to each other and part 
of an uninterrupted struggle for total liberation". There is thus "no conflict 
between the struggle for national liberation and socialism. The struggle 
against national oppression and the struggle against capitalist exploitation are 
complementary to each other and part of an uninterrupted struggle for total 
liberation".123 
However, the following features of the political resolution are significant. In 
the first place, while COSATU endorsed the ANC's Freedom Charter, it 
identified its demands as a minimum set of demands signalling the 
federation 's continuing commitment to look beyond the Charterist focus on 
national liberation to economic transformation .124 In the second place, by 
arguing that there is no conflict between the struggle against national 
oppression and the struggle against capitalist exploitation, COSATU rejected 
the two-stage theory of revolutionary change in favour of a view that the 
struggle for national liberation was part of the struggle for socialism. 125 
Finally, COSATU maintained its independence by rejecting affiliation with other 
organisations. 
What was significant, however, was the increasing involvement of COSATU 
in political struggles, the adoption of the Freedom Charter, the affirmation of 
ties with the ANC-SACTU-SACP alliance in exile, and the formation of 
alliances with internal progressive organisations, in particular, the UDF. This 
represents the spread of the revolutionary consciousness underlying the 
123 Fine,A. and Webster,E. (1989); op.cit., p.263. 
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"political unions" and the UDF into the leading worker organisation in the 
country. 
In conclusion, the trade unions affiliated to the UDF played an important role 
in the development of revolutionary consciousness and its spread amongst the 
organised working class and other sectors of the community and mass 
mobilisation and organisation leading to a shift in the balance of social forces 
towards the UDF. A number of factors demonstrate this point. 
In the first place, the UDF unions played a significant role in the develop-
ment and expansion of a revolutionary consciousness in South Africa. The 
common principles and objectives, and practices of these unions arose before 
the formation of the UDF and COSATU and some of these became 
important in both organisations after their formation. 
These unions did not limit their role and objectives to the purely economic 
interests of the working class. From the outset, the unrons wh ich later 
affiliated to the UDF linked trade union struggles with urban conflicts. In 
addition, the UDF unions were united in their rejection of reforms in labour 
legislation and their commitment to the struggle for national liberation. They 
were essentially non-racial in terms of their principles and stressed the 
leadership of the working class in the struggle for national liberation. They 
recognised the importance of trade union participation in the broad struggle 
for liberation and affiliation to national political organisations. Finally, all were 
"Charterist" in terms of ideological affiliation, thus recognis ing an alternative 
political leadership and system in South Africa. All of these represented a 
political challenge to the dominant socio-political system in South Africa. They 
also represent some of the most important elements of the national political 
culture which developed within the UDF tradition and which eventually 
influenced the direction taken by COSATU. 
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For the UDF unions, the goal of struggle was national liberation and this 
could be achieved by uniting their struggles with all township struggles and 
participating in the national democratic struggle as affil iates of the new 
political organisations. Thus, narrow trade union interests were subordinated 
to the national political challenge of the dominant system. However, although 
the UDF unions laid stress on the struggle for national liberation and the 
creation of a non-racial , democratic South Africa , they all laid emphasis on 
working class leadership in this struggle. 
SARHWU, for instance, stated that the struggle for national liberation must 
be led by the working class because only "the working class, in alliance with 
other progressive sections of the community, can build a happy life for all 
South Africans". In addition, at its inaugural conference SARHWU resolved to 
call on COSATU to promote working class leadership in the struggle. 
Likewise, GAWU held the view that it was involved in a national democratic 
struggle wherein it places emphasis on the leadership role which has to be 
played by the working class. Nowhere, however, do these unions explicitly 
state that they were struggling for the establishment of a socialist society. 
For the UDF unions, apartheid was seen as the central contradiction and 
national liberation and the establishment of a non-racial , democratic South 
Africa were seen as the primary and immediate objectives. 
The activities of the UDF unions also constituted a direct challenge to the 
apartheid system. SAAWU, for example, was the first union to call for one-
man-one-vote and its participation in community struggles as well as its other 
activities (e.g. the 1983 Mdantsane bus boycott, assistance in the formation 
of community organisations, and affiliation to the UDF) made it a target for 
state repression. MACWUSA played a central role in local campaigns of the 
UDF, including the March 1985 stayaway. SARHWU, on the other hand, 
conducted one of the largest strikes of the 1980s against a state-run 
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corporation. The 1987 SATS workers strike constituted a challenge of the 
industrial relations policies of state-run corporations and resulted in the rapid 
increase in membership of the union and its influence in the transport sector. 
In the second place, the UDF unions played an important role in mass 
mobilisation and organisation, Firstly, the general internal structure and style 
of organisation of the UDF unions as well as the creation of alliances with 
other organisations in order to create a convergence of workplace and 
township struggles demonstrated an early commitment to mass mobilisation 
and organisation. 
Initially, the UDF unions were preoccupied with mass mobilisation rather than 
internal worker control of the unions or organisational practices that 
encouraged strong unions. The objective was to draw as many people as 
possible into these structures and/or their activities, including township 
residents who were not members of the unions. From their inception many 
of the UDF unions adopted mass participatory democracy as their internal 
form of organisation . These included SAAWU and GAWU which both 
emphasized the importance of workers directly controlling their unions behind 
the twin principles of "mass participatory democracy" and "collective 
leadership". Mass meetings, which served as the main fora to refer decisions 
taken by Branch Committees to the workers , were often held in the 
townships and were also attended by non-unionists. This had the effect of 
drawing the broader community into trade union struggles while trade union 
members were drawn into community struggles. 
Most of the UDF unions were general unions and concentrated on organising 
in one area. SAAWU, for example, concentrated its organisational activities 
in Mdantsane, and organised the township residents working in numerous 
factories and industries. This method of organising promoted mass 
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organisation because membership was confined largely to a single township 
and union organisers were able to recruit members on the buses and trains 
to and from Mdantsane. Similarly, GAWU organised workers in the transport, 
building , engineering , services, and local government sectors who were living 
in the townships of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. The trend towards general 
unionism was also promoted by the practice of recruiting at mass rallies in 
the townships. 
Finally, the commitment of the UDF unions to linking their struggles (for 
independent organisation, recognition , higher wages, greater control over the 
conditions of production) with urban conflicts concerning education , rent, 
transport, housing, and the struggle for political rights led to the establishment 
of alliances with other community organisations. The unity-in-action practised 
by the UDF unions was another factor which promoted community support 
for (and involvement in) trade union struggles and the support and 
involvement of trade unions in community struggles. The resulting convergence 
of trade union and community struggles promoted mass mobilisation and 
organisation with the trade unions playing a leading role in township struggles 
and organisations, for example SAAWU in East London. In turn , the strong 
links between unions and community structures expanded trade union 
membership. For example, MACWUSA was approached by workers in various 
industries in Port Elizabeth for help in organising them because of its links 
with PESCO, and in particular, the popularity of the latter. 
The re-emergence of political unionism in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
had a profound impact on subsequent developments in the independent trade 
union movement. The disproportionate voting power of this group, together 
with high levels of political confidence arising from the UDF-dominated political 
upsurge, provided the UDF unions with considerable influence within 
COSATU's national structures. The trade union movement was also influenced 
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by the formation of the UDF and the upsurge of popular resistance during 
the eighties. Organised labour was increasingly drawn into popular struggles 
and by the middle of the decade the unions and popular organisations were 
drawn together. In 1987 formal links were established between the UDF and 
South Africa's largest trade union federation - COSATU. 
Perhaps one of the most significant features of the 1980s was the role of 
trade unions in securing the spread of revolutionary consciousness within the 
trade union movement. This is best indicated by COSATU's increasing 
involvement in political struggles, adoption of the Freedom Charter, affirmation 
of ties with the ANC-SACTU-SACP alliance in exile, and formation of 
alliances with internal progressive organisations, in particular, the UDF. This 
represents the spread of the revolutionary consciousness underlying the 
"political unions" and the UDF into the leading worker Federation in the 
country. 
The UDF trade unions were thus an important component of the political and 
ideological struggle to raise the revolutionary consciousness of the working 
class and were partially responsible for drawing not only trade union 
members into political struggles, but the broader community into their 
struggles as well. In the process, the objectives of the UDF were increaSingly 
spread in black civil society. The UDF unions were "community organisations", 
with close links with other organisations in the townships. They also played 
an important role both in the formation of other organisations and participated 
in their campaigns. The following chapter traces the history of various civic 





The emergence and proliferation of civic associations in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s occurred in response to a wide variety of political , material and 
social grievances and, in some cases, as a result of the conscious 
organisational efforts of activists. These organisations formed the main 
organisational base of the UDF when it was formed in 1983 and in its 
activities thereafter. 
The people's war strategy of the ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance also focused 
attention on the formation of civic organisations. The primary objective of 
mass mobilisation and organisation was to increase participation in the 
national liberation struggle. This strategic objective has its parallel in the 
LeninistlGramscian strategic emphasis on mass mobilisation and organisation 
around all struggles in civil society which are primarily directed against the 
ruling bloc. However, in the LeninistlGramscian model, mass mobilisation and 
organisation are also directed at raising the revolutionary consciousness of 
the masses until their particular demands are transformed into a universalistic 
political challenge to the dominant system. 
This chapter focuses specifically on the role these civic associations played 
in mass mobilisation and organisation and the spread of revolutionary 
consciousness leading to a shift in the balance of social forces towards the 
UDF. This is done in two ways. First, a focus on the general factors leading 
to the formation of civic associations, the effects of struggle, state repression 
and counter-mobilisation on civics, the general nature and strategies of these 
organisations, and the general role and aims of civic associations. Second, 
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an analysis is made of the formation , structure and membership, aims and 
objectives and activities of selected civic associations. 
Here the emphasis is on the role the civic associations played in mobilising 
and organising people around the concrete particulars of their everyday lives 
(rent increases, bus-fare increases, etc.) and transforming their particular 
interests into a universalistic political challenge of the dominant system. 
Underlying these processes was the central role played by civic associations 
in promoting and expanding the ideological leadership of the UDF in civil 
society. In order to demonstrate the latter, we must look at the reasons for 
the formation of the civic associations, their structures, aims and objectives, 
membership, and activities as well as changes to these. In the latter sense, 
changes to these factors demonstrate a shift in the balance of social forces 
towards the UDF. The shift towards the UDF is also demonstrated by the 
revival of various community organisations and the proliferation of new 
community organisations after the formation of the Front. 
It is argued, firstly, that these organisations played a hegemonic-building role 
by promoting mass mobilisation and organisation, and developing and 
faCilitating the spread of a common national political culture. The former is 
demonstrated by the mobilisation and organisation of people by civic 
associations around the concrete particulars of their every-day lives, and the 
revival of certain civics and proliferation of new civic associations after the 
formation of the UDF. The latter is demonstrated by the manner in which 
civic associations incorporated a common set of principles and objectives, and 
strategies and tactics which eventually transformed the particular demands of 
their communities into a universalistic political challenge of the dominant 
apartheid system. 
Secondly, some community organisations experienced significant changes in 
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their structures, leadership and membership, aims and objectives, and in their 
strategies and activities. These changes demonstrated a marked shift towards, 
and led to their affiliation to, the UDF, and their incorporation of the UDF 
political tradition of struggle, leading to the transformation of their activities 
into a universalistic political challenge of the dominant apartheid system. 
Finally, this analysis reveals the type of democratic organisations which were 
emerging during the course of the struggle: their structures, practices and 
membership. 
8.2. Overview 
Three broad periods can be seen in the emergence and development of civic 
associations during the period under review. These periods are differentiated 
in terms of the nature and role of civics, and the scale, intensity and form 
of their activities. Between 1979 and mid-1984, a number of civic associations 
were formed in response to local struggles over a wide range of grievances. 
From mid-1984 to the middle of 1986, township resistance intensified and 
spread throughout the country leading to the establishment and entrenchment 
of "people's power" in certain parts of the country. From mid-1986 to the 
end of the period under review, the government employed repression to 
destroy the civics while simultaneously upgrading the townships in an attempt 
to eliminate some of the causes of resistance. 
The numerous civic associations, which sprang up in townships near all the 
major cities and many rural towns and villages during the 1980s, emerged 
in response to a variety of different factors. Some were developed to oppose 
the various government-sponsored local government systems. Others were 
stimulated by the virtual collapse of the town council system during the mid-
1980s. Many emerged and expanded in the context of popular struggles 
around local issues, such as increases in rent and transport costs , resistance 
to state repression and forced removals, and squatter struggles. A number 
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found their origin in campaigns around local issues combined with national 
or regional campaigns. State repression during the various emergencies 
resulted in the emergence of a number of civics and the expansion of the 
support base of many existing ones. Finally, civic associations emerged as 
a result of the conscious organisational efforts of activists. 
In many areas, civic organisations and other community organisations emerged 
prior to the formation of the UDF and provided the Front's initial support 
base. In some areas popular mobilisation and organisation emerged in 
response to local, regional, or national political initiatives of the UDF. In 
others, the emergence and organisation of resistance were locally-inspired. 
Some civics affiliated to the UDF only after they had emerged within their 
particular local sites of struggle. Finally, strong grass-roots organisations 
emerged without affiliating to any of the major political organisations, including 
the UDF.1 
Between 1979 and mid-1984 a number of civic organisations emerged in 
response to struggles against rent and bus fare increases, evictions, influx 
control, the housing shortage, inadequate township infrastructure, and corrupt 
or unaccountable local township councillors.2 These organisations were 
generally small (with the exception of PEBCO between 1979 and 1980). By 
the end of 1983, those formed at the beginning of the period had moved 
into decline and relative insignificance while others formed during 1982-3 
expanded their support base after the formation of the UDF. From 1985 
onward the situation changed when the former group of civics underwent a 
2 
See Keenan,J. (1988); "Counter-revolution as reform: Struggle in the Bantustans", in Cobbett,W. 
and Cohen,R. (eds.); Popular struggles in South Africa, (New Jersey, Africa World Press, Inc.), 
p.138. 
Seekings,J. (1991) ; "Township resistance in the 1980s", in SWilling,M., Humphries,R. and 
Shubane,K. (eds.); Apartheid city in transition, (Cape Town, Oxford University Press) , p.291 . 
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revival while the latter group went into decline. 
The Vaal Triangle uprising in September 1984 transformed township struggles 
from protest to confrontation, which often took a violent form. Opposition to 
the new constitutional dispensation and the BLAs provided another impetus 
to mass mobilisation. Between mid-1984 and the middle of 1986, rent, 
consumer and school boycotts, as well as mass stayaways intensified 
township resistance and promoted mass organisation on an unprecedented 
scale. Township resistance focused on regional and national, rather than local 
issues, indicating the Significance of the existence of national political 
organisations, particularly the UDF. 
In 1985, local activists and UDF organisers stepped up their efforts to 
establish civic associations in unorganised areas. A number of existing 
organisations were revived , in particular those in the Eastern Cape. That year 
also saw the development of the street committee system which was adopted 
by most existing civics by the end of 1986. In addition, the collapse of the 
urban councils by mid-1985 created an administrative and political vacuum in 
the townships. Many civics stepped into this vacuum, performing limited 
administrative and judicial duties. Furthermore, in certain areas the authorities 
were forced to enter into negotiations with civics on a wide range of issues. 
From mid-1986, severe repression under the state of emergency constrained 
the activities of all community organisations and a number of civics were 
destroyed. The declaration of the second state of emergency on June 12, 
1986, introduced a sustained crackdown on community organisations and 
political activists. In 1986 alone, over 20,000 people, mostly members of the 
UDF, were detained. This was followed by a number of criminal and political 
trials. The banning of meetings, curfews, door-to-door searches and the 
occupation of townships by the security forces curtailed the activities of most 
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civic associations and resulted in the destruction of people's power. 
During 1987, the government embarked on a programme to upgrade the 
townships in an attempt to revive local authorities and to win the hearts and 
minds of township residents. According to Boraine3 , the attempts "to improve 
some of the material conditions under which oppressed people live is a 
direct response to the nationwide popular uprising" of the previous years. In 
addition, it was part of the government's "Total Strategy" - using economic 
reforms to win the population over. At the centre of this aspect of 
government strategy were the JMCs.4 
Programmes for "urban renewal" were introduced in selected townships 
identified as "oilspots" or "strategic bases" from which the security forces 
believed they could "regain control" over the African population. s Control 
could then be extended to other parts of the country by expanding the 
programme to include other townships. Underlying this programme was a 
policy of "eliminating" activists and crushing community organisations.6 JMCs 
were made responsible for the redevelopment of urban townships and the 
revival of town councils .7 
State repression and township redevelopment from mid-1986 paralysed the 
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township politics as local administrations refused to negotiate with them. The 
removal of experienced leaders and constant harassment of communities by 
the security forces curtailed the activities of most civic associations in 1987. 
By the end of the year, most civics were led by inexperienced leaders who 
lacked political and organisational skills. 
In broad terms, civic associations have been identified as alternative organs 
of people's power. For example, Sisa Majola described civic associations in 
the following terms: 
The true antithesis to the community councils and the bantustan administrations are the 
people's communes that are already springing up out of the mass uprising .... Between 
the period of apartheid rule and the creation of a people's republic in South Africa, there 
lies the period of bitter struggle between the oppressor and the people, which will be won 
in each area by the destruction of the enemy's organs of administration and the setting 
up of revolutionary people's communes in every victorious district. ... The creation of 
people's communes will achieve for our people the immediate tactical advantage of 
consolidating our achievements, and will also provide a practical school for our people 
in the long-term strategic objective of building a democratic people's stateB 
However, a closer look at these organisations indicates a wide diversity in 
their nature and role. Factors such as regional location, resistance history 
and the availability of skilled leadership, the existence of well-organised, 
community-based organisations, relationship with other progressive 
organisations, and relationship with other local black political organisations 
were responsible for different levels of development. Some civic associations 
were led by a small elite (the SCA during the early 1980s), while others 
were more broadly based (PEBCO during 1979-1980). A number consisted 
of a small band of activists (SCA) , while others included the vast majority 
of township residents (CRADORA and DVRA). Some civic associations had 
branches in more than one township (PESCO, JORAC, CAHAC and 
NOTPECO), while others had branches in one township only (the AAC, MeA, 
8 
Majola,S. (1986); "The beginnings of people's power: Discussion of the theory of state and 
revolu!ion in South Africa", in The African Communist, (No.106, Third Quarter) , p.S7. This was part 
of a Wider debate on the nature and role of these organisations. 
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UBCO, DVRA and CRADORA). 
These factors contributed to the diversity in structure found among the civic 
associations which affiliated to the UDF. Some had committees at the street, 
block, area, branch, and organisation level. Smaller civic associations found 
such a structure unnecessary or were unable to create them. Differences 
were also evident in the linkages between the leadership and membership 
with some maintaining links through the use of pamphlets and infrequent 
mass meetings while others held regular branch meetings with their 
constituencies. 
From mid-1985 the commitment to direct democracy took root in many 
townships. This resulted in the utilisation of the street committee system by 
many civics. By early 1986 these rudimentary organs of "peoples' power" had 
taken root in townships in the Eastern Cape and the PVW area. In May 
1987, Murphy Morobe, acting publicity secretary of the UDF, spelt out the 
organisation's view of democracy.9 
9 
10 
The "rudimentary organs of people's power" - such as street committees, shop-steward 
structures, parent, teacher and student associations - were the beginnings of the kind of 
democracy for which the UDF was striving. The street committees ... comprised an 
executive of 10 to 12 people elected by all the people on a street. These sent 
representatives to area committees who in turn chose a township civic executive which 
was ratified in a rally. 
The tasks of such structures included political representation; the communication of ideas 
from mass base to leadership and vice versa; debate over the tactics and strategies of 
stayaways, rent and consumer boycotts; the resolving of social disputes through people's 
courts, while actively opposing "kangaroo" justice; and intervention in the running of the 
townships through building parks, clearing rubble, fighting crime, and "even collecting rent 
to build new houses and facilities for township residents" .... the UDF's idea of democracy 
was evolved and practised by people in the face of enormous repression . It grew from the 
grass-roots organisations in the townships.10 
Murphy Morobe became acting publicity secretary of the UDF after the arrest of Patrick Lekota 
in 1986. 
Sunday Tribune, May 1987. 
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The formation of local-level grassroots organisations marked an important 
departure in resistance politics. In the past, the "national" or "regional" areas 
were arenas in which organisations sought to establish themselves. However, 
these areas "are fairly dispersed and therefore stretch the resources any 
organisation may possess". 11 Seekings pointed out that "national and regional 
organisation should be constructed from strong grassroots organisation". The 
street and area committees which arose in the process of struggle provided 
this base.12 Street and area committees also helped to bridge the generation 
gap, a serious problem which became evident during campaigns in the first 
half of the 1980s. According to Swilling: 
Significantly, street and area committees have helped activists bring the militant youths 
under control , by dividing youth squads into smaller more disciplined units attachable to 
a street or area committee .... 13 
In addition, since membership included workers, women and youth, they 
provided an organisational link between specific local organisations of these 
groups. Street and area committees also proved reasonably effective in 
countering state repression. "Tight local-level organisation has helped to lessen 
the damaging effect which detention, disappearance or death of leaders might 
otherwise have had".14 These new structures also "constituted a challenge 
to the authority of the local state because they enhanced the authority of 
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in 1985 provided an opportunity to establish people's power in the 
townships.16 Beginning in the Eastern Cape townships of Cradock and 
Uitenhage in 1985, and spreading to the PVW townships and other parts of 
the country thereafter, townships became "liberated zones" in which no civil 
authority existed. 
Figure 1 below provides an example of a street committee structure. In the 
hypothetical example given, each street committee represents 40 households. 
Block committees are made up of two representatives from each of the ten 
street committees in the block. At the apex of the structure is the five 
member township Executive Committee elected from among four representa-
tives of each of the four block committees in the township and ratified at 
a mass rally. Figure 2 below sets out in schematic form the structure of the 
Alexandra Action Committee.17 Table 3 below provides an outline of the 
street committees of some of the civic associations under review. 
16 
Majola,S. (1986); op.cit ., p.S7. 
17 
Mufson,S. (1990); Fighting years: Black resistance and the struggle for a new South Africa 
(Boston, Beacon Press), p.127 and Jochelson,K. (1990); op.cit., p.7. • 
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Figure 1: Street Committee Structure 
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Figure 2: Proposed Structure of the Alexandra Action 
Committee (UC) 
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Table 3: Street Committee Structure of Civic Associations under review 
Civic Street Committee Structure 
SCA The SCA formed street committees of between 20 and 40 households. Each street 
elected leaders (consisting of four parents - two men and two women - and two youths -
one student, and one working or unemployed) which were represented in a block 
committee consisting of six or eight adjoining streets. The block committees in turn 
elected the next tier of leaders to their township "branch". Each of Soweto's 26 townships 
had a branch and the branches between them elected the fourth tier, which was the "in-
terbranch". The inter-branch, consisting of two members from each of the 26 townships, 
was accountable to the executive committee of the SCA.(1) 
MCA The basic units of organisation were the street and hostel committees. The executives 
of street committees came together to form a section committee and the section commit-
tees and five delegates of all other progressive organisations operating in the township 
together formed an area committee. Each of the sections elected two representatives to 
sit on the central committee, which had seventy members. This committee met every 
fortnight and represented Mamelodi's top decision making forum. Ten central committee 
members, and four representatives elected by the Mamelodi Youth Organisation, the 
student committee, the Zakheni Women's Organisation and the newly formed Mamelodi 
Teachers Union (MATU), formed the executive.(2) 
USCG USCO had an Executive Committee of 12 members from the Langa and KwaNobuhle 
townships. Represented on the Executive Committee were the trade unions, the 
Uitenhage Youth Congress, Uitenhage Women's Organisation, Uitenhage Students' 
Committee, Uitenhage Parents' Committee, Uitenhage Traders' Association, the 
Consumer Boycott Committee, the Langa Advisory Committee and the Langa 
Coordinating Committee. In Langa the street committees consisted of between four and 
ten members which sent representatives to one of five area committees consisting of 10 
members.The area committees sent three representatives each to the Langa Advisory 
Committee, which consisted of these 15 representatives plus 10 other members. The 
Langa Co-ordinating Committee had 12 representatives: four clergymen, 3 Uitenhage 
Youth Congress representatives, 3 trade union representatives and 2 area committee 
representatives. (3) 
DVRA The DVRA consisted of nine branches, each divided into area and street committees. Two 
representatives from each branch committee sat on the General Council (GC), along with 
two or three people from the Central Executive Committee, 21 people altogether. The 
nine-member CEC was elected at a mass meeting. Local youth, student and trade union 
organisations existed independently of the DVRA.(4) 
CRADORA Cradock's single township was divided into seven zones. Within each of these zones, 
forty young activists were assigned the task of mobilising people to attend publ ic meetings 
to elect zonal representatives. The zones were sub-divided into streets with representa-
tives from each street sitting on street committees. The committees fell under the 
residents' association.(5) 
Sources: (1) 'The rocky rise of people's power', in Frontline, (December 1986), p.13. 
(2) 'Mamelodi: Back to the roots', in SASPU National, (VoL7, No.4, Nov/Dec 1986), p.13. 
(3) Watson,V.; 'Towards new forms of local government in a future South Africa', in Heymens,C. and 
Totemeyer,G. (eds.); Government by the People: The politics of local government in South Africa 
(Kenwyn, Juta), Figure 7, p.173. ' 
326 
(4) 'Building from the bottom up', in SASPU National , (Vol. 7 , No.4, Nov/Dec 1986), p.15. 
(5) 'Street-style democracy', in S~SPU National , (Vo1.7, No.4, Nov/Dec, 1986), p.13. 
The strategies employed by the various civic associations in their campaigns 
also took a number of different forms. They included marches, demonstra-
tions, transport, rent, and consumer boycotts, and mass stayaways from 
work .1 8 The civic associations also played a leading role in providing political 
direction at the local level. The rent boycott, which began in the Vaal 
Triangle at the end of 1984, was initiated by a UDF affiliate and taken up 
by UDF affiliates in other parts of the country. In the process, the rent 
boycott was transformed from a tactic to oppose rent increases to a strategy 
to challenge the government. Consumer boycotts were introduced in the 
Eastern Cape townships by UDF affiliates and were soon taken up in other 
parts of the country by other affiliates. Activists soon realised the potential 
uses of the consumer boycott and began to link local demands with national 
political demands. 
Civic associations played a central role in co-ordinating these struggles. They 
spearheaded township struggles around issues such as increasing rent and 
service charges, increases in bus-fares and food prices, etc. Such struggles 
facilitated the growth of civic associations in townships which were previously 
insulated from political activity, while existing associations were often at the 
centre of mobilisation of the campaigns. In addition, civic associations often 
formed the foundation of many regional and national political campaigns. 
A significant tactical change began to emerge during the second half of the 
1980s particularly in the Eastern Cape townships (in Uitenhage, Port Alfred 
and Cradock) and Tumahole (near Parys). Civic associations engaged in 
negotiations either with the local development board or with businessmen and 
18 
Refer to Chapter 3, pp.1 00-1 05 and chapter 4, pp.157 -8 above. 
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white municipalities on administering or upgrading the townships. 
By the middle of the 1980s most civic organisations had a broad mandate 
from their constituencies. This mandate came to include opposition to all 
forms of apartheid oppression and exploitation which township residents were 
experiencing. From 1984 civic associations increasingly recognised and 
asserted a political role in their campaigns. Civics began to link local 
concerns with demands for the resignation of town councillors , the release 
of detainees and political prisoners, the withdrawal of the army/police from 
townships, and the unbanning of political organisations. This represented the 
transformation of the particular demands of townships residents into a 
universalistic challenge of the dominant system. 
A number of major weaknesses and deficiencies were evident in the practices 
of civic associations. Firstly, the exclusive use of pamphlets and infrequent 
mass rallies by some civics resulted in weak links between the leadership 
and rank-and-file members and limited the opportunities for mass participation 
in decision-making. Secondly, many campaigns which included the widespread 
use of intimidation, more particularly the consumer boycotts in the Eastern 
Cape and the "people's courts", led to a drop of community support for the 
campaigns as well as for the specific civic association concerned .19 
The civic associations were also affected by their relationship with regional 
and national structures of the UDF. Many organisers and leaders of civic 
associations were drawn into national campaigns and national and regional 
structures at the expense of local organisations. For example, JORAC and 
CAHAC "were once extremely successful at the local level, but their 
influence declined sharply as their leaders were drawn into national 
19 
Seekings,J. (1986); "Workers and the pol itics of consumer boycotts", in South African Labour 
Bulletin, (Vo1.11 , No.6, June), pp.2S-S. 
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campaigns and were encouraged by UDF leaders to ignore local issues".20 
State repression was perhaps the most significant factor which adversely 
affected the structure, membership and practices of the civic associations. 
During the country-wide revolt which emerged in the wake of the Vaal 
Triangle uprising in 1984, communities in many parts of the country 
responded to state repression by forming youth congresses and mass-based 
organisations. In towns and villages previously insulated from political activity, 
youth groups rapidly sprang up to defend their communities against state 
repression. These youth organisations played a central role in the formation 
of structures such as street committees and civic organisations. 
From mid-1986, severe repression under the state of emergency constrained 
the activities of all community organisations and a number of civics were 
destroyed. Experienced leaders were replaced by leaders without organisational 
and political skills, resulting in a transformation of the practices and activities 
of civic associations. Under these conditions, militant youths, operating without 
organisational control , engaged in violent clashes with the security forces, 
provoking an intensification of repression. 
In general, civic associations played a significant role in local, regional and 
national structures of the UDF. A number of members of civic associations 
were drawn into regional and national structures. In 1985, twenty civic leaders 
were included among the 62 UDF leaders on six regional UDF executives. 
Civic leaders on the first national executive committee of the Front included 
Moss Chikane, Popo Molefe, Frank Chikane, Virgil Bonhomme, Trevor Manuel 
and the Rev. Xundu . This is Significant because it gave certain civics a 
direct link with regional and national UDF structures. 
20 Ibid., pp.9-10. 
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In addition, with the exception of COSAS and youth congresses, civics were 
dominant in terms of membership and number within the Front. They were 
thus strongly represented at Regional and National General Councils, as well 
as in local level structures, e.g. area committees. This gave civics a powerful 
voice in the highest regional and national decision-making organs of the UDF. 
Fifty-seven civic associations were represented at the inaugural conference of 
the UDF in August 1983: 29 from the Transvaal ; two from the Western Cape 
(CAHAC with 21 affiliates and the Western Cape Civic Association represent-
ing six township zones); 24 from Natal; and two from the Eastern Cape.21 
During the second half of the 1980s, the number of civic associations 
affiliated to the UDF approached 200. 
The following is an analysis of 10 civic associations in six UDF regions. 
These are, the Soweto Civic Association (SCA), the Alexandra Action 
Committee (AAC) , the Mamelodi Civic Association (MCA), the Port Elizabeth 
Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO), the Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation 
(UBCO), the Duncan Village Residents' Association (DVRA) , the Cradock 
Residents' Association (CRADORA), the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC), 
the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC), and the Northern 
Transvaal People's Congress (NOTPECO). 
The focus is on the formation , structures and membership, aims and 
objectives and activities of these organisations during the period under review. 
The primary aim is to illustrate the effect of conditions under which civics 
were organised, the factors motivating the formation of civics, their relationship 
with the community, their relationship with structures of the UDF, their 
responses to, and the effects on them, of the emergencies, and transform-
21 Refer to Appendix A below. 
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ations in their strategies, aims and structure during the period under review. 
The emphasis here is on the role these organisations played in promoting 
mass mobilisation and in raising the revolutionary consciousness of the 
masses. 
The civics reviewed in this study have been chosen because they provide 
an illustration of the three broad periods in the emergence and development 
of civic associations. The SCA, PESCO, JORAC, CAHAC and USCO are 
examples of organisations which emerged during the first period and were 
transformed by popular struggles and state reaction during the subsequent 
periods. The DVRA, Cradora, the MC and the MCA were established in the 
context of popular struggles during the period 1984-1986. These four civic 
organisations are examples of the establishment of "people's power" and state 
reaction to this phenomenon. Finally, NOTPECO illustrates the emergence of 
community organisations in the rural areas. 
8.3. The Transvaal 
8.3.1. Soweto Civic Association (SCA) 
The first of the modern civic associations was formed in Soweto, a city 18 
kilometres outside Johannesburg. 22 Soweto's political significance originated 
in the 1976 student-initiated revolt against Bantu Education. Most of the 
political activities in the immediate aftermath of the uprising were initiated by 
the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC). 
In 1977, a successful rent boycott initiated by the SSRC against a rent 
increase imposed by the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) led to the 
resignation of most of Soweto's Urban Santu Councillors. Immediately after 
the resignation of the councillors a suggestion was made by the Soweto 
22 
Refer to Appendix B below for a summary of the conditions underlying mass mobilisation in 
Soweto and to Appendix C below for a summary of the emergence and development of the SCA. 
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branch of the Black People's Convention that "prominent people in Soweto" 
should establish a civic body to run the affairs of the area . This would be 
a properly representative organisation reflecting popular aspirations in the 
townships. At a meeting held on 26 June, 1977, at the offices of the World 
newspaper, attended by 61 Soweto notables, a Committee of Ten (COT) was 
elected. The official name of the COT was the Soweto Local Authority 
Interim Committee, and its aim was to study and formulate recommendations 
for the running of civic affairs in Soweto.23 
The COT comprised prominent members of Soweto's middle class with links 
to the BCM. Its chairman was Dr Nthato Motlana, a former ANC Youth 
League activist. The immediate objective of the COT was to formulate a 
model of local government in opposition to the government-sponsored local 
authorities. Its recommendations included, among other things, the creation of 
an autonomous city with a council of 50 elected members. This council 
would have a budget of R5 million to modernise the city over a five year 
period, to be financed by local taxation and an extensive subsidy from 
central government. The Committee proposed to negotiate directly with the 
government once the plan had been given public sanction through mass 
meetings.24 
During the first two years of its existence the COT was an undemocratic 
and elitist body. The Committee maintained links with the community through 
the liberal English press and commemorative rallies often held at Regina 
23 
24 
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Press) , p.209; Lodge,T. (1983); Black Pol itics in South Africa since 1945, (London and New York, 
Longman), p .. 353; Davies,R. , O'Meara,.D. and Dlamini,S. (1 988); The struggle for South Africa: A 
reference gUide to movements, organisations and institutions, Vo!.2 , New Edition , (London and 
New Jersey, Zed Books), pp.356-7. 
Gast.row,S. (1987); op.cit., p.210; Davies,R. et.a!. (1988) ; op.cit. , p.357 and Lodge,T. (1983); 
Op.Clt., p.354. 
332 
Mundi Cathedral. According to Lodge, it took the COT "a long time to start 
building a political organisation which would allow their local constituency to 
participate in their decisions rather than merely ratifying them at public 
meetings".25 
Towards the end of 1979, the Soweto Committee of Ten took steps to 
expand its popular base. In September 1979 the Committee arranged a 
conference with the theme, "Soweto - An Introspection", to deal with Soweto's 
problems and also to expand the Committee's activities. The Soweto Civic 
Association (SCA) was formed at this conference, with the Committee of Ten 
acting as an interim executive until elections could be held . The civic 
association immediately set out to build branches and by mid-1980 it had 
established 33 branches. 
Structurally, the constitution allowed for an executive committee, an inter-
branch and local branches. The inter-branch, consisting of two representatives 
from each branch and the executive committee of the SCA, met at least 
once a month. A minimum of 15 people could form a branch with its own 
five-member executive committee. The supreme decision-making body of the 
association was the Annual General Meeting which comprised the executive 
committee and ten delegates from each branch , as well as observers from 
local branches and invited observers. 
The Interim Committee immediately began to seek links with community 
organisations in other regions. In November 1979 it proposed to PEBCO that 
a national co-ordinating body of community organisations be set up. The 
PEBCO leadership felt, however, that much more grassroots organisation was 
25 Lodge,T. (1983); op.cit., p.355. 
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necessary before such a move could be contemplated. 26 
The SCA had the following aims and objectives: to build an organisation that 
is non-racial and democratic in principle; to encourage civic, social , economic, 
educational, sporting , cultural , and other related activities in the interests of 
the community; to strive for democratic decision-making and participation at 
all levels; to strive towards the improvement of the living conditions of the 
people; to act on behalf of, and to represent, the people of Soweto; to co-
operate with any organisation/committee and/or group with similar aims and 
objectives; and to oppose local government institutions that are not represen-
tative of the people. The civic aimed to draw people into the organisation 
by getting involved in popular struggles around issues like high rents and 
service charges, the unpopular community councils, and fighting for the 
recognition of Sowetans as permanent South African residents.27 
From the outset the SCA was strongly Black Consciousness (BC) in political 
orientation. However, according to Lodge, the leadership embraced and 
reflected a wide range of political opinion . It included a centre ground which 
advocated the Freedom Charter and called for a national convention ; on the 
right V.L. Kraai of the Soweto Traders' Association and Dr Motlana promoted 
the cause of black capitalism; while on the left George Wauchope espoused 
the socialism of AZAPO.28 
The SCA spurned any negotiations with WRAB, opting instead to negotiate 
directly with the government once its demands had been met. However, the 
26 
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leadership rejected negotiating with the government to discuss community 
councils unless the councils were totally autonomous, freehold tenure was 
introduced and a large . grant was made for Soweto's advancement.29 The 
SCA also rejected participation in any government-sponsored institutions. 
In 1979 the Soweto Community Council announced a 100 percent rent 
increase, to be implemented in three stages between September 1979 and 
August 1980. The SCA called for a rent boycott which was followed by a 
stay away from work and mass demonstrations.30 The rent boycott, which 
gained the support of only five per cent of Soweto's households, succeeded 
in delaying the implementation of the increase for over a year. Nonetheless, 
the rent boycott, which required a strong organisational structure and an 
active membership, demonstrated the inability of the SCA to sustain 
campaigns which involved "bread-and-butter" issues. This became more 
apparent towards the end of 1980 when the organisation appeared to have 
lost its momentum. 31 The SCA resorted to the courts in response to the 
implementation of rent increases in 1980. The failure of the court case to 
prevent the implementation of the increases weakened the SCA's leadership 
position in the townships. 
The leadership of the SCA realised that the organisation required a change 




The ineffectiveness of the SCA in the struggle for leadership in Soweto impressed upon 
Black Consciousness organisations the need to change strategy. In short, it was realised 
that Black Consciousness organisations needed to engender a broader power-base, 
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One step the SCA took to expand its organisational base arose before the 
Black Local Authorities elections held in November and December 1983. The 
SCA took a leading role in forming an Anti-Community Councils Election 
Committee, which held meetings and rallies calling for a boycott of the 
elections.33 This committee, which was composed of student, youth , women's 
and labour organisations, gave the SCA access to a wide range of 
individuals and groups.34 
The SCA was also represented at the launching conference of the Transvaal 
UDF on 21 May 1983. Three members of the SCA were elected to the 
Regional Executive Committee on 6 August, 1983.35 However, opposition to 
the Charterist position by certain members of the executive prevented the 
SCA from affiliating until October 1984, more than a year after the UDF was 
formed . 
The SCA was able to have its first general meeting in December 1984 at 
which a new executive committee of eight was elected. The new executive 
included the Rev. Frank Chikane, vice president of the Transvaal UDF, Isaac 
Mogase, former member of the ANC Youth League and founding member of 
the SCA, and Patrick Lephunya, a former office bearer of COSAS and 
administrative secretary of the Transvaal UDF. The new executive demon-
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in October, marking a shift in the balance of social forces towards the UDF. 
No elections were held in 1985 and 1986 because meetings were banned 
and many of the organisation's members detained.36 During the height of 
the township revolt in 1984 and 1985 Soweto remained relatively inactive. 
According to Shubane37 , Soweto failed to participate in the country-wide 
revolt because of the withdrawal of Soweto's best organisers and leaders 
away from the townships and into the UDF's national and regional structures; 
the absence of well-organised , community-based organisations that 
characterised many smaller townships which participated in the revolt; the 
growth of Soweto's middle class containing sections which opposed radical 
actions and the absence of radical trade unions; and internecine struggles 
between different organisations which led to a mis-direction of political activity. 
The total membership of the SCA in 1984 was 177.38 In 1985, however, 
Soweto, and in particular the SCA, experienced a "political renaissance". This 
was brought about by the declaration of the first state of emergency in July 
1985 which included Soweto in its list of "affected areas". Under emergency 
conditions activists could no longer use mass rallies, meetings, and other 
overt forms of mobilisation. "The focus shifted to building street committees, 
a process that started slowly in some Soweto townships in 1985 but gained 
momentum in 1986".39 A new leadership style emerged which was opposed 
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was placed on grassroots organisation and mass participation .40 
This remarkable rise in the SCA's organisational capacity was reinforced by 
a boycott of rent and service charges called for by the organisation on the 
1 June, 1986. The street committees played a fundamental role in monitoring 
the progress of this popular campaign and in mobilising actions against 
evictions. This led to a rapid growth of the street committee system in 
Soweto and expanded the support base of the SCA.41 In addition, 22 
Soweto town councillors fled the township in 1986 after their lives had been 
threatened and some of their houses burnt down resulting in a breakdown 
of local administration .42 
By the end of June, 1986, 80 percent of Soweto residents had stopped 
paying rent. The government tried to break the boycott: it urged people to 
pay secretly by mail ; shut off the electricity of boycotters and ; once these 
efforts proved futile , began evicting residents in August. In its call for the 
rent boycott the SCA demanded the resignation of all councillors ; the ending 
of rent payments by pensioners; refuse collection and repair of sewerage 
pipes on a regular basis; the erection of street lights in the townships; and 
the withdrawal of soldiers from townships.43 In late June 1986, the associ-
ation added a number of political demands: the lifting of the state of 
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unbanning of organisations.44 
The inclusion of these political demands is significant because they presented 
a challenge to the dominant apartheid system. The initial focus on economic 
and other local issues were linked to demands which posed a challenge to 
the authority of the apartheid reg ime. It signified the transformation of 
particular demands into a political challenge of the dominant system. 
In 1986, however, the SCA suffered a number of setbacks as the govern-
ment clamped down on organisations in Soweto. On June 16 a number of 
members of the executive committee of the SCA were caught at a roadblock, 
bringing to seven the number of leaders in detention. The lack of leadership 
in Soweto led to confusion and chaos. Street committees floundered in the 
absence of community leaders, while the youth began to take over the 
meetings.45 In addition, Soweto res idents claimed that the security forces 
were targeting political activists following a number of attacks on activists and 
their homes.46 Violent clashes between UDF-affil iated organisations and Black 
Consciousness groups aggravated the situation . 
Under these conditions, the SCA endorsed a resolution taken by residents 
to form "people's militias" or self-defence units, stating that the situation "we 
are being forced into" may lead the organisation to review "our commitment 
to non-violent struggle".47 The youth organisations and the SCA divided 
44 
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Soweto into eight areas, each designated by an acronym.48 In each of 
these areas street committees were set up which usually consisted of four 
parents (two men and two women) and two youths (one schooling , and one 
working or unemployed). 
An in-depth survey of attitudes to the rent boycott in Soweto conducted by 
Philip Frankel provides insight into the SCA's support in the townships.49 
Frankel's survey indicates a high degree of political mobilisation in Soweto 
in 1987. 43,1 percent of respondents said there were street committees in 
their streets. 45,2 percent of those who had street committees in their streets 
participated in committee meetings. In addition , not one respondent was 
opposed to the SCA, although 79,2 percent said that they had not attended 
meetings of the civic. 43,1 percent of the respondents actively supported the 
SCA. 
The rent boycott continued into the following year and the council persisted 
with the evictions. In response, the street and block committees called for 
a one-day stay away in April 1987 and another two-day stayaway on 5 and 
6 May.50 The rent boycott also placed some pressure on the SCA to 
transform its tactics. The SCA used the law to challenge the eviction of rent 
defaulters - at least five legal actions were launched in 1986 and 1987.51 
The evictions and power cuts prompted by the boycott exacted a toll on 
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constituents to settle it. 52 This led to tentative negotiations between the SCA 
and the local town clerk, Mr Nico Malan. 
In May negotiations were held between the council and SCA lawyers who 
were challenging the confiscation of the possessions of tenants who had 
been evicted. 53 However, the SCA held that it would only negotiate with the 
town clerk on the issue of the rent boycott. It was argued that councillors 
were representatives of "discredited" local authorities, while the town clerk was 
an official government representative. Negotiations broke down because of 
Malan's insistence that the SCA negotiate with the Soweto Town Council, 
which he saw as "the only official platform" for residents of Soweto. 54 The 
SCA, on the other hand, rejected talks with the council as a matter of 
principle and because it felt that the council was powerless to solve the 
problems faced by Soweto residents. 55 By the end of 1987 the majority of 
Soweto residents were still withholding rent while the council continued 
evicting rent defaulters. 
8.3.2. Alexandra Action Committee (AAC) 
At the end of 1985, three organisations dominated politics in Alexandra 
township56: the Alexandra Residents ' Association (ARA) , the Alexandra Civic 
Association (ACA) , and the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO). ARA was 
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introduced by the government in 1979. Alexandra was to be "replanned for 
the accommodation of landowners and other families" and a masterplan to 
upgrade the township was unveiled in 1980.57 ACA grew out of an 
opposition party which had contested and lost the 1981 council elections. It 
then decided against participating in the election, believing this would lend 
credibility to government structures and affiliated to the UDF in 1983.58 
ARA saw itself as the representative of working class interests and 
emphasised the role of the activist as facilitator rather than "line-giver", and 
careful, slow, house-by-house organisation.59 By contrast, AyeO and ACA 
were inclined to rely on pamphlets and press statements rather than slow 
grassroots organisation . AYCO tended to emphasise nationally co-ordinated 
political campaigns and underplayed local grievances.6o ARA, by contrast, 
focused on local issues such as opposition to the development scheme and 
rent increases. 
ARA's domination of opposition politics in Alexandra was eroded in late 1985 
when AYCO became a significant actor in township politics. AyeO began 
organising and educating its youth constituency by holding weekly discussions 
on the education crisis, township social problems, apartheid and capitalism, 
and organising youth street-by-street. The youth congress also charged its 
membership with the responsibility for conscientising their parents. However, 
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1985 state of emergency when the entire executive was detained.61 
An unruly element took over political activity as more and more experienced 
activists were removed through further detentions. Youth leaders who were 
released from detention in December attempted to reassert control and 
channel political activity in a positive direction by forming groups for each of 
the four sections into which they had divided Alexandra. These groups, they 
believed , could promote grassroots rather than centralised organisation.62 
Between December 1985 and February 1986, activists in the township held 
a series of meetings leading to the formation of the MC. On the 17 
February, an acting executive was elected with Moses Mayekiso, general 
secretary of the Metal and Allied Workers' Union, as chairman . The acting 
executive was mandated to: 
1. organise the community into yard, block and street committees; 
2. help the people to solve their own community problems; 
3. represent the community to other organisations and the authorities; 
4. unite people regardless of their race, colour, belief, creed or tribe.53 
Mayekiso's trade union background had a strong influence on practices within 
the MC.
64 
Officials and representatives had to be accountable to the 
membership and were obliged to obtain a mandate from members. This was 
best indicated by the workshops and regular report back meetings held in 
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Resistance politics in Alexandra was transformed at the beginning of 1986 
in what has been termed the "Six Day War" by residents . At a funeral of 
an unemployed youth, attended by over 11 ,000 people on 15 February, police 
fired on the mourners and four people were killed and 27 injured.65 Over 
the following days the youth clashed with the police and army and a virtual 
civil war raged in the township. Tension in the township mounted when 
soldiers in armoured personnel carriers swarmed into Alexandra to disperse 
about 30,000 people marching to the police station on February 18. 
A mood of anger set in and over the next few months a rad ical conscious-
ness took root in the township. Flags of the ANC and SACP were displayed 
at a funeral for 17 victims of clashes with the security forces on 5 March; 
calls were made for the formation of street committees as forms of people's 
government; demands for affordable rent and electrification of the township 
were linked to political demands such as the dissolution of the council and 
municipal police, withdrawal of troops and police from the township, and 
unbanning of the ANC.66 
During April consumer and rent boycotts were launched in Alexandra as part 
of a national programme intended to isolate all collaborators socially and 
effect the collapse of local administration . On 22 April , Alexandra 's mayor, 
Rev. Buti , and three remaining councillors resigned in the wake of petrol-
bomb attacks and gutting of their homes, boycotts of their businesses and 
general ostracism.67 
The collapse of local administration and diminishing support for ARA placed 
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the Youth Congress and the Action Committee at the forefront of the 
township's politics. A day after the councillors resigned residents stayed away 
from work and students boycotted schools. Leaders called for the establish-
ment of self defence units and claimed that "people's power" had been 
established. This confident outlook was dashed in mid-May when the security 
forces cordoned off the township , set up checkpoints at every exit and 
carried out a house-to-house search .68 
On 25 May, block representatives met to elect an executive committee to 
serve the AAC until its inaugural meeting in August. On the same day, the 
AAC was unanimously elected sole representative of Alexandra during a mass 
meeting of all organisations in the township. The ARA was unilaterally 
disbanded while the ACA was dissolved and incorporated into AAC structures. 
The Youth Congress, it was decided, would continue to organise its 
constituencies under the auspices of the AAC.69 
The AAC was primarily concerned with issues which immediately affected the 
residents of Alexandra. These included unemployment, police harassment, 
informers, high taxi and bus fares , low wages, high rents, poor education, 
poor housing, the demolition of shacks by police, the presence of troops in 
the township, and the "bucket system" of sewerage. 70 
Street committees also operated as "people's courts". At least five of these 
courts were established in the township. According to Seekings, the courts 
seem to have begun as advice offices, with residents helping others trace 
relatives who were missing after the "Six-Day War". These advice offices 
68 
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grew, as people brought a wider range of problems until a number of courts 
were established, partly in connection with the anti-crime campaigns. 71 The 
AAC thus performed certain administrative and judicial functions normally 
reserved for the authorities and residents in the township subsequently 
declared that they had established "people's power". 
The government's response to the establishment of "people's power" in 
Alexandra was a combination of repression and economic reform. On May 
23 the government appointed Steve Burger as township administrator. When 
Burger assumed this position, control of the township was divided between 
the security forces and the AAC through its network of street and area 
committees. 
The declaration of another state of emergency in mid-1986, and widespread 
detentions and the occupation of the township by the security forces crushed 
popular resistance. 72 The township was invaded by security forces the night 
before the emergency was declared and thousands were detained, including 
the entire AAC leadership. This was followed by 24-hour roadblocks as the 
SADF cordoned off the townShip. In addition, numerous residents were 
charged with public violence, sedition, treason, subversion, arson and murder 
in an attempt to counter the ideology of "people's power".73 Four members 
of the executive committee, including Mayekiso, were arrested and 
subsequently charged with treason. 
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first phase of the rehabilitation process to enable the second phase of urban 
and social renewal to get under way".74 They claimed that: 
The entire leadership of the three major revolutionary front organisations in the 
township ... were in detention, or had fled, or in one case, was dead (allegedly murdered 
by AZAPO supporters.75 
Most of Alexandra's political activists were in detention, prison or hiding by 
the end of 1986. In addition , by the beginning of 1987, the rent boycott had 
virtually disappeared (87,82 percent of residents were paying their rent) , along 
with the school boycott.76 However, according to an activist: "Although 
organisations operate under great pressure, they are carrying on very, very 
well. They hold meetings underground, nobody knows where or how. They 
are in fact carrying out the struggle in spite of the difficulties".77 
Yard committees and people's courts continued to operate, but were "not so 
effective because of the clampdown". However, according to an activist: "Our 
support is still strong . People were mobilised and conscientised and the next 
step was to organise them, to get them into structures. Now we're having 
to talk to people about the clampdown and how it affects the struggle". In 
addition, "one difference is that [organisations] are now more vigorous than 
they were when they were above ground. In my view, the government has 
taught the people more methods of avoiding the police and still carrying 
on".78 
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The second aspect of the government's strategy was a programme, conducted 
by the Alexandra mini-JMC, to upgrade the township. The service section of 
the mini-JMC was charged with the task of upgrading the township in order 
to remove some of the causes of political resistance in the township. 
Furthermore, the socio-economic and information programmes of the mini-JMC 
were aimed at legitimising the local authority .79 From September, 1986, 
Alexandra was firmly under the control of the authorities. The urban renewal 
programme was complemented by a crackdown on the MC, involving the 
removal of its leadership and intimidation of its members. Some 40 members 
of the MC were still in detention or facing trial for treason at the end of 
the year. In addition, vigilante attacks on activists increased in frequency from 
March 1987.80 
During the period from the declaration of the state of emergency to the end 
of 1987, the civic was marginalised from township politics by the operations 
of the security forces, vigilantes and the Alexandra mini-JMC, as well as the 
immobilisation of the leadership through political trials. 
8.3.3. Mamelodi Civic Association (MCA) 
On November 21 , 1985, 50,000 residents of Mamelodi township near 
Pretoria
81 
marched to protest a ban on weekend funerals , the restriction 
against more than fifty mourners attending each funeral , high rents, and the 
presence of troops in the townships. The marchers, who were led by women, 
were fired on by the police, leading to the death of thirteen people and the 
injury of hundreds. The outrage over the police actions led to widespread 
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mobilisation and the emergence of a civic organisation in the township. 
Before the events of 1985, the leading mass organisations in Mamelodi were 
branches of COSAS, the Mamelodi Action Committee, which was formed in 
the wake of the 1980/81 school boycotts, the Release Mandela Campaign, 
the Zakheni Women's Organisation (ZWO) and the Mamelodi Youth 
Organisation (MAYO). All these organisations affiliated to the UDF when the 
latter was formed in 1983.82 
Political mobilisation during 1984 revolved around school boycotts, door-to-door 
visits during the UDF Million Signature Campaign and the Federation of 
South African Women (FEDSAW) anniversary. Political discussion in the area 
was also stimulated by the decisive rejection of the tri-cameral parliament and 
the September 3 Vaal uprising, while residents strongly supported the 
November 1984 regional stayaway and the Black Christmas campaign . During 
1985, parents formed the Mamelodi Parents Association (MPA) following a 
continuing school boycott and clashes with the police.83 In 1985, Mamelodi's 
town councillors were also subjected to popular pressure to resign and this 
led to the resignation of three councillors during the year. 
Although Mamelodi was not included in the list of "affected areas" during the 
1985-86 partial state of emergency, activists spoke of an undeclared state of 
emergency in the township. The authorities banned meetings while the 
security forces disrupted mass gatherings. Residents found it impossible to 
hold meetings, making communication difficult. Under these conditions, unruly 
elements in the township "hijacked the struggle for their own ends", 
82 




demanding money from businessmen in the name of COSAS.84 Local youths 
and elders met in July 1985 to root out the hooliganism plaguing the 
township. 
After this meeting youth activists in the township, particularly those belonging 
to COSAS and MAYO, began setting up Disciplinary Committees (DCs). The 
DCs soon developed into a network of organisations which crisscrossed the 
whole township. These committees were largely responsible for the campaign 
to end increasing crime committed in the name of the youth organisations 
and to provide political education .8s 
The main activists in grassroots organisations were the youth , who dominated 
the DCs. This position changed on November 21, 1985, when increasing 
numbers were drawn into community organisations in the wake of increasing 
opposition to the town council and high rents, and the massacre of protesting 
residents. Popular resentment was sparked by inexplicable fluctuations in rent 
and tariff accounts between July and November.86 
On 17 November 1985, the MPA called a meeting to discuss a number of 
points of conflict following a stayaway organised by the youth . These 
included: the fluctuating rent and service tariffs; the SADF's presence in the 
township; police brutality during the school boycotts; and the banning of 
funerals for unrest victims. A march to the administration board offices was 
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the community and promoted mass mobilisation. 
Heavily armed policemen and soldiers ordered the marching demonstrators to 
gather at the local stadium if they wanted their grievances to be heard. The 
chanting crowd prevented Mamelodi's mayor, Bennet Ndlazi , from speaking. 
Police opened fire on the demonstrators after they ignored an order to 
disperse.88 In the aftermath of the massacre, residents decided to embark 
on a rent boycott and intensified the process of establishing a civic associ-
ation in the township. An interim committee of seven people was elected 
towards the end of the year and the MCA was formally launched in April 
1986. Thirty-five section committees, with their respective street committees, 
were established. Block committees were also developed in the hostels after 
differences between residents and hostel inmates were settled .89 
The basic units of organisation were the street and hostel committees. These 
were represented on the 35 section committees. Each of the sections elected 
two representatives to sit on the central committee, which had seventy 
members. This committee met every fortnight and represented Mamelodi's top 
decision making forum. Ten central committee members, and four representa-
tives elected by MAYO, the Zakheni Women's Organisation and the newly 
formed Mamelodi Teachers Union (MATU) formed the executive. 
Most elected civic members were workers - active shop stewards and 
members of COSATU affiliates. The MCA drew together organisations of 
students, youth, women , teachers and representatives of streets and hostels 
and ensured direct communication between the township and most Pretoria 
88 
89 
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factories. 90 Section committees discussed and enforced the rent boycott. The 
section committees also examined legal, rent or eviction problems; family and 
neighbour disputes; and cleaning the section. The town council, responding 
to the rent boycott, cut off garbage collection in the township and from 
December, 1985, section committees ran refuse removal and road cleaning 
programmes. 
The MCA also set up "people's courts", as people were encouraged to 
boycott the police. People's courts were also responsible for political 
education and street meetings discussed street issues and broader political 
and other issues.91 The youth built people's parks to honour the massacre 
victims, and gave them names such as Mandela Park, Tambo Place.92 In 
the first half of 1986, Mamelodi residents regularly attended meetings of the 
street and section committees, participating in a wide range of discussions 
on conditions in Mamelodi as well as national political issues. They also 
boycotted the police station, and took their disputes to the people's courtS.93 
However, the declaration of the state of emergency in mid-1986 transformed 
township politics in Mamelodi. The primary target of the security clampdown 
was the MCA as detentions and mass arrests removed the civic's leadership 
and scores of members. The wave of repression was followed by a 
programme of "township upgrading". The "welfare" committee of the Mamelodi 
mini-JMC co-ordinated a massive programme of upgrading of infrastructure 
and services, while co-ordinating the actions of government departments and 
90 
"Mamelodi: Back to the roots" , op. cit. , p.13. 
91 Loc.cit. 
92 
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actively promoting the position of the Mamelodi Town Council. 94 The security 
section of the mini-JMC, the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), gathered 
information about all organisations and kept track of where activists lived. 
The JOC effectively curtailed the activities of the MCA by intimidating many 
residents against becoming involved with the civic association and disrupting 
MCA activities through its security network. In addition, the JOC enabled the 
authorities to regain control over the day-to-day administrative functions of the 
township.95 Repression and the redevelopment programme also strengthened 
the position of the Mamelodi Town Council. Despite these efforts by the 
authorities, the MCA continued to function, albeit at a fairly low level.96 Sy 
the second half of 1987, however, the security forces had given way to 
builders' lorries, road-making equipment and teams of workmen .97 
8.4. The Eastern Cape 
8.4.1. The Port Elizabeth Slack Civic Association (PESCO) 
The first of the modern mass-based civic organisations emerged in the 
Eastern Cape city of Port Elizabeth .98 PESCO was formed on October 10, 
1979, "to represent the aspirations of the African people and to take up their 
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documented.100 
PEBCO's formation was preceded by a 100 percent increase In the cost of 
living for Africans in the Port Elizabeth area. A public meeting on 10 
October 1979 to protest against increases in transport, fuel and lighting, 
township service charges, and food costs resolved to create a larger body 
embracing the residents of all Port Elizabeth's townships. The meeting elected 
a "Committee of Ten", with Thozamile Botha as convenor, to draft a 
constitution by October 26. A mass meeting attended by between eight and 
nine thousand people was held in New Brighton on the 30 October where 
the constitution was adopted and a new executive elected .101 
According to the constitution, the ten-member executive committee was elected 
at the annual general meeting attended by four delegates from each of the 
branches. The council of the organisation consisted of one delegate from 
each of the branches and all the members of the executive. The next tier 
of the organisation was formed by the branches which generally dealt with 
local issues. Decisions of the council were conveyed to the residents through 
local mass meetings where the views of the people were gathered and 
decisions made on strategy. 102 Another means of communication between 
the council and the people were the frequent mass rallies called by the 
organisation.103 
The constitution defined the aims and objectives of the organisation as 
100 
101 
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follows: to fight for equal rights for all the people of Port Elizabeth; to fight 
all discriminatory legislation enacted by the government and local authorities; 
to seek participation in decision-making on all matters affecting the people 
of South Africa; to fight for the granting of the right to blacks to buy land 
under freehold title at any place of their choice; and to resist any attempt, 
direct or indirect, to deprive blacks of their South African citizenship. 104 
PESCO's aims included the creation of one municipality for the whole of Port 
Elizabeth, thus rejecting community councils and separate municipalities for 
whites and blacks. PESCO was only prepared to negotiate with the 
government in an all-race national convention , which should follow the 
unbanning of the liberation organisations and the release of political prisoners, 
making it one of the first organisations inside the country to make these 
demands. For the achievement of its aims, the organisation utilised the 
strategy of pressure and demand as an alternative to both negotiation and 
violence, the latter being regarded as counter-productive under existing circum-
stances. 105 PESCO rejected participation in government institutions and 
collaboration with organisations participating In such institutions. PESCO 
justified its involvement in workplace and community issues by drawing 
attention to the connection between low wages and the ability to pay 
rent. 106 
Membership of the organisation was open to blacks only, which included 
coloureds and Indians.107 At the time of formation, PESCO consisted of 
three branches made up of the existing residents' associations in Zwide, 
104 Ibid., p.20 and Evans,M. (1980); op.cit. , p.47. 
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Kwaford and Tembalethu. Residents' associations were soon established in the 
Kwazakhele, Walmer and New Brighton townships.108 In March 1980, 
PEBCO was joined by the Malabar Ratepayers' Association representing the 
Indians of Malabar. A representative of the coloured township of Gelvandale 
was also elected to the organisation's executive in anticipation of the 
formation of a branch. Membership grew rapidly with a reported 3 000 card 
carrying members in January 1980, rising to 5,000 when the Malabar 
Ratepayers' Association joined in March.109 PEBCO's popularity was also 
augmented by the supportive role it played in the two strikes at the Ford 
Motor Company towards the end of 1979.110 
PEBCO's composition and ideological base reflect the diversity of support the 
organisation enjoyed in its first year. The leadership was dominated by the 
petty bourgeoisie but the organisation's radical confrontationist line generated 
a great deal of support among students and workers as well as businessmen 
and professionals. These included both older former ANC members as well 
as many who had been activists in the BCM in the seventies. PEBCO's 
emphasis on black unity in the struggle against white domination led to a 
tendency to ignore the distinct class differentiation within the organisation. 111 
In this period a significant change in PEBCO policy occurred . At the time 
of its formation in 1979 the major national political organisation was AZAPO, 
with which PEBCO maintained links. The dominant position of Black 
Consciousness among black people was eroded during this period as a 
political realignment towards the ANC spread throughout the country. PEBCO 
108 Ibid., p.33. 
109 1b 'd I ., p.36. 
110 Ibid., pp.28-32 and Brewer,J.D. (1987); op.cif., pp.188-189. 
111 
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became a part of this process in 1982 when it, together with COSAS and 
other community organisations in Port Elizabeth , commemorated the Defiance 
Campaign and the foundation of the Freedom Charter, and stressed the need 
for different race groups to cooperate in order to achieve democracy in 
South Africa.112 
Five PEBCO leaders, including Botha, were detained in early 1980. Botha 
and the others were released on February 27 and he and three other 
PEBCO leaders were immediately served with three-year banning orders. He 
subsequently left the country to join the ANC in exile.113 The loss of 
Botha's charismatic leadership was one of the main reasons for the 
subsequent decline of PEBCO. During the following four years PEBCO 
experienced repeated leadership crises and eventually declined in signifi-
cance. 114 By the end of 1983, the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (PEYCO) 
had taken leadership of township politics. 
The first concrete attempts to revitalize PEBCO came towards the end of 
1984 when Edgar Ngoyi, Samuel Hashe and Henry Fazzie became involved 
in the civic association . Ngoyi and Fazzie were both ANC stalwarts and were 
elected to the PEBCO executive a month after their release in October, 
bringing to five the number of executive committee members who were 
graduates of Robben Island.11 5 The executive committee immediately com-
mitted the organisation to struggles around rent and service charges. 
112 Brewer,J.D. (1987); op.cit., p.273. 
113 
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In 1979 PEBCO emerged from below as an umbrella body for the local 
residents' associations. When PEBCO re-emerged at the end of 1984, it did 
not have the benefit of a strong foundation in mass-based residents' 
associations. The revival of the civic came from above and, instead of 
establishing grassroots structures, the leadership retained the mass-meeting 
strategy which had been appropriate in the days when PESCO was an 
umbrella body. 116 
The opportunity for the civic association's first campaign came in November 
1984, following a proposed rent increase by the Khayamnandi Town Council. 
PESCO threatened a boycott of council-owned liquor outlets , a bus boycott 
and a one-day stayaway. The Council backed down and the rent hikes were 
withdrawn leading to an increase in PEBCO's support.117 In March 1985 
PESCO proposed another stayaway to protest job cutbacks, the merger of 
Ford and General Motors companies, and a rise in the price of petrol. The 
stayaway was planned for March 18 and was to be preceded by a boycott 
of stores during the weekend of the 16 and 17 March. The stayaway was 
supported by 90 per cent of the African workers of Port Elizabeth .118 
PESCO subsequently called for a boycott of white-owned shops which began 
on July 15. According to White: 
By early November (1985) the boycott in Port Elizabeth was coming to a head. In the first 
place the CB (consumer boycott) was - and had been for almost four months - still sol idly 
in place and, within the retail sector, was having devastating economic effects. Secondly, 
the State of Emergency and the enormous repression unleashed against township 
residents, their organisations and their leaders had simply not achieved its desired 
effects: "unrest" and mass militancy were continuing and spreading, albeit on a rather 
shaky organisational basis and often in a rather directionless way. Such factors - leading, 
116 L b M " G a our onltonng roup (1985); "Report: The March stayaways in Port Elizabeth and 
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it seems, to a flurry of negotiations and liaison between local business and elements 
within the state locally (particularly the police) - prompted authorities to release all the 
central Port Elizabeth leadership in mid-November.
119 
The consumer boycotts and subsequent clampdown by the state on 
community organisations resulted in two important developments in Port 
Elizabeth. Firstly, negotiations between the Port Elizabeth Chamber of 
Commerce and the local state resulted in a victory for the masses. 
Community organisations agreed to lift the boycott by December 1 after the 
state withdrew the SAP and SADF from the townships, permitted those in 
hiding to re-emerge and conceded several minor demands (e.g. concessions 
to black pensioners).120 
Secondly, PESCO began an intensive re-organisation process at a mass level. 
During the consumer boycott it became evident that organisational infrastruc-
ture and political discipline were weak and led to mis-directed youth militancy. 
A criminal element emerged which used the name of progressive 
organisations to extort money and alcohol from residents of the townships. 
In addition, politically rooted inter-faction violence split Port Elizabeth's African 
population throughout 1985 and early 1986. This violence had its roots in the 
quest for regional political domination by the UDF and AZAPO. 
Immediately after their release in December, the Port Elizabeth leaders set 
about addressing these problems and , taking the example set in Cradock, 
began to organise street committees.121 At a prayer meeting organised by 
the UDF in December 1985, attended by more than 1,000 people, the first 
119 White,R. (1986); "A tide has risen. A breach has occurred: Towards an assessment of the strategic 
value of the consumer boycotts", in South African Labour Bulletin, (VoI. 11 , No.5, May), pp.89-90. 
120 Ibid., p.90. 
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area committee members (all recognised church and civic leaders) were 
elected.122 During 1986 PEBCO was able to expand its membership 
because of these structures. The consumer boycott contributed to the rapid 
development of the street committees. The "fact that the strategy involved 
practically every resident in the township and that any significant change in 
direction required widespread support from township residents laid the basis 
for the development of these structures.,,123 
In 1986, another stayaway was organised by Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage 
community organisations to commemorate the March 1985 massacre in 
Uitenhage. This stay-away was supported by unions in both cities and 
virtually all African workers stayed at home, as well as 25 percent of all 
coloureds in Port Elizabeth and 79 percent in Uitenhage. 124 Subsequent 
stayaways on May Day and June 16 were also well supported by blacks in 
both cities. 
The stayaways of 1986 introduced three new developments in Port Elizabeth. 
Firstly, the stayaways were marked by co-operation between COSATU unions 
and local UDF affiliates. Secondly, this co-operation brought coloured workers 
into the actions, extending township-generated protests beyond group area 
borders. Thirdly, a small , but growing , number of businessmen began to 
accept the legitimacy of popular demands: some accepted that May Day and 
June 16 should be paid holidays; and, there were no reported dismissals. 
In addition, PEBCO was able to continue with negotiations with the local 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, individual employers, and the state, 
122 E t p . as ern rovlnce Herald, (17.12.85), p.1. 
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including the SAP.125 
Sy the end of the year, however, PESCO, and almost every other UDF 
affiliate in the Eastern Cape, was in a state of chaos. Only one regional 
leader remained at large, while most of the members of PESCO's executive 
committee, including Henry Fazzie and Mkhuseli Jack, were in detention. 
Mass meetings and funerals were banned and the consumer boycott had 
petered out. The absence of the leadership led to confusion at the base and 
street committees operated sporadically and without purpose and direction.126 
In addition, residents were subjected to a reign of terror by lawless bands 
of youth once the street and area committee became inoperative. 
During the second half of the year, the government used emergency 
regulations to remove leaders, and to destroy grassroots and middle-level 
township groups. In the first two weeks of the emergency, as many as 200 
area and street committee members were detained and by January 1987, 
over 1,000 township residents had been detained.127 Port Elizabeth's 
townships were invaded by the security forces and, from July 19, 1986, were 
cut off from the rest of the world by kilometres of razorwire fence. In the 
first week of July, the government prohibited 52 Eastern Cape organisations 
from holding or advertising in-door gatherings.128 
On November 3, 1986, community organisations in Port Elizabeth initiated 
another consumer boycott, demanding the release of Nelson Mandela and all 
political prisoners, the unbanning of political organisations, the unconditional 
125 Ibid., p.71 . 
126 Mufson,S. (1990); op.cit., pp.266-7. 
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return of all exiles, the abolition of apartheid , the lifting of the state of 
emergency and the release of all detainees. During the campaign , residents 
reported that vigilantes ("witdoeke") were operating in the townships. These 
vigilantes, identified by their "blue overalls", were seen helping staff security 
force roadblocks.129 
Sy the end of 1987, PESCO was relatively weaker because of the mass 
arrests and widespread repression in the area . More importantly, the main 
problem at the time was the quality of leadership in the executive committee 
and the council. The removal of experienced and respected leaders from the 
political scene and restrictions imposed on meetings and mass mobilisation 
created a leadership vacuum which affected the functioning of the 
organisation. 
Although PESCO still functioned, meetings and attendance at meetings of the 
structures was erratic. The council 's meetings, which had a maximum of 25 
street and area representatives, had a regular attendance of 15. Constitu-
tionally, it was required to meet twice a month but in reality met only once 
a month. In addition, PESCO called campaigns but failed to use the 
opportunity to strengthen its street and area committees, develop new activists 
and generate new skills required under the emergency situation. 
Port Elizabeth was also targeted by the state as an area designated for 
"upgrading". R43 million was ear-marked for unemployment relief, infrastructural 
upgrading, self-help housing and the training of municipal policemen in 35 
Eastern Cape townships. These included townships in Aliwal North, Bedford, 
Cathcart, Cradock, Fort Beaufort, Grahamstown, King William's Town, 
129 The Weekly Mail, (7.11 .86 - 13.11 .86), p.4. 
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Kirkwood, Molteno, East London, Queenstown, and Uitenhage.13o This 
demonstrated the state's desire to bring about material reforms as a means 
of reducing urban tensions. 
8.4.2. Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation (UBCO) 
The Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation was formed in October 1979, the 
same month PEBCO emerged on the political scene, but soon declined in 
significance.131 1980 saw widespread mass action in the Eastern Cape as 
a whole as school students in the region joined a country-wide school 
boycott and workers in the automobile industry embarked on a strike for 
higher wages. The repression that came after the school boycott and the 
strike made mass organisation at a civic level difficult and contributed to the 
decline of UBCO.132 In addition , differences between trade unionists in the 
area finally resulted in the destruction of UBCO. 
In 1980, FOSATU affiliates in Uitenhage maintained a harmonious relationship 
with UBCO. However, in June 1981 , tensions arose in UBCO between a 
prominent community leader and FOSATU. Mr Thomas Kobese accused the 
union federation of planning to infiltrate community organisations for its own 
ends. He resigned from the newly elected executive on the grounds that the 
elections were undemocratic and rigged in favour of FOSATU supporters. 
Earlier in the year, Kobese had resigned as FOSATU secretary in Uitenhage 
to join the rival Motor Assembly and Component Workers' Union of South 
130 Eastern Province Herald, (15.11 .85). Cited in SWilling,M. (1988); "'Because your yard is too 
big": Squatter struggles, the local state and dual power in Uitenhage, 1985-1 986', paper presented 
to the African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, p.22. 
131 Refer to Appendix B below for a summary of the conditions underlying mass mobilisation in 
Uitenhage and to Appendix C below for a summary of the emergence and development of LSD 
132 Lund,S. (1986); "The battle for Kabah: Orderly urbanisation and control", in South African Labour 
Bulletin, (VoI.11 , No.8, Sep/Oct), p.55. 
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Africa (MACWUSA).133 
Between 1981 and 1983, UBCO experienced a decline and ultimately 
collapsed and community leadership passed to the UDF-aligned Uitenhage 
Youth Congress (UYCO) when the latter was formed at the end of 1984. 
Conflict between UDF affiliates and FOSATU affiliates in the town was sharp 
because the UDF's key leaders were also officials of MACWUSA. Many 
young people were leaving school without any prospect of finding a job. 
Some joined UYCO while others, with no links to any group, roamed the 
townships attacking police and assaulting or killing residents suspected of 
collaborating with the authorities. This served to sharpen the divide between 
unions and community groupS.134 
UBCO's revival occurred in the wake of a massacre of residents in early 
1985. The UDF-aligned community organisations, including UBCO, called a 
stayaway for the 18 March to protest against sales tax and price increases. 
FOSATU unions refused to support the stayaway, so increasing tension 
between FOSATU-unions and the local UDF. The community organisations 
decided to proceed with the stayaway which was heeded by one in three 
workers.
135 
However, events over the next few days brought about a 
transformation of the relationship between the older unions and community 
organisations as well as a revival of UBCO. 
On March 21, 1985 police fired on a crowd attending a banned funeral, 
killing 21 people. The following day, an estimated 17,000 students boycotted 
133 "UBCD leader in walk-out over allegations of Fosatu infiltration", in SASPU National , (VoI.2, 
No.6, August 1981 ), p.5. 
134 Friedman,S. (1987); Building towards tomorrow: African workers in trade unions, 1970-1987, 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press), pp.452-3. 
135 Ibid., p.452. 
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schools, and a number of violent clashes between students and the police 
occurred in the townships. 136 Popular resentment was fuelled by the 
occupation of the townships by the security forces and bans imposed on 
memorial services. A number of policemen's homes were destroyed and on 
the 23 March, an angry crowd murdered the only remaining town councillor, 
Tamsanqa Benjamin Kinikini, and three of his sons.137 
In the absence of a local council, the residents of Uitenhage's townships 
began to set up their own co-ordinating body, bypassing government 
structures to begin administering garbage collection, schools, and health care. 
According to one resident: "Organisations in lJitenhage feel that with the 
community council gone, we need street-level democracy in the townships to 
deal with our problems. So through mass meetings, house meetings, and 
sending letters to residents, we tried to popularize this idea".138 Planact 
found that: "After the Langa massacre, members of all sections of the 
community flocked to join community organisations. During the course of the 
year many new organisations were formed" .139 In December, UBCO took 
over the function of coordinating the activities of the new specialised 
organisations.14o 
During 1985, Uitenhage's African community embarked on three consumer 
boycotts: between April and July, late July and 27 September, and 11 
136 
137 
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October and 14 December. In that year, tensions in Uitenhage mounted once 
plans were revealed for the removal of the entire Langa community to 
KwaNobuhle. The government declared a state of emergency on July 21 and 
some 85 activists in Uitenhage were immediately detained. Many others were 
forced underground leaving a leadership vacuum in the townships. The threat 
of removal and an increased security presence in the area led to the 
outbreak of violence as township youth squads (amabutho) attacked security 
patrols. 
At the end of October, leaders re-emerged and re-established contact with 
their organisations and older residents responded to the activities of the 
amabutho by forming their own structures. These factors accounted for the 
spread of street committees and the formation of Parents Crisis Committees 
to end the school boycott. 141 
During the first half of 1986, membership of local affiliates of the UDF 
expanded while students engaged in a boycott of classes and enforced a 
consumer boycott of white-owned shops in Uitenhage. However, local 
organisation was threatened by the government's attempt to remove all the 
residents of Langa township to KwaNobuhle. Local UDF affiliates took the 
government to court to stop the removal. Notwithstanding, after the declaration 
of the state of emergency on 12 June 1986, police rounded up Langa's 
leaders, then forcefully removed the township's 20,000 residents to a 
collection of tents in KwaNobuhle. 142 
Before the removal, tensions emerged within local affiliates of the UDF in 
Langa. According to Mufson, the sustained school boycott upset parents who 
141 Swilling,M. (19888); op.cit., p.11 . 
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wanted their children to attend school. The township had only four shops, 
and the consumer boycott of white-owned shops made shopping difficult. 
Harsh punishments were meted out by people's courts to suspected informers, 
people who declined to join the consumer boycott, and common criminals. 143 
The declaration of the emergency, the detention of leaders and the 
subsequent removal effectively destroyed organisation in Langa. This was 
coupled with a sustained effort to upgrade KwaNobuhle in an attempt both 
to lure Langa's residents to the new township and to remove the material 
causes of resistance in the township. 
In KwaNobuhle, the emergence of a vigilante group, the African Parents 
Concerned Committee (APCC), placed further constraints on community 
organisations. The APCC was able to draw on between three and four 
thousand men in an attack on local affiliates of the UDF on January 4, 
1987, beginning a wave of conflict in the area.144 
Sy the end of 1987, civic organisations in the Eastern Cape as a whole 
were experiencing similar problems faced by PESCO: the lack of skilled 
leadership following the removal of experienced and respected leaders from 
the political scene through detention and political trials; and restrictions 
imposed on meetings and mass mobilisation. The restrictions imposed under 
the state of emergency made it difficult for people to meet, resulting in the 
destruction of street and area communities. In Uitenhage, the leadership 
vacuum affected the functioning of USCG but also had a more important 
negative affect. The invasion of KwaNobuhle by the security forces and the 
leadership vacuum led to widespread confrontation between the security forces 
143 Ibid., p.268. 
144 .Lo~ge ,T. (1~91) ; op.cit., p.168. The confl ict between the APCC and local UDF organisations 
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and the youth. Barricades were set up in the township and the youth 
attacked security vehicles with petrol bombs. 
These confrontations intensified repression and the introduction of municipal 
policemen and kitskonstabels (special policemen) curtailed the activities of 
many organisations and activists. Despite the destruction of community 
organisations and the intense level of repression , the spirit of defiance in 
KwaNobuhle was not destroyed. At the end of 1987, the township was one 
of the five Eastern Cape townships - out of a total of 45 - in which the 
town council had not been revived . 
8.4.3. Duncan Village Residents Association (DVRA) 
Organised labour in East London played a central role in popular struggles 
during the early 1980s.145 In the absence of a mass-based community 
organisation trade unions emerged as the dominant form of organisation in 
the townships. SAAWU in particular functioned as a community organisation 
with its leaders playing a central role in such struggles as the 1983 bus 
boycott and resistance to Ciskeian independence.146 The dominance of trade 
unions in township struggles laid the basis for linking community and 
workplace struggles in the area.147 However, the existence of a powerful 
and militant trade union may also have delayed the emergence of a 
community organisation. 
Widespread dissatisfaction with the Ciskei Transport Corporation (CTC) was 
145 Refer to Appendix B below for a summary of the conditions underlying mass mobilisation in 
Duncan Village and to Appendix C below for a summary of the emergence and development of 
the DVRA. 
146 SWilling,M. (1984) ; '''The buses smell of blood": The East London boycott' , in South African 
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sharpened by a bus-fare increase in July 1983. A mass meeting held on 10 
July in Duncan Village elected a "Committee of Ten" to represent the 
community's interests to the CTC. After an unacceptable response from the 
CTC, residents decided to boycott the bus company. The involvement of 
trade union officials and the wider community in the boycott raised questions 
about the development of a civic association.148 
The formation of the DVRA in August 1985 followed the introduction of the 
new town council. One of the responsibilities of the Duncan Village 
Community Council (DVCC) was to reverse the flow of people in the 
township. In terms of official policy, the residents of Duncan Village were to 
be relocated to Mdantsane in the Ciskei and the former was to dissolve into 
oblivion. In early 1984, the council ordered the demolition of 400 shacks, 
leaving 2,000 people homeless. In addition, rents were raised , intensifying 
opposition to the council. The bus boycott and removals set the stage for 
building a civic association . An interim committee was established and the 
idea propagated throughout the township through discussions among 
residents. 149 
The interim committee divided the township into eight geographical areas and 
organised an anti-removal committee (ARC) made up of adults and youths. 
In August, 1985, the funeral of slain Natal UDF leader Victoria Mxenge was 
held in Duncan Village. The funeral was followed by attacks on the homes 
of town councillors and school buildings as well as clashes with the security 
forces following the invasion of the township by the SADF. The police were 
148 Ibid., p.67. 
149 "Building from the bottom up", in SASPU National , (Vo1.7, No.4, Nov/Dec 1986), p.12. 
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unable to enter the township for the next three weeks.150 
On the 15 August, DVRA was officially launched at a mass meeting, 
attended by 10,000 people, and a Central Executive Committee (CEC) 
elected . The CEC was mandated to set up branches and draw up a list of 
short-term, medium-term and long-term demands. The long-term demands were 
political , such as the demand for a non-racial municipality in a non-racial 
country. Medium-term demands were for creches, old age homes, and 
restructuring of the township with the people's participation. Short-term 
demands were for better streets, etc.151 In the following weeks, area 
organisers set about the establishment of nine branches, each with its own 
committee.152 During the next few weeks the DVRA ruled the township 
while the town council was forced to conduct its business from an office in 
the East London city centre. 153 
The response of the authorities to the situation in the township consisted of 
a few major concessions as well as repression. In late August, the 
Department of Cooperation and Development announced that Duncan Village 
would be retained, extended 99-year leasehold rights to the township and set 
aside R 10 million for improvements.154 The authorities also moved swiftly 
to return order to the township by using emergency regulations to detain 
leaders and arrest residents. 
150 Loc.cit.; Mufson,S. (1 990); op. cit. , p.115; and Atkinson,D. (1 991 ); Cities and Citizenship: Towards 
a normative analysis of the urban order in South Africa , with special reference to East London, 
1950-1986, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Natal, Durban, p.509. 
151 "8 'Id' f h UI '"9 rom t e bottom up", op. cit. , p.13. 
152 Lac. cit. Refer to Table 3 above. 
153 Atkinson,D. (1991 ); op.cit., pp.509-510. 
154 Ibid., p.510. 
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Duncan Village was also earmarked for up-grading as part of the govern-
ment's strategy to wrest control from community organisations. The DVRA 
spent months negotiating with the East London City Council (ELCC) and the 
city's National Party Member of Parliament about plans for the upgrading of 
the township. The ELCC and the DVRA reached an agreement that the city 
council would take over the administration of Duncan Village, in consultation 
with the DVRA.1 55 However, just when the talks appeared to be making 
progress, the government tried to resuscitate the discredited town council 
leading to a breakdown in the negotiations. 156 The government announced 
that elections for a new community council would be held after the 
completion of the upgrading project. It was hoped that the existing council 
would gain credit for the upgrading. 
Discussions between the ELCC and the DVRA on the upgrading project 
floundered at the end of 1985 because of the involvement of the DVCC in 
the planning process. The DVRA noted with concern that the DVCC was 
"seen to be the prime movers behind the scenes: allocating land for the 
building of the temporary schools and receiving money from the government 
for the upgrading of Duncan Village". The association called on the 
government to dismantle the community council , and direct the ELCC to act 
as its agent in Duncan Village. 157 
Throughout 1986, the DVRA and the DVCC fought for hegemony in the 
township. Rival claims to control of the upgrading process led to intervention 
by white authorities, namely the ELCC and the government. The ELCC was 
155 Kruger,F. (1987); "Community opposes new style removals", in Work in Progress, (No.46, 
February), p.30. 
156 . 
Mufson,S. (1990); op. Cit. , p.245. 
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prepared to recognise the DVRA as a representative agency of the township. 
The government, on the other hand, maintained that the community councils 
were the official representatives of urban Africans. 158 
After the declaration of the state of emergency in July 1986 mass arrests 
and detention of leaders marginalised the DVRA from township politics. An 
estimated 300 DVRA members and officials, including street committee mem-
bers, were detained. 159 In July Minister of Constitutional Development and 
Planning Chris Heunis told a delegation of East London councillors that under 
no circumstances would the council be permitted to deal with the DVRA. 
Thus, "with representative community leadership in jailor hiding, the state 
could begin to implement its plans". 160 
The absence of the community leaders was used to bring the newly styled 
Gompo town committee back into Duncan Village and to rebuild its credibility 
by handing it the credit for upgrading the township. A major area of 
controversy arose over the proposed removal of 37,000 people to make way 
for the upgrading project. Once this became known, the DVRA distanced 
itself from the project, stating that: "Nothing is being done in the area in 
consultation with the people of Duncan Village" .161 
The four phase upgrading project was disclosed to about 500 residents by 
the mayor of Duncan Village at a meeting in July 1987.162 This signalled 
158 See Atkinson,D. (1991) ; op. cit. , pp.S11-S24. 
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that the upgrading project was under the control of the town council. This, 
together with the failure of the ELCC to take over the administration of the 
township and the detention and harassment of the DVRA's leadership and 
members, strengthened the position of the town council. By mid-1987 the 
level of unrest in Duncan Village had fallen and students had returned to 
school. In addition, the council began to take action against rent defaulters. 
Although the rent boycott (which began in mid-1986) continued throughout 
1987, it was relatively weak. In addition , the absence of community leaders 
(most detainees were released towards the end of 1987 with the exception 
of key leaders) strengthened the position of the town council. Residents had 
to get the personal approval of the Mayor, Eddie Makeba, if they desired 
anything from a house to a burial plot. Residents who approached him had 
to produce rent receipts before their request was considered , thus signalling 
the manner in which the DVRA lost control to the town council. 
8.4.4. The Cradock Residents' Association (CRADORA) 
Cradora was formed on 4 October 1983 to oppose a proposed rent increase 
in some areas of Lingelihle township .163 The rent hike was prompted by 
the development of a new section of the township, which was introduced 
under a new and perplexing system of "sliding rents". The residents of the 
new houses were required to pay R54 more than before. 
The founders of the civic organisation were Mathew Goniwe, a school teacher 
and former political prisoner, and Fort Calata who was also a teacher and 
nephew of an ANC treason tria list. Goniwe, popular among the militant youth, 
emerged as a charismatic leader of the organisation. He introduced the street 
committee system to Lingelihle, which became the first township to establish 
163 Refer to Appendix B below for a summary of the conditions underlying mass mobilisation in 
Cradock and Appendix C below for a summary of the emergence and development of Cradora. 
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a network of street committees in the country .154 
In December 1983, the government attempted to stifle Goniwe's growing 
influence by transferring him to another school 100 miles from Cradock. 
When he refused to accept the transfer he was fired , sparking the most 
widespread and sustained school boycotts ever in South Africa .165 Beginning 
in February 1984, Cradock's 14,500 school students boycotted classes for a 
year and a half demanding Goniwe's reinstatement as well as democratic 
SRCs, textbooks and sufficient qualified teachers. 166 The outbreak of the 
school boycott was followed by thirteen months of violence and mass 
detentions. 
In early April 1984, Goniwe was detained, depriving the community of a 
leader who had the stature necessary to end the stalemate between the 
students and the authorities. In the ensuing weeks, three other members of 
Cradora were detained, police reinforcements were deployed in the township 
and more than a 100 people arrested on charges of public violence and 
attending illegal meetings.167 In the wake of these arrests the police pres-
ence in Lingelihle increased leading to a virtual seige. 
The school boycott was accompanied by a campaign against the local 
authorities. Cradora's call on town councillors to resign was accompanied by 
attacks on the houses of councillors and other residents associated with the 
local white administration. By January 1985, all the town councillors had 
resigned, leaving a vacuum which was subsequently filled by Cradora. The 
164 Mufson,S. (1990); op.cit., p.11 1 and Lodge,T. (1 991); op. cit. , pp.74-S. Refer to Table 3 above. 
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campaign was characterised by frequent clashes with the police, while the 
local authorities tried to crush Cradora by detaining its leaders, banning its 
meetings, and terrorising its supporters. However, repression had the effect 
of uniting the community and increasing support for Cradora .168 
The Lingelihle Village Council was the first African local authority to resign 
in the Eastern Cape. Councillors stated that they had resigned because they 
had been rejected as representatives by the community and were viewed as 
servants of apartheid . In addition , they claimed that the system of local 
authorities created councils which were financially impotent. 169 In large part, 
this impotency was reflected by the inability of the council to improve 
conditions in the township because they were not given a hearing by the 
authorities. 170 The resignation of the local council gave Cradora a measure 
of recognition from the authorities. Representatives of Cradora met top 
officials in the DET over the school boycott and took over the administration 
of the payment of pensions. 171 
Throughout the first half of 1985, Cradock residents engaged in widespread 
resistance and outbreaks of violence. This violence was sparked by a ban 
on a Cradora meeting to be held on February 2. On that day the police 
entered the town in armoured personnel carriers (Casspirs) .172 The ensuing 
violence was marked by an increase in attacks on the homes of policemen 
living in the township. On June 5, SADF and SAP personnel moved into 
168 
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Lingelihle in response to the violence. Three weeks later, the stabbed and 
burnt bodies of four Cradora leaders, including Goniwe, were found in bushes 
along a road near Port Elizabeth. 
Cradock was included among the "affected areas" during the eight month 
partial state of emergency. According to a community leader: "During the First 
Emergency, despite the death of our comrades and the detentions, resistance 
was the same". Police informer networks were all but smashed, detained 
leaders were rapidly replaced, residents' meetings were held under the guise 
of church services, and "people's education" classes were held to give some 
direction to boycotting students.173 
Community organisations in Cradock were ravaged by the second state of 
emergency and the deployment of municipal police. Goniwe's murder, and the 
detention and harassment of leaders left the civic association without leaders. 
Street committees still existed at the beginning of 1987, but met sporadically. 
Street committees from Lingelihle's eight residential blocks each elected three 
representatives to a co-ordinating group called the Local Committee. However, 
no executive was drawn from the committee's 24 members, who were mostly 
in their twenties. According to one member of the Committee: 
The structures are operating basically from second leadership level down. We want to 
elect leaders democratically, but we can 't hold meetings and many people are in 
detention.174 
During the emergency, "dirty elements" were once again providing information 
for the police and residents accused municipal policemen of committing 
malpractices against them. The community's problems were exacerbated by 
falling morals and discipline because of the lengthy school boycott. Although 
173 The Weekly Mail , (24.4.87 - 29.4.87) , p.14. 
174 L . 
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the community was highly politicised by events during 1984-85, the leadership 
vacuum left the residents without any direction.175 
At the end of 1987 there was still widespread opposition to the local 
authorities despite the suppression of community organisations. At the end of 
November 1987, Lingelihle township in Cradock was among the three 
townships in the Eastern Cape which were run by administrators and not by 
community councils. This demonstrated the failure of the state to eliminate 
or undermine the influence of the progressive forces in the township. 
8.5. Natal 
Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) 
In Durban's black townships, rent increases and related matters such as the 
lack and poor quality of housing as well as increases in transport costs were 
the main reasons for the emergence of civic organisations.176 The civic 
organisations which emerged in Durban 's African townships in the early 1980s 
eventually formed an umbrella body, JORAC. 
In October 1982, the Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB) announced that 
it would increase rent in townships under its jurisdiction in May 1983. The 
PNAB proposed a rent increase of between 25 and 90 percent (averaging 
63 per cent) . Two months later, in December, PUTCO in Inanda announced 
a bus-fare increase of 7,6 percent on cash fares , and 16,6 percent and 19,4 
percent on coupon fares . In the same month the Durban Transport Manage-
ment Board (DTMB) declared an increase in bus fares of 12 per cent. l77 
175 L 'f oc.C/ . 
176 Refer to Appendix B below for a summary of the conditions underlying mass mobilisation in 
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The affected townships responded to the proposed busfare increases by 
boycotting DTMB buses. In each of the affected townships - Inanda, 
Clermont, Lamontville, Klaarwater, St Wendolins and KwaMashu - a Local 
Commuter Committee (LCC) emerged to co-ordinate the boycott. These in 
turn united to form a Joint Commuter Committee.178 The 1982 Durban 
transport boycott made four significant gains. According to McCarthy and 
Swilling: 
Firstly, the formation of LCCs in each area facilitated the growth of community 
organisations in the greater Durban area; secondly, the formation of the JCC was an 
important step towards forging inter-township unity; thirdly, a well supported petition 
managed to popularise the JCC leadership; fourthly , the extensive discussions, 
pamphleteering and participation generated a new political consciousness.179 
The townships within which these LCCs emerged were areas that were 
previously unorganised. In addition, these new community organisations 
"provided the community leaders with a ready-made constituency that they ... 
managed to develop and enlarge".180 The LCCs, which in some cases 
developed strong community participation and support, formed the 
organisational base of the community organisations which served the 
townships. Harrison Dube, a disenchanted member of the Ningizumu 
Community Council (NCC), organised mass meetings and used general 
community activity to inform residents about the dynamics of the rent 
increase, and the unrepresentative and impotent response of the NCC to the 
proposed increases.181 
Dissatisfaction with the Town Council 's efforts to represent the residents on 
178 McCarthy,J. and Swill ing,M. (1984) ; "Transport and Political ReSistance", in South African 
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the rent issue led to the formation of JORAC on 8 April 1983 as an 
umbrella body of residents' associations serving five townships. These were 
the Lamontville Rent Action Committee, the Hambanathi Residents' Association, 
the Chesterville Rent Action Committee, the Klaarwater Residents' Association, 
and the Shakaville Residents' Association.182 JORAC also included represen-
tatives from hostels in the townships. 
Representatives were elected by each of the constituent residents' associations 
at meetings held in the townships. These representatives in turn elected the 
executive of JORAC. JORAC's first executive comprised: 12 representatives 
from Lamontville; 12 representatives from Hambanathi; 6 representatives from 
Chesterville; 6 representatives from Klaarwater; and 4 representatives of the 
hostels. 183 
Although JORAC was created to unite a few townships in their opposition to 
rent increases, it soon became a leading force in the community on other 
issues as well. Eventually, it became an affiliate of the UDF when the latter 
was formed at the end of 1983. The leadership of the residents' associations 
which made up JORAC consisted largely of members of the petit-bourgeoisie. 
Nonetheless, these organisations had a "common people" approach and a 
strong "redistributive focus which often brought them into conflict with elite 
interests". 184 
Several of JORAC's executive members became high ranking officials of the 
UDF. The first regional Executive of the Natal UDF included Rev. Xundu, 
182 Suttcliffe,M. and Weilings,P. (1988); op.cit. , p.346. 
183 Reintges,C.M. (1986); op.cit., p.120n. 
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vice chairperson of JORAC, as well as S. Tsenoli and Victoria Mxenge. 
JORAC's close links with the progressive movement placed it in direct conflict 
with Inkatha and other statutory bodies. 
On April 25, 1983, the organisation's chairman, Harrison Dube was shot 
dead, sparking off violence in both Lamontville and Chesterville. According to 
Reintges, the assassination failed to disrupt opposition to the rent increase. 
Instead, the outrage generated by Dube's murder served to unite the 
community against the Community Council and the PNAB.185 Under the 
chairmanship of the Reverend Mcebisi Xundu, JORAC staged mass protest 
meetings in May and July. The authorities' immediate response was to 
postpone the increases until August. But they were eventually shelved 
indefinitely, partly for fear of provoking further unrest and partly because of 
uncertainty over the future of the townships. 186 
The failure of the NCC to effectively represent the residents on the rent 
issue, as well as its lack of interest in eliciting residents' responses, made 
it apparent that the Council did not represent residents' interests.187 By the 
end of May 1983, all the councillors on the Hambanathi and Klaarwater 
Advisory Boards, as well as several Ningizumu Community Councillors had 
resigned .
188 
In addition , Lamontville residents called for community councils 
to be scrapped and replaced by JORAC, and resolved to boycott the 
Community Council elections scheduled for June 6.189 JORAC's demands 
185 Reintges,C.M. (1986); op.cit., p.90. 
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extended beyond the rent issue. Resolutions taken at meetings of the 
constituent organisations included demands that the PNAB townships be 
administered by the Durban municipality and for representation on the City 
Council. 190 
Other factors which were instrumental in widening JORAC's support were its 
democratic organisation and links with other progressive forces . As Dan Smit 
explains: 
The strength of JORAC is in no small measure due to the fact that the movement had 
been strong on organisation. A number of spatially disparate communities have been 
organised into a single movement to fight issues of common interest. JORAC also linked 
with and obtained support (both organisationally and moral) from other significant urban 
social movements in the Durban metropolitan area, such as the Joint Commuters 
Committee and the Durban Housing Action Committee. Links have also been established 
with progressive community organisations such as Diakonia and the trade unions.191 
JORAC's capacity to establish links with other progressive organisations was 
encouraged by the fact that it was strongly represented on the UDF Regional 
executive, which was made up exclusively of people living in Durban. Smit 
also attributed JORAC's success in mass mobilisation on its ability to reach 
the masses through the utilisation of grass-roots, door-to-door tactics. 192 
However, JORAC had limited support in KwaZulu-administered townships. 
In the latter areas, Inkatha was able to use the considerable powers of 
coercion and patronage of the homeland government to minimize penetration 
by the UDF. Inkatha was strongly entrenched in local government structures 
and the homeland government's control over the granting of trading licences 
and loans provided it with support among local traders and businessmen. 
190 R . C emtges, .M. (1986); op.cit., p.89. 
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Civil servants and teachers were "nudged" into co-operating with Inkatha 
because they depended on the homeland government for their jobs. Inkatha's 
dominance was further aided by the special status it was accorded at 
homeland schools, including those in the urban townships, where Inkatha was 
allowed to mobilize school-children through its youth brigade branches at each 
school and the "Inkatha syllabus" taught at schools.193 The homeland 
government's control over the KwaZulu security forces provided it with the 
coercive means to prevent the UDF from mobilising in the KwaZulu 
townships. The situation was different in the PNAB-administered townships 
because of the absence of the homeland authorities. 
JORAC's support is reflected in a number of surveys conducted in the 
African townships during the 1980s. In October 1983, the Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences found that 84 percent of respondents (n=100) in Lamontville, 
Chesterville and Klaarwater felt that JORAC was making a sincere effort to 
solve township problems, 74 percent favoured "the youth of the townships", 
18 percent the community council , 24 percent the KwaZulu Government, and 
53 percent the Durban City Council. One percent of the respondents felt that 
JORAC was causing problems. By contrast, 20 percent felt that Inkatha 
assisted residents in solving their problems and 44 percent felt that the 
organisation was causing problems. 194 A survey of 756 people in Lamontville 
in 1984 by the Built Environment Support Group found that 97 percent of 
respondents felt that Inkatha had not helped the community .195 
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In the aftermath of the Inanda "riots" in 1985, the Institute of Black 
Research found that 51 percent of 227 respondents in KwaMashu , Umlazi, 
Inanda and Clermont supported the UDF.1 96 A survey of Lamontville 
residents undertaken in April 1986 during the occupation of the township by 
the security forces found the following levels of support: UDF - 78 percent; 
ANC - 21 percent; UDF student/youth groups such as COSAS, Malayo and 
AZASO - 21 percent; the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
- 8 percent; and JORAC - 5 percent. 197 
JORAC's links with the UDF had a number of adverse affects on the 
organisation. Firstly, a number of local leaders were drawn into regional and 
national structures of the Front. Secondly, JORAC bore the brunt of the 
ideological and violent battle between the UDF and Inkatha (which was 
supported by the state in this confrontation) .198 From July 1984, JORAC's 
activities were directed towards defending itself against the combined assault 
of the state and Inkatha. 
In August 1983 the incorporation issue resurfaced when the Department of 
Co-operation and Development announced that a "final" decision had been 
taken to incorporate Lamontville and Hambanathi into KwaZulu, with 
Chesterville's fate undecided. This provoked further unrest in townships 
already tense over Dube's assassination and the rent increases. JORAC 
maintained that incorporation would endanger residents' Section 10 urban 
rights (thus making them vulnerable to the pass laws) and make KwaZulu 
responsible for township services and upkeep. Both Pretoria and the PNAB 
196 
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refused to negotiate with the community organisation on the issue. The 
KwaZulu government, meanwhile, retained a low profile. All this had the effect 
of hardening opinion in the townships against incorporation and furthering 
resentment against Inkatha.199 
Violence erupted on 22 July 1984 when Inkatha supporters provoked a fight 
at a service in Lamontville to unveil a tombstone honouring Dube. The 
violence spread to Hambanathi in August when Inkatha supporters attacked 
houses and set fire to cars in the township. JORAC official Alfred Sithole 
and two others were killed and the house of JORAC chairman Joseph 
Gumede stoned during the week long violence. The families of those closely 
associated with JORAC and the UDF eventually fled the township .20o 
Buthelezi's announcement that he would visit Lamontville on 1 September to 
allow residents to express their views on incorporation, and provocative 
statements he made before the visit, prompted a massive evacuation of the 
township. Although there was no violence on the day of the rally, during the 
days which followed residents of a nearby hostel attacked residents of the 
township. In early 1985, violence erupted between residents of Hambanathi 
resulting in an exodus of the most prominent JORAC activists.201 
The declaration of the partial state of emergency in July 1985 (which 
excluded Natal) intensified repression of the civic. JORAC's chairman, 
Reverend M. Xundu, was detained in August and other executive members 
forced into hiding.202 In late August, Inkatha impis attending a Shaka Day 
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Rally in Umlazi crossed into Lamontville where they attacked houses and 
residents, killing four people. The wave of attacks on JORAC officials and 
UDF members, the detention and removal of leaders, and the distancing of 
residents from the organisation for fear of Inkatha reprisals effectively 
smashed JORAC during the second half of 1985. 
Intensified conflicts between Inkatha and UDF members were sparked off by 
the murder of Victoria Mxenge, a treason trial lawyer of the UDF and 
treasurer of the organisation . This provoked unrest throughout Durban: the 
youth embarked on a school boycott; Inkatha members attacked mourners at 
Mxenge's funeral; vigilantes attacked township residents; and numerous attacks 
were waged on individuals. By means of this wave of intimidation, Inkatha 
was able to establish itself in the townships while simultaneously removing 
JORAC from the political arena.203 This process was facilitated by the 
activities of the security forces. 
On 16 April 1986, the SAP and SADF invaded Lamontville at the invitation 
of the town council. Roadblocks were set up, and homes and individuals 
searched, while residents were forced to indicate their support for the 
community council , the UDF or COSATU on a signed statement which 
included their names and addresses.204 Members of the Lamontville Co-
Ordinating Committee, representing various community organisations including 
JORAC, accused the security forces of assisting Inkatha impis. In Chesterville, 
residents were harassed by the "A-team" vigilantes. About 40 people were 
killed during 1986 and hardly three weeks into 1987 eight more people were 
killed. 
203 Suttcliffe,M. and Wellings,P. (1988) ; op.cit., pp.354-6 and De Villiers,R. (1985); "Inkatha and 
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The residents of Lamontville and Chesterville responded to the wave of 
intimidation and violence by forming the Lamontville Crisis Co-ordinating 
Committee (LCCC) - comprising the local branch of COSAS, Malayo (youth 
organisation), the Lamontville Residents' Association, the local branch of the 
Natal Organisation of Women (NOW), the Lamontville Parents' Association, 
Hostel representatives, the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), and 
JORAC - and the Chesterville Crisis Committee respectively.205 The motivat-
ing force behind the formation of these organisations was to increase 
organisational co-ordination and extend the social base of the community 
organisations. 
It was hoped that these organisations would lead to the creation of civic 
associations in the two townships. However, according to Schofield , "these 
relatively high profile bodies ... gave the vigilante units easily accessible civic 
bodies and high profile township personalities, who were easy targets for 
vigilante hit squads". The leadership of local community organisations bore 
the brunt of the intensive wave of vigilante attacks. Consequently, the LCCC 
and the Chesterville Crisis Committee split into a myriad of "interest 
groups".206 
During 1986, clashes between UDF-aligned organisations and Inkatha, 
vigilantes and the security forces continued unabated. Inkatha demonstrated 
its determination to suppress popular organisation in Durban's African 
township. Although the wave of intimidation and repression led to the collapse 
of organisations in the townships, the spirit of defiance, as well as opposition 
to Inkatha, was not diminished. The violence also spread to the KwaZulu 
205 R . t C M . 
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townships, particularly KwaMashu where clashes between vigilantes and school 
students developed into unprecedented open warfare. 
8.6. The Western Cape 
Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC) 
Although the first modern civic organisation was formed in Soweto in 1977, 
the first mass-based civics were formed in Port Elizabeth's African townships 
and Cape Town's coloured suburbs.207 School and consumer boycotts in 
Cape Town in 1979-80 played an important part in the early development 
of civic organisations in the suburbs. The thirty-two civic groups which 
emerged between 1980 and 1982 in the coloured suburbs often began as 
small , ad-hoc groups to tackle such problems as inconvenient and expensive 
transportation, high rents, and poor recreational and child-care facilities.208 
In 1980 a number of popular struggles provoked the emergence and growth 
of community organisations in Cape Town. Community activity in support of 
the 1980 school boycotts, a bus boycott against fare increases and a meat 
boycott in support of a strike by meat workers involved widespread 
community mobilisation. Political activity was focused almost entirely on the 
emerging community organisations because of the relative weakness of trade 
unions in the area. The most important of these organisations were the 
residents' associations in Cape Town's coloured suburbs and the parent-
student committees which were formed to support the school boycotts. Twelve 
of these organisations came together in June 1980 to form the Umbrella 
Rentals Committee (URC) to oppose a rent increase announced by the City 
207 Refer to Appendix B below for a summary of the conditions underlying mass mobilisation in 
Cape Town and to Appendix C below for a summary of the emergence and development of 
CAHAC. 
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and Divisional Councils in May 1980.209 
The government responded to widespread community mobilisation in the 
Western Cape by banning all meetings in the area from mid-June. When the 
ban on meetings was lifted in September that year, the URC was able to 
meet. At its first meeting the committee concluded that the problems facing 
the oppressed people in their residential areas did not arise from the rent 
question alone but from the "whole housing situation". It accordingly decided 
to broaden its perspective and changed its name to CAHAC to reflect this. 
When CAHAC had its second meeting in December 1981 , it had 33 affiliate 
organisations based in both the "Coloured" and African communities.21 0 
CAHAC was formed largely to combat the proposed rent increases during 
1980. In this struggle CAHAC concentrated on the organisation of the rent 
campaign within the context of a broader struggle over the whole housing 
question in South Africa. This campaign involved three phases. The first 
involved the unification of a number of dispersed local civic associations and 
other groups into a larger and more effective organisation . 
In the second phase the organisation articulated its grievances and framed 
its demands. The Committee identified the causes of the massive rent 
increases and eviction of tenants as: the lack of representation of oppressed 
people on bodies taking decisions about housing; the Group Areas legislation 
which forced people to live far from their work-place and placed them under 
the control of state officials; and the system of "jump rents" which pushed 
up rent payments enormously when fairly small wage increases were won. 
CAHAC demanded: the ending of all rent increases; the setting of rents at 
209 Lac. cit. 
210 L 't ac.c/. 
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affordable levels; that the government take full responsibility for housing; and 
bigger state subsidies for housing.211 
The final phase in the rent campaign was publicity and mass action. In early 
December 1981 the organisation embarked on a campaign against high rents. 
CAHAC organised a petition (which was signed by 41 000 people) , rallies, 
meetings and demonstrations and finally demanded a meeting with the 
Minister of Community Affairs, Pen Kotze. However, a meeting with the 
Minister in March 1982 failed to gain any favourable response from the 
authorities. By the end of 1982 CAHAC had decided against a rent boycott 
because it did not yet feel strong enough to sustain such a campaign. In 
addition to the rent campaign, CAHAC was involved in campaigns against 
bus fare increases, boycotts of products in support of striking workers and 
in mobilising support for the anti-Republic Day and anti-SAIC campaigns in 
1981.212 
Two principles played an important role in CAHAC activities during the early 
1980s: the belief that working-class struggles cannot be narrowly confined to 
factory based issues; and the belief in working class leadership. CAHAC 
contended that rents often absorb up to 50 percent of wages and cannot 
therefore be considered as secondary issues. In addition, it was argued that 
if working class leadership is to be established within the broader struggle 
for democracy, then it is important "that workers themselves move increasingly 
into leadership positions, not only in trade unions but also in community and 
other organisations". 213 
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CAHAC also committed itself to establishing working relationships with other 
progressive organisations. It resolved to establish a firm relationship with the 
trade union movement, recognising the close link between the struggles 
workers face in their workplace and in their communities.214 However, 
according to Nasson, suspicion and factionalism in the coloured community 
prevented "civic structures in the Western Cape from attaining the cohesion 
and maturity that existed in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal" .21 5 From 
the early 1980s, civic associations in the coloured townships began to reflect 
"philosophical divisions and significant differences in political outlook between 
the unity movement and the increasingly influential charterist-oriented 
organisations".216 
Tensions between the two ideological groups emerged after the formation of 
a broad-based Disorderly Bills Action Committee (DBAC) in August 1982 to 
oppose the "Koornhof Bills". The unity movement groups within the DBAC 
questioned the role of white liberal organisations such as NUSAS and the 
Black Sash as well as black petty bourgeois groups such as the Western 
Cape Traders' Association. This led to the withdrawal of CAHAC, other 
charterist movements, and the trade unions from the committee.217 
The formation of the UDF in 1983 also generated conflict within CAHAC. 
Ideological differences within the Western Cape coloured community led to the 
disaffiliation of some CAHAC affiliates in 1983. These were the Schotsche-
kloof Residents Association , the Bokmakierie, Bridgetown, Silvertown, Kewtown 
21 4 L 'f OC.CI . 
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Residents Association (BBSK) and the Bishop Lavis Action Committee. 
During 1982 and 1983, CAHAC was drawn into the national political 
campaign against the reform initiatives. CAHAC, because of its roots in the 
coloured community, was at the centre of the campaign . According to 
CAHAC's chairman, Wilfred Rhodes, the organisation's guiding principles made 
it impossible for it to support the reforms. These principles included the belief 
that all South Africans should have direct representation at every level of 
government.218 CAHAC strongly condemned and rejected the reforms in the 
following terms: 
We believe that working within the system will never bring about the fundamental change 
we all desire. We reject any reforms that exclude the vast majority of the population of 
SA. CAHAC will continue to strive for a non-racial democratic South Africa.219 
The organisation aimed to mobilise the community against the proposals by 
seeking "alliances with all those who stand in opposition to the Government's 
constitutional proposals". 220 CAHAC was included among the 50 organisations 
which met in early May 1983 to plan a joint campaign against the 
constitutional proposals. A co-ordinating committee was established and broad 
principles drawn up as the basis for the campaign. This meeting laid the 
basis for the formation of the Western Cape region of the UDF which was 
formally launched on 24 June. 
CAHAC, through its constituent organisations, was able to reach almost every 
resident of the coloured residential areas. The campaign against the 
constitution was conducted largely through the Million Signature campaign, 
house-to-house meetings and mass rallies. In this campaign, activists 
21 8 
Cape Herald, (22.5.82), p.1. 
21 9 
Cape Herald, (15.1.83), p.10. 
220 Rand Daily Mail, (31 .12.82), p.? 
391 
popularised the UDF and called on prospective voters to boycott the 
elections. The low polls in the election for the House of Representatives in 
August 1984 was regarded as a huge success by those opposing the new 
constitution. In the Western Cape, where nearly 40 percent of the total 
coloured population and an estimated 35,5 percent of eligible voters live, the 
average poll in the 20 constituencies was only 11 percent. 221 
However, mobilisation during the anti-election campaign was not transformed 
into permanent organisation. By the beginning of 1985 civic, youth and 
student activity had declined and organisations which emerged during the 
campaign were depleted. Many organisations collapsed and those that still 
existed involved only a small number of activists. In mid-1985, however, the 
spread of the school boycott to the Western Cape revived and transformed 
organisations and politics in the region.222 
The school boycott gave rise to a new student organisation, the Western 
Cape Students Congress (WESCO), and led to the revival of CAYCO. It also 
led to the rapid political education of thousands of school students and other 
young people. The government's heavy-handed response to the boycott and 
other popular activities also promoted the pol itical consciousness of adults. 
Parents were brought into the protest by the formation of PTSAs and 
education crisis committees while many other adults overtly supported the 
students. 
During the school boycott political activity and protest in the Western Cape 
assumed near insurrectionary levels. However, the brief period of mass 
221 Heymans,C. (1985); 'The new constitution: A view on "coloured" perspectives', in Africa Insight, 
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protest was followed by a wave of repression . The government responded 
to the upsurge in protest by targeting the UDF and its leaders.223 On 26 
October 1985 the government extended the state of emergency to the 
Western Cape. Sixty-nine members of civic organisations (includ ing almost the 
entire Western Cape UDF executive) were detained and 100 organisations 
prohibited from holding meetings.224 
Community organisations in the Western Cape were ravaged by the various 
emergencies, particularly, the second state of emergency.225 Mass detentions 
from the outset of this emergency forced many key activists and leaders in 
the coloured areas into hiding. In addition, police actions against mass 
meetings eroded mass mobilisation because of the widespread fear of the 
effects of involvement. The government also banned 119 organisations in the 
Western Cape, including CAHAC, from functioning , from holding any meetings 
and publishing any statements in any form.226 However, according to 
Nasson: 
despite the UDF's shrinking organisational base in the Western Cape, the ideology and 
imagery of the charterist tradition continued to occupy a vital position in the lexicon of 
progressive politics throughout the eighties. UDF supporters, away from the whiff of tear 
gas and the clatter of South African pol ice helicopters, retained the capability of rapidly 
mobilising mass demonstrations with thousands of exuberant supporters.227 
Throughout the eighties CAHAC failed to develop a mass base. The 
Committee remained a collection of community organisations consisting of a 
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small number of activists. People flocked to the organisation during times of 
crisis and drifted out at the end of campaigns. The historical tradition of 
weak, ultra-left political organisation, the existence of a rival organisation and 
a weak tradition of trade union organisation accounted for the failure to 
create a mass based organisation . In addition , from mid-1985 the UDF and 
its affiliates bore the brunt of repression resulting in the neutralisation of 
many leaders and organisations. 
8.7. Northern Transvaal 
The Northern Transvaal People's Congress (NOTPECO) 
The Northern Transvaal is largely rural and the region included four 
homelands - the "self-governing" territories of KwaNdebele, Lebowa, and 
Gazankulu, and the "independent" Venda.228 The issues facing African 
people in the area are issues which face all rural Africans in the country. 
These are poverty, landlessness, over-population, drought, high unemployment, 
the effects of forced resettlement, and rule by corrupt and puppet chiefs and 
homeland authorities. Many people faced the additional threat of incorporation 
into, or forced resettlement to, the homelands. 
The Northern Transvaal region of the UDF was launched at the beginning 
of 1986 and soon had over 100 affiliates. A number of village and action 
committees from the rural areas, consisting of students, the youth and older 
residents, were part of this group. The most important structures in the 
region were the youth congresses, which mushroomed in the second half of 
the 1980s. 
Mass mobilisation in the Northern Transvaal was provoked by three major 
struggles during the second half of the eighties: the Lebowa revolt from 
228 Refer to Appendix B below for a summary of the conditions underlying mass mobilisation in the 
Northern Transvaal and to Appendix C below for the emergence and development of NOTPECO. 
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1984-86, and the anti-independence struggles in Venda and KwaNdebele. In 
addition, resistance to incorporation and relocation into the homelands gave 
rise to a number of rural community organisations. The following is an 
analysis of rural struggles in Lebowa, Moutse and KwaNdebele, and their 
impact on mass mobilisation in these areas. 
The formation of the Northern Transvaal UDF region in 1986 brought together 
sixty-three affiliates: most of these organisations were in or near the Lebowa 
homeland.229 Many community organisations in Lebowa grew from small 
political discussion groups. Increasing national organisation and resistance, and 
the spread of ideas on organisation , and strategies and tactics from the 
urban areas to the rural areas provided an impetus to local organisation. 
Responding to a climate of political change, feeding on the accounts and materials 
brought by youths in contact with the urban areas and some input from individual Turfloop 
students, these groups discussed the rise of the UDF and the contents of the Freedom 
Charter.23O 
The proliferation of youth congresses in Lebowa can be traced to the 1984 
school boycotts. The 1984 school boycott was responsible for politicisation in 
Lebowa following a police assault of marching students. The students 
responded by attacking government vehicles and introduced a campaign to 
isolate the local police. This campaign was coupled with a call on chiefs and 
MPs to resign when the UDF region was formed in 1986. The school 
boycott and the campaign to isolate the police spread to Sekhukhuneland and 
in Steelport farm and mine workers stayed away from work on May Day. 
The major forces behind mass mobilisation in the area were students from 
229 Lodge,T. (1991); op. cit. , p.119. 
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Turfloop, UDF activists, and members of COSATU unions. Beginning in mid-
1984, these activists began organising meetings for school students, the youth 
and the community leading to the formation of community organisations in the 
area.231 For example, in a village in Letsilele near Tzaneen , the Merakoma 
Youth Congress (MEYCO) was a leading force in the formation of street 
committees. 232 The village was divided into three sections, with street 
committees formed in each section. A people's court was set up after the 
death of an activist in an attempt to isolate the police. In addition, the 
emergence of street committees led to the removal of the local chief from 
his position. Thus, as Jo-Anne Collinge pointed out: 
Within particular villages - as for instance in Steel port - the youth congress co-ordinates 
its work with women's, pupils, workers' and civic organisations. The structures, activists 
pOint out, are a rural equivalent of the street committees and neighbourhood 
organisations established in the urban townships .. .. Popular organisations in Lebowa have 
taken up the national education issues and they have posed themselves as an 
"alternative" civic body by handling public projects such as clean-up campaigns. They 
have also taken up distinctly local issues - such as protest against enforced contributions 
to a company-owned recreation club in Eerstegeluk.233 
On April 11, 1986, the regional chairman of the Northern Transvaal UDF 
died in detention 12 hours after he was detained. Twenty thousand people 
attended his funeral on the 4 May, where it was announced that white-owned 
businesses would be boycotted. During May, the South African police and 
army entered southern Lebowa and effectively occupied the homeland after 
the declaration of the state of emergency on June 12.234 A vigilante group 
also emerged in the homeland at the beginning of 1986 and, during the 
second half of the year, UDF activists were forced to retreat. In Sekhukhune 
231 See Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (1 989); "Workers and the Community", in South African 
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and Nebo the majority of community organisations were crushed by 
respression during the state of emergency. The residents of the homeland 
accused the police of torture, assaults, firebombing and intimidation. During 
1987 a number of organisations were reactivated.235 In both areas village 
committees were established while students were organised into the 
Sekhukhune Students Congress (SESCO) and Nebo Students Congress 
(NESCO) despite repression by the security forces. 
Rural resistance and mass mobilisation in the region were also provoked by 
border adjustments leading to the consolidation of Lebowa, KwaNdebele, 
Venda and Gazankulu. One example of resistance to incorporation and 
relocation occurred in the central Transvaal area of Moutse which was 
incorporated into KwaNdebele on 31 December 1985. 
In 1980 Moutse was excised from Lebowa and placed under central 
government administration as a step towards its incorporation into KwaNdeb-
ele.236 During the following years, the mainly Pedi-speaking residents of the 
villages refused to accept incorporation. Opposition to incorporation was 
spearheaded by two groups: the government-appointed tribal authorities, chiefs, 
and Lebowa MPs; and the mass based community organisations - village 
committees and youth organisations.237 
In October 1985, at a mass meeting 10,000 people in Moutse unanimously 
rejected incorporation. On December 22, over 5,000 people at a rally rejected 
incorporation and resolved to form youth and parents organisations in their 
235 "Sekhukune and Nebo don't give in", in SASPU National, (Last Quarter, 1987), p.4. 
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villages and boycott anything connected to KwaNdebele - documents, passes, 
pensions, schools and shops. On 1 January 1986, the day after Moutse was 
incorporated into the homeland, vigilantes from KwaNdebele attacked the 
residents of Moutse's villages in a dawn raid , leaving seven vigilantes, two 
policemen and one villager dead. 60 residents were loaded onto trucks by 
the vigilantes and taken to a stadium where they were held captive, beaten 
and tortured.238 
The next day, protest meetings were held in two Moutse villages, which were 
followed by the murder of two policemen by protesting residents. On 3 
January, police and soldiers invaded the villages.239 In the ensuing months, 
clashes with the police intensified. At the forefront of resistance and mass 
mobilisation were the area's youth congresses, in particular the Dennilton 
Youth Congress (DEYCO) and the Uitvlught Youth Congress (UIYCO).240 
These two congresses, the former established at the beginning of 1985 and 
the latter in December 1985, were politicised during the resistance campaign 
by police harassment. Once politicised , these organisations identified their 
primary task as building community organisations and people's power in 
Moutse. During the campaign against incorporation, village meetings and mass 
rallies led to the formation of a number of village committees in Moutse. 
These came together to form the Moutse Civic Association . 
In 1986, resistance to independence for KwaNdebele led to the formation of 
a popular alliance consisting of the royal family, the youth , the homeland's 
civil service, local white farmers, and the population at large.241 Resistance 
238 The Cape Times, (3.1.86), p.1. 
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began after the central government announced plans to relocate the residents 
of Ekingale242 and incorporate Moutse into the homeland. Throughout 1985, 
the residents of these two areas resisted these plans, paving the way for 
the anti-independence struggles in the homeland. The use of Mbokodo to 
harass opposition groups in these two areas was followed by widespread 
harassment of KwaNdebele's anti-independence groups in 1986. 
The KwaNdebele anti-independence struggle took a number of different forms: 
school boycotts, stayaways, demonstrations and strikes. Between May and 
August 1986 there was a sustained school boycott, a two-day stay away by 
the civil service, and a three-day stay away by homeland workers. The period 
was also characterised by numerous clashes between the youth on the one 
hand, and Mbokodo and homeland police and the SADF on the other. 
Resistance in the homeland began after a mass meeting at the Royal Kraal 
on 12 May, 1986, following an announcement on 7 May that KwaNdebele 
would become independent in December. 
At this meeting, the 20 to 30 thousand people present put forward three 
demands to be put to the homeland authorities: that the decision to accept 
independence be withdrawn; that Mbokodo be dismantled; and that all MPs 
and cabinet ministers resign . During April , community outrage against Mbokodo 
was inflamed by the assault and abduction of school children and teachers, 
and the murder of an anti-independence activist, Jacob Skosana, on 28 April. 
On May 13, soldiers and police invaded nearly all the 25 villages in 
KwaNdebele after hundreds of youths went on a rampage on the day of 
Skosana's funeral. 243 
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A report-back meeting, scheduled for 14 May, was banned by the local 
magistrate. However, 25,000 people attended the meeting, which was broken 
up by the police and army. In the aftermath of the attack, students 
embarked on a school boycott, the businesses and houses of 41 MPs were 
burnt down, and successful mass stayaways were held on 3-4 June and 16 
June. Between 15 and 29 July, the entire civil service stayed away from 
work. The turning point of the violence occurred on the 29 July when Piet 
Ntuli a leader of Mbokodo and a Cabinet Minister, was murdered. The , 
legislative assembly eventually banned Mbokodo and cancelled the indepen-
dence plans on 12 August. 244 
However, in late 1986 a new spate of detentions swept through the 
homeland indicating a renewed crackdown on anti-independence activists. By 
October, most of the leading opponents of independence were in hiding. 
Skosana's death in November, and the election of George Mahlangu as Chief 
Minister, led to uncertainty on the future of the homeland. In 1987 the 
homeland government renewed its attempts to gain independence.245 In 
March, house-to-house raids were carried out by police and 'unknown 
supporters, scholars were detained, vigilante groups were harassing people 
and there was a strong police and army presence in the villages. Detentions, 
banning of meetings, and harassment of opposition groups by the South 
African and homeland police took its toll and by May, the momentum of the 
anti-independence movement was reversed. On May 6, the Legislative 
Assembly took a decision to declare the homeland independent retrospective 
from 11 December 1986.246 
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However, in June, the Pretoria government's attitude towards granting 
independence underwent a significant change when it declared that indepen-
dence would only be conferred after a show of "broad support" .247 
The anti-independence struggle in 1986 was won without any formal 
organisation. However, according to the Transvaal Rural Action Committee, 
during the course of the campaign "the population became politicised and 
was able to take power into its hands".248 In 1987, activists identified the 
formation of mass organisations as a priority. The second wave of resistance 
to independence provoked the formation of structures linking students, youth 
and old people. According to a KwaNdebele youth activist: 
We have a coordinating committee for the students, youth and old people .... We are 
preparing to form street and village committees in every village. There is unity among the 
people and they are eager to fight this thing. We want to form organisations, for the 
people, of the people and by the people.249 
The major UDF-aligned organisation in the area was the KwaNdebele Youth 
Congress (KYC) which emerged in response to Mbokodo activities. The youth 
of KwaNdebele took it upon themselves to defend the community against the 
brutality of the vigilantes and security forces. Many took to the bush during 
the three month anti-independence struggle in 1986. The youth also took it 
upon themselves to form community organisations in the area, focusing on 
street and village committees. 
After the launch of the Northern Transvaal Regional UDF at the beginning 
of 1986, regional organisers set out to establish the Northern Transvaal 
247 The Cape Times, (10.6.87), p.13. 
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People's Congress (NOTPECO).250 NOTPECO was formed in August 1986 
to draw the numerous village committees which sprang up throughout the 
region into an umbrella civic organisation. These included organisations such 
as the Phaahla-Manoge Action Committee, the Leandra Action Committee, and 
the Moutse Civic Association. Three urban-based action committees manned 
by migrant workers on the mines were formed "to further awaken rural 
people from political slumber" .251 The creation of an umbrella civic 
organisation for the region was seen as a means of expanding organisation 
in the rural areas - a means of politicising people and drawing them into 
progressive structures. 
The establishment of NOTPECO introduced the first regional civic organisation 
in the country. The formation of NOTPECO was significant for another 
reason. The organisation drew together migrants working in the urban areas 
and residents of the rural villages. One of NOTPECO's aims was to close 
the gap between the rural communities and the migrant workers in the cities. 
This was achieved, according to the organisation, by establishing committees 
of migrant workers in the towns and cities to work alongside the village 
committees. NOTPECO, according to Delius, used the urban hostels as 
recruiting grounds and rural burial societies as building blocks.252 
Migrant workers living in hostels in the urban centres were formed into urban 
committees with links to their village committees. Whenever one of the 
committees met, a delegate was sent from the other committee. Both the 
urban and rural committees shared the same agenda, so both committees 
250 See "NOTPECO: Bridging the gap from town to village", in SASPU National , (Vo1.7, No.4, Nov/Dec 
1986), pp.17-18. 
251 L 'f OC.C/ . 
252 Delius,P. (1990); op.cif., p.22. 
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were bound by decisions taken at committee meetings. Thus, urban 
committees had a say in decisions affecting their rural communities, while 
rural dwellers, who often preferred to consult the migrant workers before 
taking decisions, had the opportunity to do so. Consequently, NOTPECO's 
membership included migrant workers from the PVN industrial centre and the 
mines, domestic workers, farmworkers, and young and old people from the 
rural villages. In addition, because of the ethnic mix located in the 
homelands and surrounding areas of the Northern Transvaal, NOTPECO's 
membership cut across ethnic lines. 
NOTPECO's constituency was largely a peasant one and , unlike the civic 
organisations in the urban areas which were concerned largely with rent and 
housing issues, was concerned largely with issues around land hunger.253 
Local structures of the umbrella civic organisation were structured along the 
lines of local youth congresses. Every village was demarcated into unit blocks 
and each unit block into street committees. Where there were no streets, as 
in most rural areas, elected representatives of the villages sat on "kgoro 
(kraal) committees". According to Peter Mokaba, general secretary of the UDF 
regional executive: 
We have already had unparalleled success in organising 'village block' and 'street 
committees'. We intend removing the tribal chiefs as soon as possible. We have called 
on them to resign. [The ultimate aim was] to allow the people to govern themselves. We 
have already established people's courts in some areas and are in the process of forming 
our own militia which will carry out the orders of the courtS.254 
These village committees entrenched "people's power" in the rural areas of 
the Northern Transvaal. According to a youth leader, John Mahlangu, the 
kgoro facilitated democratic participation through "grassroots involvement" in 
discussions in small groups, thus making "it possible to continue mass 
253 N N · ew atlon, (23.4.87) , p.21 . 
254 S d T· un ay Imes, (11 .5.86) , p.7. 
403 
meetings", during a period in which they had been banned .255 
NOTPECO was highly critical of the tribal authorities and aimed at developing 
a close relationship with trade unions. It also sought support among the 
unemployed and aimed to start employment generating projects. From 1985 
migrants with trade union experience began to play an assertive role in the 
affairs of some villages. These men usually emerged as informal local 
leaders by challenging the traditional decision-making processes.256 
However, NOTPECO's influence in the region was over-shadowed by the 
numerous youth organisations which sprang up in late-1985 and 1986. For 
example, by March 1986, almost every village in Sekhukhuneland had its own 
youth congress.257 These organisations grew under conditions of widespread 
resistance and repression . This had a number of consequences for rural 
organisation and resistance. 
The increasing membership of youth congresses led to the declining influence 
of relatively politicised elements in the village committees "who were either 
swept along with this new constituency or were increasingly overshadowed by 
new leaders more in tune with the concerns of this enlarged following". 
Parents' committees in the villages diminished in significance once the 
migrants returned to the urban areas. Under these conditions, the activities 
of the youth "increasingly took the form of a generational revolt against all 
forms of authority". State reaction to the militancy of the youth during 1986 
and 1987 led to the collapse of the youth movement by mid-1987.258 
255 New Nation, (23.4.87), p.21 . 
256 Delius,P. (1990); op.cit. , p.22. 
257 Ibid., p.23. 
258 Ibid., pp.23-4. 
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In conclusion, the formation of the UDF drew together large numbers of civic 
associations in a broad alliance to oppose the apartheid regime. This Front 
organisation also had a major role in the formation of new civics during the 
second half of the 1980s. The result was the increasing mobilisation and 
politicisation of black society. These were evident in the capacity of civic 
associations to develop a mass-based membership and/or to mobilise 
communities to support their campaigns. This demonstrated the hegemonic-
building role played by civic associations during the period under review. In 
this sense, the civic associations played a central role in mobilising and 
politicising civil society leading to a shift in the balance of social forces 
towards the UDF. 
Firstly, civic organisations emerged in response to a wide range of political, 
economic and social factors, and , in some cases, as a result of the 
organisational efforts of activists. The emphasis of these organisations was 
on the mobilisation and organisation of people around the concrete particulars 
of their everyday lives (rent increases, bus-fare increases, state repression, 
etc.). The majority of black people have similar material and political 
grievances, which played a major role in mass mobilisation and organisation. 
In addition, civic associations embarked on various campaigns around local 
issues as a means of mobilising people and drawing them into their 
organisations. 
The first modern civic associations were established in Soweto (to oppose 
the community council system and rent increases) and in Port Elizabeth (to 
oppose rent increases) . The SCA, established by a small group of prominent 
residents, was unable to build a mass base until 1985. By contrast, PEBCO, 
which was established by the unification of four existing residents' associ-
ations, had a much wider mass base in its first year of existence. During 
this period, the SCA remained an elite organisation with a small following 
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and a relatively minor influence on township politics. This was apparent 
during the revolt which broke out in September 1984. During its first year 
of existence, PEBCO's rallies were often attended by up to 10,000 people. 
Both CAHAC and JORAC were formed by existing residents' associations to 
oppose rent increases in Cape Town's coloured suburbs and Durban's African 
townships respectively. They thus had a mass base with affiliates in a 
number of townships. However, both civics had to contend with powerful rival 
organisations. In the Western Cape, the rival Federation of Cape Civic 
Associations prevented the civics affiliated to CAHAC from attaining cohesion 
and maturity. In Natal, very weak links with trade unions and , more 
importantly, clashes with Inkatha, prevented JORAC from consolidating its 
support base. 
The formation of the UDF in 1983 and widespread opposition to the new 
constitutional dispensation and the "Koornhof Bills", generated a number of 
civic organisations and the revival of others between 1983 and 1986. Amidst 
widespread resistance to the introduction of the BLAs and state repression 
during 1985 and the beginning of 1986, civics were established in townships 
in Cradock (CRADORA), in Pretoria (MCA) , in East London (DVRA) , in 
Alexandra (MC), in the Northern Transvaal (NOTPECO), and in many other 
areas. In addition, a number of civics were revived (pEBCO, UBCO and the 
SCA). 
In general, civics were established or revived during this period in response 
to a combination of state reform and repression . The inclusion of Soweto in 
the list of "affected areas" when the first emergency was declared in 1985 
led to a tactical change leading to the formation of street committees in the 
townships. The SCA also embarked on a rent boycott during the second half 
of 1986, which was well supported, and a number of stayaways. PEBCO's 
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revival occurred in the wake of a consumer boycott and as a result of 
widespread repression during the first emergency. The gains made by the 
well-supported consumer boycott increased the organisation's prestige and 
state repression led to the formation of street committees throughout Port 
Elizabeth's townships. 
The revival of Uitenhage's civic association occurred in the aftermath of a 
massacre in Langa on March 21 , 1985. This was followed by a school 
boycott and, amidst violent confrontation with the security forces and attacks 
on policemen and councillors, the local authority collapsed . The street 
committee system was introduced and UBCO briefly took over the running 
of the township. 
The MCA was formed in 1985 after police fired on protesting residents of 
Mamelodi. In the aftermath of the massacre, residents decided to embark on 
a rent boycott and establish a civic association. The MCA set up street 
committees and people's courts and virtually ran the township for a brief 
period. In Alexandra township, police action at a funeral at the beginning of 
1986 led to a virtual civil war in the township. The Me took advantage of 
the situation and set up street committees which took over some of the 
administrative and judicial functions after the local authority collapsed. Similar 
motivations for the establishment or revival of civics occurred in other parts 
of the country. 
The UDF was able to extend its influence to the rural areas during the 
second half of the 1980s. Struggles against homeland rule , "independence" 
and incorporation and relocation into the homelands, and the effects of 
poverty, landlessness, over-population, drought, and high unemployment led to 
the formation of mass-based organisations in these areas. The establishment 
of NOTPECO in August 1986 brought together a number of these 
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organisations into an umbrella civic organisation. NOTPECO became the first 
regional civic organisation in the country. 
The civics organised communities in one township or brought together 
organisations from a number of townships or villages. CAHAC, JORAC, 
PESCO, USCG and the SCA drew their membership from more than one 
township while NOTPECO united a number of existing village committees into 
a regional civic organisation. PESCO, USCG and the SCA functioned with 
branch structures which elected a small executive committee. CAHAC, JORAC 
and NOTPECO were umbrella organisations with delegates from all affiliate 
organisations represented on their executive committees. PESCO, USCG and 
the SCA maintained links with their membership through mass rallies. 
However, PESCO, as well as CAHAC and JORAC, had regular meetings at 
branch (or affiliate) level in addition to mass meetings, thus ensuring mass 
participation. 
Most of the civic associations formed during the first period (1979-1984) were 
led by the petit-bourgeoisie. The SCA's undemocratic and elitist foundations 
largely accounted for its insignificant membership until 1985. PESCO, although 
led by the petty bourgeoisie, had a radical confrontationist approach which 
appealed to students and workers as well as businessmen and professionals. 
likewise, JORAC had a "common people approach and a strong redistributive 
focus which played a major role in providing it with widespread support. 
A central tool of mass mobilisation and organisation were the various 
campaigns organised by the civics around local material, as well as political 
grievances. The civic associations spearheaded township struggles around 
issues such as increasing rent and service charges, increases in bus-fares 
and food prices, etc. Such struggles facilitated the growth of civic associ-
ations in townships which were previously insulated from political activity, 
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while existing associations were often at the centre of mobilisation of the 
campaigns leading to an increase in their support. 
The SCA, for example, aimed to draw people into the organisation by getting 
involved in popular struggles around issues like high rents and service 
charges, the unpopular community councils, and fighting for the recognition 
of Sowetans as permanent South African residents. A rent boycott organised 
by the SCA in June 1986, which was well supported by Soweto residents, 
led to a rapid growth of the street committee system in Soweto and 
expanded the support base of the civic. 
The AAC was primarily concerned with issues which immediately affected the 
residents of Alexandra. These included unemployment, police harassment, 
informers, high taxi and bus fares, low wages, high rents, poor education, 
poor housing, the demolition of shacks by police, the presence of troops in 
the township, and the "bucket system" of sewerage. In April 1986 consumer 
and rent boycotts were launched in Alexandra as part of a national 
programme intended to effect the collapse of local administration. The 
resulting collapse of local administration placed the Action Committee at the 
forefront of the township 's politics and led to its takeover of local administra-
tion for a brief period . 
PEBCO was revived in November 1984 when it threatened a boycott of 
council-owned liquor outlets, a bus boycott and a one-day stayaway following 
a proposed rent increase by the Khayamnandi Town Council. The Council 
backed down and the rent hikes were withdrawn leading to an increase in 
PEBCO's support. A PEBCO organised boycott of white-owned shops in July 
15 1985, which lasted until December, led to the formation of street 
committee structures and a substantial expansion of the civic's membership. 
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During 1985, Uitenhage's African community embarked on three consumer 
boycotts organised by the local civic association . The boycotts during the first 
part of the year resulted in an expansion of USCG membership, as well as 
the support of other UDF organisations in the area. However, during the 
second half of the year USCG suffered a decline in support. The township 
had only four shops, and the consumer boycott of white-owned shops made 
shopping difficult. Harsh punishments were meted out by people's courts to 
suspected informers, people who declined to join the consumer boycott, and 
common criminals. 
JORAC, which was created to unite a few townships in their opposition to 
rent increases, soon became a leading force in the community on other 
issues as well. Likewise, CAHAC, which was formed because of rent 
increases, became involved in campaigns against bus fare increases, boycotts 
of products in support of striking workers and in mobilising support for the 
anti-Republic Day and anti-SAIC campaigns in 1981 . 
Virtually all the organisations which existed at the time of the elections for 
the SLAs and the tri-cameral parliament participated in mobilising in the anti-
elections campaigns. CAHAC, for example, through its constituent 
organisations, was able to reach almost every resident of the coloured 
residential areas. The campaign against the constitution was conducted largely 
through the Million Signature campaign, house-to-house meetings and mass 
rallies. In this campaign, activists popularised the UDF and called on 
prospective voters to boycott the elections. However, mobilisation during the 
anti-election campaign was not transformed into permanent organisation. Sy 
the beginning of 1985 civic, youth and student activity had declined and 
organisations which emerged during the campaign were depleted. Many 
organisations collapsed and those that still existed involved only a small 
number of activists. 
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By contrast, the leading role played by the SCA in the anti-elections 
campaign before the elections for the BLAs increased the support base of 
the organisation. The SCA took a leading role in forming an Anti-Community 
Councils Election Committee, which held meetings and rallies calling for a 
boycott of the elections. This committee, which was composed of student, 
youth, women's and labour organisations, gave the SCA access to a wide 
range of individuals and groups. 
Street committees also played a fundamental role in mass mobilisation and 
organisation. These structures provided the base for establishing strong 
grassroots organisation. In Mamelodi, for instance, the intention was to 
organise the community into yard , block and street committees, while in 
Soweto the basic structure was the street committee. Each street elected 
leaders (consisting of four parents - two men and two women - and two 
youths - one student, and one working or unemployed) which were repre-
sented in a block committee consisting of six or eight adjoining streets. 
In addition, since membership included workers, women and youth, the street 
committees provided an organisational link between specific local organisations 
of these groups. For example, the executive of the MCA, based on the 
street committee system, consisted of ten central committee members, and 
four representatives elected by the Mamelodi Youth Organisation, the student 
committee, the Zakheni Women's Organisation and the newly formed 
Mamelodi Teachers Union (MATU). The USCO Executive Committee had 
represent~tives from the trade unions, the Uitenhage Youth Congress, 
Uitenhage Women's Organisation, Uitenhage Students' Committee, Uitenhage 
Parents' Committee, Uitenhage Traders' AssOCiation, the Consumer Boycott 
Committee, the Langa Advisory Committee and the Langa Coordinating 
Committee. 
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Secondly, the civics played a central role in transforming the particular 
interests of communities they organised into a universalistic political challenge 
of the dominant system. This they did in a number of ways. The principles 
and objectives of civic associations affiliated to the UDF represented 
challenges to the dominant apartheid system. Many of these civic associations 
had adopted the Freedom Charter by the end of the period of review, 
signalling their conception of an alternative political system to that of 
apartheid . All the civic organisations rejected and opposed apartheid structures 
and, during the mid-1980s, began to develop alternative organs of people's 
power. The UDF civic associations drew into their structures organisations of 
the youth, women and trade unions (unity-in-action) and recognised the link 
between the struggles of these interest groups and their own struggles. In 
practice, unity-in-action meant uniting these struggles into one struggle against 
all aspects of apartheid exploitation and domination. In addition , from the very 
beginning, civic associations linked immediate material issues with broader 
political issues in their aims and objectives. Among these was the call for 
the overthrow of the whole political structure and black representation in 
central government. 
In large part, the civic associations emphasized the destruction of apartheid 
rather than the movement to socialism as the goal of the national liberation 
struggle. Although most adopted the Freedom Charter, or were identified as 
"Charterist" because of their affiliation with the UDF, little attention was 
placed on developing a socialist content in their aims and objectives. 
However, some civics did promote an embryonic socialist consciousness. 
CAHAC, for example, maintained a strong belief in working class leadership 
and argued that if working class leadership is to be established within the 
broader struggle for democracy, then it is important "that workers themselves 
move increasingly into leadership positions, not only in trade unions but also 
in community and other organisations". 
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The civics' challenge of the dominant system was also evident in the new 
structures created by them during the second half of the 1980s. The 
introduction of the street committees constituted a challenge to the authority 
of the local state. The total collapse of the local authorities in 1985 was 
identified as an opportunity to establish people's power in the townships. 
Many civics stepped into this vacuum, performing limited administrative and 
judicial duties. Furthermore, in certain areas the authorities were forced to 
enter into negotiations with civics on a wide range of issues. Civic 
associations perceived the street committees as alternative structures of mass 
participatory democracy which were bound by such democratic principles as 
mandates, accountability, and report-backs. 
United action and collaboration with other progressive forces were evident in 
the principles and practices of all the civic associations reviewed. The SCA, 
for example, aimed to co-operate with any organisation which had similar 
aims and objectives to its own. Before the elections for the Black Local 
Authorities in 1983 the SCA also took a leading role in forming an Anti-
Community Councils Election Committee, composed of students, youth, 
women's, and labour organisations. 
The strategies employed by civic associations in their campaigns during the 
second half of the 1980s also took the form of a challenge to state power. 
By the middle of the 1980s most civic organisations were directing their 
activities at opposing all forms of apartheid oppression and exploitation which 
township residents were experiencing . From 1984 civic associations increasing-
ly recognised and asserted a political role in their campaigns. Civics began 
to link local concerns for the abolition of rent, service charges and bus fare 
increases with demands for the resignation of all town councillors, the release 
of detainees and political prisoners, the withdrawal of the army/police from 
townships, and the unbanning of political organisations. 
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The rent boycott, which began in the Vaal Triangle at the end of 1984, was 
initiated by a UDF affiliate and taken up by UDF affiliates in other parts of 
the country. In the process, the rent boycott was transformed from a tactic 
to oppose rent increases to a strategy to challenge the government. 
Consumer boycotts were introduced in the Eastern Cape townships by UDF 
affiliates and were soon taken up in other parts of the country by other 
affiliates. Activists soon began to link local demands with national political 
demands. 
Finally, civic associations also played a central role in expanding the political 
and ideological leadership of the UDF in civil society. Civic associations led 
popular resistance under the banner of the UDF in many townships and rural 
villages and their dominance within civil society spread the UDF tradition to 
most parts of South Africa. Here, because of the mass-based membership 
of civic associations and their dominance in local politics the UDF was able 
to shape the political, intellectual and moral objectives of communities. This 
is a clear demonstration of the role civic associations played in the political 
and ideological struggle found in Gramsci's strategy of the war of position. 
The political leadership of the UDF civic associations is demonstrated by the 
lead they took in township campaigns. For example, the SCA took the lead 
in forming an Anti-Community Councils Election Committee prior to the 
elections for the BLAs in 1983. It also initiated a boycott of rent and service 
charges on 1 June 1986, and by the end of the month 80 percent of 
Soweto residents had stopped paying rent. In the course of the rent boycott 
a survey of Soweto residents indicated the widespread support of the civic 
association. In April 1986 a well-supported consumer and rent boycotts 
launched by the AAC as part of a national programme intended to isolate 
all collaborators socially and effect the collapse of local administration resulted 
in the resignation of the entire town council. 
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PESCO's leadership in the townships of Port Elizabeth is also best indicated 
by the campaigns it initiated. The November 1984 PESCO threat of a boycott 
and a one-day stayaway led to a withdrawal of a proposed rent hike. In 
March 1985, a PESCO initiated stayaway was supported by 90 per cent of 
the African workers of Port Elizabeth. On July 15 PESCO called for a 
boycott of white-owned shops which lasted until December. In 1986, another 
stayaway was organised by Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage community 
organisations to commemorate the March 1985 massacre in Uitenhage. This 
stay-away was supported by unions in both cities and by African and 
coloured workers in the two cities. Subsequent stayaways on May Day and 
June 16 were also well supported by blacks in both cities. 
In a number of instances civic associations were able to establish elaborate 
networks of street committees, drawing in the majority of the people living 
in their communities into their structures. Examples here are the MC in 
Alexandra, the MCA, and Cradora . Finally, in certain areas the authorities 
were forced to enter into negotiations with civics on a wide range of issues. 
This represented a limited shift of power from the local authorities to the 
mass-based civic associations. Examples here include the SCA, which entered 
into negotiations with the town clerk on the rent boycott, PESCO, which 
entered into negotiations with the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
individual employers, and the state, including the SAP, during the course of 
a consumer boycott, and the DVRA, which entered into negotiations with the 
East London City Council about plans for the upgrading of Duncan Village. 
Widespread and sus.tained rent, consumer and transport boycotts, the 
formation of extensive networks of street committees involving large numbers 
of people, the detention and arrests of scores of township people, mainly 
members of the civics , widespread rebellion often reaching insurrectionary 
levels, the cordoning off of entire townships, all of these demonstrate the 
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extent to which black people, and the African people in particular, were 
prepared to make sacrifices in the struggle for national liberation. The 
establishment of peoples power in many townships, and the central role 
played by certain civic associations in their townships thereafter demonstrated 
the extent of their political impact. The enormous resources (both human and 
financial) expended by the state to destroy these civic organisations also 
demonstrate their significance in this struggle. 
Thus, the civic associations reviewed here played a central role in meeting 
the LeninistlGramscian strategic emphasis on mass mobilisation and 
organisation around all struggles in civil society which are primarily directed 
against the ruling bloc, and the political and ideological struggle to raise the 
revolutionary consciousness of the masses. What also becomes clear is the 





This chapter focuses on the role of women's organisations in the political 
and ideological struggle to raise the revolutionary consciousness of women 
in South Africa. This is done, firstly , by examining the issues which confront 
women as a specific group and their responses to this and , secondly, by 
examining the formation, membership and structure, and policies and aims of 
selected women's organisations which were affiliated to the UDF. 
The former analysis leads to an understanding of the general factors 
underlying the formation of women's organisations, the general role of women 
and of women's organisations in the national liberation struggle, and the 
general nature, and aims and objectives of these organisations. The latter 
analysis leads to an understanding of the strategies used to draw women 
into the national liberation struggle, and the nature of the revolutionary idea 
within the UDF women's organisations and its spread through these 
organisations. Finally, this analysis reveals the type of democratic 
organisations which were emerging during the course of the 1980s: their 
structures, practices and membership. 
9.2. Overview 
More than 50 percent of South Africans are women. Approximately 81 
percent of the women in South Africa are black. African women make up 
66,5 percent. 1 In 1980 32,4 percent, 38,3 percent and 25,7 percent of 
Shapiro,J. (1980); "Political and economic organisation of women in South Africa: The limitations 
of a notion of 'sister-hood' as a basis for solidarity", in Africa Perspective, (No.15, Autumn), p.12. 
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African, coloured and Indian women respectively were economically active.
2 
African women comprised 65,5 percent of the female labour force while 
coloured and Indian women constituted 11 ,6 percent and 2,2 percent 
respectively.3 African women are also over-represented in the unemployed 
category. In 1980, 75 percent of African women were recorded as having no 
paid work.4 
African women constituted the most exploited and oppressed group in South 
Africa. In the first place, as blacks, they were confronted by the general 
system of oppression characteristic of apartheid . Secondly, as workers, they 
experienced the exploitation characteristic of racial capitalism. Finally, as 
women, they experienced inequality both at home and at the workplace. The 
multiple burdens faced by women led to the increasing participation of women 
in organisations which addressed these problems. These included, at one 
level, increasing participation of women in the independent trade union 
movement and, at another level , the emergence and proliferation of 
organisations which dealt specifically with women's issues. 
There are a variety of forms of oppression and exploitation directed against 
working women in general and African women in particular. Working mothers 
often leave their children with unqualified child minders because there are no 
adequate child care facilities in the townships. In addition, women in general 
and pregnant women in particular have no legal protection at work and, 
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left to have children - they use this as an excuse not to train them or 
promote them. In addition , after a hard day at work women are expected 
to do all the domestic work at home.s 
In South Africa there is no explicit policy regarding maternity rights and 
maternity leave. In the majority of cases, employers grant unpaid leave after 
which returning to work depends on individual negotiation.6 Women thus often 
return to work as soon as possible leaving their children in the care of adult 
relatives. 
Apartheid has also defined a particular place in the social division of labour 
for African women. The migrant labour system reinforced women's dependence 
on their husbands, fathers or male guardians. However, the desperate 
economic situation common to most households in the homelands forced 
many women to move to the urban areas in search of employment. These 
women often gained employment in jobs which have a low prestige, are low 
paying and have bad working conditions.7 
African women and, to a lesser degree, coloured women have been 
concentrated in domestic service and agricultural employment. Domestic service 
isolates the individual worker, intensifies her vulnerability vis-a-vis her 
employer and makes exploitation absolute. In the agricultural sector, African 
and coloured women have been employed mainly as irregular or casual 
agricultural workers. Furthermore, these two sectors were excluded from labour 
legislation which permitted legal organisation, bargaining, protective legislation, 
S 
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workmen's compensation , and so on . This reinforced women's vulnerability and 
powerlessness. Another major employer of women is the clothing sector, 
which is characterised by poor working conditions, low pay, and poor health 
conditions.8 
After 1960, employment of black women in the manufacturing , commercial and 
service sectors of South Africa increased dramatically.9 Women employment 
in professional, technical and related jobs increased from 41 ,6 percent of total 
employment in this category in 1960 to 44,9 percent in 1980. African women 
constituted 88,0 percent of female employment in agriculture and fisheries, 
82,8 percent of women employed in services, and 56 percent of women 
employed in production.10 
The increasing number of women entering the work-place, and the growth of 
the independent trade union movement, resulted in the increasing participation 
of women in trade unions. The existence of unions with a large female 
membership made it possible for women's rights to be placed firmly on the 
agenda of the trade union struggle for working class rights. Trade union co-
operation with the political organisations led to the inclusion of women's rights 
in the demands made by the broad liberation movement. In addition , women 
increasingly participated in community and political organisations. 
The UDF's Women's Congress, launched on 25 April 1987, brought together 
eight regional women 's organisations affiliated to the UDF. According to 
Jaffee: "The UDF's Women's Congress is a concerted attempt to assert 
8 
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women's leadership, bring women's issues into the UDF in a more forceful 
way, and ensure that women's struggle is an integral part of political 
struggle" .11 
These issues were a dominant concern of women in both the independent 
trade union movement and the mass democratic movement. During the early 
1980s none of the emerging unions elected a women president or branch 
chairperson. Even in industries where women predominated or were as 
numerous as men, such as commerce and clothing, the union presidents 
were men. Furthermore, although some unions elected women general-
secretaries, this position is often far less an important position than the 
presidency.12 
Within both local community organisations and national political organisations 
there was a problem with the organisational involvement of women. Women 
were poorly represented in leadership positions at all levels, in part, due to 
their family responsibilities . Out of 61 national and regional UDF leaders in 
1985 only eight were women. Women were often involved in short-term 
activities; but this was not translated into a sustained organisational role. 
Women are possibly the least organised group of township residents, despite (indeed 
because of) the fact that they face specific problems, stemming from the sexual division 
of labour and their "triple oppression", as women, as workers and as blacks. Women are 
therefore likely to be under-represented in all township organisations except for 
specifically women's organisations .. .. 13 
In addition, until the mid-1980s, the organisation of women workers was very 
11 
Jafee,G. (1987) ; op. cit. , p.84 
12 
Friedman,S. (1987); op.cit., pp.415-6. 
13 
Seeki~gs , J . (1986) ; "Workers and the politics of consumer boycotts", in South African Labour 
Bulletin, (Vo1.11 , No.6, June-July), p.28. 
421 
Iimited.14 This was due to a number of factors . Firstly, women are generally 
employed in economic sectors which are badly paid , unprotected by 
legislation, and relatively unstable within the economy. Secondly, women 
employed in agriculture and domestic service are highly controlled and 
isolated. They usually live on their employers premises and resistance of any 
form is often met with harsh punishment. 15 Even in unions with a majority 
of women workers, women are prevented from fully participating in union 
affairs because of their domestic responsibilities .16 
According to Hassim et.a!. , the manner in which the independent trade union 
movement and the political organisations conceptualize women's oppression 
and their role in the struggle had implications for the way in which women 
participated in the struggle, for the way in which their interests and needs 
are addressed in the course of struggle, and for development policy in post-
apartheid South Africa.17 The reproduction of roles and relationships which 
oppress women within popular organisations was a central concern of women 
during the 1980s. 
According to Leila Patel , lithe question of the emancipation of women did not 
appear on the agenda of political organisations and trade unions automati-
cally".18 The development of a formal position on women's oppression and 
the role of women in the struggle within political organisations and the 
independent trade union movement was largely due to the wide-spread 
14 
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participation of women in popular struggles and the emergence and 
proliferation of women's organisations. 
In spite of the under-representation of women in leadership positions and 
their inability to participate fully in long-term political activities, women played 
a significant role in popular struggles and campaigns during the 1980s. The 
upsurge of political activity during this period led to an increase in the 
participation of women as well. Women, often in leadership positions, could 
be found in the trade unions; leading the resistance to forced removals in 
the rural areas; leading the squatter struggles; at the centre of consumer 
boycotts; in student and community organisations; and in street committees.19 
In addition, women joined support committees for detainees, trained as first 
aiders offering emergency health and counselling services in the townships, 
and became involved in organisations fighting to free the children from 
detention.20 
Women workers displayed a high degree of militancy with strikes taking place 
in all sectors, (except domestic service) , in which African women are 
employed. Women are the breadwinners in a large number of households 
with the result that any threat to their ability to support their households is 
met with militancy.21 
According to Berge~2, a number of factors helped to foster a militant, 
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economic responsibility most women bear, the large number of women 
migrants who live in single-sex hostels that are densely populated and rigidly 
controlled, and the strict regulation of living and working conditions that lends 
a political dimension to all workers' protests. 
Women also played a Significant role in the general opposition to apartheid . 
The many struggles rooted in local protests against housing shortages, high 
rents, increases in transport costs, the lack of social services and Bantu 
Education facilitated the politicisation and mobilisation of women. In many 
cases women assumed leadership roles in crisis committees set up to deal 
with rent and consumer boycotts. In some cases women dominated structures 
at the forefront of struggle. Women also provided the initial impetus for 
consumer boycotts in several townships. This is partly due to the pattern of 
income expenditure by working women and in part due to the responsibilities 
of housewives. Most working women reserve their income for groceries and 
rent. 
These struggles increasingly drew women into grassroots organisations. 
Women became heavily involved in community-based organisations, forming 
a large proportion of the rank-and-file membership of the organisations 
represented in the UDF. More particularly, the 1980s witnessed a growth in 
the number of women participating in already existing women's organisations 
and the spread of women's organisations to many parts of the country. 
In spite of the increasing participation of women in the broader liberation 
struggle, and even as consciousness of women's strategic interests rose, the 
main focus of attention were local popular struggles and the struggle for 
national liberation. Thus, 
... political battles over rents, squatter rights and bus boycotts are always so preSSing that 
there is no time to consider questions of patriarchy out of this context. Whether or not 
these issues are debated .. . the very political partiCipation of the women must challenge 
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their inferior position in society and the prevailing sexual division of labour?3 
However, women's organisations provided a platform for women to articulate 
their grievances in a political context and to take a lead in organisation and 
in action . Most women's organisations were formed to articulate women's 
issues and demands. Many organisations were started to improve the 
conditions of life/survival of women, while others were formed to meet the 
various class, professional , ethnic, and cultural needs of various women.24 
Many were formed speCifically to foster self-help and other schemes for the 
assistance of women, for instance, the establishment of creches, etc. A few 
were formed specifically to combat the sexual oppression of women . Others, 
such as the Inkatha Women's Brigade, were created by political organisations 
to draw the support of women and the youth and to channel the aims and 
objectives of these organisations to these groupS.2S 
The objective of some women's organisations was to draw women as a 
united group into the broad liberation struggle. Some of these became 
affiliates of the UDF and strove to place women's issues on the agenda of 
the broad liberation struggle. According to Tessa Marcus, the fundamental 





1. The recognition by the national liberation movement that women are oppressed as 
women and that women's oppression, as a social injustice, has to be overcome. 
2. The recognition that it is necessary for women to organise as women to overcome their 
oppression. 
3. The recognition that the women's struggle is an integral part of, and not in contradiction 
with, the national liberation struggle.26 
Unterhalter,E. (1983); op.cit., p.893. 
Casaburri ,I.M. (1988) ; op. cit. , p.1SS. 
See Hassim,S. (1988) ; "Reinforcing Conservatism: An analysis of the politics of Inkatha's 
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Marcus,T. (1988); op.cit., p.102. 
425 
The formation of women's organisation which combined the struggle for 
women's rights with the struggle for national liberation placed women's issues 
on the agenda of the broad liberation movement. Issues which concern 
women specifically are not normally the subject of political struggle. By 
bringing the triple oppression and exploitation of women into broader political 
debates, the barriers which kept women out of political struggles were broken 
down.27 Furthermore, people became increasingly conscious that gender is 
a political issue. 
The UDF women's organisations identified the need for a specific women's 
organisation to fight both against the forms of oppression and exploitation 
particularly directed against women, and against sexism in other 
organisations.28 One commentator viewed the need for progressive women's 
organisations in the following terms: 
Women's issues, although they can form a rallying point, cannot be a priority in the 
business of trade union or civic organisation. "Politics" is seen as a specifically male 
interest where women seldom take part in discussion let alone form part of any political 
organisation .... 
It is thus important to build a militant and confident spirit amongst women. Because of 
existing ideological barriers by which women are often excluded from political responsibil-
ity women must play an important role in the organisation. This will encourage the belief 
that they can change not only their own position in society but also playa central role in 
the struggle for democracy. In a women's organisation this can develop without 
introducing conflicts produced by the male-female (dominant-passive) relationship.29 
The UDF women's organisations mobilised women around the issues most 
immediate to them: health , childcare, food prices and housing. They also 
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membership. They had leadership training and educational workshops. In 
addition, they produced newsletters (e.g. FEDTRAW News and Women's 
Voice) , which focused on news related to specific branches and the activities 
of their organisations. These newsletters also focused on specific issues and 
demands which concern women as a whole, such as maternity rights, child-
care facilities, etc., as well as local and national popular struggles. 
These organisations were strongly committed to democracy, which meant 
encouraging full and active participation in their organisations. As one women 
activist said , "control of our own organisations is a step towards taking 
control of our own lives". 30 The emphasis on active participation was thus 
directed towards instilling confidence in their members. A major objective of 
these organisations was to encourage women to take an active part in their 
own organisations as well as other community or political organisations. 
In general, the UDF women's organisations sought to improve the quality of 
women's lives through the following activities31 : income-generating activities 
(sewing , handicrafts, etc.); educational activities (literacy projects, leadership 
training , etc.); agricultural activities (vegetable growing, etc.); home and health-
care activities (creches, family hygiene, etc.); and civil and political activities 
(encouraging women to participate in local and national political campaigns 
and organisations). 
The leadership of the women's organisations consisted of veterans of the 
1950s and the Congress Alliance and younger, educated , black women , many 
politicised through student politics. There were a small number of branches 
30 
31 
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among white, Indian and coloured women, and a growing organisation in rural 
areas, particularly in the Cape and the Transvaal. The mass membership of 
the organisations were black working class women radicalised through 
apartheid exploitation and domination. 
This gave rise to a new consciousness among women, "one which reflects 
a deeper understanding of the nature of their oppression as women and a 
growing resolve to challenge it at every level". Women recognised the need 
to mobilise at a political level; examined the way their organisations should 
relate to other democratic organisations; examined how women's issues can 
be taken up in the political organisations and in the trade union movement; 
and examined ways of defending women's organisations under repressive 
conditions. 32 
Fourteen women's organisations were present at the inaugural conference of 
the UDF in August 1983.33 The following is an analysis of the most 
significant of the women 's organisations which affiliated to the UDF. The 
focus is on the formation , membership and structure, and policies and aims 
of the various organisations in order to demonstrate their role in the political 
and ideological struggle to raise the revolutionary consciousness of women. 
This leads to an understanding of the strategies used to draw women into 
the national liberation struggle, and the nature of the revolutionary idea and 
its spread through women's organisations. 
9.3. Federation of Transvaal Women (FEDTRAW) 
The first major African women's organisation in South Africa was the Bantu 
Women's League formed as the women's wing of the ANC. The Bantu 
32 
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Women's League (which later became the ANC Women's League) was formed 
in 1913 to oppose attempts by municipalities in the Orange Free State to 
force African women to carry passes.34 In April 1954, the ANC's Women's 
League joined with other women's organisations to form the Federation of 
South African Women (FEDSAW).35 
FEDSAW was the first attempt to establish a broad-based women's 
organisation to take up women's issues. It also registered its willingness to 
take up national political issues when it pledged its support for general 
campaigns of the Congress Alliance. FEDSAW was established to unite 
women in struggles against all forms of exploitation and oppression which 
particularly affected women , to mobilise women to participate in the broader 
liberation struggle and to fight against sexism in other organisations.36 
FEDSAW had two primary aims: to work for majority rule and an end to 
apartheid; and to build a multiracial women's organisation that would also 
work for the rights of women . FEDSAW was a united front of women who 
were members of political organisations, trade unions and community 
organisations. The organisation's members, estimated to be 230,000 women, 
were drawn largely from the ANC's Women's League but included other 
members of the Congress Alliance.37 These included women members of the 
Congress of Democrats, the Coloured People's Congress, the South African 
Indian Congress as well as the Food and Canning Workers' Union.38 
34 
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In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre a number of organisations were 
banned while state security forces embarked on a wave of repression. 
FEDSAW was never formally banned but many of its leaders were jailed , 
restricted or forced into exile. In addition , the organisation was prevented 
from holding meetings or carrying on other activities.39 The organisation was 
effectively destroyed by the activities of the security forces during the early 
1960s. The formation of FEDTRAW in December 1984 was the first step in 
an attempt to revive FEDSAW. 
In 1984 over 200 women representing women's groups throughout the 
Transvaal met to unite women in common action for the removal of political, 
legal, social and economic disabilities and to work towards a free, non-racial 
and democratic society where women would be treated with dignity and 
equality. The formation of FEDTRAW was an attempt to create a federal 
structure for a revived FEDSAW.40 
On March 31 1984, 150 women at a Transvaal Regional Conference elected 
a Transvaal FEDSAW Interim Co-ord inating Committee. Th is Committee was 
mandated to work towards a Transvaal regional conference, and to start 
women's groups where none existed and strengthen existing women's 
groupS.41 FEDTRAW was launched at a conference held on the 7-9th 
December, 1984 where the 200 delegates ratified the draft constitution and 
elected the first executive. 
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Committee and branches. The Inter-branch Committee consisted of delegates 
from each branch and met at least once every three months. The Annual 
General Meeting (AGM) was the supreme decision-making body of the 
organisation and met in September of each year. Each branch was allowed 
four delegates with voting rights. The new organisation elected Sister Bernard 
Ncube, a leading anti-apartheid activist, as its first president. Three vice-
presidents were elected while the organisation's four patrons were Mrs 
Albertina Sisulu, Francis Baard , Winnie Mandela and Helen Joseph. The new 
organisation chose the Women's Charter (adopted at the "Congress of the 
People") as its guiding principles, thus displaying its early allegiance to the 
ANC. 
In terms of its constitution, FEDTRAW had the following aims and objectives 
which directly related to women: obtaining equal rights with men in relation 
to property, marriage and children, and for the removal of all laws and 
customs that deny women such equal rights; the development of every child 
through free compulsory and equal education for all, the protection of mother 
and child through maternity homes, social welfare, creches and nursery 
schools, in countryside and towns, thro~gh proper homes for all , and through 
the provision of health services, water, lights, transport, sanitation and other 
amenities of modern life; the removal of regulations, customs or social 
practices which hinder the activity of women in democratic organisations, and 
the right to participate equally in the work of these organisations; building 
and strengthening women's sections in the National Liberation Movement, and 
to promote the organisation of women in trade unions and through other 
community organisations; and educating society as a whole on the rights and 
responsibilities of women . 
The organisation also had a number of other aims and objectives which were 
linked to social and political issues, and included: obtaining the right to vote 
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without restriction or discrimination; obtaining the right to full opportunities for 
employment, equal pay and possibilities of promotion in all spheres of work, 
the right to enjoy acceptable working conditions and benefits, the right to join 
the union of one's choice; the removal of all laws that restrict free 
movement, that prevent or hinder the right of free association and expression, 
the right to a healthy family life and to live and work wherever people 
choose; and co-operation with all other organisations that have similar aims 
in South Africa as well as throughout the world . 
The organisation planned to concern itself with practical problems faced by 
women such as unemployment, work conditions, removals , education, and 
housing and to link these to the national struggle for liberation. In 1985 the 
Federation's Education Officer outlined the aims of the organisation at a 
workshop on women: 
Our understanding of the special disabilities faced by women is that they are rooted in 
exploitation, racial oppression and sexism. The battle against capitalism, racism and 
sexism cannot be fought as part of a three stage plan - the struggle must be waged 
simultaneously at all these levels. We are committed to building women's organisations; 
to uniting women; to raising the voice of women in the national democratic struggle led 
by the working class. It is our task to develop the working-class leadership amongst 
women and to allow working-class interests to dominate our women's organisations.42 
FEDTRAW linked the struggle for women's rights and freedoms together with 
the struggle against capitalism and racism. There was also a growing 
awareness that women do not win their emancipation only in the politics of 
mass mobilisation but in organisations which address the specific needs of 
women within the overall struggle for national Iiberation.43 According to 
FEDTRAWs Education Officer: 
42 
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today, and why we need to plant the seeds of the new society in the womb of the old so 
that it grows and develops in the direction we would like it to gO.44 
FEDTRAW was acutely aware of the absence of women in leadership 
positions in the community and political organisations. There was a need to 
organise women because: "Our struggle needs all the people in South Africa 
to get involved in building democracy. Half of these people are women. But 
there are not many women in our organisations. And very few women are 
leaders. Some organisations, like civics, have lots of women. But the women 
are not leaders". 45 
But getting women involved in women's organisations goes beyond ensuring 
women's leadership in other organisations. FEDTRAW argued that women 
must be organised in order to improve their conditions. In addition, the 
involvement of women in organisations like FEDTRAW would make them 
aware of "other organisations which are working in the struggle".46 This 
would increase their political consciousness as well as their involvement in 
the national liberation struggle. 
According to FEDTRAW, organisations specifically designed for women are 
necessary because women need to develop their organisational skills if they 
are to improve their position in the country. Women's organisations are 
needed so that women can learn from each other, develop confidence and 
be able to take leadership positions. Through such organisations women can 
discuss the special problems faCing them as women and how to deal with 
44 
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FEDTRAW organised women by focusing on the numerous local issues and 
problems women face. Women's groups were created when women came 
together to discuss local problems such as childcare, the high cost of food, 
education, etc. They established their own creches or established bulk-buying 
schemes. Once established the group broadened to embrace issues such as 
high rents, inadequate housing and low wages. Once the women became 
aware that the problems they faced are problems faced by women throughout 
the country they soon identified with the struggle for national liberation. 
Through this mobilising tactic FEDTRAW was able to raise the consciousness , 
of women from the level of their particular interests to the level of 
consciousness of national oppression and exploitation. 
FEDTRAW was established as a non-racial, multi-class federation of women's 
organisations. Membership was open to women of all races and from all 
social backgrounds. The organisation had a small number of professional 
black women members, with the bulk of the membership drawn from women 
workers, mainly in industry and service jobs. FEDTRAW had a small number 
of white women members which were almost exclusively English-speaking and 
middle class. Women in the rural branches of FEDTRAW were mainly 
peasant women, living in the homelands.48 Residential segregation resulted 
in the formation of groups along racial grounds. 
FEDTRAW brought together a number of local women's organisations. It had 
23 regional affiliates each incorporating a number of branches. Soweto, for 
47 
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example, had 50 branches.49 Throughout 1984, women in the Transvaal 
concentrated on building up local-level organisations. Women's groups were 
set up in the Vaal Triangle; in Pretoria, women's groups were set up in 
Atteridgeville, Mabopane, Soshanguve and Mamelodi; in Johannesburg groups 
were formed in Coronationville, Bosmont, and Newclare (coloured) , Alexandra 
and Soweto (African), and Lenasia (Indian) ; and in the remote rural and 
semi-rural areas, groups were established in Tzaneen and Pietersburg in the 
Northern Transvaal. 50 The impetus for organisation was diverse, but most 
women's groups dealt with issues affecting the daily life of women . 
The Vaal Organisation of Women (VOW) was organised around issues such 
as high prices, high rents and child care. The group organised discussions 
on these issues and , in order to encourage participation , organised projects 
like jumble sales, a programme of child-care, and adult literacy, and a 
grocery co-operative. The Soweto women's group discussed school fees, 
electricity and busfare increases, health, nutrition, religion , and the arrests of 
fathers, husbands and children. In the rural areas, the major issue was 
poverty and many rural women's organisations started out as vegetable-
growing or buying co-operatives. In the Northern Transvaal , women formed 
cultural and singing groups. Indian and coloured women were organised 
around opposition to the new constitution. 51 Thus, there was a mix of both 
the immediate issues which affected women and broader political issues. 
FEDTRAW also took up a number of national campaigns other than the anti-
BLAs campaign and the campaign against the tri-cameral parliament. For 
example, in 1985, the organisation resolved to work with the youth on the 
49 
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International Year of the Youth campaign and to endorse and popularise the 
Education Charter. It also participated in campaigns for an end to military 
conscription, for the withdrawal of troops from the townships, for free and 
equal education in South Africa, and for the abolition of apartheid .52 The 
broad political campaigns the organisation engaged in demonstrated its 
commitment to united action with other organisations and to the national 
liberation struggle to end apartheid . 
In sum, FEDTAWs aims and objectives were directed specifically at bringing 
about change in areas which directly affected women's interests and in areas 
which would lead to national liberation. It drew women into the organisation 
by focusing initially on issues which affect women directly, and linked these 
to national social and political issues, thereby raising the revolutionary 
consciousness of their members. It also engaged in campaigns in co-operation 
with other organisations, and linked its struggles to the national political 
challenge of the dominant system. 
9.4. United Women's Organisation (UWO) 
The middle of 1980 was a period of intense mass mobilisation in the 
Western Cape. 53 Popular struggles engendered a number of community 
organisations including CAHAC and the Western Cape Civic Association. The 
1976 Soweto uprising and subsequent wave of state repression provoked the 
formation of a women's organisation in the region. At the end of 1978 a 
small group of women in Gugulethu began working towards the formation of 
an organisation for women.54 These women had participated in FEDSAW in 
the 1950s and 1960s and saw the need for a women's organisation to help 
52 
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mobilise the people.55 
The events of 1976 brought the youth to the forefront of the struggle against 
apartheid and eventually fostered tensions between the youth and their 
parents. During the 1980 school boycotts parents sought ways in which they 
could actively support the youth. UWO was initially formed to support 
students in the education struggle. As one UWO executive member explained: 
1976 showed parents that they were not able to support their children and that there was 
something wrong with our society. We had fought Bantu Education when it was started 
in 1954, yet many parents became their children's enemy when they stood up against that 
education in 1976. We saw that we had no voice to speak for us or our ch ildren. We knew 
that as women we were oppressed both in our houses and at work, and that we needed 
to work towards changing things as women with both short- and long-term goals.56 
I n April 1981, more than 300 delegates from 31 areas of the Western Cape 
attended the launching conference of UWO.57 The participants recognised the 
need for a specific women's organisation to struggle for the elimination of 
women's oppression within the context of the broader struggle against 
oppression and exploitation in South Africa.58 Most of the participants had 
a history of political experience in trade unions, community organisations or 
in popular struggles during the 1950s. The meeting accepted the Draft 
Constitution and mandated the areas represented to begin organising women 
and forming local branches of UWO.59 
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In the preface of the Policy Document60 of the organisation, UWO stated 
"that oppression in South Africa cannot be wholly removed without removing 
the oppression of women". In addition: "Only in the wider setting of 
fundamental rights for all can we hope to achieve our own important goal. 
We cannot abstract ourselves from political issues, for they are our daily life, 
the roofs over the heads of our families, the food in the stomachs of our 
children. Our place must be as part of the struggle for fundamental rights". 
UWO aimed: to participate in the struggle for full and equal democratic rights 
for all; to work on practical activities which affect the day-to-day problems 
of people in oppressed communities; to involve women in solving problems 
that affect them in their community and at their places of work; and to 
struggle for the removal of all racial and sexual discrimination and economic 
exploitation.61 In terms of both its principles and aims, then, UWO identified 
the link between the liberation of women and national liberation, the link 
between issues which directly affected women and political issues which 
affected the subordinated people in general. 
UWO identified women's oppression as deriving from capitalist exploitation, 
rather than inherent contradictions between men and women. As its 




It is clear that women's oppression has a basis in the general system of capitalist 
exploitation. The rulers confuse us by making it seem as if men are responsible for 
women's oppression and thus we don't see that as workers we are all exploited and must 
join forces against the system of exploitation. There are women's organisations which 
make the mistake to organise women against men and thus do not threaten the system 
in any way.62 
Adopted as policy at the First UWO Conference on 5th April 1981 and amended at the Second 
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uwo thus asserted a strong anti-capitalist perspective, and , like FEDTRAW, 
linked the struggle against women's oppression, apartheid and capitalist 
exploitation. 
And: 
The fight to end this system of exploitation can only end in defeat as long as women 
occupy a passive position in society. Women's oppression must be ended and it is only 
women who can consistently fight to achieve their liberation. This shows the need for 
organisation on a broad and democratic scale, since it is only by organising that women 
can become a political force. While recognising that both men and women are exploited 
under capitalism, it is also necessary to organise women around that oppression which 
they experience unlike men (sexism - the belief that women are inferior to and dependent 
on men - and domestic slavery) ... Even within the organisations of the oppressed, 
prejudices against women still exist and must be rooted ouLWomen must constantly 
struggle against their own attitudes of passivity as well as against the attitudes of men, 
both of which have been socially conditioned.53 
In addition, women's organisations helped "to train women , to give them 
leadership and organisational skills" . This also promoted fuller participation by 
women in other community organisations.64 
A primary objective of UWO was to "unite women from all classes who 
could play a constructive role in the struggle for democracy in South Africa". 
It organised discussions between women at various branches, and public 
functions such as commemorative meetings on 9 August - South African 
Women's Day - in order to draw women into the organisation . It encouraged 
women to participate in other organisations of the oppressed masses and 
fight within them for the "removal of all laws, regulations, conventions and 
customs that discriminate against women", as well as against sexist practices 
which persist within these organisations themselves. 65 
UWO brought together veterans of the struggles of the 1950s and the 
Congress Alliance with younger, educated black women and working class 
63 
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black women. The organisation had a number of white members but its white 
membership was small and almost exclusively drawn from women with petty 
bourgeois, university-educated backgrounds. The mass membership of the 
organisation was composed of black working class women, radicalised through 
poverty and their circumstances. UWO had small branches in the coloured 
areas of Cape Town, largely made up of professional women , and huge 
branches, up until mid-1986, in Crossroad, entirely made up of working 
women , the majority of whom were domestic servants.66 
According to a UWO executive member, the organisation had a membership 
of one thousand in 1982, 90 percent being African women. In some cases, 
branches of the organisation were racially mixed (particularly in racially mixed 
or "grey" areas), but many of the branches were racially segregated because 
of residential segregation. Initially, UWO had large white branches, but after 
the formation of the UDF in 1983 many white members became more active 
in the UDF.67 
UWO delegates at the launching conference of the UDF in August 1983 
represented 19 branches located in white and coloured suburbs as well as 
African townships and squatter camps.68 Women were generally excluded 
from leadership positions in community and political organisations in most 
parts of the country. In the Western Cape, however, and as a consequence 
of UWO encouraging its members to participate in other organisations, women 
were strongly represented in local community organisations. UWO was an 
early forerunner of the phase of resistance and organisation which occurred 
66 
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in the early 1980s; its members actually helped initiate community 
organisations. As a result, women maintained their positions in such 
organisations.69 
UWO members played a central role in the formation of civics in their own 
areas.70 In Gugulethu, for example, the community responded to the 1980 
school boycotts by forming a Parents Action Committee. When the boycott 
ended, activists in UWO and the Parents Action Committee came together 
to form a civic. UWO's commitment to involving women in the broader 
liberation was also evident in its early activities. UWO participated in broader 
struggles of the oppressed such as the anti-Republic Day campaign in 1981 
and the anti-Ciskei campaign in 1983.71 
However, according to Bernstein, UWO, like its counterpart in the Transvaal, 
began to seek forms of more permanent mobilisation and organisation of 
women. UWO set itself a double objective. "Recognising the social barriers 
to the organisation and political activities of black women under apartheid", 
UWO gave its "attention to promoting the organisation of women into smaller 
localised groups dealing with immediate issues. This included encouraging 
women to join and work in trade unions. In this way the women in smaller 
organisations, concentrating on local and grassroots issues, could also be 
drawn into the national political campaigns".72 
UWO branches began to focus on projects that were important to people in 
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their area. "For example, the KTC branch concentrated on getting more taps 
and doing something about the lack of garbage collection . ... Reaching women 
through organising creches is a very big project in most township 
branches".73 The organisation also demonstrated its support for trade union 
struggles and community struggles.74 The organisation was active in the 
early stages of the Nyanga Squatters' campaign and had representation on 
the Wilson-Rowntree and Leyland Strike Support Committees in 1981 .75 UWO 
saw problems of high rents and bad housing, forced removals because of 
the Group Areas Act, and the threat of evictions, as women's concerns.76 
The organisation linked specific "women's concerns" with general political 
concerns.77 For example, in 1982 UWO had two themes for the year -
"Childcare" and "High Prices". Play groups were organised , and UWO 
organised around International Children's Day and the United Nations 
Declaration of Children's Rights. The organisation held a meeting on the 
issue of high prices and resolved not to buy bread for a week. They also 
called on the shopowners to support them in their struggle against high 
prices. The themes for 1983 were "Childcare", the "Koornhof Bills" and the 
"Constitution" . 
UWO also encouraged political education, with branches considering the 
importance of feminism and how it relates to women's role in the national 
democratic struggle. At broader forums of the organisation, discussions were 
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held on the struggles in countries such as Algeria, Nicaragua, Cuba, the 
Philippines, and the peace movement. Members "studied the history of the 
struggle, the ANC, the history of South Africa" , the Freedom Charter and 
held workshops on media skills .78 In addition to discussions on political 
issues, UWO held discussions on strategy and tactics, e.g. the consumer 
boycott. 
UWO consisted of an elected Executive Committee and numerous local 
branches. Five women formed a UWO women's group and when the group 
reached ten or more members a branch was formed. Each branch elected 
representatives to an Executive Council , the supreme decision-making body, 
which met every second month. Branches operated fairly autonomously, 
determining which projects were suited to their areas and the abilities and 
interests of their members.79 
UWO played an important role in the formation of the Western Cape UDF. 
In early 1983 UWO issued a call for women to bring the organisations they 
were part of into the UDF.80 Many UWO members became active in both 
the women's organisation and the UDF.81 Members of UWO played a 
relatively prominent role in the regional UDF. It had three members, including 
a past UWO president Mrs Mildred Lisea, on the Western Cape Regional 
UDF in 1985.82 In addition, one of its members, Cheryl Carolus, sat on the 
first NEC of the Front. 
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On 22 March 1986, UWO merged with a township-based women's 
organisation, the Women's Front, to form the United Women's Congress 
(UWCO). This was in response to the UDF call to consolidate all sector-
based affiliate groups. The Women's Front, a small organisation comprising 
less than 100 members, initially resisted a merger on the grounds that UWO 
was dominated by whites. However, according to Fester, the executive 
members of UWO were mostly black people - mostly domestic workers; and 
all the chairpeople had been black people. The first executive committee of 
UWCO, consisting of eight people, included a chairperson and two secretaries 
from each of these groups. UWCO's membership reached 2,500 in 1986.83 
UWCO also prioritised education in its activities. The new organisation created 
an Education and Training portfolio in its executive to organise broad 
educational forums and branch education projects. The organisation also 
encouraged interbranch education by promoting joint activities. For example, 
the Observatory branch worked with the New Crossroads branch on a sewing 
co-operative while the Woodstock branch worked with the Langa branch.84 
This type of activity was directed towards promoting a deeper understanding 
by women of different races of the issues which affect women of other 
races. 
In sum, UWO was able to draw women from the different races and class 
groups into an organisation which dealt specifically with women's issues, but 
linked these with the national liberation struggle. The objective was to draw 
women as a specific group into the national liberation struggle, while 
simultaneously ensuring that women acquire a leadership role in community 
83 
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and political organisations and that women's issues are placed on the agenda 
of the broad liberation front. In the process, UWO was able to mobilise and 
politicise a small number of women in Cape Town, leading to their 
involvement in the broader national-democratic revolutionary struggle. 
9.5. Natal Organisation of Women (NOW) 
Durban also experienced a period of mass mobilisation during the early 
1980s. In Durban's African townships, rent increases and related matters such 
as the lack and poor quality of housing as well as increases in transport 
costs were the main reasons for the emergence of community 
organisations.85 The struggles which provoked the growth of community 
organisations had a particular affect on African women. 
The struggles against rent and bus-fare increases were sparked off by real 
declines in living standards. An additional assault on the living standards of 
Durban's African population particularly affected women, who are responsible 
for the management of the household.86 Opposition to the proposed rises in 
living costs were directed at the state, in particular the Port Natal Administra-
tion Board (PNAB). Popular struggles were soon directed towards opposing 
Inkatha's attempt to control the Natal townships by incorporating them into 
KwaZulu. Women played a direct role in this opposition when, in 1983, 
women from Lamontville confronted the central state directly by travelling to 
Cape T own to put forward their demands to Parliament. 87 
Natal's women experienced the same problems women in other parts of the 
country were experiencing . According to Hassim et.a!. : 
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Although women participated in these struggles and were dominant in the management 
of some of the campaigns, political leadership ultimately fell into the hands of men. 
Increasingly, mass meetings became the key means of reaching people and consolidating 
the campaigns. At this level , women were severely handicapped .... Whilst they (women) 
participated confidently in the day-to-day activities of community organisations, they were 
significantly absent from the platform at mass meetings. This was further compounded 
by the inability of many women to speak English with the degree of fluency required for 
public meetings conducted in English.88 
NOW was formed at the end of 1983 by women in Durban's townships. 
These were mostly women who were involved in the community organisations 
and popular struggles affecting the townships at the time. The motivation 
came largely from women involved in JORAC and NIC. The organisation 
grew out of a small group of women "who felt the need to come together 
and observe South African National Women's Day on the eighth of August", 
1983. This group later consolidated to form the women's organisation before 
joining the UDF.89 
NOW soon had about 20 branches in the Durban area , and began to 
expand in the rural areas. Initially, the organisation had members only in 
Durban townships like Lamontville and KwaMashu. By 1987, NOW had 
members in Empangeni, Pietermaritzburg and Natal rural areas such as 
Howick, Ladysmith and Weenen and claimed a total membership of 1,000. 
In addition, according to NOW activists, almost all the townships around 
Durban had branches.90 These included informal settlements such as Inanda 
and Umbumbulu, the Natal townships such as Lamontville and Chesterville, 
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overtly non-racial and organised women of all races. 91 However, its initial 
leadership was drawn largely from women activists in JORAC and NIC. 
NOW identified the participation of women in trade unions and community 
organisations as important. It co-operated with other progressive organisations, 
especially civic and youth structures, around community issues.92 Now thus 
recognised the importance of united action tactics and the link between 
various types of popular struggles. NOW aimed: to struggle against all racial, 
economic, and sexual exploitation; to unite women to solve problems that 
affect women in the community and at work; and to strengthen women so 
that they become more confident of their decisions and actions, and to 
enable them to play a greater role in other organisations to which they 
belong. 
The organisation aimed to organise women around issues that most affected 
their lives - the high cost of living, poor housing, maternity benefits and 
childcare. The Pietermaritzburg branch organised a creche while the 
Lamontville branch got involved in a knitting project. Other branches took up 
civic issues such as transport, education and rent, soup kitchens for 
pensioners and orphans. NOW ran projects such as shoe making and sewing 
co-operatives to organise unemployed women. 93 NOWs demands included the 
right to full employment opportunities for women, with equal pay and 
promotion possibilities; free and compulsory education for all ; and the removal 
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The issues which affected women differed from area to area . In the informal 
settlements, struggles were based on survival: over scarce material resources, 
particularly land and water; and the threat of incorporation into KwaZulu. In 
the KwaZulu townships, the major issue was education. However, women 
were drawn into NOW as violent confrontation between UDF supporters ' -
usually the youth - and Inkatha members increased. NOW focused on issues 
such as high rents, inadequate education and incorporation into KwaZulu to 
draw women in the Natal townships into the organisation .94 Opposition to 
the tri-cameral parliament drew women in the Indian and coloured townships 
into the organisation. 
NOW identified apartheid as the root of women's problems and encouraged 
participation in national political campaigns. This was partially responsible for 
the crisis NOW experienced during 1984-1985. The demands placed on 
women to participate in broad political campaigns rather than those that 
affected their material demands placed constraints on the organisation's ability 
to organise and sustain membership. Furthermore, suggestions brought by 
women in NOW to the UDF to take up issues such as General Sales Tax 
hikes could not be tackled because of the pressures placed on the national 
leadership by the 1984 treason trial. NOW also faced more general problems 
associated with organising women politically, such as their isolation in the 
home or in domestic service, and the burdens on women's time created by 
their responsibilities for housework and childcare.95 
NOWs organisational problems were further compounded by state repression 
and the conflict between Inkatha and local UDF structures. These 
organisational problems prevented NOW from developing and consolidating a 
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strong base among women in the townships. But it was the confl ict between 
Inkatha and UDF structures which affected NOWs attempts at organisation 
and which finally destroyed local UDF structures in Durban's townships. The 
conflict between the UDF and Inkatha was waged over education , local 
government, and the proposed incorporation of certain townships into 
KwaZulu.96 
During 1985, however, the popular struggles in Durban's African townships, 
resistance against state repression and opposition to incorporation into 
KwaZulu played a central role in mobilising previously unpoliticised women. 
These struggles extended the women's terrain beyond the isolation of 
individual households into the neighbourhood and community.97 Once the 
townships were drawn into the battle against Inkatha over incorporation , when 
the troops moved into the townships, and once the school children went on 
boycott, women were increasingly drawn into the daily townsh ip battles. 
Women became increasingly involved in the township struggles as troops 
moved into the townships and vigilante groups began to appear. In 
Lamontville, for example, women (as mothers and teachers) put themselves 
in the front line in clashes between boycotting school students and the 
security forces. In Chesterville where, in addition to security force harassment, 
attacks occurred on homes of UDF members at the hands of vigilantes, 
many men and boys were forced to leave their homes and go into hiding. 
The women organised themselves in order to protect their children and their 
homes from attacks by vigilantes. They held all-night vigils and for a while 
they were able to stave off the violence. 98 
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Women activists in NOW also played an important role in the creation of 
"new structures in which they have moved into positions of dominance in 
certain townships".99 These took the form of crisis committees to deal with 
local issues such as detentions, the deployment of troops in the townships, 
and support for boycotting school students. The organisation also participated 
in such national campaigns as the anti-election campaigns, the UDF's One 
Million Signature Campaign, etc. 
In sum, NOW played a similar role as the other women's organisations 
discussed above in drawing in a number of committed activists into the 
struggle for national liberation. Mobilisation and organisation focused on the 
link between women's issues and national political issues. However, the 
struggle for national liberation soon took precedence over other issues 
because of direct confrontation between community organisations, and the 
state and Inkatha during the second half of the eighties. In the process 
NOW was able to politicise and mobilise a relatively small number of women 
from all race groups and virtually every class group. 
9.6. UDF Women's Congress 
In 1985 the UDF adopted the phrase "From Mobilisation to Organisation" as 
part of its theme for that year. This involved transforming the massive 
support it enjoyed in its campaigns into mass-based organisations. Part of the 
process of developing mass based organisations involved the establishment 
of powerful, sector-based national affiliates - women, youth and civics being 
the most important. The emphasis lay in streamlining and centralising 
organisations in the process of consolidating the UDF as a whole. 
At the UDF's National Working Committee Conference in May 1986, the UDF 
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singled out the role of women as a key issue in its Programme of Action. 
It passed a resolution urging that women be organised: 
Women's organisations should be formed where none exist and should affiliate to the 
regional structures which need to be built and strengthened to pave the way for a strong 
national structure.1OO 
UDF activists embarked on a programme to consolidate women's organisations 
at the local and regional levels as a precursor to national consolidation. In 
the process a tremendous amount of unity and cohesion was developed at 
a regional and national level. For example: "In both the Border and Western 
Cape regions, competing women's organisations were united into single 
organisations" .101 
F rom the outset, student and youth organisations emphasised the organisation 
of women in their structures. COSAS, AZASO and the youth congresses all 
developed women's sections with a view to increasing the involvement of 
women in their organisations. In addition, women's groups at universities 
affiliated to regional women's organisations. Women's groups also sprang up 
in many urban townships and rural villages, most having close links to their 
local civic associations. These groups formed the basis of the organisations 
which came together to form a national women's organisation in 1987. 
The UDF Women's Congress was formed under conditions of secrecy in 
Cape Town on 27 April 1987. The launch was attended by delegates of 
eight regional women's organisations. Among the delegates at the launching 
conference were members of student groups and trade union affiliates of the 
Front. The launching conference of the Women's Congress did not adopt a 
formal constitution. It elected a twenty-person national committee and a 
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council with four convenors, one for each of the provinces.102 Included 
among the convenors were UDF president Albertina Sisulu and N. Ngalo.103 
According to one of the participants: 
Our idea is that by consolidating ourselves into this national organisation, we will 
strengthen our presence within the UDF as well as our activities outside the UDF within 
other women's organisations. Because until we women are powerful and confident 
enough, we can't expect to participate fully in the struggle.104 
One of the major objectives of the Women's Congress was to unite "the 
broadest range of democratic women". The launching conference pointed out 
that the Women's Congress was not a wing of the UDF but "an organisation 
uniting all women's organisations which are affiliated to the UDF". The 
Women's Congress also indicated its determination to organise women outside 
the ranks of the UDF as well. It resolved to approach women's organisations 
outside the UDF and to work towards relaunching FEDSAW. The Congress 
identified a relaunched FEDSAW as the ideal way of achieving the goal of 
maximum unity. In FEDSAW, "all women who are against apartheid , even if 
they do not want to be in the UDF, can join together and fight for 
freedom". 105 
The Women's Congress saw its ultimate goal the creation of a society free 
of any form of oppression - whether through race, sex or class. It claimed 
a direct role in the national political struggle, concentrating on specific issues 
confronting women, such as legal inequities. Resolutions emerging from the 
Women's Congress indicated the explicit linking of general and specialised 
issues: they called for the unconditional release of detainees, especially 
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children, and pledged to work with COSATU in establishing women's rights 
within the trade union movement. The organisation saw itself as being within 
the tradition of the ANC Women's League of the 1950s. Thus the new 
organisation adopted the Freedom Charter and the ANC's Women's 
Charter. 106 
At the launching conference, the Women's Congress noted several problem 
areas within the UDF. These problems were particularly evident in the light 
of the Congress's belief that the struggle for freedom could only be won if 
men and women fought side by side; that the struggle against apartheid and 
exploitation could not be victorious while women were in bondage; and that 
a democratic society could not be established when women were oppressed 
and unable to participate fully in all aspects of society. 
The Women's Congress noted in a resolution that although women were 
active in most UDF affiliates: there was a marked absence of women in 
leadership at regional and national levels; discrimination against women at 
work, in the home and in political organisations was not challenged by UDF 
affiliates; women lacked the confidence and skills to participate actively in 
organisations; women deferred to men in organisations and men often did not 
listen to women's views; and sexual harassment took . place in UDF 
organisations. 
The Women's Congress identified several ways in which it planned to 
respond to these problems. It resolved to: educate men and women in all 
UDF affiliates about the oppression of women ; ensure that UDF activities 
were organised in a way which would enable women to participate fully; end 
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sexism in the UDF's ranks and promote a vision of a non-sexist future 
South Africa; and raise women's issues in all UDF forums and take UDF 
campaigns into women's organisations. 
The UDF's Women's Congress also pledged itself to building women's 
leadership. This it would do by: encouraging and training women to become 
leaders; fostering collective leadership answerable to the members; developing 
leadership who would be committed to work in the organisation; and building 
working class leadership. The organisation stated that women have the right 
to live and work where they choose; to maternity benefits; to child care; to 
a healthy work environment; to equal pay; to education and to job security. 
In order to achieve these rights the Women's Congress would encourage 
women to join trade unions; stand in solidarity with worker action; campaign 
against unemployment; campaign for a living wage; fight against sexual 
harassment and forced contraception; fight for maternity rights and creches; 
and fight against unsafe working conditions. 107 
In 1987, the UDF-aligned women's organisations articulated a common set of 
demands which reflected the increasing participation of women in popular 
struggle and the growing recognition of the specificity of women's oppression. 
These demands included: an end to the state of emergency; support for the 
rent boycott; an end to high prices; higher wages and workers' rights; an 
end to gutter education ; a rejection of identity books and influx reforms; and 
an end to sexual harassment, rape and wife battering . These demands 
asserted the link between women's emancipation and national liberation and 
the view that women's emancipation must be based on four guiding 
principles: "democracy, working-class leadership, non-racialism, and the equality 
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of men and women".108 
Although the Women's Congress brought together a number of UDF-aligned 
women's organisations, the membership of the Congress was insignificant 
when compared to the female population of the country. UDF acting publicity 
secretary, Murphy Morobe, acknowledged in an address to COSATU's 
congress in July 1987 that: "We have still not taken the organisation of 
women as seriously as we should, if we hope to advance".109 Domestic 
responsibilities, the widely held belief that politics is for men only, and 
women's lack of confidence in their abilities were the main factors responsible 
for the weak organisational involvement of women. 
In conclusion, the UDF-aligned women's organisations were responsible for 
placing gender issues firmly on the agenda of the Front and associated 
organisations. The development of a formal position on women's oppression 
and the role of women in the struggle within political organisations and the 
trade union movement was largely due to the wide-spread participation of 
women in popular struggles and the emergence and proliferation of women's 
organisations. 
The women's organisations were a major means of drawing women who were 
not members of trade unions, civic associations, or student and youth 
organisations into the UDF. They also provided a political home for many of 
the older generation of political activists as well as young activists who were 
concerned with women's issues. In addition, these organisations heightened 
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the political consciousness of their members thereby producing a small 
number of highly active, militant and politically conscious women. 
Combining women's issues with local community and national political issues, 
the women's organisations which emerged in the eighties combined the 
struggle for women's liberation with the struggle for national liberation. 
These organisations gave rise to a new consciousness among women which 
reflected a deeper understanding of the nature of their oppression as women 
and a growing resolve to challenge it at every level. 
This is a clear demonstration of Gramsci's war of position whereby a sector 
of society is mobilised under the banner of a national liberation front. Here, 
the UDF was able to mobilise women in the anti-apartheid struggle by 
forming organisations which focused on issues which affected them. These 
organisations linked the women's struggle with the national liberation struggle 
and united their objectives with those of the UDF. In the process they 
functioned as a means through which the ideology of the UDF spread 
through black civil society, thus promoting and expanding revolutionary 
consciousness. In short, the UDF's women's organisations played a small, but 
important role in the national liberation struggle by mobilising a sector of the 
community through their focus on issues which were important to them. 
Some of these organisations were activist organisations with a small number 
of members. Others were mass-based comprising the majority of women in 
a particular township. Some women's organisations brought together women 
over a vast area. Membership of these were through affiliated women's 
groups or branches while other organisations were based on individual 
membership. In all of these organisations, however, there was a commitment 
to the struggle for national liberation, and the establishment of a united, non-




This study traced the formation, policies and aims, strategies and tactics, 
membership and structure, and practices of the UDF and selected affiliated 
organisations during the period 1983-1987. The central problem investigated 
was the relation between revolutionary theory and praxis and the aims, 
policies and practices of the UDF and selected affiliate organisations. The 
main intention was to prove that the formation of the UDF and revolutionary 
developments during the period of review accorded with a LeninistiGramscian 
model of a United Front strategy. 
Lenin developed the "two-stage" theory of revolution in which an alliance of 
the proletariat and the peasantry wages the bourgeois-democratic revolution 
as a prelude to the struggle for socialism. In the first stage, the stage 
leading to a democratic revolution , the proletariat must lead all struggles 
directed against the ruling class. Under the leadership of the Communist 
Party, the proletariat must rally all the separate currents of protest against 
autocracy into a single stream. This was reinforced by the "united front" 
tactics adopted by the 3rd Comintern Congress which called for communists 
to join other organisations (e.g. professional , women, student or youth 
organisations) with a view to obtaining control over them. The communists 
could use these organisations to infuse socialist consciousness into the 
masses. Finally, Lenin stressed the importance of the political struggle to 
develop and expand revolutionary consciousness. 
Gramsci expanded the Leninist concept of alliances and their role in 
advancing the revolutionary struggle, particularly in countries where civil 
society is highly developed. In such societies, the terrain of civil society is 
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also a terrain of struggle. The relevance of Lenin's concept of alliances 
assumes a new dimension in Gramsci's concept of the "war of position". In 
the "war of position", the aim of the working class is to undermine the 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie by increasingly assuming leadership in the 
numerous social movements found in civil society. 
The war of position corresponds to a gradual shift in the balance of social 
and cultural forces. In order to establish its hegemony, the working class 
must become the leading political and cultural force in a system of alliances 
with other classes and social forces. To gain the support of these groups 
for the revolutionary movement it is necessary for the working class to 
present itself as the leading movement in the struggle for the demands and 
objectives of other social forces and movements. In the process, proletarian 
ideology will be infused in the consciousness of these social forces providing 
the basis for a transformation of class and political relations. The war of 
position, therefore, is an ideological struggle at the level of civil society in 
which proletarian consciousness is promoted and expanded , leading to a shift 
in the balance of social and cultural forces towards the working class. 
Thus, a LeninistlGramscian model of revolutionary strategy and praxis would 
involve a stage of struggle leading to a national-democratic revolution in 
which the working class, together with all forces interested in overthrowing 
the ruling bloc but not in the immediate transition to socialism, establishes 
a historical bloc, united to achieve common economic, political, and 
intellectual objectives, and under the political, intellectual and moral leadership 
of the working class. 
However, it is Lenin's two-stage theory of revolution and the importance of 
the struggle for political freedom - the democratic revolution - that assumes 
significance here. Thus, the LeninistlGramscian model is the application of the 
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war of position to that stage of struggle leading to a democratic revolution. 
In this sense, revolutionary consciousness arises from the transformation of 
the particular demands of various social classes and forces into a universal-
istic political challenge of the dominant system, and is directed at a 
democratic revolution. This does not mean, however, that the promotion and 
expansion of socialist consciousness is ignored. Rather, the demands of 
ideology and class war are subordinated to those of the national democratic 
struggle. 
The essential requirements of the LeninistiGramscian model of a United Front 
strategy are as follows: 
(1) the necessity of mass mobilisation and organisation around all struggles 
in civil society which are primarily directed against the ruling bloc; 
(2) the necessity of creating a broad alliance of social forces under a 
minimum programme and which is directed primarily at the goal of democratic 
revolution; and 
(3) the necessity for political and ideological struggle in which revolutionary 
consciousness is promoted and expanded. 
The 1960s witnessed the destruction of popular resistance to apartheid and 
the banning of the ANC and the PAC. This decade was relatively quiescent 
as the state used its extensive security establishment to contain black 
opposition. Popular resistance was revived by a wave of strikes in Durban 
in 1973 and the 1976 Soweto revolt. The major extra-parliamentary opposition 
movement during the seventies was the SCM, which set the ideological and 
organisational foundations for black resistance. However, the SCM and its 
progeny, AZAPO, failed to provide the organisational form to sustain 
mobilisation and resistance. 
During the early 1970s, the ANC's internal political work involved the creation 
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of a permanent network of ANC cells to undertake political duties. After the 
Soweto revolt the focus of these cells was directed towards influencing 
potentially sympathetic legal organisations. 
In 1979, a strategic review led to a change in the ANC's revolutionary 
strategy from its prior emphasis on the armed struggle. This change was 
based on the following important conclusions: that political struggle was 
primary in all phases of revolution; that revolution could succeed only through 
mass involvement in the struggle; that it was necessary to build the broadest 
possible united front to unite all classes and strata in the anti-apartheid 
struggle; and that it was necessary to create legal and semi-legal 
organisations inside the country that should be led by the revolutionary 
vanguard. 
The new strategy adopted in August 1979 was called the four-pillar people's 
revolutionary war strategy, which included, among others: the mobilisation of 
the masses to actively resist apartheid; and the establishment of people's 
power in black areas. The main elements of this revolutionary strategy were: 
the establishment of mass-based organisations to challenge apartheid 
domination and exploitation; the creation of a multi-class and non-racial united 
front to challenge white minority rule; and establishing the ideological and 
political hegemony of the ANC within the Front's affiliates and the Front 
itself. 
The strategic and tactical aims of the revolutionary alliance were heavily 
influenced by the writings of Lenin, and the practical experiences of 
Vietnamese revolutionaries. However, a complex relationship existed between 
revolutionary intentions and concrete developments in the country. The 
people's war revolutionary strategy stressed the mobilisation of the broadest 
coalition of forces against the apartheid regime, punctuated by guerilla 
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warfare, leading to a general uprising and the overthrow of the state. 
Revolutionary intentions did not, however, correspond with the development 
of the revolutionary situation in the country. Although this strategy gave rise 
to mass m'obilisation and widespread rebellion , it did not result in the 
overthrow of the apartheid regime. 
Instead, the formation of the UDF and revolutionary developments thereafter 
are best explained by the LeninistlGramscian United Front strategy -
increasing the complexity of civil society by establishing mass organisations, 
creating a historical bloc in opposition to the ruling bloc, and expanding the 
revolutionary consciousness of the masses. 
These have their parallels in some aspects of the ANC's people's war 
revolutionary strategy - mass organisation and resistance, the creation of a 
united front to challenge white minority rule, and winning members of the 
front's affiliates and the affiliates themselves politically to the ANC's positions. 
There are also parallels in developments in popular resistance during the 
1980s - the general drive to create mass-based community organisations, the 
creation of the UDF in August 1983, and, the spread of a common national 
political culture that has its roots in a long tradition of resistance to white 
minority rule. 
During the 1980s the challenge to white minority rule in South Africa reached 
an unprecedented level as popular struggles in the townships, villages and 
factories provoked unparalleled state repression and reform, The main factors 
which shaped popular resistance in the 1980s were: the emergence of a 
militant youth contingent and the proliferation of community organisations born 
in the context of popular struggles; an institutionalised political system 
maintained by a powerful regime with a considerable repressive capability; 
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and orientation towards political struggle on the part of the ANC. 
A process of deskilling and mechanisation which occurred during the 
seventies resulted in a highly complex and diverse African working class. This 
was a better educated working class than previously, it contained a large 
number of semi-skilled , urbanised workers, and it was militant. The late 1970s 
and early 1980s was characterised by an unrivalled organisational drive and 
a wave of industrial- and community-based popular struggles. 
This organisational drive and wave of popular struggles were also affected 
by material conditions. The impact on the black population of the worsening 
economic conditions during the early to mid-1980s resulted in their increasing 
participation in the existing popular organisations and the emergence of a 
number of new organisations. From 1979 a large number of community 
organisations were formed in response to rent, bus-fare and price increases. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s changes were made in the form and 
functioning of certain state apparatuses. These changes resulted in the 
creation of an extensive security system designed to be a comprehensive 
response to revolutionary activity and capable of extensive and systematic 
repression. The main purpose of the system was to counter what the state 
believed was a revolutionary onslaught against it, to contain internal political 
resistance, and to co-ordinate a "welfare" system to remove the social and 
material causes of resistance. The government's repressive reforms were 
supported by other political and social reforms aimed at removing causes of 
resistance. These included a new constitutional dispensation and the extension 
of limited autonomy to Black Local Authorities. These structural conditions 
gave rise to a number of organisational and ideological developments. 
Firstly, there was a general drive to create disciplined and highly structured 
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township organisations with a strong commitment to mass participation, 
democratic practices and accountability. Civic associations, student, youth and 
women's organisations took root in scores of towns and villages throughout 
the country. Factors which encouraged or provoked the establishment of these 
organisations were: the changing material conditions within the country as a 
whole and its affect on the black population; state policy during the period; 
the numerous popular struggles against the terms of labour reproduction and 
state policy; the political realignment of black activists away from Black 
Consciousness towards the ANC and the Freedom Charter; and the formation 
of the UDF. 
Secondly, the UDF was created with two main objectives in mind: to oppose 
the Constitutional and Koornhof Bills, and to strive for a unitary, non-racial, 
non-sexist and democratic South Africa. The Front identified its immediate role 
in uniting the broadest possible coalition of forces in opposition to the new 
reforms. The fragmented and localised popular struggles - rent, transport, 
trade union, student, unemployed, women, etc. - were organised under a 
national united front which guaranteed the broadest possible unity-in-action of 
different classes and social groups. 
Thirdly, these organisational developments, as well as the upsurge in popular 
resistance, gave rise to a common national political culture. The main 
components of this political culture were: the rejection of, and opposition to, 
apartheid structures and the development of alternative organs of people's 
power; the adoption of a strategy based on "unity-in-action" and the 
mobilisation of grass-roots organisations formed around local issues; the 
consolidation of a political language with its own slogans, freedom songs and 
symbols; an ideological system expressed in such documents as the Freedom 
Charter; and the articulation of a set of common demands such as the 
release of political prisoners, the unbanning of organisations and the 
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establishment of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and unitary South Africa. 
The formation of the UDF, the elaboration of certain united aims and 
objectives, and the adoption of specific strategies and tactics conformed to 
certain strategic requirements of the LeninistlGramscian United Front strategy. 
First, was the formation of the UDF, which was a "concrete elaboration in 
practice" of the strategic objective of a historical bloc of all .classes and 
strata opposed to the ruling bloc. Second was the development of a set of 
common aims and objectives, which conforms to Gramsci's idea of a united 
front with common political , intellectual and moral objectives. Third, were the 
evolving strategies and tactics, which transformed the particular demands of 
numerous organisations into a universalistic political challenge of the dominant 
system, and which aimed at national liberation. 
The UDF was able to draw under its political leadership a wide variety of 
organisations, consisting of leaders and with membership drawn from every 
race and virtually every class group in society. By the end of 1987, UDF 
affiliates had been established in almost every corner of the country. The 
following profile of the Front's organisational capacity indicates the hegemonic 
position it achieved in black civil society, thus meeting another requirement 
of the LeninistlGramscian model: achieving political leadership in the 
organisations of civil society, leading to mass politicisation and the spread of 
revolutionary consciousness. 
By the end of 1987, the UDF had close to 700 affiliates with a total 
membership of over two million and a wider support base. UDF affiliates 
were mainly student and youth organisations, civic associations, trade unions, 
women's organisations, political organisations, religious organisations, and 
sports and cultural organisations. The Front's members were drawn from 
almost every major anti-apartheid tradition in the country. The UDF was also 
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a multi-class organisation, consisting of affiliates which ranged from petit-
bourgeois to worker organisations. Among the affiliates were several middle-
class business groups. The UDF also drew support from every race group 
in the country, including a number of whites. However, the overwhelming bulk 
of the rank-and-file membership of UDF affiliates was drawn from the African 
working class. 
Initially, with the exception of the so-called "political unions", the UDF was 
unable to establish a workable relationship with significant sectors of the 
independent trade union movement. This position changed in the second half 
of the decade and in 1987 formal links were established at all levels with 
COSATU. 
The UDF faced a number of challenges in its struggle for hegemony. Firstly, 
the state employed repression and economic reform to limit the support for, 
and activities of, the UDF and its affiliates. The widespread detention of 
activists, security force activity, vigilante actions, and upgrading programmes 
eroded UDF support and activity. Secondly, government "collaborators" in the 
urban areas and the tribal homelands were used to suppress the UDF. 
Thirdly, the initial reluctance of organised labour to participate in the Front 
and its programmes inhibited attempts to draw trade unions into the UDF. 
Finally, the hegemony of the UDF was undermined by the existence of other 
mass organisations, in particular, Inkatha, the BC-oriented organisations and 
the New Unity Movement, which were also struggling to achieve hegemony 
in the black townships. 
The people's war strategy of the ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance also focused 
attention on the mobilisation and organisation of the working class, women, 
the rural masses, and the youth and students, and the formation of civic 
organisations. This strategic objective has its parallel in the LeninistlGramscian 
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emphasis on mass mobilisation and organisation around all struggles in civil 
society which are primarily directed against the ruling bloc as well as 
developments in popular resistance which led to a general drive to create 
mass-based community organisations. 
The student/youth organisations, trade unions, civic associations, and women's 
organisations affiliated to the UDF played a hegemonic-building role by 
promoting mass mobilisation and organisation, particularly around the concrete 
particulars of people's everyday lives (rent and bus-fare increases, education 
issues, women's issues, etc.). 
The affiliates of the UDF that played the most significant role in mass 
mobilisation and organisation were the student and youth organisations. 
Student and youth organisations focused on particular sectors of civil society, 
drawing them into the struggle for national liberation. 
The initial basis for mass mobilisation and organisation in the schools were 
the glaring inequalities between the racially-based education systems and the 
resulting defects of African education in particular and black education in 
general. From the very beginning of its existence, COSAS emphasized the 
organisation of students around issues affecting them rather than concentrating 
on issues affecting the community. However, students soon realised that they 
needed the support of their parents and began organising students in various 
actions around community issues, often in collaboration with community 
organisations. 
Local structures of student organisations were also based on very small 
numbers, making it easy for students who supported their aims to establish 
a branch. Branches could be established by a minimum of four students 
(COSAS) or ten (AZASO). 
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The first youth congresses to emerge in 1983 focused on the organisation 
of all youth in order to tackle their problems through united and collective 
action, and to develop a role for young people in their communities and in 
the broader democratic struggle. High failure and drop-out rates at schools, 
age-limit regulations at schools, and economic recession during the 1980s 
swelled the ranks of unemployed youth, which formed the major constituency 
of the youth congresses. 
However, most youth congresses tended to concentrate on political campaigns 
which became the main organisational tool of the congresses and student 
organisations as well. These included campaigns against the BLAs, the tri-
cameral parliament, homeland independence, the threat of removals, state 
repression (the formation of defence committees) , etc. In addition , youth 
congresses participated at the forefront of other campaigns which related to 
local material grievances, such as the rent boycotts (where the youth 
mobilised to resist evictions), and, in particular, the consumer boycotts and 
mass stayaways, which were largely enforced by youth congresses and (when 
coupled with school boycotts) student organisations. School boycotts served 
as a major organisational tool as well. 
The student and youth organisations extended their organisational role beyond 
that of organising the youth into student organisations and congresses. They 
also assumed responsibility for organising and conscientising their parents. 
This was directed towards the formation of street and area committees in the 
townships and villages. 
The trade unions affiliated to the UDF also played a central role in mass 
mobilisation and organisation. The general internal structure and style of 
organisation of the UDF unions as well as the creation of alliances with 
other organisations in order to create a convergence of workplace and 
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township struggles demonstrated an early commitment to mass mobilisation 
and organisation. 
Initially, the UDF unions were preoccupied with mass mobilisation rather than 
internal worker control of the unions or organisational practices that 
encouraged strong unions. The objective was to draw as many people as 
possible into these structures and/or their activities, including township 
residents who were not members of the unions. From their inception many 
of the UDF unions adopted mass participatory democracy as their internal 
form of organisation. This had the effect of drawing the broader community 
into trade union struggles while trade union members were drawn into 
community struggles. 
In addition, most of the UDF unions were general unions - that is, open to 
workers from all sectors of the economy. This method of organising made 
recruitment easy and promoted mass organisation because membership was 
confined largely to a single township. The trend towards general unionism 
was also promoted by the practice of recruiting at mass rallies in the 
townships. 
Finally, the commitment of the UDF unions to linking their industrial-based 
struggles with community struggles led to the establishment of alliances with 
other community organisations. The unity-in-action practised by the UDF 
unions was another factor which promoted community support for (and 
involvement in) trade union struggles and the support and involvement of 
trade unions in community struggles. The resulting convergence of trade union 
and community struggles promoted mass mobilisation and organisation while 
certain trade unions played a leading role in township struggles and 
organisations. In turn, the strong links between unions and community 
structures expanded trade union membership. 
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Civic organisations emerged in response to a wide range of political, 
economic and social factors, and , in some cases as a result of the 
organisational efforts of activists. The emphasis of these organisations was 
on the mobilisation and organisation of people around the concrete particulars 
of their everyday lives. The majority of black people have similar material 
and political grievances, which played a major role in mass mobilisation and 
organisation. In addition, civic associations embarked on various campaigns 
around local issues as a means of mobilising people and drawing them into 
their organisations. 
A central tool of mass mobilisation and organisation were the various 
campaigns organised by the civics around local material, as well as political, 
grievances. The civic associations spearheaded township struggles around 
issues such as increasing rent and service charges, increases in bus-fares 
and food prices, etc. Such struggles facilitated the growth of civic associ-
ations in townships which were previously insulated from political activity, 
while existing associations were often at the centre of mobilisation of the 
campaigns leading to an increase in their support base. In addition, virtually 
all the organisations which existed at the time of the elections for the BLAs 
and the tri-cameral parliament participated in mobilising opposition to the new 
apartheid structures. 
The street committees established by the civic associations also played a 
fundamental role in mass mobilisation and organisation . These structures 
provided the base for establishing strong grassroots organisation. In addition, 
since membership included workers, women and youth, they provided an 
organisational link between specific local organisations of these groups. 
The women's organisations which became affiliates of the UDF also expanded 
mass mobilisation and organisation by mobilising women around issues which 
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affected them. The objective was, however, to link these issues to the nature 
of apartheid exploitation and domination. By combining women's issues with 
local community and national political issues, these organisations combined 
the struggle for women's liberation with the struggle for national liberation. 
The people's war strategy of the ANC-Ied revolutionary alliance also aimed 
at winning members of the UDF's affiliates and the affiliates themselves 
politically to the ANC's positions. This has its parallels in the 
LeninistlGramscian emphasis on expanding the revolutionary consciousness of 
the masses as well as developments in popular resistance which led to the 
spread of a common national political culture. 
Revolutionary consciousness developed unevenly within the various civic 
associations, trade unions, etc., as well as between the different types of 
organisations, for example, between student organisations and civic 
organisations. Politicisation lay emphasis either on the goal of national 
liberation, without including a socialist content, or included a socialist content. 
Thus, the two main elements of revolutionary consciousness, the struggle for 
national liberation and the struggle for socialism, are to be found in the 
various organisations discussed below. 
Student and youth organisations played a pivotal role in the development and 
spread of revolutionary consciousness in South Africa and in achieving the 
political and ideological leadership of the UDF. In many respects, the student 
and youth organisations, and their principles and objectives presented a 
challenge to the dominant system as these organisations developed (or 
incorporated) certain features of a revolutionary consciousness leading to its 
spread inside South Africa. A large proportion of the youth assimilated a 
political consciousness and popular culture based on opposition to apartheid 
through membership of these organisations. 
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The formation of COSAS in 1979 was perhaps one of the most significant 
factors in the liberation struggle during the eighties. The student organisation 
was a major force in the popularization of the ANC within the country; in 
establishing "unity-in-action" with other progressive forces; and in the various 
popular struggles waged during the period under review. Former COSAS 
members became leading activists in other progressive organisations -
SANSCO, youth congresses, trade unions, civic associations and women's 
organisations. 
After the initial outburst of student resistance in Soweto, schools and tertiary 
institutions for blacks became sites of struggle as increasingly politicised 
students challenged the state's authority and contested apartheid education, 
ultimately elaborating their own conception of a unified and democratic system 
of education. 
The demands of student and youth organisations also reveal a growing 
challenge to the dominant system. The declaration of the partial state of 
emergency in 1985 shifted the focus of student demands from educational 
issues to the national focus on the release of detainees, the removal of 
troops from the townships, and the unbanning of political groups. In addition, 
school boycotts during 1985 rendered the schools ungovernable, a process 
that mirrored that occurring in the townships following the collapse of local 
authorities, and led to a shift of objectives from reform of the educational 
system to control. Likewise, university students also challenged the state's 
authority in their institutions by drawing attention to their "bush" character and 
the call for their transformation into "Peoples Campuses". The establishment 
of committees of peoples power at all levels was seen as the foundations 
of peoples power and democratic control of campuses. 
These organisations were also among the first mass based organisations to 
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commit themselves to united action with other community organisations. The 
shared experiences of apartheid domination and exploitation generated a 
sense of unity in struggle against the common enemy. This resulted in their 
total rejection of apartheid education and society as a whole. 
Student organisations were also the first mass organisations to adopt the 
Freedom Charter and to declare their support for the ANC. They also played 
a central role in popularizing the ANC through, for example, the 1980 
Freedom Charter campaign. Both school and university student organisations 
aimed in the long-term at the creation of a non-racial and democratic 
education system in a non-racial and democratic society. This presented a 
challenge to the apartheid system since they identified the struggle for a 
non-racial and democratic education system as part of the broader struggle 
against oppression and exploitation . All of these reveal a desire for an 
alternative political leadership and system to that of apartheid . 
Of all the organisations reviewed here the student and youth organisations 
displayed the most advanced sense of class analysis and of socialist 
consciousness. They recognised the leadership role of the working class and 
of the national-democratic path to socialism. 
Finally, student and youth organisations emphasized political education in their 
programmes. Their newsletters dealt with the anti-apartheid struggle in general 
and with other popular struggles abroad. In addition, student/youth 
organisations held educational workshops and forums which dealt with 
politically relevant issues, campaigns and strategies. 
The political leadership of these organisations is apparent in their support 
base and in the role they played in national, regional and local campaigns. 
COSAS, SANSCO, and SAYCO were the most significant student and youth 
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structures of the internal resistance organisations. Their dominance in schools, 
universities and in local township and rural communities provided them with 
political and ideological leadership, which in turn expanded the hegemony of 
the UDF in black civil society. 
During 1984 CaSAS expanded from an activist group to a mass movement 
and was able to generalise student demands from one area of the country 
to another, thus illustrating its political leadership among school students. At 
the time of its banning in 1985 CaSAS had an estimated 3 million 
supporters. At the time of its formation in March 1987, SAYCa claimed a 
membership of between 500,000 and 700,000 (and a support base of two 
million). At the end of 1986 SANSCa claimed that it had 67 branches. 
The student and youth organisations also played a leadership role in student 
campaigns and in certain community campaigns. They were prominent in the 
education struggle, the rent, transport and consumer boycotts, campaigns 
against the new constitution, the Black Local Authorities, the struggles against 
forced removals and incorporation into the homelands, and homeland 
independence. Certain youth congresses were at the forefront of struggle in 
the urban townships and rural villages. They were also prominent in 
coordinating and sustaining popular campaigns and assisting other sectors 
such as women and the civics. Student and youth organisations also played 
a prominent role in local structures of the UDF. In most regions, these 
organisations were strongly represented at area, zonal and regional levels and 
often acted as reinforcing mechanisms in the Front's organisational structures. 
The significance of student/youth organisations lay, however, in the ideological 
contribution they made in producing a generation of people who rejected 
apartheid society and were prepared to make sacrifices to destroy it. 
Furthermore, the commitment to non-racialism, democracy, unity-in-action with 
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other progressive organisations, and a commitment to the ideals of the 
Freedom Charter were introduced by these organisations. These principles 
soon spread to a large number of organisations which proliferated during the 
first half of the 1980s. 
The trade unions affiliated to the UDF also played a central role in raising 
the revolutionary consciousness of the working class. The essential character-
istics of these unions included: a commitment to mass mobilisation and 
organisation; the recognition of the importance of unity-in-action (combining 
union struggles with township struggles); opposition to all apartheid structures 
and modes of domination (registration and the Industrial Council system); a 
commitment to non-racialism; a recognition of the leadership role of the 
working class in the struggle; and a commitment to transforming the particular 
demands of workers into a political challenge of the dominant system 
(identifying national liberation as the goal of struggle). 
These unions did not limit their role and objectives to the purely economic 
interests of the working class. From the outset, the unions which later 
affiliated to the UDF linked trade union struggles with urban conflicts 
concerning education, rent, transport, housing, and the struggle for political 
rights. In addition, the UDF unions were united in their rejection of reforms 
in labour legislation and their commitment to the struggle for national 
liberation. They were essentially non-racial in terms of their prinCiples and 
stressed the leadership of the working class in the struggle for national 
liberation. They recognised the importance of trade union participation in the 
broad struggle for liberation and affiliation to national political organisations. 
Finally, all were "Charterist" in terms of ideological affiliation , thus recognising 
an alternative political leadership and system in South Africa. All of these 
represented a political challenge to the dominant socio-political system in 
South Africa. 
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For the UDF unions, the goal of struggle was national liberation and this 
could be achieved by uniting their struggles with all township struggles and 
participating in the national democratic struggle as affiliates of the new 
political organisations. Thus, narrow trade union interests were subordinated 
to the national political challenge of the dominant system. However, although 
the UDF unions laid stress on the struggle for national liberation and the 
creation of a non-racial, democratic South Africa, they all laid emphasis on 
working class leadership in this struggle. 
Nowhere, however, do these unions explicitly state that they were struggling 
for the establishment of a socialist society. For the UDF unions, apartheid 
was seen as the central contradiction and national liberation and the 
establishment of a non-racial, democratic South Africa was seen as the 
primary and immediate objective. 
The re-emergence of political unionism in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
had a profound impact on subsequent developments in the independent trade 
union movement. The trade union movement was also influenced by the 
formation of the UDF and the upsurge of popular resistance during the 
eighties. Organised labour was increasingly drawn into popular struggles and 
by the middle of the decade the unions and popular organisations were 
drawn together. In 1987 formal links were established between the UDF and 
South Africa's largest trade union federation - COSATU. Thus, by 1987, 
political unionism had taken root in major sectors of the trade union 
movement. This was also due to the culture of community involvement 
established by the UDF's political unions. 
Perhaps one of the most significant features of the 1980s was the role of 
trade unions in securing the spread of revolutionary consciousness within the 
trade union movement. This is best indicated by COSATU's increasing 
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involvement in political struggles, adoption of the Freedom Charter, affirmation 
of ties with the ANC-SACTU-SACP alliance in exile, and formation of 
alliances with internal progressive organisations, in particular, the UDF. This 
represents the spread of the revolutionary consciousness underlying the 
"political unions" and the UDF into the leading worker federation in the 
country. 
The UDF trade unions were thus an important component of the political and 
ideological struggle to raise the revolutionary consciousness of the working 
class and were partially responsible for drawing not only trade union 
members into political struggles, but the broader community into their 
struggles as well. In the process, the objectives of the UDF were increasingly 
spread in black civil society. 
Civic associations also played a central role in transforming the particular 
interests of communities they organised into a universalistic political challenge 
of the dominant system. This they did in a number of ways. 
The principles and objectives of civic associations affiliated to the UDF 
presented challenges to the dominant apartheid system. Many of these civic 
associations had adopted the Freedom Charter by the end of the period of 
review, signalling their conception of an alternative political system to that of 
apartheid. All the civic organisations rejected and opposed apartheid structures 
and , during the mid-1980s, began to develop alternative organs of people's 
power. The UDF civic associations drew into their structures organisations of 
the youth, women and trade unions (unity-in-action) and recognised the link 
between the struggles of these interest groups and their own struggles. In 
practice, unity-in-action united these struggles into one struggle against all 
aspects of apartheid exploitation and domination. In addition , from the very 
beginning , civic associations linked immediate material issues with broader 
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political issues in their aims and objectives. Among these was the call for 
the overthrow of the whole political structure and black representation in 
central government. 
In large part, the civic associations emphasized the destruction of apartheid 
rather than the movement to socialism as the goal of the national liberation 
struggle. Although most adopted the Freedom Charter, or were identified as 
"Charterist" because of their affiliation with the UDF, little attention was 
placed on developing a socialist content in their aims and objectives. 
However, some civics did promote an embryonic socialist consciousness, for 
example, CAHAC. 
The civics' challenge of the dominant system was also evident in the new 
structures created by them during the second half of the 1980s. The 
introduction of street committees constituted a challenge to the authority of 
the local state. Many civics stepped into the vacuum created by the collapse 
of the local authorities in 1985, and established "peoples power" by 
performing limited administrative and judicial duties. In certain areas the 
authorities were forced to enter into negotiations with civics on a wide range 
of issues. In addition , civic associations perceived the street committees as 
alternative structures of mass participatory democracy which were bound by 
such democratic principles as mandates, accountability, and report-backs. 
United action and collaboration with other progressive forces were evident in 
the principles and practices of all the civic associations reviewed , indicating 
a recognition of the pervasive nature of apartheid domination and oppression 
and the need for the unity of all struggles against the dominant system. 
Thus, the strategies employed by civic associations in their campaigns during 
the second half of the 1980s took the form of a challenge of state power. 
By the middle of the 1980s most civic organisations were directing their 
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activities at opposing all forms of apartheid oppression and exploitation which 
township residents were experiencing . Civics began to link local concerns for 
the abolition of rent, service charges, and busfare increases with demands 
for the resignation of all town councillors, the release of detainees and 
political prisoners, the withdrawal of the army/police from townships, and the 
unbanning of political organisations. Furthermore, the UDF civics began using 
rent and consumer boycotts as a strategy to challenge the government by 
linking local demands with national political demands. 
Civic associations also played a central role in expanding the political and 
ideological leadership of the UDF in civil society. Civic associations led 
popular resistance under the banner of the UDF in many townships and rural 
villages and their dominance within civil society spread the UDF tradition to 
most parts of South Africa. The organisational impetus provided by popular 
struggles during the mid-1980s led to the growth of civic organisations in 
every major city and in almost every small and medium-sized town in the 
country. These ranged from the large, mass-based civics of Port Elizabeth 
to the small rural village committees. By the end of 1987 the UDF had 
some 200 urban and rural civic organisations. 
Here, because of the mass-based membership of civic associations and their 
dominance in local politics, the UDF was able to shape the political, 
intellectual and moral objectives of communities. This is a clear demonstration 
of the role civic associations played in the political and ideological struggle 
found in Gramsci's strategy of the war of position in which an ideology is 
spread throughout society and determines united political , intellectual and 
moral objectives. The political leadership of the UDF civic associations is 
demonstrated by the lead they took in township campaigns. 
The rent boycott, which began in the Vaal Triangle at the end of 1984, was 
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initiated by a UDF affiliate and taken up by UDF affiliates in other parts of 
the country. In the process, the rent boycott was transformed from a tactic 
to oppose rent increases to a strategy to challenge the government. The 
UDF-initiated boycotts were well-supported and played a central role in the 
collapse of the black local authorities in the mid-1980s. Many civics stepped 
into this vacuum, performing limited administrative and judicial duties. Similarly, 
consumer boycotts were introduced in the Eastern Cape townships by UDF 
civic associations and were soon taken up in other parts of the country by 
other affiliates. These highly successful boycotts soon took on a political 
significance when activists began to link local demands with national political 
demands. 
The civic associations also played a leading role in initiating mass stayaways, 
which, in many cases, were well-supported by their communities. In a number 
of instances civic associations were able to establish elaborate networks of 
street committees, drawing in the majority of the people living in their 
communities into their structures. Finally, in certain areas the authorities were 
forced to enter into negotiations with civics on a wide range of issues. This 
represented a shift of power from the local authorities to the mass-based 
civic associations. 
Sustained rent, consumer and transport boycotts, the formation of extensive 
networks of street committees involving large numbers of people, the 
detention and arrests of scores of township people, mainly members of the 
civics, widespread rebellion often reaching insurrectionary levels, the cordoning 
off of entire townships, all of these demonstrate the extent to which black 
people, and the African people in particular, were prepared to make sacrifices 
in the struggle for national liberation. The establishment of peoples power in 
many townships, and the central role played by certain civic associations in 
their townships thereafter demonstrated the extent of their political impact. The 
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enormous resources (both human and financial) expended by the state to 
destroy these civic organisations also demonstrate their significance in this 
struggle. 
The various women's organisations which affiliated to the UDF also played 
a role in promoting and expanding revolutionary consciousness and in 
promoting the ideological and political leadership of the UDF in black civil 
society. This they did largely by drawing women into their structures through 
their focus on issues which immediately affected them, and educating them 
about the link between these and national oppression and exploitation, 
resulting in the expansion of revolutionary consciousness. Increasingly women 
were drawn into political struggles through their membership of women's 
organisations while they developed a consciousness of their own oppression 
as women. In the process, the women's organisations functioned as a means 
through which the ideology of the UDF spread through black civil society, 
thereby promoting and expanding the hegemony of the Front. 
It is difficult to estimate the extent of politicisation achieved through any of 
these organisations. What is demonstrated here, however, is that these 
organisations did mobilise and organise large sectors of black civil society 
and were able to draw people into a highly politicised challenge against the 
dominant apartheid system which was directed at the goal of national 
liberation. 
Thus, the events leading to the formation of the UDF, and subsequent 
revolutionary developments during the period of review met the three essential 
characteristics of the LeninistlGramscian united front strategy. Firstly, a highly 
developed civil society emerged during the late 1970s and early 1980s which 
made it possible for the application of Gramsci's war of position during the 
national democratic struggle. The process of mass mobilisation and 
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organisation was conducted around the wide variety of material and political 
issues which resulted from the apartheid system of domination and 
exploitation, and which were eventually transformed into a challenge of that 
system. 
Secondly, the formation of the UDF, its evolving principles and objectives, 
and strategies and tactics essentially met the need to establish a broad 
alliance of social forces in the form of a historico-political bloc, under a 
minimum programme involving united political, intellectual and moral objectives, 
during that stage of struggle involving a universalistic political challenge of 
the dominant system which leads to a democratic revolution . 
Finally, the extensive organisational and political leadership achieved by the 
UDF, and the mobilising and organising role of the various community 
organisations met the third strategic requirement of the LeninistlGramscian 
model - the spread of revolutionary consciousness. Here the organisations 
which came together to form the UDF in late 1983, the subsequent formation 
of new organisations and the incorporation of others in the Front, and the 
increasing mobilisation, organisation and politicization of people through these 
structures resulted in the spread of revolutionary consciousness, and the 
increaSing hegemony of the UDF in black civil society. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
On February 22, 1988 the government imposed restrictions on 18 
organisations, including the UDF and 14 of its affiliates. These organisations 
were prohibited from engaging in a wide range of political activities such 
as encouraging boycott campaigns or stirring up public opinion against the 
BlAs. The restricted organisations could only act to preserve their assets, 
perform certain administrative duties or take legal advice or judicial advice 
or judicial steps. In addition, repression during the state of emergency had 
weakened many UDF affiliates and large numbers of UDF leaders remained 
in detention throughout 1988. 
More important, however, was the affect of state repression on the 
structure and activities of the UDF. Firstly, it resulted in the transformation 
of the Front from a mass organisation to a political party. The detention 
of leaders, mass arrests, the banning of meetings, etc . resulted in the 
centralisation of decision-making and the transformation of the UDF into a 
vanguard party. Secondly, state repression and counter-mobilisation resulted 
in the virtual destruction of local affiliates and forced many UDF activities 
underground. These changes brought to an end the period of resistance 
which corresponded to the leninist/Gramscian model of revolutionary 
strategy and tactics. Instead, the UDF became a leninist vanguard party, 
with its affiliate membership operating largely underground. 
In April, 1989 the government released 900 detainees, including most of 
the high level leaders of the UDF. On their release, the UDF and COSATU 
(the "Mass Democratic Movement" - MOM) immediately embarked on a 
defiance campaign of civil disobedience against hospitals and schools for 
whites. This campaign, which included mass meetings and mass marches 
in major cities and other areas, led to a revival of the Front. 
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On February 2, 1990, the government unbanned all political organisations, 
including the ANC. On April 6-7, the UDF held its Fourth National Working 
Committee at the University of the Western Cape. One of the central 
issues before the delegates was the future of the Front. The conference 
had two options: firstly , the UDF should disband and be replaced by the 
ANC, and; secondly, the UDF should continue to exist to fulfil its role of 
co-ordination and building of the unbanned ANC. The ANC wanted the UDF 
to continue to exist. 
At the conference Popo Molefe, in a paper entitled "The Future of the 
UDF", raised some of the problems associated with the disbanding of the 
Front. Firstly, whereas some of the UDF affiliates could be easily absorbed 
into the ANC structure, such as SAYCO, NIC, TIC, and the Women's 
Front, there were many others, such as the religious, cultural and sports 
organisations, which could not. Secondly, the ANC could not abandon the 
armed struggle because the government had not met all the pre-conditions 
for negotiations set out in the Harare Declaration. It still remained possible 
that the government would ban the ANC because of the latter's refusal to 
abandon the armed struggle. Finally, it would be difficult to realize the 
objective of rebuilding the ANC and retaining the mass content of the 
struggle without the UDF. 
The unbanning of the ANC meant that the UDF could no longer play a 
political role. In addition, many leading members of the Front were 
increasingly drawn into structures of the ANC. However, the conference 
decided that the UDF should not disband. Those organisations which could 
be absorbed into the ANC were permitted to do so. The UDF would 
continue to exist to co-ordinate the activities of the mass-based 
organisations, such as the civics, and play the role of facilitating the 
rebuilding of ANC structures. However, since the UDF could no longer play 
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a political role it would be phased out once it had completed the task of 
rebuilding the ANC. In 1991, after considerable debate, most UDF leaders 
felt that the Front had achieved its objectives. The decision to disband the 
Front was announced by its leaders on March 4, 1991. 
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Appendix A: List of Organisations. with branches and affiliates. that 
registered as participants at the National Conference of the United 
Democratic Front. August 20. 1983 
TRANSVAAL 
a) Student 
Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) 
Turfloop 
Wits Black Students Society 
Medunsa 
Soweto Teacher Training College 
Soweto College of Education 
Transvaal Regional Committee 
Student Tuition Society 
National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) 
Wits SRC 





Kagiso Youth League 
Benoni Youth League 
Benoni Student Movement 
Alexandria Youth Congress (AYCO) 
Lenasia Youth League 
Bosmont Youth Organisation 
Saulsvilie/Atteridgevilie Youth Organisation 
Lutheran Church Youth League 
Soweto Youth Congress (SOYCO) 
Young Christian Students (YCS) 
Pretoria Branch 
Central Branch 
Time to Learn 
Reiger Park Youth Movement 
SACC Youth Desk 
c) Worker 
South African Mineworkers' Union (SAMWU) 
Municipal and General Workers' Union 
General and Allied Workers' Union (GAWU) 
South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) (Transvaal) 
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Orange and Vaal General Workers' Union (OVGWU) 
Johannesburg Scooter Drivers' Association 
Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union 
Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) 
d) Civic Associations 
Winterveld Action Committee 
Mamelodi Action Committee 
Federation of Residents' Association - Lenasia 
Sendane Civic Association 
Reiger Park Tenants and Ratepayers Association 
Co-ordinating Rent Actions Committee (CRAC) 
Soweto Committee of Ten 
Motllakeng Civic Association 
Westbury Residents' Action Committee 
Naledi Civic Association 
Emedeni South Civic Association 
Mapetta Village Civic Association 
East Rand People's Organisation 
Tembisa Civic Association 
Noordgesig Ratepayers Association 
Actonville Rents Action Committee 
Orlando Civic Association 
Extension 9 Residents' Association - Lenasia 
Extension 10 Residents' Association - Lenasia 
Soweto Civic Association 
Huhudi Civic Association 
Soweto Residents' Association 
Krugersdorp Residents' Association 
Jabulani Civic Organisation 
Ten Morgan Residents' Action Committee 
Diepkloof Extension Residents' Committee 
Kinross Civic Association 
Ennerdale Civic Association 
West Rand Action Committee 
e) Women 
Federation of South African Women 
Women's Group, Transvaal Indian Congress 
University Women's Group, Turfloop 
Women's Group, Glynn Thomas 
Pfunanoni Women's Club 
Black Sash, Transvaal 
Lenasia Women's group 
f) Religious 
Ecumenical Visitors Programme 
The Grail - Johannesburg 
g) Political 
Transvaal Indian Congress 
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Transvaal Anti-President's Council Committee 
Alexandria People's Action Party 
Release Mandela Committee (Transvaal) 
Anti-Community Council Committee 
h) Other 
Media Action Group 
Detainees Parents' Support Committee 
Detainees Aid Movement 
Africa Perspective 
Community Newspaper Project 
SASPU National Newspaper 
South African Students Press Union 
Community Resource and Information Centre 
Africa News Association 
Khovangano Cultural Group 
Labour Resource Centre 
SPEAK Newspaper 
National Education Union of South Africa 
Health Workers Association 
Workers Support Committee 
Media and Resource Centre 
National Medical and Dental Association 
WESTERN CAPE 
a) Student 
Azanian Students Organisation 
University of Cape Town 
University of the Western Cape 
Regional Committee 
National Union of South African Students 
UCT SRC 
Muslim Students Association 
Congress of South African Students 
18 Branches 
b) Youth 
Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO) 
Ocean View Youth 
Lavender Hill Youth 
Steen berg Youth 
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Elsies River Youth 
KTC Youth 
Gugulethu Section One Youth 
Gugulethu Section Two Youth 
Gugulethu Section Three Youth 
Gugulethu Section Four Youth 
New Crossroads Youth 




New City Youth 
Mbekweni Youth 
Worcester Youth 
Zimele Sege (Paarl) Youth (35) 
Inter-Church Youth (ICY) 
235 Youth Groups throughout the Western Cape. 
c) Worker 
Media Workers Association of South Africa - Western Cape. 
Retail and Allied Workers' Union (RAWU) 
d) Civic 
Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC) 
Lavender Hill Residence Association 
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Steenberg/Retreat Housing Area Committee 
Hout Bay Action Committee 
Kensington and Facreton Ratepayers and Tenants Association 
Avondale Tenants Association 
Ravensmead Residents Action Committee 
Lotus River/Grassy Park Residents Association 
Bellville South Housing Action Committee 
Bonteheuval Residents Association 
Hanover Park Residents Association 
Kewtown Residents Association 
Silvertown Residents Association 
Schotesha Kloof Civic Association 
Crawford Residents Association 
Woodlands Housing Action Committee 
Westridge Housing Action Committee 
Worcester Housing Action Committee 
Valhala Park Civic 
Belhar Civic 
Manenberg Civic 
Rylands Civic (21 ) 
Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA) 
Six township zones 
e) Women 























Ecumenical Action Movement (TEAM) 
Young Christian Students (Western Cape) 
Association of Christian Students 
Student Union for Christian Action (SUCA) 
g) Political 











Detainees Parents' Support Committee (Western Cape) 
Grassroots Newspaper 
Western Cape Traders' Association 
NATAL 
a) Student 
Azanian Students Organisation 
University of Durban-Westville 
University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg) 
University of Natal (Durban) 
Durban Medical School 
University of Zulu land 
Natal T echnikon SRC 
Congress of South African Students 
National Union of South African Students 
Durban SRC 
Pietmaritzburg Local Committee 
b) Youth 
Reservoir Hills Youth Club 
Lamontville Youth 
Matinane Youth 
T ongaat Youth 
Amoltana Youth 
Kwa-Mashu Youth League 
Chesterville Youth Organisation 
Umlazi Youth League 





Sons of Young Africa 
c) Worker 
African Workers Association 
South African Tin Workers Union 
National Federation of Workers 
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South African Allied Workers Union (Natal) 
d) Civic 
Durban Housing Action Committee 
Asherville Ratepayers Association 
Reservoir Hills Ratepayers Association 
Reservoir Hills Action Committee 
Amoytana 
Merebank Ratepayers 
Chatsworth Housing Action Committee 
T ongaat Civic Association 
Joint Rents Action Committee 
Nabanati 
Greenwood Park Ratepayers Association 
Joint Commuters Committee 
Pietermaritzburg Ratepayers 
Committee of Concern (Sydenham) 
Bombay Heights Ratepayers Association 
Umlaer Ratepayers Association 
Commuters Association 
Committee of Concern (Pietermaritzburg) 
Committee of Concern (Wentworth) 
Committee of Concern (Verulam) 
Phoenix Working Committee 
Newlands East Ratepayers Association 
Cato Manor Ratepayers Association 
St Wendolins Ratepayers Association 
e) Women 
KwaMashu Women's Group 
Durban Women's Group 
Natal University Women's Organisation 
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f) Religious 
Young Christian Students (Pietermaritzburg) 
Nazareth Baptist Church 
Isilido United Congregational Church 
Church of the Nazareth 
Diakonia 
g) Political 
Release Mandela Committee (Natal) 
Natal Indian Congress 
Democratic Lawyers Association 
Anti-South African Indian Council 









Social Workers Forum 
Pietermaritzburg Child Welfare Society 
Claremont Advice Office 
Zomani Ladysmith Club 
National Medical and Dental Association (Durban) 
Natal Health Workers Association 
UKUSA Newspaper 
a) Students 
COSAS Eastern Cape 
COSAS Bloemfontein 
OTHER REGIONS 
NUSAS Local - Rhodes University 
Black Students Society - Rhodes 
b) Youth 
Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (PEYCO) 
Galvandale Youth 
West Coast Youth 
Independent Youth Association (Bloemfontein) 
South Cape Youth 
COSMOS 
All Saints Youth (Oudtshoorn) 
Uitenhage Youth Congress (UYCO) 
Westville Youth 
Congregational Youth (Oudtshoorn) 
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St Blaiz Roman Catholic Youth (Mosselbay) 
Saldanha Youth 
Pelikan Ontspanning en Kultuur Organisasie 
Bloemfontein Youth Congress 
c) Worker 
Motor Assemblies and Components Workers' Union (MACWUSA) 
General Workers Union of South Africa (GWUSA) 
South African Allied Workers Union (East London) 
Saldanna Food and Canning Workers Union 
d) Civic 
Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation 
Malabar Ratepayers and Tenants Association 
e) Women 
Port Elizabeth Women's Organisation 
West Coast Women's Organisation 
f) Religious 
West Coast Muslim Association 
West Coast Church Organisation 
Moravian Church - Genadendal 





West Coast Traders Association 
Border Region Delegation 
UDF Interim Committee - Eastern Cape 
South West District Primary Schools Sports Association 
Orange Free State Delegation 
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Soweto consists of twenty-six townships with between 2 and 3 million 
people. It has a broader ethnic and economic mix than any other 
township, consisting of migrant worker hostels, a handful of upper 
middle-class houses, shantytowns, and numerous two-, three- and four-
roomed houses and an expanding conservative property-owning middle 
class. Soweto's political culture was also influenced by the lack of 
militant and powerful trade unions which might have played a role in 
radicalizing and organising the community.(1) 
Alexandra township lies twelve miles north of Johannesburg and in the 
heart of an affluent white residential area. It is located outside the city's 
muniCipal boundaries and was one of the few freehold townships for 
Africans in the country. Alexandra residents were constantly under 
threat of removal from the area. Access to property rights made 
possible the development of a land-owning class as well as the 
development of African businesses resulting in a class structure which 
included the most skilled and experienced members of the working 
class as well as an established petty bourgeoisie. The autonomy 
Alexandra enjoyed from Johannesburg resulted in an influx of people 
who had no official sanction to live in an urban area. Alexandra also 
evolved organically over forty years and generations of families living 
together over a period of time were able to develop a strong sense of 
community. Alexandra's history of militancy provided the foundation for 
a well-developed history of collective action by the communitY.(2) 
In 1953 the first residents were forcibly moved into Mamelodi, near 
Pretoria, and by the middle of the 1980s the township had a population 
of close to 200,000 crammed into 13,800 houses and countless 
backyard shacks. The township also included hostels accommodating 
16,732 men from the various homelands. Accommodation has always 
been a major grievance in Mamelodi and residents consistently 
complained about the shortage of houses, the high rents and tariffs, and 
the government's failure to compensate victims of the forced 
removals.(3) 
The overwhelming majority of Africans living in the Eastern Cape are 
Xhosas giving the region a unique homogeneous nature. In Port 




Drought, over-population and lack of employment in the homelands led 
to a rapid population growth and high unemployment rates. Fundsfor 
housing have been inadequate, and the townships are characterised 
by a lack of adequate services, overcrowding and shacks. The Eastern 
Cape has a history of political and trade union militancy which laid the 
basis for a high level of political consciousness.(4) 
USCO Economically, Uitenhage is closely bound to the economic fate of the 
auto industry. An economic recession which began in 1982 led to high 
levels of unemployment. The state's failure to provide adequate 
housing, and the influx of large numbers of displaced people from the 
Cape rural areas, caused extreme overcrowding and the establishment 
of massive squatter settlements. Uitenhage's African population was 
also sympathetic towards the ANC. Conditions in the townships, the 
economic plight of township residents and the region 's political tradition 
made Uitenhage a fertile ground for mobilisation.(5) 
DVRA East London's ethnic homogeneity and long tradition of popular 
struggles influenced mass mobilisation in the African township. East 
London workers earned by far the lowest wages in South Africa. In 
addition, the crisis-ridden economy is characterised by high rates of 
unemployment. A high degree of insecurity prevailed in Duncan Village 
because of the strict application of influx control, the threat of removal 
from the city bounds, and Ciskeian 'independence'.(6) 
CRADORA Cradock is a small rural town located at the northern point of the 
Eastern Cape, in the heart of the conservative sheep-farming plains of 
the Great Karoo. Cradock exhibited all the characteristics of the 
country's rural towns: rigidly observed racial hierarchies; ingrained 
deference to whites; and intense oppression and exploitation . Cradock's 
African population is housed in Lingelihle with a population of between 
fifteen and seventeen thousand, consisting largely of uneducated and 
unskilled labourers. Cradock also has a long tradition of support for the 
ANC.(7) 
JORAC Durban is the largest port in South Africa and is a major tourist area. 
The city also has an extensive industrial network which stretches along 
the northern and southern coastal regions and an interior corridor which 
extends up to the Pinetown-New Germany industrial complex. Natal is 




homeland government that developed a powerful political movement. 
On the one hand, during the first half of the 1980s Inkatha embarked on 
a programme to consolidate its support in Durban's African townships. 
On the other hand, the threat of homeland consolidation and 
incorporation into KwaZulu had long hung over Durban's African 
townships. Durban's African townships suffered from a lack of 
development and shortage of services characteristic of most African 
townships. The area also experienced widespread retrenchments and 
a high rate of unemployment during the recession which began in the 
early 1980s.(8) 
CAHAC Like Natal, the Western Cape has a number of peculiar characteristics 
such that there was no certainty that the region would follow national 
political trends. In part, the reasons for this are complex, relating to the 
specific social and economic conditions in the area and political 
traditions. These include: the relatively small number of Africans living 
in the Western Cape as a result of the "Coloured Labour Preference 
Policy"; a weak tradition of mass-based organisation; and a weak 
tradition of worker organisation. Cape Town is dominated numerically 
and socially by the coloured people. Although Africans, particularly 
Xhosas from the Eastern Cape, have a long history of residence in the 
area, the region is unique in that Africans constitute a minority. 
Coloured opposition politics is bound up with the history of ultra-left 
movements, particularly the Unity Movement. Historically, the ANC had 
relatively little support in the Western Cape. Factories are relatively 
small, and workers have weaker bargaining power because of the 
relatively unskilled and labour intensive character of their work. Cape 
Town's relatively small coloured working class, although possessed of 
a long tradition of trade unionism, has a conservative reputation. State 
ownership of housing and the shortage of houses in the region shaped 
popular organisation during the 1980s.(9) 
NOTPECO The issues facing African people in the Northern Transvaal are issues 
which face all rural Africans in the country. These are poverty, 
landlessness, over-population, drought, high unemployment, the effects 
of forced resettlement, and rule by corrupt and puppet chiefs and 
homeland authorities. Many people faced the additional threat of 
incorporation into, or forced resettlement to, the homelands. The region, 
because of the various homelands in the region, is characterised by an 




unemployment, particularly among the youth, combined with relatively 
high levels of education, accounted for a militant youth contingent in the 
region. Most people worked in South Africa's white-owned farms, on the 
mines or in the industrial centres of the Transvaal as migrant workers. 
The homelands are utterly devoid of a productive economy or 
resources, forcing many into the migrant labour system. The region has 
a history of resistance to homeland authorities and support for the 
ANC.(10) 
Sources: (1) Lodge,T. (1983); Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, (London and New York, 
Longman) , pp.15-16; Mufson,S. (1991) ; 'Introduction: The roots of insurrection', in Lodge,T. and Nasson,B. 
(eds.); Update South Africa: Time running out - All , Here, and Now: Black pol itics in South Africa in the 
1980s, (Cape Town, David Philip) , p.15; Shubane,K. et.al. (1991); 'Soweto', in Lodge,T. and Nasson,B. 
(eds.); op.cit., pp.265-6. 
(2) Lodge,T. (1983); op.cit. , p.13 and pp.156-7; Mufson,S. (1990); Fighting Years: Black resistance and 
the struggle for a new South Africa, (Boston, Beacon Press), pp.35-6. 
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Appendix C: Chronology of the Emergence and Development of Civic 
Associations under review, 1977-1987 
A. The Soweto Civic Association (SCA) 
1977 A successful rent boycott leads to the resignation of most of Soweto's Urban 
Bantu Councillors. The Soweto branch of the Black People's Convention calls 
for the formation of a civic association to run Soweto. At a meeting held on the 
26 June the Committee of Ten is formed to study and formulate recommenda-
tions for the running of Soweto. 
1979 In September the Committee of Ten holds a conference to deal with Soweto's 
problems and to expand the Committee's activities. The SCA is formed at this 
conference, with the Committee of Ten acting as an interim committee until 
elections could be held. 
1980 The SCA fails to prevent the implementation of rent increase thus weakening 
its leadership position in the townships. 
1983 The SCA takes the leading role in the formation of an Anti-Community 
Councils Election Committee, consisting of student, youth, women's and labour 
organisations. This gives the SCA access to a wide range of individuals and 
groups. 
1984 The SCA affiliates to the UDF in October. It holds its first annual general 
meeting in December at which a new executive committee of eight is elected. 
Included in the new executive are a number of leading members of the UDF. 
1985 Soweto is included in the list of "affected areas" when the state of emergency 
is declared. The focus shifts to the building of street committees, a process 
that starts slowly in some townships in 1985 but gains momentum in 1986. 
1986 The SCA calls for a rent boycott to begin on 1 June. The widely supported 
boycott increases support for the SCA. Security forces detain several members 
of the executive committee on June 16, bringing to seven the number of 
leaders in detention. Twenty-two town councillors flee Soweto after their lives 
are threatened and some of their houses burnt down. In August members of 
the SADF are deployed in Soweto to quash violence provoked by police action 
which resulted in the death of 27 people and wounding of 120. 
1987 The rent boycott continues in Soweto after negotiations between the SCA and 
authorities fail. 
B. The Alexandra Action Committee (AAC) 
1985 The Alexandra Youth Congress begins organising and educating its youth 
constituency and sets out to promote grassroots organisations (street 
committees). First of a series of meeting held in December which leads to the 
formation of the AAC. 
1986 A virtual civil war begins in Alexandra after police fire at mourners attending 
a funeral on 15 February. On 17 February, an acting executive of the AAC is 
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elected and mandated to form street committees. Outrage erupts on February 
18 when police disperse 30,000 people marching to demand the rem?val of 
security forces from the township and the release of those arrested dUring the 
previous four days. During April , consumer and rent boycotts are launched as 
part of a national programme intended to isolate all collaborators and effect the 
collapse of local government. The Alexandra Town Council collapses after the 
resignation of all councillors on 22 April. In mid-May the security forces cordon 
off the township, set up check points at every exit and carry out house-to-
house searches. On 25 May, block representatives meet to elect an executive 
committee to serve the MC until its inaugural meeting in August. The MC is 
unanimously elected sole representative of Alexandra during a mass meeting 
of all organisations in the township. The township is invaded by the security 
forces the night before the declaration of the emergency. Thousands of 
residents are detained, including the MC leadership. From September, 1986 
Alexandra is once again firmly under the control of the authorities when the 
Alexandra mini-JMC takes over control of the township. 
1987 Street and yard committees continue to operate but not as effectively as 
before. 
C. The Mamelodi Civic Association (MCA) 
1985 On November 21, police fire on 50,000 residents of Mamelodi township 
marching to protest a ban on weekend funerals, the restriction against more 
than fifty mourners attending each funeral, high rents, and the presence of 
troops in the townships. Mamelodi residents embark on a rent boycott and 
intensify the process of establishing a civic association. Popular pressure leads 
to the resignation of three town councillors. Local youths and elders meet in 
July to formulate plans to root out the hooliganism plaguing the township. This 
leads to the formation of Disciplinary Committees, which soon develop into a 
network of organisations crisscrossing the township. 
1986 The MCA is formally launched in April. The leadership and scores of members 
of the MCA are detained after the declaration of the emergency. The Mamelodi 
mini-JMC takes over the running of the township, curtails the activity of the 
MCA by intimidating many residents against becoming members of the 
association and repression of activists. 
1987 Security personnel move out of Mamelodi giving way to township developers. 
D. The Port Elizabeth Civic Organisation (PESCO) 
1979 PEBCO is formed on October 10, to oppose high water and rental charges and 
to represent the aspirations of the African people and take up their grievances 
with the authorities. 
1980 PEBCO moves into decline following the detention, banning and subsequent 
flight into exile of its president, Thozamile Botha. Leadership problems plague 
the organisation until the end of 1984. 
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1984 In November, Edgar Ngoyi, Samuel Hashe and Henry Fazzie are elected to 
the Executive Committee of PESCO, bringing to five the number of Robben 
Island graduates on the executive. PESCO's popularity increases after the 
Khayamnandi Town Council withdraws a rent increase in response to a threat 
by the civic to boycott council-owned liquor outlets, to boycott buses and to call 
a one-day stay away . 
1985 PESCO organises a consumer boycott on the weekend of 16 and 17 March 
and a stayaway on the 18 March to protest job cutbacks, the merger of Ford 
and General Motors companies, and a rise in the price of petrol. The stay away 
is supported by 90 percent of the African population. On July 15, PESCO takes 
up a consumer boycott which is widely supported and continues until 
December. The government clampdown on PEBCO after the declaration of the 
emergency and the highly successful consumer boycott lead to a decision to 
develop street committees. In December the consumer boycott is lifted after 
the SAP and SADF are withdrawn from the townships and activists in hiding 
are permitted to re-emerge. The leaders immediately begin to organise street 
committees and the first area committees are elected at a prayer meeting 
organised by the UDF. 
1986 Three stayaways organised by PESCO - to commemorate the March 1985 
massacre in Uitenhage, May Day, and June 16 - are well supported. During 
the second half of the year the government uses emergency regulations to 
remove leadership and destroy grassroots and middle-level groups (200 area 
and street committee members and almost the entire executive committee are 
detained). Security forces invade the townships which are cut off from the rest 
of the world from July 19. Fifty-two Eastern Cape organisations, including 
PEBCO, are prohibited from holding or advertising in-door meetings. 
1987 PEBCO is relatively weak by the end of the year because of mass arrests and 
widespread repression in the area. Although PEBCO continues to function, 
meetings and attendance at meetings are erratic, while street committees 
remain inoperative. 





USCG is formed in October to represent the residents of Uitenhage's African 
townships. 
UBCO declines in significance because of widespread state repression of 
striking workers and boycotting students in the Eastern Cape. 
Differences between trade unionists and community leaders finally result in the 
collapse of UBCO. Setween 1981 and 1983, the civic experiences a decline 
and ultimately collapses, passing leadership in the townships to the UDF-
aligned Uitenhage Youth Congress (UYCO). 
UB~O and other UDF organisations call for a stayaway on 18 March to protest 
against sales tax and price increases. On March 21 police fire on a crowd 
attending a banned funeral , killing-twenty one people. Popular resentment is 
fuelled by the occupation of the township by the security forces and a ban on 
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memorial services. The ensuing violence leads to the destruction of the town 
council the revival of UBCO and the creation of street committees. All sections 
of the ~ommunity flock to join community organisations after the massacre. In 
May the government announces its intention to remove the entire Langa 
community to KwaNobuhle, leading to the formation of the Langa Co-ordinating 
Committee. Eighty-five activists are detained after the declaration of the 
emergency and many other leaders forced underground. At the end of October 
leaders re-emerge and begin to form street committees. In December, UBCO 
takes over the function of co-ordinating the activities of the new specialised 
organisations. 
1986 During the first half of the year membership of UBCO expands while students 
engage in a boycott of classes and enforce a consumer boycott. Police round 
up the leaders of UBCO after the declaration of the emergency and forcibly 
remove Langa's 20,000 residents to nearby KwaNobuhle. 






The residents of Duncan Village respond to widespread dissatisfaction with the 
Ciskei Transport Corporation and a bus-fare increase in July by boycotting 
buses. The involvement of trade union officials and the wider community in the 
boycott raises questions about the development of a civic association. 
The Duncan Village Town Council orders the demolition of 400 shacks, leaving 
2,000 people homeless. The removals and a proposed rent increase lead to 
the establishment of an interim committee to work towards the formation of a 
civic association. The interim committee establishes an Anti-Removal 
Committee which calls for the resignation of town councillors. 
In August, the funeral of slain UDF leader Victoria Mxenge is held in Duncan 
Village. This is followed by attacks on the homes of town councillors and 
school buildings and clashes between youths and the security forces. The 
town councillors are forced to flee the township and for the next three weeks 
the authorities, including the police, are unable to enter the township. The 
DVRA is Officially launched on August 15 and takes over the running of the 
township. In late August the authorities use emergency regulations to detain 
leaders and arrest residents. The DVRA begins negotiations with the East 
london City Council on a proposed upgrading project. Negotiations break 
down because of the involvement of the town council. 
After the declaration of the emergency, mass arrests and detention of leaders 
(300 members and officials, including street committee members) marginalise 
the DVRA from township politics. The absence of community leaders is used 
to bring the newly styled Gompo town committee back into the township and 
to rebuild its credibility by handing it credit for the upgrading. 
The Duncan Village town council takes control of the upgrading project. This, 
together with the detention and harassment of the DVRA's leadership and 
members, strengthened the position of the town council. By mid-year the level 
of unrest in Duncan Village has fallen, students have returned to school and 
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the council begins to take action against rent defaulters. 
G. The Cradock Residents Association (CRADORA) 
1983 Cradora is formed on October 4 to oppose a rent increase proposed by the 
Lingelihle Town Council. Mathew Goniwe, Cradora chairperson, sets out to 
establish street committees in the township. In December, the government 
attempts to stifle Goniwe's influence by transferring him to another school 100 
miles from Cradock. Goniwe refuses the transfer, and is fired , sparking a 
fifteen month school boycott. 
1984 In February, Cradock's 14,500 school students embark on a school boycott 
demanding Goniwe's reinstatement, democratic SRCs, textbooks and sufficient 
qualified teachers. Goniwe and three Cradora leaders are detained in April. 
Police reinforcements are deployed in the township and over 100 residents 
arrested on charges of public violence and attending illegal meetings. 
Cradora's call on town councillors to resign is accompanied by attacks on their 
houses. 
1985 By January all the town councillors have resigned, leaving a vacuum which is 
filled by Cradora. A ban on a Cradora meeting on February 2 provokes 
violence and the invasion of the township by the security forces. On June 5, 
SAP and SADF personnel move into the township. Three weeks later the burnt 
body of Goniwe and three other Cradora leaders are found . At the end of the 
year an administrator is appointed to run the township and make preparations 
for elections for a new town council. 
1986 Goniwe's murder and the detention and harassment of leaders leave Cradora 
without a leader. Intensified repression after the declaration of the emergency 
and falling morals and discipline leave the community without direction. 
1987 Street committees continue to exist but meet sporadically. However, opposition 
to the local authorities is strong and by the end of the year the Town Council 
has not been resuscitated. 
H. The Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) 
1982 In October the Port Natal Administration Board announces that it would 
increase rent in African townships under its jurisdiction in May 1983. In 
December, PUTCO and the Durban Transport Management Board announce 
increases in bus-fares. In each affected community a Local Commuter 
Committee (LCC) is formed and are united to form the Joint Commuter 
Committee (JCC). 
1983 The LCC's form the organisational base of community organisations which 
serve Durban's PNAB townships. Dissatisfaction with the Town Council's 
efforts to represent residents on the rent issue leads to the formation of 
JORA~ on April 8. On 25 April , JORAC's chairman, Harrison Dube, is 
assassinated, sparking off violence in Lamontville and Chesterville. In August, 
the Department of Co-operation and Development announces that a "final 
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decision" had been taken to incorporate Lamontville and Hambanathi into 
KwaZulu, provoking further unrest. 
1984 Violence erupts in Lamontville on 22 July when Inkatha supporters provoke a 
fight at a service to unveil a tombstone honouring Dube. Chief Buthelezi visits 
Lamontville on September 1 to discuss the incorporation issue, prompting a 
massive evacuation of the township. 
1985 The clashes between Inkatha and UDF supporters spreads to Hambanathi and 
many prominent JORAC leaders are forced to leave the township. In August, 
JORAC treasurer, Victoria Mxenge is assassinated, sparking widespread 
violence. The wave of attacks on JORAC officials and UDF members, the 
detention and removal of leaders, and the distancing of residents from the 
organisation effectively smash JORAC during the second half of the year. The 
residents of Lamontville and Chesterville respond to the intimidation and 
violence by forming the Lamontville Co-ordinating Committee and the 
Chesterville Crisis Committee. 
1986 Violence in Durban spreads to KwaZulu townships as Inkatha supporters clash 
with youths. 







A series of popular struggles (the school boycott, a bus boycott, and a meat 
boycott in support of striking workers) provoke the emergence and growth of 
community organisations in Cape Town. Twelve of these organisations unite 
to form the Umbrella Rentals Committee (URC) in June to oppose a 
threatened rent increase announced by the Cape Town City and Divisional 
Councils in May. In September the URC changes its name to CAHAC. 
In early December CAHAC embarks on a campaign against high rents by 
organising petitions, rallies and demonstrations. CAHAC also participates in 
the anti-Republic Day and anti-SAIC Campaigns. 
In August CAHAC joins the Disorderly Bills Action Committee (DBAC) to 
oppose the "Koornhof Bills". Ideological differences with BC-oriented 
organisations lead to the withdrawal of CAHAC and other charterist 
organisations from the DBAC. 
CAHAC joins with 50 other Western Cape organisations in early May to plan 
a joint campaign against the constitutional proposals. 
CAHAC activists partiCipate in the anti-election campaign which includes the 
Million Signature campaign, house-to-house meetings and mass rallies. 
Mass mobilisation during the campaign is not converted into permanent 
organisation and civic activity declines during the first half of the year. In mid-
year, the school boycott spreads to the Western Cape leading to a revival and 
transformation of organisation and politics in the region. The wave of mass 
protest which accompanies the boycott is followed by a wave of repression. 
The emergency is extended to the Western Cape on October 22. Sixty-nine 
members of civic organisations are detained and 110 organisations prohibited 
from holding meetings. 
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1986 Mass detentions from the outset of the emergency during the year force many 
key activists and leaders underground. In addition, 119 organisations are 
prohibited from holding any meetings or publishing statements of any form. 





High school students in Lebowa and students at the University of the North 
(Turfloop) join the COSAS-initiated country-wide boycott in demand for 
democratically elected SRCs. Parents Crisis Committees are formed in 
response to the school crisis while a number of youth organisations emerge. 
In the middle of the year students from Turfloop, UDF activists, and members 
of COSA TU unions organise meetings for students, the youth and the 
community leading to the formation of community organisations. 
In the middle of the year police assault a group of marching students 
demanding the reopening of schools in Lebowa. This sparks a wave of arson 
attacks on government property and calls for the isolation of Lebowa police. 
In September plans are finalised for the incorporation of Moutse into 
KwaNdebele. These plans are rejected at mass meetings in October, on 
December 15, and December 22. Numerous village meetings give rise to 
village committees which unite to form the Moutse Civic Association. Moutse 
is incorporated on 31 December. 
Vigilantes from KwaNdebele attack the residents of Moutse on January 1. 
Throughout the year, residents of Moutse are forcibly removed to Lebowa. The 
Northern Transvaal Region of the UDF is launched in February. The unrest in 
Lebowa continues and spreads to smaller towns between February and April. 
In late March three Sekhukhune Members of Parliament announce their 
resignation and pledge their support for the UDF. On April 11 , the regional 
chairman of the UDF dies in detention. Twenty-thousand mourners at his 
funeral on May 4 decide to boycott white-owned businesses. During May the 
SAP and SADF enter southern Lebowa and occupy the homeland after the 
declaration of the emergency, bringing the revolt to an end. Between May and 
August, residents of KwaNdebele engage in a sustained school boycott, a two-
day stayaway by the civil service, and a three-day stayaway by workers to 
oppose independence plans. Resistance begins at a mass meeting at the 
Royal Kraal in May, following an announcement on May 7 that KwaNdebele 
would become independent in December. On May 13, police and soldiers 
invade nearly all 25 villages in KwaNdebele after hundreds of youths go on the 
rampage at a funeral of an activist killed by the police. On 12 August the 
KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly cancels independence plans. NOTPECO is 
formed in August to draw together the numerous village committees into an 
umbrella organisation. The KwaNdebele government renews its crackdown on 
anti-independ~nce organisations and by October most of the leading 
opponents of Independence were in hiding. 
!he KwaNdebele gove,rnment renews its attempts to gain independence and, 
In March, house-to-hou:se raids, detention of scholars and vigilante attacks are 
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intensified, while the police and army invade the villages. In June the 
government of KwaNdebele requests the Pretoria government to grant the 
homeland independence. The repression of opposition groups take their toll 
and by May the momentum of the anti-independence movement is reversed. 
However, the Pretoria government rejects the request for independence. The 
increasing militancy of the youth and their domination of politics in the region 
overshadows the activities of other community organisations. A sustained 
crackdown in reaction to the militancy of the youth results in the collapse of the 
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